

PLACE: Dobbs Building, Raleigh, North Carolina

DATE: Monday, September 26, 2022

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:45 p.m.

DOCKET NO.: E-100, Sub 179

BEFORE: Chair Charlotte A. Mitchell, Presiding

Commissioner ToNola D. Brown-Bland

Commissioner Daniel G. Clodfelter

Commissioner Kimberly W. Duffley

Commissioner Jeffrey A. Hughes

Commissioner Floyd B. McKissick, Jr.

Commissioner Karen M. Kemeraït

IN THE MATTER OF:

Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,

2022 Biennial Integrated Resource Plans

and Carbon Plan

VOLUME: 24

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E X H I B I T S

IDENTIFIED/ADMITTED

Exhibit TF-1.....	191/-
SACE, et al. Fitch Redirect	229/-
Examination Exhibit 1	
SACE, et al. Fitch Redirect	229/-
Examination Exhibit 2	

P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Good morning. Let's go back on the record, please. By my records we're -- by my notes, we're up with NCSEA's witness, Mr. Fitch.

MS. CRALLE JONES: Chair Mitchell, if we could do some preliminary motions, if it's appropriate time.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Please proceed.

MS. CRALLE JONES: Good morning, Commissioners and Chair Mitchell, Cathy Cralle Jones on behalf of Appalachian Voices. With all parties having waived cross and the Commission indicating they had no questions, at this time, I would move that the direct testimony of Mr. McIlmoil and Dr. Kinkhabwala prefiled in this docket on September 2nd and consisting of 42 pages be copied at the appropriate time into the record as if given orally from the stand. And that the summary of that testimony filed on Friday, September 23rd also be copied into the record of hearing.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Hearing no

1 objection to your motion, it is allowed.

2 (Whereupon, the prefiled direct
3 testimony of Rory McIlmoil and
4 Yunus Kinkhabwala and prefiled summary
5 testimony of Rory McIlmoil and Yunus
6 Kinkhabwala were copied into the record
7 as if given orally from the stand.)
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**STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
UTILITIES COMMISSION
RALEIGH**

DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179

In the Matter of:)	DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and)	RORY MCILMOIL AND
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 2022)	DR. YUNUS KINKHABWALA
Biennial Integrated Resource Plans)	ON BEHALF OF
and Carbon Plan)	APPALACHIAN VOICES

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1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q: PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS, AND CURRENT**
3 **POSITION.**

4 **A:** My name is Rory McIlmoil. My business address is 589 W. King Street,
5 Boone, NC 28607. I am the Senior Energy Analyst at Appalachian Voices.

6 **Q: WOULD YOU PLEASE ALSO INTRODUCE THE REST OF YOUR**
7 **PANEL?**

8 **A:** Yes. Also presenting with me today on behalf of Appalachian Voices is Dr.
9 Yunus Kinkhabwala, with Physicians, Scientists, and Engineers for Healthy
10 Energy (PSE Healthy Energy). Dr. Kinkhabwala will introduce himself.

11 **Q: WHAT ARE YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AS SENIOR ENERGY**
12 **ANALYST AT APPALACHIAN VOICES?**

13 **A:** In my role as Senior Energy Analyst, my responsibilities include researching
14 energy and affordability policy models, analyzing the impact on low-income
15 ratepayers and the environment of policies or rate structures my
16 organization might support or oppose, and advocating for utility clean
17 energy and low-income affordability programs and rate structures that
18 equitably benefit families and local communities.

19 **Q: PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND**
20 **PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.**

21 **A:** I graduated from Furman University with a Bachelor of Science in Earth and
22 Environmental Science and received a Master of Arts in Global
23 Environmental Policy from American University's School of International
24 Service. I previously served as the Energy Program Manager with
25 Downstream Strategies, an environmental and energy consulting firm

1 based out of Morgantown, West Virginia, and joined Appalachian Voices in
2 2013 as the Energy Savings Program Manager, analyzing and advocating
3 for equitable energy efficiency finance programs, rate structures and
4 distributed solar policies through North Carolina's rural electric
5 cooperatives.

6 I was promoted to Senior Energy Analyst in 2018 and have since
7 focused my efforts on state energy policy. Appalachian Voices intervened
8 in the 2019 Duke Energy Carolinas rate case, where I testified on the impact
9 that the Companies' proposed rate increase at the time would have on
10 energy cost burdens for low-income families. I have participated in the
11 stakeholder process for the development of the North Carolina Clean
12 Energy Plan and associated B-1 Working Group focused on Performance-
13 Based Regulation, served as a leading project partner on the Energy
14 Insecurity in the Southeast project led by the Nicholas Institute at Duke
15 University, lobbied on House Bill 951 with a focus on impacts of the bill for
16 low-income households, and over the past year have served as a co-leader
17 of the sub-team tasked with assessing customer challenges related to
18 affordability for the Low-Income Affordability Collaborative ("LIAC").

19 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA**
20 **UTILITIES COMMISSION ("THE COMMISSION")?**

21 **A:** Yes. As mentioned previously I served as an intervenor and expert witness
22 representing Appalachian Voices and the Center for Biological Diversity in
23 the Duke Energy Carolinas 2019 rate case.

1 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TESTIMONY OR COMMENT AS**
2 **AN EXPERT BEFORE ANY OTHER REGULATORY BODIES OR**
3 **FORUMS?**

4 **A:** Yes. As a participant in the North Carolina Clean Energy Plan stakeholder
5 process I submitted comments on behalf of Appalachian Voices on the draft
6 Plan to the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality.¹ I also on
7 two occasions submitted comments on behalf of Appalachian Voices and
8 partner organizations regarding the Commission's COVID disconnection
9 moratorium and the Companies' disconnection and arrearage management
10 policies in NCUC Docket M-100, Sub 158.^{2,3} Again on behalf of Appalachian
11 Voices, I produced and submitted comments on the Duke Energy Progress
12 and Duke Energy Carolinas Integrated Resource Plan.⁴ Finally, in
13 conjunction with comments submitted by Appalachian Voices in this docket,
14 I authored a report on *Addressing Low-Income Energy Affordability in the*
15 *Carolina Carbon Plan*.⁵

16 **Q: ARE YOU SPONSORING ANY EXHIBITS WITH YOUR DIRECT**
17 **TESTIMONY?**

18 **A:** No.

¹ Appalachian Voices. Comments on North Carolina's Clean Energy Plan. Submitted directly to the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality via email and the online portal. September 9, 2019.

² Appalachian Voices, et al. Instituting a New Moratorium On Regulated Electric, Gas and Water Shutoffs to Protect Utility Customers and Public Health. NCUC Docket M-100 Sub 158. March 8, 2021.

³ Appalachian Voices. Duke Energy Progress and Duke Energy Carolinas Joint Response, and Extension of the Limited Residential Disconnection Moratorium. NCUC Docket M-100, Sub 158. June 15, 2021.

⁴ Appalachian Voices Comments on Duke Energy 2020 IRP. NCUC Docket E-100, Sub 165. May 27, 2021.

⁵ Appalachian Voices Comments on Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC's 2022 Proposed Carbon Plan. NCUC Docket E-100, Sub 179. June 15, 2022.

1 **Q: DR. KINKHABWALA, PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS**
2 **ADDRESS, AND CURRENT POSITION.**

3 **A:** My name is Dr. Yunus Kinkhabwala. I am a clean energy scientist with
4 Physicians, Scientists, and Engineers for Healthy Energy (PSE). My
5 business address is: 1440 Broadway, Suite 750 Oakland, California 94612.
6 PSE is a non-profit energy science and policy research institute that brings
7 together experts in public health, science, and engineering to conduct and
8 publish research on clean energy, energy and environment, and
9 environmental public health, and to translate that research to a broad range
10 of stakeholders.

11 **Q: WHAT ARE YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AS A CLEAN**
12 **ENERGY SCIENTIST WITH PSE HEALTHY ENERGY?**

13 **A:** My work focuses on the public health and economic impacts of clean energy
14 transitions and how such impacts are distributed among populations. In my
15 work with PSE, I have developed datasets from publicly available resources
16 to represent household spending on energy and used such data to guide
17 policies that were published in 2022, *Pathways to Energy Affordability in*
18 *Colorado*, a report authored at the request of the Colorado Energy Office.
19 Additionally, I have developed energy systems models supporting the
20 development of a virtual power plant using grid edge resources for the
21 purpose of replacing a peaker power plant situated in a historically
22 disadvantaged community in Los Angeles. These models account for hourly
23 benefits of investments in efficiency and both utility and behind-the-grid
24 solar and storage. Furthermore, for the state of California's Strategic Growth

1 Council I have developed models to optimize the strategic siting of
2 combined solar and storage resilience hubs which entails estimating the
3 economic benefits of these distributed resources based on climate and
4 building properties.

5 **Q: PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND**
6 **PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.**

7 **A:** I have a Bachelor of Science degree in physics from the University of Illinois
8 and received my PhD in Applied Physics from Cornell University as a
9 National Science Foundation (NSF) Graduate Research Fellowship
10 Program fellow where I developed predictive models of complex systems
11 which led to methods to forecast small area demographic changes.

12 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA**
13 **UTILITIES COMMISSION (“THE COMMISSION”)?**

14 **A:** No.

15 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TESTIMONY OR COMMENT AS**
16 **AN EXPERT BEFORE ANY OTHER REGULATORY BODIES OR**
17 **FORUMS?**

18 **A:** Yes. Together with PSE scientists, Dr. Elena Krieger, and Dr. Patrick
19 Murphy, I reviewed and prepared comments on Duke Energy Carolinas,
20 LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC’s 2022 Proposed Carbon Plan, filed
21 on July 15, 2022 in this docket.

22 **Q: ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

23 **A:** I am testifying on behalf of Appalachian Voices.

24 **Q: ARE YOU SPONSORING ANY EXHIBITS WITH YOUR DIRECT**
25 **TESTIMONY?**

1 **A:** No.

2 **Q:** **MR. MCILMOIL, HOW IS THE AFFORDABILITY PANEL'S TESTIMONY**
3 **ORGANIZED?**

4 **A:** Our testimony focuses on three particular topics as identified by
5 Commission for hearing in its *Order Scheduling Expert Witness Hearing,*
6 *Requiring Filing of Testimony, and Establishing Discovery Guidelines*
7 entered on July 29, 2022. Those topics are: **Cost**, with focus on affordability;
8 **Near Term Procurement**, with focus on resource alternatives to gas plant
9 expansion; and **EE/DSM/Grid Edge**, with emphasis on how targeting
10 investment in these programs for low-income residential customers is a
11 cost-effective way to control energy capacity demand while bridging the
12 affordability gap for all customers.

13 **Q:** **WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE PANEL TESTIMONY IN THIS**
14 **PROCEEDING?**

15 **A:** The purpose of the first part of our testimony is to describe why affordability
16 must be a central objective of the Carbon Plan. We will lay out for the
17 Commission the scale and depth to which North Carolina households
18 served by Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress already
19 struggle to afford their electric bills and describe how that challenge has
20 been worsening and will be exacerbated by the Carbon Plan, unless the
21 Commission and the Companies actively work to include necessary
22 analytics and mitigative investments as part of the plan. The next portion of
23 our testimony briefly addresses alternative resources, including utility scale
24 solar, offshore wind, and energy storage, that should be prioritized in lieu of

1 expanding natural gas plants to reduce the cost of decarbonization and
2 mitigate impacts to communities surrounding those plants and the
3 environment. Finally, we will address how investments in energy efficiency
4 and other grid edge resources targeted toward low-income households is a
5 cost-effective method to lower energy demand while bridging the
6 affordability gap for all customers. Our testimony concludes with
7 recommendations to the Commission regarding how to effectively address
8 and enhance affordability in the final Carbon Plan and recommended
9 resource modeling that would avoid further build-out of natural gas plants.

10

TOPIC: COST: Least Cost and Rate Impacts for Customers

11 **AFFORDABILITY MUST BE A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE OF THE CARBON PLAN**

12 **Q: THE COMPANIES DESCRIBE AFFORDABILITY AS ONE OF ITS FOUR**
13 **CORE OBJECTIVES FOR THE CARBON PLAN. HOW WOULD YOU**
14 **DESCRIBE CURRENT AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGES FOR**
15 **COMPANIES' RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS?**

16 **A:** The Companies' own data indicates that more than 980,000 residential
17 households, representing nearly one-third (32%) of the total residential
18 customer base served in North Carolina, qualify as low-income per federal
19 poverty guidelines (less than 200% of the Federal Poverty Level, or "FPL").⁶

20 **Q: HOW DOES HOUSEHOLD INCOME RELATE TO ENERGY**
21 **AFFORDABILITY?**

⁶ DE Response to Appalachian Voices DR 1-17.

1 While qualifying as low-income serves as a foundational condition placing
2 households at risk of experiencing affordability challenges, income level
3 alone is not a direct predictor, but there is a correlation. I used the
4 Companies' analytics produced for the Low-Income Affordability
5 Collaborative (LIAC) to estimate that 231,165 low-income households (24%
6 of all low-income households⁷) currently find themselves in an arrearage
7 situation in which they (1) were behind on paying their average/regular bill
8 amount for six or more months or (2) were behind by twice the amount (or
9 more) of their average bill for two or more months, thus meeting the
10 Companies' stringent definition of "arrears struggling" households.

11 **Q: DOES THE COMPANIES' DEFINITION OF "ARREARS STRUGGLING**
12 **HOUSEHOLDS" ADEQUATELY CAPTURE AFFORDABILITY**
13 **CHALLENGES THAT LOW-INCOME CUSTOMERS FACE?**

14 **A:** No. The Companies' definition of "arrears struggling" is extremely stringent.
15 It does not capture low-income customers that may spend three to five
16 months of the year – which may represent winter or summer months when
17 their bills are the highest – being unable to afford their bill at the time it is
18 due. As such, the number of low-income customers captured by the
19 Companies' "arrears struggling" definition serves as a minimum
20 representation of the population of low-income households that struggle to
21 afford their monthly electric bill.

⁷ See Joint N.C. Low-Income Affordability Collaborative Q. Progress Rep. at Appendix F, N.C. Util. Comm'n Docket E-7 Subs 1213, 1214, 1187 and E-2 Subs 1219, 1193 (Apr. 25, 2022), <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=ae12f626-823d-4ae7-86c5bc4e49aa4208> ("Revised LIAC Customer Analytics") [hereinafter Joint N.C. Low-Income Affordability Collaborative].

1 **Q: IS IT ONLY LOW-INCOME CUSTOMERS THAT FACE AFFORDABILITY**
2 **CHALLENGES?**

3 A: No. The Companies' analytics show that another 13% of non-low-income
4 households also met the arrears definition, amounting to more than 277,000
5 households that are not low-income but that are still vulnerable to
6 unaffordable electric bills and at risk of being disconnected for non-payment.
7 Adding that value to the number of "arrears struggling" low-income
8 households results in a total of more than a half-million households currently
9 qualifying as "arrears struggling," representing nearly one-sixth of all
10 households served by the Companies in North Carolina.

11 As of May 2022, the most recent month for which data has been
12 published and the month when the Companies filed their proposed Carbon
13 Plan, nearly 575,000 households, or 18.4% of the reported residential
14 customer base at that time, were more than 30 days in arrears. Those
15 customers owed a total of more than \$213 million, for an average of \$371
16 per customer in arrears⁸, or more than three times the average monthly bill
17 for residential customers of Duke Energy Progress and more than 2.5 times
18 the average monthly bill for residential customers of Duke Energy Carolinas
19 in 2020.⁹

20 **Q: HAVE AFFORDABILITY CONDITIONS IMPROVED SINCE PRIOR TO**
21 **AND DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC?**

⁸ NCUC COVID -19 State of Emergency Util. Reporting Data Through May 2022, N.C. Util. Comm'n Docket M-100 Sub 158 (July 1, 2022).

⁹ US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Form EIA-861. File Sales_Ult_Cust_2020.xlsx.

1 **A:** No. Conditions are worse. While data is not publicly available for pre-
2 pandemic monthly arrearages, the Companies reported that nearly 499,000
3 total residential customers were 30-days in arrears in May 2020 – the first
4 month for which such data was reported – owing approximately \$116.7
5 million (\$234 per customer in arrears).¹⁰ By May 2021, the number of
6 residential customers in arrears had declined by 8%, but the total amount
7 of arrears had increased by nearly the same amount. From May 2021 to
8 May 2022, the number of customers in arrears increased by 26%, while total
9 arrears jumped by 79%, to \$213 million, resulting in a 35% increase in the
10 average amount owed. In fact, the three highest values for total arrears for
11 the Companies' residential customers since the beginning of mandatory
12 monthly reporting in April 2020 have occurred in the past three months of
13 reporting: \$222.3 million in March 2022, \$226.4 million in April and \$213.4
14 million in May. Additionally, both the number of customers in arrears and
15 total arrears have been steadily increasing, overall, since January 2021,
16 when the Companies reported a total of 429,672 residential customers in
17 arrears and \$105.7 million in total arrears.¹¹

18 In sum, affordability challenges experienced by the Companies'
19 residential customer base in North Carolina are worse than they have been
20 since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and are continuing to worsen.

¹⁰ Exec. Order 124 Monthly Data for May, 2020 Rep. to the Governor, N.C. Util. Comm'n Docket M-100 Sub 158 (June 18, 2022).

¹¹ NCUC COVID -19 State of Emergency Util. Reporting Data Through May 2022, N.C. Util. Comm'n Docket M-100 Sub 158 (July 1, 2022).

1 Thus, as the Commission develops and the Companies embark on
2 implementing a Carolinas Carbon Plan, affordability challenges must be
3 addressed as a core part of the plan, not as an afterthought. Otherwise,
4 existing affordability challenges and impacts are likely to worsen as more
5 residential customers become vulnerable to falling into arrears and
6 potentially being disconnected for non-payment.

7 **Q: WHAT IS THE PRIMARY DRIVER OF AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGES**
8 **FOR THE COMPANIES' LOW-INCOME AND OTHERWISE**
9 **VULNERABLE CUSTOMERS?**

10 **A:** Energy Inefficiency. As an active stakeholder in the LIAC process, I
11 represented Appalachian Voices as a co-lead of Sub-team A, which was
12 tasked with assessing customer challenges as they relate to affordability. In
13 that role I served as a primary author of the assessment report, distilling the
14 results of the analytics into a summary report that was presented to the
15 broader LIAC stakeholder group. The Companies acknowledged that these
16 factors were likely due to energy-inefficient building stock, heating and
17 cooling systems and appliances, concluding that the findings “strongly
18 suggest that improving a household's energy efficiency through air sealing,
19 insulation, and energy efficient heating systems could substantially reduce
20 a household's likelihood of experiencing a [disconnection for non-
21 payment].”¹²

¹² See Joint N.C. Low-Income Affordability Collaborative at Appendix F.

1 **Q: DO THE COMPANIES' LOW-INCOME PROGRAMS COUPLED WITH**
2 **OTHER PUBLICLY AVAILABLE RESOURCES SUFFICIENTLY**
3 **ADDRESS THOSE AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGES?**

4 **A:** No. If the Companies' programs, and the state Weatherization Assistance
5 Program, Low-Income Energy Assistance Program or Crisis Assistance
6 Program (LIEAP/CIP) sufficiently addressed low-income affordability
7 challenges, the current affordability gaps outlined above would not likely
8 exist at the scale and breadth that they do today. For instance, the
9 Companies' analytics for the LIAC showed just 2% of its residential
10 customer base (7.5% of its low-income customer base) received LIEAP/CIP
11 assistance for paying their electric bills during the March 2019 through
12 February 2020 analytical period.¹³ Statewide, less than 4,000 households
13 received weatherization assistance funding, in 2021.¹⁴

14 Additionally, according to the LIAC Final Report, less than 0.1% of
15 program-eligible customers have participated in the Duke Energy Carolinas
16 Weatherization Program and Equipment Replacement Program, and the
17 impact of the program for those that have participated is a reduction in the
18 estimated electric energy burden of only 1% or less. The Companies also
19 report that the Neighborhood Energy Savers Program has reached 7.8%
20 and 10% of Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress' program
21 eligible customers, respectively. While that is a laudable achievement, the

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ North Carolina Weatherization Assistance Program. <https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/1873>. Accessed August 31, 2022.

1 nature of the program – in that it provides only education, energy
2 assessments, and direct install measures rather than high-impact energy
3 efficiency upgrades and improvements – limits the impact it has on the
4 estimated electric energy burden for participating customers to a 0.4%
5 burden reduction or less. Similar shortfalls characterize the Helping Home
6 Fund, which serves less than 1,000 eligible households each year, and the
7 Share the Light program, which serves only 5,000 households each year.¹⁵

8 While the Companies' existing programs are critical and provide
9 tangible affordability and health-related benefits to its vulnerable customers,
10 they serve only a small segment of the low-income customer base and have
11 minimal impact on alleviating affordability challenges, reducing energy cost
12 burdens or addressing peak winter and summer usage and demand in low-
13 income households. And while there have been significant increases in
14 funding for state weatherization and bill assistance programs during the
15 COVID-19 pandemic, it still has not been enough to meet the scale and
16 depth of need that exists.

17 **Q: HOW WILL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CARBON PLAN**
18 **AFFECT EXISTING AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGES FOR LOW-**
19 **INCOME AND OTHERWISE VULNERABLE CUSTOMERS?**

20 **A:** Appalachian Voices submitted testimony and analysis in the Duke Energy
21 Carolinas (DEC) 2019 rate case projecting how DEC's proposed rate

¹⁵ Joint North Carolina Low-Income Affordability Collaborative Quarterly Progress Report. Docket Nos. E-7, Subs 1213, 1214 and 1187 and E-2, Subs 1219 and 1193. At 19-30.

1 increase would impact low-income customers in terms of increased energy
2 burdens.¹⁶ As of 2019, the average household energy burden for the
3 332,000 low-income households (less than 150% FPL) served by DEC
4 exceeded the 6% affordability threshold, while 141,000 of those households
5 experienced a “severe” energy burden exceeding 10.9%.¹⁷

6 DEC’s estimate of customer bill impacts in the initial rate case filing
7 estimated an increase of \$8.06 per month, which approximates the \$8
8 estimated monthly impact of DEC residential customers in 2030 resulting
9 from Portfolio 1 in the proposed Carbon Plan. Using the bill impact value
10 from DEC’s rate case filing, we calculated that such an increase would have
11 resulted in more than 57,000 low-income households (17% of all low-
12 income households) moving into the “severe” energy burden category.¹⁸

13 As a proxy for the 2030 expected impact on energy burdens for low-
14 income DEC households as a result of the Carbon Plan, this impact from
15 an arguably modest increase in monthly bills should not be underestimated.
16 The Companies’ LIAC analytics illustrate how energy burdens exceeding
17 the 6% threshold impact increase the likelihood that a household will meet
18 the definition of “arrears struggling” and/or be disconnected for non-
19 payment. For the definition of arrears, the analytics showed that compared

¹⁶ See N.C. Util. Comm’n Docket E-7 Sub 1214.

¹⁷ APPLIED PUB. POL’Y RSCH. INST. FOR STUDY AND EVALUATION, LIHEAP ENERGY BURDEN EVALUATION STUDY 12 (July 2005), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocs/comm_liheap_energyburdenstudy_apprise.pdf.

¹⁸ Direct Test. Of Rory McIlmoil for Ctr. Biological and Appalachian Voices, N.C. Util. Comm’n Docket E-7 Sub 1214 (Feb. 18, 2020).

1 to a 6% energy burden a household with a 10% energy burden is 36% more
2 likely to meet the arrears definition, while a 12% burden level renders a
3 household 52% more likely to meet the definition. For disconnections, the
4 relative likelihoods are 8% and 10%, respectively.¹⁹

5 Without clearly targeted and sufficiently funded low-income energy
6 efficiency and distributed energy programs, combined with increased bill
7 assistance or discounted rate programs for low-income customers, the
8 Carolinas Carbon Plan as proposed will only serve to exacerbate existing
9 affordability challenges. The increase in costs for households already
10 struggling to afford their bills projected by the Companies for each of the
11 four proposed Carbon Plan portfolios will only make it harder for those
12 households to afford future bills. As a result, the impacts associated with
13 affordability challenges -- namely disconnections for non-payment -- can be
14 expected to increase as well.

15 In the statistical analysis portion of the LIAC analytics the Companies
16 report a “disconnected for non-pay” population of approximately 186,000
17 households that experienced a disconnection during the 12-months prior to
18 the pandemic. This represents approximately 8% of the Companies’ total
19 residential customer base and nearly half (47%) of the population of “arrears
20 struggling” customers from which the disconnection sub-population was
21 taken.²⁰ That is a significant number of households that experienced a loss

¹⁹ See Joint N.C. Low-Income Affordability Collaborative at Appendix F.

²⁰ See Joint N.C. Low-Income Affordability Collaborative at Appendix F.

1 of electricity service because they could not afford to pay their bill. Again,
2 this impact is likely only to grow if the Companies' proposed plan is
3 approved and implemented without the inclusion of targeted investments
4 that enhance affordability through energy efficiency, distributed energy
5 resources, and bill assistance or other affordability programs.

6 **THE PROPOSED CARBON PLAN LACKS ANY ATTEMPT TO MITIGATE**
7 **AFFORDABILITY IMPACTS**

8 **Q: HOW DO THE COMPANIES APPROACH AFFORDABILITY IN THE**
9 **PROPOSED CARBON PLAN AND SUPPORTING TESTIMONY, AND IS**
10 **THAT APPROACH SUFFICIENT?**

11 **A:** The Companies list "affordability" as one of four core objectives of the
12 Carbon Plan, but then they refuse to define what they mean by affordability,
13 either generally or in the context of the Carbon Plan. Instead, the
14 Companies inappropriately conflate the terms "least cost" and "affordability"
15 in its proposed plan and testimony. While related, these terms are not the
16 same. "Least cost" does not mean "affordable," it merely means "less costly
17 than the alternative."

18 Despite the fact that electric bills are unaffordable for hundreds of
19 thousands of their residential customers, as detailed previously, the
20 Companies continuously work to construct the perception that they already
21 provide "affordable service," "affordable electricity" and "affordable rates."
22 This construct is belied by the Companies' own analytics that show nearly

1 430,000 of its customers were in arrears in January of 2021 with those
2 numbers steadily climbing to 575,000 customers as of May 2022.

3 For example, in its proposed plan and testimony, the Companies
4 repeatedly claim affordable service as a hallmark.

5 *“The Companies intend to take a multipronged approach to*
6 *maintaining affordable and reliable service while also meeting CO2*
7 *emissions reduction targets.”²¹ ...*

8 *“The Companies are committed to the continued provision of*
9 *affordable electricity for residents, businesses, industries, and*
10 *communities in the Carolinas.”²²*

11 *“Under the oversight of the Commission and the PSCSC, the*
12 *Companies’ current system is reliable, flexible, affordable and*
13 *increasingly clean. Customers have benefitted from the Companies’*
14 *diverse fleet of generation... providing reliable and affordable*
15 *electricity that has contributed to the State’s economic*
16 *prosperity...”²³*

17 *“The Companies understand the critical importance of maintaining*
18 *affordable and competitive rates, and we are focused on continuing*
19 *to achieve efficiencies across the business to maintain our affordable*
20 *rates.”²⁴*

21 While the Companies’ four proposed portfolios may represent the “least
22 cost” (e.g., “less costly”) pathway relative to other options (in the

²¹ DUKE ENERGY, CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN Appendix E at 9 (May 16, 2022) (emphasis added) [hereinafter CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN].

²² *Id.* at 20.

²³ DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KENDAL C. BOWMAN FOR DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC. Docket E-100, Sub 179. At 9.

²⁴ *Id.* at 18.

1 Companies' opinion), all four portfolios result in an increase in customer
2 bills, and none would be "affordable" for the substantial number of
3 residential customers already struggling to afford their current electric bills.
4 The Companies' approach is not sufficient.

5 **Q: CAN YOU PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF HOW THE PROPOSED PLAN**
6 **FALLS SHORT IN DEALING WITH AFFORDABILITY?**

7 **A:** The Companies' approach to and perception of "affordability" should have
8 evolved as a result of the LIAC process but appears to not have changed.
9 The Companies mention "cost" and "affordability" together, but only present
10 "cost" impacts, and nothing for "affordability" impacts. The Companies
11 provide no definition of, or metrics related to, affordability, no reference to
12 "affordability" definitions or affordability challenges identified and discussed
13 throughout the LIAC process, and no analysis of impacts resulting from
14 affordability challenges such as arrearages, disconnections or other
15 impacts that may result from the implementation of any of the four carbon
16 plan portfolios.

17 In fact, when Appalachian Voices requested the Companies to
18 "[p]rovide any datasets, analysis, modeling, documentation, etc. Duke used
19 or produced to determine how the estimated cost of each of the four
20 portfolios will impact arrearages and disconnections for residential
21 customers, particularly low-income customers," the Companies responded
22 that "[t]he question seeks information that is outside of the scope of the
23 Carbon Plan proceeding," and again reverted back to conflating "least cost"

1 with affordability.²⁵ As arrearages and disconnections directly represent the
2 outcomes of affordability challenges faced by Duke Energy’s customers,
3 however, the admission that the Companies consider such an analysis to
4 be “outside the scope of” the Carbon Plan underscores their lack of
5 commitment to addressing actual affordability concerns.

6 Finally, the Companies’ perception that their affordability objective is
7 a matter of presenting a “least cost” plan for reducing carbon emissions
8 rather than of addressing existing and potential affordability challenges and
9 impacts experienced by hundreds of thousands of households they serve is
10 reflected in the exclusion from the Carbon Plan of any investments or
11 programs that would reduce costs for residential customers or, at a
12 minimum, offset future costs projected to result from the Carbon Plan.

13 **Q: DO THE COMPANIES HAVE THE DATA AND TOOLS AVAILABLE TO**
14 **MODEL THE IMPACTS OF THEIR PROPOSED CARBON PLAN**
15 **PORTFOLIOS ON LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME AFFORDABILITY**
16 **CHALLENGES?**

17 **A:** Yes, but they have chosen not to use those tools in their carbon planning
18 process. During the initial discovery process, Appalachian Voices asked
19 the Companies to provide details on “how Duke incorporated data and
20 analysis from/of the detailed customer usage and demographics dataset
21 produced by Duke and Acxiom for purposes of the [LIAC] for the purpose
22 of analyzing the impact of the four carbon plan portfolios on customers of

²⁵ DE Response to Appalachian Voices DR. 1-7.

1 different income levels, housing tenure, housing type, race, age, region
2 (urban vs. rural) and other customer segments analyzed for the LIAC.” The
3 Companies responded that “[a]t the time the Carbon Plan was being
4 developed, the analytics and data pipelines used for the [LIAC] were still a
5 work in progress. Because of this overlap in the timing, LIAC analytic results
6 were not specifically included in the Carbon Plan. However, as stated in the
7 Carbon Plan, the Companies are committed to use the findings from the
8 LIAC going forward to expand the Companies’ programs and support
9 customers.”²⁶

10 The actual timeline of events belies this response. Duke Energy and
11 Acxiom produced the initial version of the noted analytics in September
12 2021, with refinements and additions being performed for new versions
13 provided to the LIAC in October, November, and December 2021, with the
14 final version (including new statistical analysis) being provided in March
15 2022. The Companies submitted their proposed Carbon Plan on May 16,
16 2022.

17 In other words, the datasets for incorporating a deep analysis of
18 potential affordability impacts on residential customers that would result
19 under the four proposed Carbon Plan portfolios were available as early as
20 September of 2021, while even the final version was available for six weeks
21 prior to the Companies’ submission of the Plan.

²⁶ DE Response to Appalachian Voices DR. 1-10.

1 **Q: DO THE COMPANIES PROPOSE, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE**
2 **CARBON PLAN, ANY PROGRAMS OR INVESTMENTS TARGETED AT**
3 **ADDRESSING LOW-INCOME AND OTHERWISE VULNERABLE**
4 **CUSTOMER AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGES?**

5 **A:** No. Despite the Companies' purported inclusion of affordability as a core
6 Carbon Plan objective, the Companies neither propose nor incorporate any
7 programs or investments in the Carbon Plan that directly target low-income
8 and/or otherwise vulnerable customers. Instead, the Companies punt that
9 responsibility to future years and other proceedings, stating, for instance,
10 that "...[t]o ensure we are helping customers most in need now and in the
11 future, we are taking steps with the input of the [LIAC] to advance new
12 proposals that will help our residential customers that may be struggling to
13 pay their bills."²⁷

14 The Companies note future programs and other low-income
15 approaches the Companies might or plan to request and adopt, including
16 the potential expansion of income qualification for low-income energy
17 efficiency programs to 300% of FPL, on-tariff energy efficiency financing,
18 pursuing Commission approval of an Energy Burden Reduction Pilot
19 program, and expanding the existing Neighborhood Energy Saver
20 program.²⁸ While most of these potential programs and changes would
21 benefit low-income households and address, to varied extents, customer
22 affordability challenges and impacts, none were integrated directly into the

²⁷ *Id.* at 20.

²⁸ CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN, Appendix E at 9-10.

1 Carbon Plan, and none are being requested by the Companies as critical
2 near-term development activities.

3 **Q: HOW COULD OR SHOULD THE COMPANIES HAVE INCORPORATED**
4 **TARGETED AFFORDABILITY PROGRAMS FOR LOW-INCOME AND**
5 **OTHERWISE VULNERABLE CUSTOMERS IN THEIR PROPOSED**
6 **CARBON PLAN?**

7 **A:** If the Companies are genuinely committed to affordability as a core
8 objective in the Carbon Plan they must go beyond a strict “least cost”
9 approach and directly incorporate programs and investments that directly
10 address affordability challenges and impacts for low-income and otherwise
11 vulnerable households. This would include expanded bill assistance, low-
12 income rate designs, and arrearage management programs that alleviate
13 existing challenges customers face with affording their electric bills. It would
14 include proactive and aggressive long-term investments in energy efficiency
15 and demand-side management to reduce household and system costs
16 related to winter and summer peak energy usage resulting from energy-
17 inefficient buildings (insulation, air sealing, etc.), heating and cooling
18 systems and appliances, particularly for low-income households.²⁹ It would
19 involve expanding distributed solar options to include customer-owned and

²⁹ In fact, Appendix E of the CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN (at 28) argues for having included targeted low-income demand reduction programs, noting that “Within residential populations, the need exists to address low-income demand [given that] lower-income customers tend to contribute more [to demand] during peak. About a third of customers participating in residential [demand reduction] programs today (that are mainly summer programs) earn less than 200% of the poverty line.”

1 community-based or shared solar programs that are accessible and
2 targeted to low-income and otherwise economically vulnerable households.

3 **Q: WOULD INVESTMENTS TO ADDRESS AFFORDABILITY CHALLENGES**
4 **HAVE ANY IMPACT ON CAPACITY NEEDS, OR OTHER SYSTEM-WIDE**
5 **COSTS?**

6 **A:** Yes. Such investments not only enhance affordability and reduce the long-
7 term need for funding bill assistance programs, but also contribute to
8 decarbonization, improved grid reliability and resiliency, and reduce or
9 avoid the need for new gas capacity and new transmission infrastructure,
10 all of which lower costs for customers.

11 **Q: ARE THERE OTHER STEPS THE COMMISSION AND COMPANIES CAN**
12 **TAKE TO ENHANCE AFFORDABILITY IN THE CARBON PLAN?**

13 **A:** Yes. A true commitment to affordability in the Carbon Plan requires
14 modeling the potential for a regional competitive wholesale market and use
15 of performance-based regulation and appropriate performance incentive
16 mechanisms to enhance affordability, reliability, and carbon reductions
17 compared to the currently proposed Carbon Plan.

18 **Q: DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANIES' REQUEST THAT THE**
19 **COMMISSION AFFIRM IN ITS CARBON PLAN ORDER THAT**
20 **EXPANDED LOW-INCOME PROGRAMS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED**
21 **AND APPROVED IN A SEPARATE DOCKET? PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

22 **A:** No, for reasons already detailed in my testimony and further explained
23 below. First, if the Companies can propose and request approval of short-
24 term development activities for resources that may not be constructed for
25 several years, they can similarly request that the Commission provide

1 conditional approval for the inclusion of low-income energy efficiency and
2 distributed energy programs and investments that contribute to the
3 mandated decarbonization goal and enhance affordability for customers.
4 However, the Companies intentionally elected not to do so.

5 Second, if affordability is a “core objective” of the Carbon Plan, then
6 the Companies should be required to incorporate affordability investments
7 – particularly those that can contribute to decarbonization – as an integral
8 part of the Carbon Plan.

9 **Q: DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANIES’ PROPOSAL TO EXPAND**
10 **THE DEFINITION OF INCOME QUALIFIED ELIGIBLE CUSTOMERS TO**
11 **300% OF FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES? PLEASE EXPLAIN.**

12 **A:** No. While we recognize that a substantial number of customers falling
13 above the generally applied 200% of FPL threshold experience affordability
14 challenges, we do not agree that the definition of income-qualified eligible
15 customers should be expanded to 300% of FPL. As explained previously in
16 my testimony, existing Company and public programs are starkly
17 underfunded and reach only an extremely small portion of the low-income
18 households (as currently defined - less than 200% FPL) in need of
19 assistance. The shortfall in funding and population of households receiving
20 assistance or participating in existing energy efficiency and bill assistance
21 programs must be addressed first before any proposal to expand the
22 eligibility definition is considered. Otherwise, if the population of eligible
23 households expands, existing resources may be spread even thinner,

1 reducing the per-household benefit, and/or reducing the ability of the
2 households that struggle the most with affordability challenges to access
3 the programs. If the Companies directly incorporate proposals and
4 investments aimed at enhancing affordability into the Carbon Plan with its
5 request to expand low-income program eligibility, our response might be
6 different. They intentionally neglected to do so.
7

TOPIC: NEAR TERM PROCUREMENT

**ALTERNATE RESOURCES TO GAS PLANTS: BENEFITS OF GRID EDGE
RESOURCES**

8 **Q: DR. KINKHABWALA, PSE PREPARED A REPORT, “*REVIEW AND*
9 *COMMENT ON THE DUKE ENERGY PROPOSED CARBON PLAN FOR*
10 *THE CAROLINAS*,” THAT WAS FILED WITH COMMENTS SUBMITTED
11 *ON BEHALF OF APPALACHIAN VOICES*, IS THAT CORRECT?**

12 **A:** Yes. I collaborated with Dr. Krieger and Dr. Murphy in the preparation of
13 that report.

14 **Q: DID THAT REPORT IDENTIFY ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED**
15 **EXPANDED USE OF GAS PLANTS?**

16 **A:** Yes. The proposed Plan includes 2.4 gigawatts (GW) of new gas combined
17 cycle facilities and 0.8-1.1 GW of new gas combustion turbines. These
18 plants would provide an estimated 14,700 GWh and 70 GWh of electricity
19 in 2030, respectively. However, the Companies did not fully consider the
20 potential of utility-scale solar, offshore wind, energy storage, or grid-edge
21 alternatives to these investments. The Plan put unnecessary constraints on
22 the timing and capacity of alternative resource deployment, including
23
24

1 onshore and offshore wind, distributed energy resources, and energy
2 efficiency. Enabling the EnCompass model to actively select these
3 resources when cost-competitive would enable a fair comparison of their
4 ability to meet energy and capacity needs. The proposed peaking gas
5 combustion plants could likely be replaced with utility-scale energy storage,
6 as has been occurring nationwide; additional peak needs could be met with
7 offshore wind deployed earlier than proposed, energy efficiency, demand
8 response, and distributed storage. As discussed more fully in our report
9 submitted as comments on behalf of Appalachian Voices, energy needs
10 could likely be met with a combination of demand-side efficiency savings
11 and expanded offshore wind and solar (utility-scale and distributed).

TOPIC: EE/DSM/GRID EDGE

13 **Q: DO YOU HAVE CONCERNS RELATING TO THE COMPANIES'**
14 **TREATMENT OF GRID EDGE RESOURCES?**

15 **A:** Yes. The Plan underutilizes grid edge resources including energy storage,
16 solar, demand response, and energy efficiency by not enabling these
17 resources to compete with utility-scale investments in the EnCompass
18 modeling runs and capping their rollout at very low levels. These resources
19 have the potential to not only obviate the need for new gas plant
20 investments but can help reduce health-damaging air pollutant and
21 greenhouse gas emissions, provide resilience, and add to grid flexibility.

1 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT THE VALUE IS, TO THE GRID AND**
2 **TO CUSTOMERS, OF GRID-EDGE RESOURCES, SUCH AS ENERGY**
3 **EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTED GENERATION AND STORAGE?**

4 **A:** Grid-edge resources hold a wide range of potential benefits for both the
5 electric grid and for customers. Energy efficiency investments, such as
6 weatherization and efficient appliances, reduce customer energy use and
7 bills, while simultaneously offsetting the need to build utility-scale
8 generation resources and subsequently mitigating the costs that get passed
9 on to customers. Weatherization can also help keep homes cool in summer
10 and warm in winter, protecting vulnerable populations from the cold and
11 from heat stroke. Distributed solar resources, inclusive of both behind-the-
12 meter and community solar systems, can provide consistent bills and
13 savings for adopters while similarly offsetting the need for utility-scale
14 generation. Energy storage systems can help provide demand
15 management, integrate renewable energy resources, and provide resilience
16 in the case of emergencies.

17 All of these resources, if they displace fossil fuel generation, hold the
18 potential to reduce utility-scale greenhouse gas and health-damaging air
19 pollutant emissions. Additional grid edge resources include, but are not
20 limited to, vehicle-to-grid systems and smart appliances that can participate
21 in demand response. These resources collectively hold the potential to
22 provide flexibility, and may provide location-specific grid benefits such as
23 deferral of distribution system investments and reduction in peak demand.

1 **Q: THE COMPANIES MAINTAIN THAT THE FIRST PILLAR OF ENERGY**
2 **TRANSITION AND THE CARBON PLAN IS TO “SHRINK THE**
3 **CHALLENGE” BY REDUCING ENERGY REQUIREMENTS AND LOAD**
4 **PATTERNS THROUGH GRID EDGE PROGRAMS. WHAT ROLE DOES**
5 **ENERGY EFFICIENCY INVESTMENT PLAY IN REDUCING DEMAND,**
6 **PARTICULARLY AS RELATES TO LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS?**
7 **A:** Energy efficiency, as Duke notes, can help reduce the challenge of meeting
8 electricity demand requirements. As such, it behooves Duke to expand its
9 energy efficiency targets. As detailed in our report, we estimated that if Duke
10 achieved efficiency levels equal 1% of retail sales per year (which Duke
11 Energy Carolina has achieved historically³⁰), inclusive of non-behavioral
12 investments with multi-year measure lifespans, that Duke would save an
13 additional 4,700 GWh and reduce demand by 800 MW by 2030. Achieving
14 2% savings per year would provide 14,300 GWh of energy savings and
15 2,500 MW of demand reductions beyond Duke’s current proposal. Such
16 investments would greatly reduce the need to build new gas plants. For
17 example, as detailed in our report for Appalachian Voices in this matter,
18 using our simulated portfolio of household energy use, we estimated that
19 investing in energy efficiency and other grid edge resources for just the
20 households with energy cost burdens greater than 6% would reduce energy
21 cost burdens for 90% of these households to less than the 6% threshold
22 with a blend of on-bill financing. Simultaneously, the investments could

³⁰ Bradley-Wright, F., H. Pohnan, & M. Shober (2022). “Energy Efficiency in the Southeast: Fourth Annual Report.” Southern Alliance for Clean Energy.” Available at: <https://cleanenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/Energy-Efficiency-in-the-Southeast-Fourth-Annual-Report.pdf>

1 annually save 2,800 GWh in electricity use in the Companies' North
2 Carolina service area alone, which represents approximately 25% of the
3 total electricity use of these households. This proportion agrees with
4 estimates from the US Department of Energy³¹.

5 **DUKE CARBON PLAN ENERGY EFFICIENCY TARGETS**

6 **Q: THE COMPANIES DESCRIBE THEIR PROPOSED ENERGY**
7 **EFFICIENCY TARGET OF 1% OF ELIGIBLE RETAIL SALES AS**
8 **“AGGRESSIVE.” DO YOU AGREE?**

9 **A:** No. The proposed energy efficiency targets in the Carbon Plan are not
10 aggressive. The Companies target savings of 1% of eligible load per year,
11 but only about two-thirds of their combined load is eligible. As other parties
12 have testified,³² this goal represents a lower percentage of retail sales than
13 Duke has achieved historically. The Companies claim that efficiency levels
14 cannot expand beyond current targets because they depend entirely on
15 “customer preferences,”³³ but Duke’s own programs and energy efficiency
16 savings demonstrate that programmatic investments in energy efficiency
17 can lead to demand reductions. It is unclear why Duke credits customer
18 preference over its own energy efficiency programs. Efficiency programs
19 across the country have effectively achieved significantly higher savings

³¹ US DOE. EnergySavers Tips on Saving Money & Energy at Home. Available at:
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/energy_savers.pdf

³² JOINT COMMENTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION, SOUTHERN
ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN ENERGY, SIERRA CLUB, AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, DOCKET NO.
E-100, SUB 179 p. 24. July 15, 2022. Available at:
<https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=c6afa7f2-ac61-439c-b406-98b42e4ca04e>

³³ DIRECT TESTIMONY OF LON HUBER AND TIM DUFF FOR DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE
ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC. P. 18 L. 6. DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179. August 19, 2022.

1 than the Companies' goals: many states achieve nearly 2% or more of retail
2 sales per year.³⁴

3 The Companies argue that they should not be beholden to targets
4 based on retail sales because some customers are permitted to opt out of
5 efficiency programs. However, this approach not only fails to consider that
6 these customers could be a potentially low-cost valuable resource, but also
7 that other factors, such as funding from the recently passed Inflation
8 Reduction Act, could contribute to the adoption of energy efficiency
9 measures for all customers. Moreover, there are large segments of eligible
10 customers who have significant energy efficiency potential that has not
11 been realized. For example, current efficiency savings for low-income
12 households -- who comprise one-third of the Companies' customers -- are
13 negligible.³⁵ The expansion of targeted programs for these households
14 would enable greater overall savings in addition to a reduction in energy
15 cost burdens for those who need it most. Finally, the Companies rely
16 significantly on behavioral interventions for which they ascribe a single year
17 of savings. The expansion of investments in weatherization, appliances,
18 and other non-behavioral measures with multi-year measure lifetimes

³⁴ Berg, W., E. Cooper, and M. DiMascio. 2022. State Energy Efficiency Scorecard: 2021 Progress Report. Washington, DC: ACEEE. Available at: aceee.org/research-report/u2201.

³⁵ Bradley-Wright, F., H. Pohnan, & M. Shober (2022). "Energy Efficiency in the Southeast: Fourth Annual Report." Southern Alliance for Clean Energy." Available at: <https://cleanenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/Energy-Efficiency-in-the-Southeast-Fourth-Annual-Report.pdf>

1 should increase the Companies' potential annual electricity and demand
2 savings.

3 **Q: THE COMPANIES CONTEND THAT ENERGY EFFICIENCY TARGETS**
4 **BASED ON RETAIL SALES IS NOT AN ACCURATE OR ILLUSTRATIVE**
5 **COMPARISON BETWEEN STATES. DO YOU AGREE?**

6 **A:** We believe that using retail sales is a valid comparison, and so does Duke
7 in some contexts — they use retail sales for comparison to other utilities in
8 their comments.³⁶ Duke provides a comparison of what it suggests would
9 be equivalent retail savings if other states saved the same average
10 residential kWh as Duke would at a 1% savings rate.³⁷ The Table provided
11 is confusing and misleading. Duke has very high residential usage (in kWh)
12 compared to nearly all the other states shown, suggesting that houses in
13 Duke territory likely have very high energy use intensity and probably have
14 more low-hanging fruit in terms of energy efficiency investments than the
15 comparison states. Many of the comparison states, such as California,
16 Massachusetts, and Vermont, have achieved roughly 2% energy efficiency
17 for many years in a row, meaning the cheapest measures have likely been
18 implemented and efficiency savings should be harder in these states, yet
19 savings remain high. However, even following Duke's logic (namely, that it
20 is harder for Duke to achieve 1% savings in terms of retail sales because
21 the total kWh reductions required would be higher), this Table demonstrates

³⁶ DIRECT TESTIMONY OF LON HUBER AND TIM DUFF FOR DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC. P. 11 Fig. 1. DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179. August 19, 2022.

³⁷ DIRECT TESTIMONY OF LON HUBER AND TIM DUFF FOR DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC. P. 27 Table 2. DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179. August 19, 2022.

1 that such savings should be possible. The “equivalent” savings for
2 Massachusetts are given as 1.73% — but it achieved 2.34% of retail sales
3 in 2021³⁸ (these savings are for all sectors, not just residential). The
4 equivalent savings for Vermont are supposedly 1.84%, but Vermont
5 achieved 1.97% of retail sales in 2021. Meanwhile, Duke is targeting 1% of
6 *eligible* load — a lower value than 1% of retail sales. Higher targets are
7 clearly achievable. We believe a comparison to percentage of retail sales is
8 valid because states that have implemented historic efficiency measures
9 are inherently going to see lower kWh of annual savings in each incremental
10 year because the easiest measures get implemented first.

11 **Q: DO YOU CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT RATES OF OTHER GRID**
12 **EDGE RESOURCES TO BE ADEQUATE?**

13 **A:** No. The Companies do not adequately address the potential expansion of
14 distributed energy resources, such as rooftop solar or demand response.
15 Their modeling software does not enable demand response, energy
16 efficiency, nor many other resources, to be selected as a resource that can
17 offset the need for new gas power plants. These resources could potentially
18 be significantly cheaper than the utility-scale resources the Companies
19 propose, but grid edge resources are not allowed to effectively compete in
20 the model. We agree with the Attorney General’s Office³⁹ that efficiency

³⁸ Berg, W., E. Cooper, and M. DiMascio. 2022. State Energy Efficiency Scorecard: 2021 Progress Report. Washington, DC: ACEEE. Available at: [aceee.org/research-report/u2201](https://www.aceee.org/research-report/u2201).

³⁹ COMMENTS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179. July 15, 2022. Available at: <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=fa173cb9-6ed8-4a84-a474-546cf27e3ad3>

1 should be a selectable resource, alongside other grid-edge resources. Even
2 if not included here, the Companies should include a more aggressive
3 efficiency scenario (e.g., 2% savings in retail sales per year) and include
4 grid edge resources as a selectable resource in all future Carbon Plan
5 iterations. Furthermore, the extension of tax credits and proposed allocation
6 of billions of dollars in financing and rebates for household-level clean
7 energy adoption, including for efficiency measures and rooftop solar, within
8 the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act suggests that the Companies' modeling is
9 likely an underestimate of future clean energy adoption rates.

10 **ENERGY COST BURDENS AND AFFORDABILITY**

11 **Q: HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE AFFORDABILITY AND**
12 **ENERGY COST BURDEN CHALLENGES OF CUSTOMERS IN DUKE'S**
13 **NORTH CAROLINA TERRITORY?**

14 **A:** Nearly all households with incomes less than the FPL experience undue
15 financial burden without bill assistance, using the standard definition of
16 "high" energy cost burdens being those greater than 6% of gross household
17 income. Over half of households in Duke Energy's North Carolina territory
18 earning between one and two times the federal poverty level (100-200%
19 FPL) also have energy cost burdens over 6%. In terms of bill assistance
20 alone, it would cost over \$600 million annually to pay down all these bills to
21 the 6% threshold, a sum far in excess of the current amount available.
22 However, through targeted use of grid edge resources such as efficiency,
23 demand response, and community solar alongside financing strategies, this

1 annual sum could be reduced by up to 95% if all low-income households
2 participated. Moreover, such investments typically pay for themselves, as
3 described above. These resources also, as noted previously, can contribute
4 to achieving carbon targets and reducing the emissions of health-damaging
5 air pollutants from fossil fuel combustion. Such investments, therefore, are
6 clearly of great value and should be pursued with great urgency to reap the
7 financial benefits as soon as possible. Each year without implementation of
8 available energy efficiency upgrades is a year of increased financial burden
9 on low-income customers and a wasted opportunity for decarbonization and
10 air pollutant emissions reductions. Given the limited amount of progress that
11 has been made thus far for low-income households,⁴⁰ there remains great
12 potential for future savings.

13 **Q: HOW DOES THE COMPANIES' PROPOSED CARBON PLAN AFFECT**
14 **AFFORDABILITY AND ENERGY COST BURDENS?**

15 **A:** The proposed Carbon Plan holds direct and indirect implications for
16 affordability. Although rates are determined separately, utility-scale
17 investments and fossil fuel costs are passed on to customers. As such,
18 unnecessary capital investments may exacerbate affordability challenges,
19 and escalating natural gas prices pose a risk to customers. Meanwhile,
20 direct investments in energy efficiency can reduce customer bills. If the

⁴⁰ Bradley-Wright, F., H. Pohnan, & M. Shober (2022). "Energy Efficiency in the Southeast: Fourth Annual Report." Southern Alliance for Clean Energy." Available at: <https://cleanenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/Energy-Efficiency-in-the-Southeast-Fourth-Annual-Report.pdf>

1 Companies expanded their energy efficiency targets and incorporated
2 affordability metrics as recommended by LIAC, more households would be
3 able to reduce their energy bills without leaving behind the neediest
4 households. As noted above, historically, low-income efficiency savings
5 have been negligible. The Companies in their response comments
6 suggested the need to expand their low-income efficiency programs.⁴¹ Such
7 investments could be bolstered by funding from the Inflation Reduction Act.
8 While the Companies assert that low-income efficiency programs are not
9 cost-effective,⁴² we suggest that ascribing a value to non-energy societal
10 benefits, such as a reduction in energy cost burdens and emission
11 reductions, may indeed show that these investments are cost-effective on
12 a societal level.

13 The Companies also suggest that relying on demand reduction
14 through energy efficiency investments is “risky” because customer
15 preference may limit adoption, but we assert that the proposed alternative
16 — namely, investments in expanded gas infrastructure — is riskier due to
17 the potential for stranded assets and the reliance on fossil fuels whose
18 volatile prices may be passed on to customers. Similarly, the proposed
19 investment in small modular nuclear reactors, an entirely unproven
20 resource, is significantly riskier than any energy efficiency investments.

⁴¹ DIRECT TESTIMONY OF LON HUBER AND TIM DUFF FOR DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC. P. 31 L. 21. DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179. August 19, 2022.

⁴² DIRECT TESTIMONY OF LON HUBER AND TIM DUFF FOR DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC AND DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC. P. 32 L. 7. DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179. August 19, 2022.

1 The Companies also propose expanding eligible “low-income”
2 populations from those earning under 200% FPL to those earning under
3 300% FPL. While I agree with other testimony⁴³ that such changes in
4 definition should be made in collaboration with the LIAC, I also note that any
5 increase in the number of eligible customers should be associated with an
6 increase in available funding, and funding targeted at those households
7 earning under 200% FPL should not be reduced but rather should be
8 increased. Furthermore, we estimate that around 75% of households with
9 incomes less than 200% FPL have energy cost burdens greater than 6%,
10 while the cost burden for households between 200% and 300% FPL is only
11 5%. The definition of low-income households as less than 200% FPL is a
12 reasonable cutoff for households that experience undue financial burden
13 and for whom the financial benefits of lower energy bills will be most
14 impactful. Any program targeted specifically at households in the 200-300%
15 FPL range should be on top of existing investment and go above and
16 beyond the investments for households earning 200% FPL and should not
17 replace those existing investments.

18 **Q: HOW COULD MODIFICATIONS TO THE COMPANIES’ PROPOSED**
19 **CARBON PLAN HELP IMPROVE AFFORDABILITY?**

⁴³ JOINT COMMENTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION, SOUTHERN ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN ENERGY, SIERRA CLUB, AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179 p. 24. July 15, 2022. Available at: <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=c6afa7f2-ac61-439c-b406-98b42e4ca04e>

1 **A:** Setting more ambitious targets for savings from grid edge resources will
2 benefit all customers. Investments in these resources have been shown to
3 have wide ranging benefits including added grid resilience, peak shaving,
4 and reduced transmission costs. Furthermore, separate targets should be
5 set specifically for low-income households. These households have
6 historically seen the least savings from Duke's programs and are also the
7 households that would benefit the most from efficiency and affordability
8 investments. Bill savings for these households would result in societal
9 benefits that extend beyond the already substantial benefits that arise from
10 reduced carbon emissions and capacity. The roughly 900,000 households
11 that are energy burdened would see an average annual savings of \$650 per
12 year. Until affordability is appropriately incorporated into planning alongside
13 grid edge resources, however, this large financial boon to low-income
14 homes will remain largely ignored as most current programs serve miniscule
15 fractions of these households.

16 **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COMMISSION**

17 **Q: WHAT ARE THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE**
18 **COMMISSION CONCERNING AFFORDABILITY?**

19 **A:** Decarbonizing the grid through a transition to clean, renewable energy
20 resources; battery storage; and substantial investments in energy efficiency
21 and demand-side management is critical for North Carolina. That transition
22 must proceed rapidly to confront the worst impacts of climate change and
23 protect public health. However, it is abundantly clear that the

1 implementation of any of the Companies' four Carbon Plan portfolios will
2 exacerbate both the challenges and impacts low-income households
3 already experience due to the unaffordability of their electric and total
4 energy bills. As such, any plan which guides the energy transition must, as
5 a core and integrated objective of the plan, directly address existing and
6 future energy affordability challenges and impacts for North Carolina
7 households, especially low-income and otherwise vulnerable households.
8 Doing so can and will contribute to the achievement of both the state's
9 decarbonization goals as well as the improvement of the economic and
10 public health of North Carolina's residents.

11 To that end, as it develops the final Carbon Plan for this biennial
12 period, we request that the Commission:

13 1. Require that the Companies define and develop metrics for
14 assessing "affordability" in a manner that describes actual experiences and
15 impacts faced by its residential customers. We therefore recommend that
16 the Commission require the Companies adopt the definition of affordability
17 codified by the California Public Utilities Commission and proposed by the
18 LIAC Sub-team B, as "the degree to which a representative household is
19 able to pay for an essential utility service charge, given its socioeconomic
20 status."

21 2. Require that the final Carbon Plan incorporate substantial
22 investments in, and model the affordability and carbon reduction benefits
23 of, customer bill assistance and arrearage management programs (such as

1 those proposed through the LIAC), low-income weatherization and other
2 energy efficiency investments, and low-income distributed energy and
3 demand reduction investments. The Commission should require the
4 analysis to include impacts on low-income customer bills (specifically,
5 average actual bills, not just average bills for a certain quantity of electricity
6 consumption, to ensure that efficiency benefits are reflected), electricity cost
7 burdens, arrearages, disconnections for non-payment, and carbon
8 emissions via the avoidance of the “need” to build new methane gas
9 generation.

10 3. Reject the Companies’ proposal to expand the definition of
11 income-qualified eligible customers for low-income assistance and energy
12 efficiency programs to 300% of Federal Poverty Guidelines.

13 4. Require the Companies to model as a sensitivity analysis how
14 a regional competitive wholesale market and legislatively approved
15 performance-based regulation would impact resource selection and
16 portfolio costs for the Carbon Plan, and by extension, carbon emissions and
17 customer affordability.

18 **Q: WHAT ARE THE PANEL’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE**
19 **COMMISSION CONCERNING RESOURCE INVESTMENTS?**

20 **A:** We recommend that that the Commission disallow the build-out of new gas
21 power infrastructure, which risks passing on volatile gas costs and stranded
22 asset costs to customers. Instead, we recommend that the Commission
23 require Duke to enable energy efficiency, offshore wind, utility-scale

1 storage, distributed solar and storage, demand response, and other
2 alternative utility-scale and grid-edge resources to compete within the
3 EnCompass model rather than be capped at arbitrarily low deployment
4 rates.

5 **Q: DOES THIS CONCLUDE THE PANEL'S TESTIMONY?**

6 **A:** Yes.

Appalachian Voices' Summary of Direct Testimony of**Rory McIlmoil and Dr. Yunus Kinkhabwala****Carolinas Carbon Plan
Docket No. E-100, Sub 179**

1 The purpose of the panel testimony is: first, to address the failure to adequately
2 address affordability concerns and rate impacts for customers in the Companies'
3 proposed Carbon Plan; second, to discuss the benefits of grid edge technologies
4 and the Companies' underutilization of such resources; and finally, to present
5 appropriate recommendations to the Commission.

6
7 The panel's affordability testimony focuses on: cost, with a focus on affordability
8 for low-income and otherwise economically vulnerable ratepayers; near term
9 procurement, looking at alternative technologies beyond the expansion of
10 additional gas fired power generation; and EE/DSM/Grid Edge resources, with an
11 emphasis on how targeting investment in those programs for low-income
12 residential customers is a cost-effective way to control energy demand and reduce
13 carbon emissions while mitigating affordability impacts.

14
15 Affordability must genuinely be a central objective of the Carbon Plan because
16 methods exist to reduce carbon emissions while simultaneously reducing energy
17 bills and energy burdens for low-income households. Moreover, the number of
18 households served by the Companies that are in arrears, and deeply so, is
19 significant and unsustainable. The Carbon Plan will exacerbate this problem unless
20 key analytics and mitigative investment targets are incorporated into the Plan
21 itself. Nearly one-third of all residential customers in the Companies' North
22 Carolina service base qualify as low-income under federal poverty guidelines. The
23 panel used the Companies' analytics produced for the Low-Income Affordability
24 Collaborative (LIAC) to estimate that 231,165 low-income households (nearly a
25 quarter of all low-income households) have spent six or more months behind on

1 paying their average/regular bill or were behind by two or more times their
2 average bill for two or more months, thereby meeting the Companies' stringent
3 definition of "arrears struggling" households. "Arrears struggling" as defined by
4 the Companies does not include those low-income customers who may spend
5 three to five months of the year – possibly including the hottest or coldest months
6 when electric bills tend to be highest – being unable to afford their bill when it is
7 due, and thus vulnerable to disconnection for non-payment. Another 277,000 non-
8 low-income households also meet the Companies' arrears struggling definition.

9
10 In total, more than half a million customers, or nearly one sixth of the Companies'
11 residential customers in North Carolina, qualify per the Companies' definition as
12 "arrears struggling." Further, as of May 2022, more than 570,000 residential
13 customers were reported as being at least 30 days in arrears, owing a total of more
14 than \$213 million. The Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated those arrearages,
15 which increased sharply over the May 2021 to May 2022 period. One primary
16 driver of affordability challenges is energy inefficiency, which is not currently
17 adequately addressed by existing programs because they serve only a very small
18 segment of the low-income customer base, do not sufficiently reduce energy cost
19 burdens, and do not sufficiently address peak winter and summer usage in low-
20 income households.

21
22 The proposed Carbon Plan is likely to exacerbate, rather than alleviate,
23 affordability challenges for vulnerable customers. Although the Companies list
24 "affordability" as one of the four core objectives of the proposed Carbon Plan, the
25 Plan lacks any attempt to mitigate affordability impacts. Instead of actually
26 addressing affordability, the Companies inappropriately conflate the concepts of
27 affordability and "least cost." "Least cost" simply means "less costly than the

1 alternative,” not necessarily affordable. Despite the arrearage problems described
2 previously, the Companies nonetheless claim to provide “affordable service,”
3 “affordable electricity,” and “affordable rates” throughout the proposed Plan and
4 their witness testimony. When asked for any analysis of how each of the four
5 Carbon Plan portfolios will impact arrearages and disconnections for residential
6 customers, the Companies responded that the question sought information
7 outside the scope of the Carbon Plan proceeding.

8
9 The Carbon Plan contains no proposals for any new programs or investments
10 targeting low-income or otherwise vulnerable customers and defer that
11 responsibility to future years and other proceedings. If the Companies seriously
12 intended to address affordability as a core objective of the Carbon Plan, they must
13 go beyond a “least cost” approach and incorporate directed programs and
14 investments targeted to address affordability challenges. Such programs and
15 investments should include arrearage management programs, community and
16 distributed solar options, long-term investments in energy efficiency and demand-
17 side management, as well as expanded bill assistance, and low-income rate
18 designs. Such improvements would not only enhance affordability but would
19 contribute to decarbonization, improved grid reliability and resiliency, and reduce
20 the need for additional capacity and transmission infrastructure, all further
21 lowering customer costs.

22
23 The proposed Carbon Plan currently includes 2.4 gigawatts (GW) of new gas
24 combined cycle facilities and 0.8-1.1 GW of new gas combustion turbines, for a
25 total of 14,470 GWh of gas-dependent electricity in 2030. As proposed, the Plan
26 puts unnecessary constraints on the timing and capacity of alternative resource
27 deployment, including on- and offshore wind, distributed energy resources such as

1 solar, and energy efficiency. Moreover, the Plan cannot determine the true “least
2 cost” set of resources since it excludes grid edge resources from the EnCompass
3 modeling runs and caps their rollout at low levels. Updating the EnCompass model
4 to actively select these resources when they are cost-competitive would enable a
5 fair comparison of their ability to meet capacity needs. The proposed peaking gas
6 combustion plans could likely be replaced with utility-scale energy storage, a
7 nationwide trend, and additional peak needs could be met with offshore wind
8 deployed earlier than proposed, as well as with energy efficiency, demand
9 response, and distributed storage. These resources have the potential to obviate
10 the need for new gas plant investments and speed decarbonization, improve grid
11 resilience and flexibility, and reduce health impairments from air pollution. Use of
12 these resources, including energy efficiency investments such as weatherization
13 and distributed energy such as solar, can also contribute to affordability by
14 reducing demand and therefore costs, providing more consistent bills and savings.
15 Additional grid edge resources, such as vehicle-to-grid systems and smart
16 appliances can provide additional flexibility and location-specific grid benefits such
17 as deferral of distribution system investments and reduction in peak demand.

18

19 Finally, increased investment in energy efficiency and other grid edge resources
20 targeted toward low-income households is a cost-effective method to lower
21 energy demand and peak loads while bridging the affordability gap for all
22 customers. Increasing energy efficiency targets to 2 percent of retail sales per year
23 from the proposed target of 1 percent of eligible load could provide 14,300 GWh
24 of energy savings and 2,500 MW of demand reductions beyond the Companies’
25 current proposal, greatly reducing the need to construct new gas plants. While
26 many states and utilities across the country have consistently achieved greater
27 efficiency targets, the Companies’ target of 1 percent is roughly the same as

1 Companies' current historical pattern of achievement and thus not ambitious as
2 the Companies claim. Moreover, the majority of the proposed efficiency targets
3 are based on short-term behavioral interventions so that their benefits do not
4 accumulate over time as they would for targets associated with physical
5 improvements that last typically between 10 to 20 years. Additionally, Duke's
6 comparatively high residential use suggests significant improvements can be made
7 through enhanced energy efficiency investments in the North Carolina service
8 area. Targeted grid-edge resources such as efficiency, demand response, and
9 community solar alongside financing strategies such as the resources included in
10 the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act have the potential to greatly improve
11 affordability. We estimate that such resources could reduce the energy
12 affordability gap - the total amount of money spent on energy beyond 6% of
13 household incomes - for North Carolina's low-income and vulnerable households
14 in the Companies' service territory by as much as 95% if all households
15 participated. By contrast, unnecessary capital investments in the construction of
16 new gas plants have the potential to exacerbate affordability challenges,
17 particularly considering escalating natural gas prices.

18

19 The Carbon Plan must, as a core and integrated objective of the plan, directly
20 address existing and future energy affordability challenges and impacts for North
21 Carolina households, particularly those low-income and otherwise vulnerable
22 households. Doing so will also contribute to the achievement of the state's
23 decarbonization goals as well as the improvement of economic and public health
24 of North Carolinians. The Panel therefore makes several recommendations to the
25 Commission. Briefly, those are that the Commission: 1) require the Companies to
26 define and assess affordability as a key component of the Plan; 2) require that the
27 final Plan incorporate substantial investments in and model the affordability and

1 decarbonization benefits of customer bill assistance and arrearage management
2 programs, energy efficiency investments, and distributed energy and demand
3 reduction investments; 3) reject the Companies' proposal to expand the definition
4 of income-qualified eligible customers for low-income assistance and energy
5 efficiency programs to 300% of Federal Poverty Guidelines; 4) require the
6 Companies to model how a regional competitive wholesale market and
7 performance-based regulation would impact resource selection and portfolio costs
8 for the Carbon Plan and, by extension, carbon emissions and customer
9 affordability; 5) disallow the build-out of new natural gas power infrastructure and
10 require the Companies to enable alternative energy and grid-edge resources to
11 compete within the Encompass model rather than be capped at arbitrarily low
12 deployment rates.

13

14 This concludes the summary of the panel's direct testimony.

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1 MS. CRALLE JONES: And I would also ask
2 that Mr. McIlmoil and Dr. Kinkhabwala be excused at
3 this time from appearing at the hearing of this
4 matter.

5 CHAIR MITCHELL: Your witnesses are
6 excused.

7 MS. CRALLE JONES: Thank you.

8 CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you,
9 Ms. Cralle Jones.

10 MS. BONVECCHIO: Good morning, Chair
11 Mitchell and Commissioners. Andrea Bonvecchio for
12 Environmental Working Group. All parties have
13 indicated that they agree to waive cross
14 examination of EWG witness Dr. Arjun Makhijani. We
15 therefore would move that the Commission excuse
16 Dr. Makhijani from participating in this expert
17 hearing, and that his prefiled direct testimony
18 consisting of 44 pages filed on September 2, 2022,
19 with a correction filed on September 12, 2022, as
20 well as his eight-page testimony summary filed on
21 September 23, 2022, be copied into the record as if
22 given orally from the stand at the appropriate
23 time.

24 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Hearing no

1 objection to your motion, it is allowed.

2 MS. BONVECCHIO: Thank you, Chair
3 Mitchell.

4 CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you.

5 (Whereupon, the prefiled direct
6 testimony of Arjun Makhijani and
7 prefiled summary testimony of
8 Arjun Makhijani were copied into the
9 record as if given orally from the
10 stand.)
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**STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
UTILITIES COMMISSION
RALEIGH**

DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179

In the Matter of:)	
Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and)	DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 2022)	ARJUN MAKHIJANI, Ph.D.
Biennial Integrated Resource Plans)	ON BEHALF OF THE
and Carbon Plan)	ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP

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I. INTRODUCTION

Q: PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS, AND CURRENT POSITION.

A: My name is Dr. Arjun Makhijani. My business address is P.O. Box 5324, Takoma Park, MD 20913. I am the President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.

Q: WHAT ARE YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH?

A: In my role as the President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, my responsibilities include being the principal researcher and writer on projects, being responsible for the fiscal soundness of the Institute and reporting to the Board about its finances and the substance of the work.

Q: PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.

A: I hold a Bachelor of Engineering (Electrical) from the University of Bombay, a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering from Washington State University, and a Ph.D. in Engineering specializing in nuclear fusion from the Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences department of the University of California at Berkeley.

Over the past forty years, I have produced various studies and articles on nuclear fuel cycle-related issues, including nuclear energy, nuclear weapons production, testing, and nuclear waste (both power and

1 weapons-related). My energy work goes back over fifty years. My most
2 recent comprehensive work on renewable energy is *Prosperous, Renewable*
3 *Maryland: Roadmap for a Healthy, Economical, and Equitable Energy*
4 *Future*, which is based on hour-by-hour modeling of the Maryland
5 electricity sector, as well as energy justice considerations in a transition to
6 renewable energy. I am the principal author of the first study ever done on
7 conservation potential in the U.S. economy (1971).

8 In the last decade, I have authored or co-authored numerous articles
9 and reports relating to the transition to a decarbonized energy system,
10 including on land use, energy justice, electrification of buildings that now
11 use fossil fuels and the cost of distributed solar for new residential
12 construction. I am a member of the Mitigation Work Group of the Maryland
13 Commission on Climate Change and a member of the Advisory Council of
14 the state-created non-profit agency, the Maryland Clean Energy Center.

15 I have served as a consultant on energy issues to utilities, including
16 the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"), the Edison Electric Institute, the
17 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and several agencies of the United
18 Nations. In 2007, I was elected a Fellow of the American Physical Society,
19 an honor granted to at most one-half-of-one-percent of the Society's
20 members. I am a co-author of *Investment Planning in the Energy Sector*,
21 which was produced in the 1970s during one of my consulting contracts
22 with Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

1 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE NORTH**
2 **CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION (“THE COMMISSION”)?**

3 **A:** No.

4 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TESTIMONY OR**
5 **COMMENT AS AN EXPERT BEFORE ANY OTHER**
6 **REGULATORY BODIES OR FORUMS?**

7 **A:** Yes. I presented testimony before the California Public Utilities
8 Commission’s *En Banc* hearing as an energy expert for the Just Solutions
9 Collective on the integration of affordability, decarbonization, and
10 modernization of the electric grid.¹ I have provided comments and
11 presented testimony on behalf of the Institute for Energy and Environmental
12 Research before the Public Service Commission of Maryland.² I have also
13 presented testimony before the United States Nuclear Regulatory
14 Commission’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. Further, I have

¹ Testimony on Integrating Equity and Affordability into Energy Transition in California. The California Public Utilities Commission Affordability Proceeding Phase 3 *En Banc* hearing (2022). Available online: <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/en-banc/makhijani-slides-w-alt-image-and-link-text.pdf>.

² Presentation on Net Metering and Distributed Energy Resources, *In the Matter of the Investigation Into the Technical and Financial Barriers to the Deployment of Small Distributed Energy Resources*, the Public Service Commission of Maryland, Public Conference 40 (2015); Comments regarding report by Gabel Associates, Inc. on the advisability of establishing an opt-in electric affordability program for residential and small business customers. *In the Matter of the Advisability of Establishing an Opt-In Electric Affordability Program for Residential and Small Business Customers*, the Public Service Commission of Maryland, Public Conference 47 (2017); Comments regarding the Electric Universal Service Program Proposed Operations Plan for Fiscal Year 2019. *In the Matter of the Electric Universal Service Program*, the Public Service Commission of Maryland, Case No. 8903 (2018).

1 presented testimony on behalf of Southern Alliance for Clean Energy before
2 the Georgia Public Service Commission.³

3 **Q: ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS**
4 **PROCEEDING?**

5 **A:** I am testifying on behalf of the Environmental Working Group.

6 **Q: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS**
7 **PROCEEDING?**

8 **A:** The purpose of my testimony is: 1) to address the costs, risks, and reliability
9 of the proposed new nuclear technology and nuclear generation in the
10 Carbon Plan filed on May 16, 2022 by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
11 (“DEC”) and Duke Energy Progress, LLC (“DEP”) (collectively, “Duke
12 Energy”); 2) to address the cost and schedule challenges associated with
13 Duke Energy’s proposed reliance on Small Modular Reactors (“SMRs”) and
14 advanced nuclear reactors as well as certain technical risks, given the
15 history of such reactor programs and proposals; 3) to address the need for
16 the Commission to acknowledge the reality and history associated with
17 nuclear power from both large and small reactors and the unlikelihood of
18 fitting into a least-cost profile that achieves the carbon reduction goals of
19 North Carolina House Bill 951 (“HB 951”); and 4) to point out the need for
20 additional portfolios because Duke Energy’s proposed portfolios were
21 similar in most major respects, including the very large amount of new

³ Testimony on Georgia Power Company’s Integrated Resource Plan, Georgia Public Service Commission Docket No. 24505-U (2007).

1 nuclear energy planned in all of them, and because they did not include
2 technologies that could make decarbonization more efficient, cost-effective,
3 and resilient.

4 **Q: HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY**
5 **ORGANIZED?**

6 **A:** The remainder of my testimony consists of two parts and two subparts
7 which are organized consistent with the outline provided in ordering
8 paragraph 1 of the Commission's *Order Scheduling Expert Witness*
9 *Hearing, Requiring Filing of Testimony, and Establishing Discovery*
10 *Guidelines* entered on July 29, 2022.

- 11 • Part II will address the topic that the Commission has identified in
12 part as "Near-Term Development Activity—prudence of
13 development work and need for long-lead time resources." Part II
14 contains two subparts: subpart (A.) will address the costs, risks, and
15 reliability of Duke Energy's proposed new nuclear technology and
16 generation, and subpart (B.) will address the cost, schedule, and
17 technical challenges associated with Duke Energy's proposed
18 reliance on SMRs and advanced nuclear reactors.
- 19 • In light of the above, in Part III, I will discuss for the Commission's
20 consideration a framework for a range of portfolios that will help
21 meet the requirements of HB 951 to design the least cost plan and
22 meet or exceed present grid reliability levels.

1 **II. TOPIC: NEAR-TERM DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY—**
2 **PRUDENCE OF DEVELOPMENT WORK AND NEED FOR**
3 **LONG-LEAD TIME RESOURCES**

4
5 **A. Costs, Risks, and Reliability of Duke Energy’s Proposed New**
6 **Nuclear Technology and Nuclear Generation**

7
8 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF HISTORICAL**
9 **DELAYS AND COST OVERRUNS ASSOCIATED WITH**
10 **DEVELOPING AND CONSTRUCTING NUCLEAR FACILITIES?**

11 **A:**A “nuclear renaissance” was proclaimed in the 2000s and quickly fizzled
12 out. Plans for 34 reactors were announced⁴ and construction started on only
13 four proposed reactors. Of those that did not materialize, six were proposed
14 and cancelled by Duke Energy. In the case of Duke Energy’s proposal for
15 two reactors at the Shearon Harris site, the company signed a construction
16 contract, but abandoned the licensing effort after that.⁵ Additionally, Duke
17 Energy abandoned plans to construct two reactors at the William States Lee
18 III site in 2017, after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) had
19 completed its licensing review.⁶ In all, Duke Energy pursued plans for six
20 new nuclear units within eight years; no nuclear capacity resulted from these
21 efforts.

22 Two of the four “nuclear renaissance” reactors that broke ground
23 and proceeded with construction were Summer Units 2 and 3 in South

⁴ Larry Parker & Mark Holt, Nuclear Power: Outlook for New U.S. Reactors, Table 1 (Cong. Rsch. Serv., 2007), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL33442.pdf>.

⁵ Mark Holt, Nuclear Energy Policy 6–9 (Cong. Rsch. Serv., 2014), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL33558.pdf>.

⁶ World Nuclear News, *Duke Seeks to Cancel Plans for Lee AP1000s*, (Aug. 29, 2017), <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Duke-seeks-to-cancel-plans-for-Lee-AP1000s-2908175.html>.

1 Carolina. Construction on both was abandoned after an expenditure of \$9
2 billion.⁷ The other two, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 in Georgia have faced serious
3 cost overruns and delays. The initial cost estimate of \$14 billion for both
4 units has skyrocketed to more than \$30 billion.⁸ The planned starting dates
5 for the Vogtle units of 2016 and 2017 have since gone by and the current
6 estimate for a start-up date is 2023.⁹

7 The experience of the failed “nuclear renaissance”—when things
8 were supposed to be more efficient and cost effective—has been
9 considerably worse than the first round of major construction during which
10 more than 120 announced nuclear units were cancelled.¹⁰ In that round, a
11 similar number of units, including those now owned by Duke Energy, were
12 actually built and commissioned. This approximately 50-50 record is not
13 good; but it did yield the largest fleet of nuclear power reactors in the world.
14 Things have gone backwards since that time: if the two Vogtle units come
15 online, as appears likely, the record of the “nuclear renaissance” would be
16 considerably worse—a completion success rate of about six percent.

17 It has been no different with France, a leading western country in
18 nuclear power generation. Its new reactor design, the 1,600-megawatt EPR,

⁷ Akela Lacy, *South Carolina Spent \$9 Billion to Dig a Hole in the Ground and Then Fill it Back in*, The Intercept (Feb. 6, 2019), <https://theintercept.com/2019/02/06/south-caroline-green-new-deal-south-carolina-nuclear-energy/>.

⁸ See David Schlissel, Southern Company’s Troubled Vogtle Nuclear Project (Inst. for Energy Econs. and Fin. Analysis 2022), https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Southern-Companys-Troubled-Vogtle-Nuclear-Project_January-2022.pdf.

⁹ Kristi E. Swartz, *Plant Vogtle Hits New Delays; Costs Surge Near \$30B*, E&E NEWS (Feb. 18, 2022), <https://www.eenews.net/articles/plant-vogtle-hits-new-delays-costs-surge-near-30b/>.

¹⁰ Larry Parker & Mark Holt, Nuclear Power: Outlook for New U.S. Reactors, CRS-3 (Cong. Rsch. Serv., 2007), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL33442.pdf>.

1 was offered to Finland at a price of 3 billion euros and construction was
2 supposed to be completed in 2009. The reactor finally began power
3 production for the grid on a test basis in the first part of 2022; a mishap shut
4 it down, and test production is set to be completed (after repairs) in
5 December 2022.¹¹ In the meantime, the cost has almost quadrupled to 11
6 billion euros.¹²

7 The record in France itself is also not promising. Costs for the
8 Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant EPR have ballooned from an estimated
9 3.3 billion euros to 12.7 billion euros and the scheduled commissioning has
10 been delayed from an initial estimate of 2012 to 2023.¹³

11 Finally, it is essential to note that the nuclear industry in western
12 countries, centered in the United States and France, does not have a
13 promising record of learning from experience. On the contrary, costs in both
14 countries increased as more reactors were built.¹⁴

15 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT YOU MEAN BY A FAILED**
16 **“NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE?”**

¹¹ World Nuclear News, *Olkiluoto 3 test production to continue until December*, (June 16, 2022), <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Olkiluoto-3-test-production-to-continue-until-Dece>.

¹² Schneider et al., *The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2019*, p. 66 (Sep. 2019), <https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnsr2019-v2-hr.pdf>.

¹³ Schneider et al., *The World Nuclear Industry Report 2021*, pp. 92-94 (Sep. 2021), <https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnsr2021-lr.pdf>.

¹⁴ Jonathan G Koomey & Nathan E Hultman, *A Reactor-Level Analysis of Busbar Costs for US Nuclear Plants, 1970–2005*, 35 *Energy Pol’y* 5630 (2007); Arnulf Grubler, *The French Pressurised Water Reactor Programme*, *Energy Technology Innovation: Learning from Historical Successes and Failures*, p. 146 (Arnulf Grubler & Charlie Wilson eds., 2013).

1 **A:** In nearly two decades, no proposed new nuclear reactor has been completed
2 or supplied power to the grid. The two Vogtle reactors in Georgia, the only
3 ones still under construction, represent about six percent of the 34
4 announced reactors, presuming they are completed. It is worth repeating
5 that six of the unrealized “nuclear renaissance” reactors were proposed by
6 Duke Energy, which spent resources on them for licensing and contracting
7 processes.

8 **Q: FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS THAT HAVE REACHED**
9 **THE POINT OF OPERATION, HAVE ANY BEEN PREMATURELY**
10 **RETIRED?**

11 **A:** Yes. Several reactors have been retired before their license expiry.

12 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE DISCUSS WHY NUCLEAR POWER**
13 **REACTORS HAVE BEEN RETIRED DESPITE BEING LICENSED**
14 **TO OPERATE BEYOND THE TIME OF THEIR RETIREMENT?**

15 **A:** High operating costs have been one of the main reasons the number of
16 operating reactors dropped from 104 at the close of 2010 to 92 in July 2022.
17 Losses from operating an uneconomical plant can be considerable.

18 For instance, in 2018, NextEra estimated that it would save
19 customers nearly \$300 million (present value) by prematurely shutting
20 down the Duane Arnold reactor and generating wind power instead.
21 Reactors have also been shut down for issues related to steam generator
22 replacement. This was the case for two reactors in California (San Onofre)

1 and one in Florida (Crystal River). The latter belongs to Duke Energy; it
2 was shut down for refueling, steam generator replacement, and a power
3 uprate. It was shut down permanently in 2013 due to problems and delays
4 associated with the steam generator replacement.¹⁵

5 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE SUMMARIZE AND COMMENT ON THE**
6 **FINAL RESOURCE ADDITIONS OF EACH PORTFOLIO FOR**
7 **2050 IN DUKE ENERGY'S CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN?**

8 **A:** As indicated in Appendix E, Table E-71 of the Carolinas Carbon Plan, all
9 four portfolios in the Carolinas Carbon Plan contain either 9,900 MW or
10 10,200 MW of new nuclear in 2050, which includes SMR and advanced
11 nuclear with integrated storage reactor design options. The highest nuclear
12 capacity is only about three percent greater than the lowest.

13 The combined combustion turbine and combined cycle gas-fired
14 generation capacity is also similar, ranging from 8,800 MW to 9,900 MW
15 across scenarios in 2050. The portfolios are also the same or similar in other
16 major respects, such as the amount of onshore wind, the level of efficiency
17 assumed, the amount of pumped hydro storage, and solar power capacity.
18 Offshore wind capacity varies across portfolios from 0 to 3,200 MW;
19 however, even the highest level would be a small fraction of generation

¹⁵ Duke Energy News Release, *Crystal River Nuclear Plant to be retired; company evaluating sites for potential new gas-fueled generation*, (Feb. 5, 2013), <https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/crystal-river-nuclear-plant-to-be-retired;-company-evaluating-sites-for-potential-new-gas-fueled-generation>.

1 requirements in 2050. Battery capacity varies somewhat across portfolios,
2 from a low of 5,900 MW to a high of 7,400 MW in the year 2050.

3 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, DOES DUKE ENERGY’S “NEW SUPPLY-
4 SIDE RESOURCE CAPITAL COST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS”¹⁶
5 CONSIDER HISTORICAL COST ESCALATIONS AS
6 DEMONSTRATED BY THE FAILED “NUCLEAR
7 RENAISSANCE?”**

8 **A:** No. Duke Energy did a capital cost sensitivity for nuclear and estimated the
9 present value of cumulative impacts at \$4 billion for a proposed portfolio of
10 about 10,000 MW. This does not reflect historical or recent cost escalations.
11 The cost of just two Vogtle reactors under construction had cost overruns
12 of more than \$16 billion, about \$7 billion per gigawatt of capacity. Duke
13 Energy is proposing to build 10 gigawatts of capacity. Moreover,
14 corporations also spent money on the “nuclear renaissance” projects that
15 were cancelled, including six proposed by Duke Energy.

16 Had Duke Energy’s sensitivity analysis reflected real-life
17 experience, its estimate would have been well over an order of magnitude
18 more than Duke Energy’s calculations. Moreover, even the very low
19 estimate of \$4 billion was not examined for its impact on the mix of
20 generation in their four proposed portfolios. Cost estimates of SMRs and

¹⁶ Duke Energy, Carolinas Carbon Plan Chapter 3 at 14-15 (May 16, 2022) (hereinafter “Carolinas Carbon Plan”).

1 advanced reactors also depend in part on mass manufacturing components
2 more than larger present-day reactors.

3 A sensitivity analysis should take into account the possibility that
4 there may not be sufficient orders for such reactors to establish the lower
5 costs anticipated by the time Duke Energy orders its reactors.

6 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, DOES A COST GAP EXIST BETWEEN**
7 **NUCLEAR AND RENEWABLE POWER?**

8 **A:** Yes. Renewable energy, specifically wind and solar, has come down rapidly
9 in cost in the last 10 to 15 years. Lazard, a Wall Street firm, publishes cost
10 estimates of electricity generation from new power plants towards the end
11 of each calendar year. In its 2021 edition, it showed unsubsidized levelized
12 cost declines for generation from utility-scale solar power plants from \$359
13 per megawatt-hour (MWh) in 2009 to \$36/MWh in 2021.¹⁷ The
14 corresponding values for onshore wind were \$135/MWh in 2009 to \$38 per
15 MWh in 2021.¹⁸ Offshore wind costs have also declined, but the history is
16 based on European experience, where many offshore wind farms have been
17 built. In 2021, Lazard estimated the range of offshore wind electricity cost
18 as between \$66 and \$100/MWh.¹⁹

19 In contrast, the estimated unsubsidized costs of nuclear electricity
20 have risen from an estimated \$123/MWh in 2009 to \$167/MWh in 2021.²⁰

¹⁷ Lazard's Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis—Version 15.0, 8 (Oct. 2021),
<https://www.lazard.com/media/451881/lazards-levelized-cost-of-energy-version-150-vf.pdf>.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.* at 17.

²⁰ *Id.* at 8.

1 The potential range of costs estimated for 2021 is also large—between
2 \$131/MWh and \$204/MWh in 2021.²¹ Of course, this presumes the reactors
3 are built and commissioned.

4 Solar is increasingly coupled with storage (as is the case in the Duke
5 Energy portfolios as well). Hence the utility-scale solar-plus-storage cost
6 is of interest. The costs of solar plus storage have also been declining
7 rapidly. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (“NREL”) estimated
8 that the unsubsidized levelized cost of utility-scale solar plus large-scale
9 storage was \$88/MWh in 2020 and that it declined to \$77/MWh in 2021;
10 this represents a decrease of over 12% in levelized cost in a single year.²²
11 The 2021 cost estimate of utility-scale solar with storage was less than half
12 the estimated cost of nuclear; as noted, in contrast to solar, nuclear costs
13 have tended to rise.

14 The above estimates are of unsubsidized costs. The practical
15 economic realities will change as a result of the newly enacted Inflation
16 Reduction Act with subsidies for nuclear, renewables, and storage. In the
17 case of solar with storage, the installed cost of utility scale projects with the
18 investment tax credit in 2021 was only about \$30/MWh.²³ If storage equal

²¹ *Id.* at 2.

²² Vignesh Ramasamy et al., U.S. Photovoltaic System and Energy Storage Cost Benchmarks: Q1 2021, p. 47 (Nat’l Energy Renewable Lab’y, 2021), <https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy22osti/80694.pdf>. The estimate does not include the investment tax credit: “In this year’s report, we calculate LCOE assuming long-term steady-state financing assumptions, with no investment tax credit and with interest rates higher than current historically low levels.” p. 44.

²³ Joachim Seel et al., Batteries Included: Top 10 Findings from Berkeley Lab Research on the Growth of Hybrid Power Plants in the United States, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, p. 6 (2022), https://eta-publications.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/berkeley_lab- battery_included - top_10_hybrid_research.pdf.

1 to the capacity of the solar installation were added, the “price adder” to the
2 cost of electricity would be \$20/MWh.²⁴ Nuclear costs will most likely
3 remain well above this level even with a comparable subsidy, such as a 30%
4 investment tax credit. Finally, the clear trendline for solar-plus storage costs
5 is sharply downward, so that costs are likely to remain low even when
6 subsidies expire by 2034. As noted, the trendline for nuclear is in the
7 opposite direction.

8 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD NEW NUCLEAR DESIGNS, SUCH**
9 **AS LIGHT WATER COOLED SMRS AND NON-LIGHT-WATER-**
10 **COOLED ADVANCED REACTORS, HAVE DIFFICULTY**
11 **COMPETING ON A COST BASIS WITH MORE ESTABLISHED**
12 **RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION METHODS?**

13 **A:** Yes. Several evaluations of the cost of electricity from SMRs have come up
14 with high estimates. For example, in its 2019 Integrated Resource Plan
15 (“IRP”), Idaho Power estimated a cost of \$121 per megawatt hour for a
16 NuScale plant operating at a 90% capacity factor.²⁵ More recently,
17 Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
18 (“CSIRO”) has estimated that the cost of generating electricity from an

²⁴ *Id.* at p. 6, Figure 4.

²⁵ Integrated Resource Plan 2019, IDAHO POWER, Appendix C (2020),
<https://www.idahopower.com/energy-environment/energy/planning-and-electrical-projects/our-twentyyear-plan/>.

1 SMR would be between A\$136 and A\$326 (Australian dollars) (about \$95
2 to \$228 in U.S. dollars) per megawatt hour.²⁶

3 As I have noted already, costs of solar would remain well below the
4 cost of nuclear even when storage equal to 100% of the solar capacity is
5 added. While a full comparison of a high variable renewable portfolio with
6 a high nuclear portfolio would be done on a system basis (as indicted in the
7 portfolios I suggested for evaluation in my July statement²⁷ and also in this
8 testimony), the margin between the high cost of nuclear and the low cost of
9 renewables plus storage is so large that nuclear would have great difficulty
10 competing with renewables.

11 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN WHETHER SMRS ARE**
12 **ECONOMICALLY SUITABLE FOR RESPONDING TO**
13 **VARIABILITY.**

14 **A:** SMRs are not economically viable even at 90% or 95% average capacity
15 factor. If SMRs respond to the variability of wind and solar by adjusting
16 power output downward when renewable output is high and upward when
17 renewable output falls, their average capacity factor will fall. Thus, the most
18 important component of cost—capital cost—will be spread out over a
19 smaller number of megawatt hours, raising the per unit cost of electricity.

²⁶ Paul Graham, et al., Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, p. 76 at Apx Table B.9 (July 2022), https://www.csiro.au/-/media/News-releases/2022/GenCost-2022/GenCost2021-22Final_20220708.pdf. An exchange rate of A\$1 = USD\$0.70 was used. It has varied from a little below to a little above that rate in recent weeks. A historical chart of the Australian dollar to U.S. dollar exchange rate is available at <https://www.macrotrends.net/2551/australian-us-dollar-exchange-rate-historical-chart>.

²⁷ Initial Comments of Environmental Working Group, Attachment A.

1 For instance, costs per megawatt-hour of SMR electricity would increase
2 by about 25% if annual capacity factor falls from 95% to 75%.²⁸

3 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PRIMARY DIFFERENCE**
4 **BETWEEN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REACTORS AND**
5 **SMRS?**

6 **A:** 1,000 MW is the usual reference size for large nuclear reactors though they
7 can be a couple of hundred megawatts smaller; of course, there are also
8 designs larger than 1,000 MW. Large reactors have generally been chosen
9 because they offer economies of scale. SMRs are modular, i.e.,
10 standardized, reactors that are relatively small, usually meaning 300 MW or
11 less per reactor. Of course, nuclear plants often have more than one unit;
12 that would generally be the case for SMRs.

13 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, DO SMRS OFFER ECONOMIES OF SCALE?**

14 **A:** No. The term “economies of scale” means that, all else being equal, the cost
15 per kilowatt of capacity of a larger reactor would be less than that of a
16 smaller unit. The total cost of an SMR would be lower because the capacity
17 and, hence, electricity generation per unit would be lower. The cost per unit
18 of capacity matters because that is the main determinant of the cost of
19 electricity from nuclear power.

²⁸ M.V. Ramana, *Eyes Wide Shut: Problems with the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems Proposal to Construct NuScale Small Modular Nuclear Reactors*, Oregon Phys. for Soc. Resp., p. 15 (2020), https://www.oregonpsr.org/small_modular_reactors_smrs.

1 The cost per kilowatt of nuclear reactor capacity tends to decrease
2 with increasing size because the amount of steel, cement, other materials,
3 and the number of welds (and the required labor), etc., do not increase
4 linearly with size.

5 Loss of economies of scale would tend to make capital cost per
6 kilowatt higher. For example, most of the early small reactors built in the
7 United States shut down early because they could not compete
8 economically.²⁹

9 **Q: ARE THERE WAYS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE POORER**
10 **ECONOMICS OF SMALL REACTORS?**

11 **A:** SMR proponents propose mass manufacturing and assembly-line style
12 construction as one means of overcoming the loss of economies of scale.
13 This, in turn, implies that there must be a considerable order book for SMRs
14 to compensate, in whole or in part, for the loss of economies of scale. They
15 also have simplified designs as a way to lower costs.

16 **Q: HOW COULD MODULARITY AND FACTORY**
17 **MANUFACTURING COMPENSATE FOR THE POORER**
18 **ECONOMICS OF SMALL REACTORS?**

19 **A:** Mass manufacturing is a standard way to lower costs for industrial products
20 dating back to the famous Ford Model T assembly lines. A current example

²⁹ M.V. Ramana, *The forgotten history of small nuclear reactors*, Inst. of Electrical and Electronics
Eng'rs Spectrum (Apr. 2015), [https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-forgotten-history-of-small-nuclearreactors#
toggle-gdpr](https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-forgotten-history-of-small-nuclearreactors#toggle-gdpr).

1 of an expensive investment that is mass manufactured would be large
2 passenger aircraft such as Boeing Dreamliners, Boeing 737s, and Airbus
3 350s. Much of the savings would arise from modularity and factory
4 manufacturing.³⁰

5 Proponents of SMRs acknowledge that a significant order book will
6 be necessary for the projected economies of standardizing the design to be
7 realized. The first units would therefore be more expensive. Industry
8 proponents estimate that the order book would have to be in the dozens to
9 one hundred reactors;³¹ independent estimates put the order book
10 requirement in the hundreds or reactors (at least) for an assembly approach
11 to compensate for the loss of economies of scale.³² Moreover, all this would
12 need to happen on the schedule that Duke Energy envisions for adding
13 reactors—for each substantially different design. Most importantly, it
14 would need to happen on a schedule that is consonant with the
15 decarbonization requirements of HB 951.³³

16 In this context, it is important to note that in reality costs increased
17 as more plants were built in the United States and France, the countries with

³⁰ Giorgio Locatelli et al., Small Modular Reactors: A Comprehensive Overview of their Economics and Strategic Aspects, 73 Prog. Nucl. Energy 75 (2014).

³¹ Arjun Makhijani, Light Water Designs of Small Modular Reactors: Facts and Analysis, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, p. 5 (Sept. 2013), <http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/SmallModularReactors.RevisedSept2013.pdf>; Heba Hashem, Westinghouse: Taking care of business, Nuclear Energy Insider, (Feb. 12, 2014).

³² See Alexander Glaser et al., Small Modular Reactors: A Window on Nuclear Energy (Princeton Univ., 2015), <https://acee.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Andlinger-Nuclear-Distillate.pdf>.

³³ See Arjun Makhijani, Light Water Designs of Small Modular Reactors: Facts and Analysis, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, pp. 5-7 (Sept. 2013), <http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/SmallModularReactors.RevisedSept2013.pdf>.

1 the highest numbers of nuclear plants.³⁴ As a result, there is no guarantee
2 that even with a substantial order book, costs will decline to the estimated
3 levels.

4 After this monumental task, even if SMRs were to consistently
5 achieve the same per-unit costs as the present large reactors, they would still
6 be an economic failure, given the high costs of large reactors.³⁵

7 **Q: CAN YOU PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF SMRS DEPLOYED AT A**
8 **COMMERCIAL SCALE IN THE UNITED STATES?**

9 **A:** There are none.

10 **Q: ARE THERE ANY SMRS THAT EXIST IN THE UNITED STATES?**

11 **A:** No SMRs have been built in the United States.

12 **Q: WHAT REACTOR DESIGNS HAS DUKE ENERGY IDENTIFIED**
13 **AS VIABLE FOR CONTRIBUTING TO THE 70% CO₂ EMISSIONS**
14 **REDUCTIONS TARGET SET OUT IN HB 951?**

15 **A:** In Appendix L, Table L-5 of the Carolinas Carbon Plan,³⁶ Duke Energy
16 identifies two SMRs and two advanced reactors that are scheduled to be
17 built and in commercial operation by the end of 2029. These designs
18 include:

- 19
 - Natrium Reactor Liquid Sodium-cooled

³⁴ Jonathan G Koomey & Nathan E Hultman, A Reactor-Level Analysis of Busbar Costs for US Nuclear Plants, 1970–2005, 35 Energy Pol’y 5630 (2007); Arnulf Grubler, The French Pressurised Water Reactor Programme, Energy Technology Innovation: Learning from Historical Successes and Failures, p. 146 (Arnulf Grubler & Charlie Wilson eds., 2013).

³⁵ Arjun Makhijani & M. V. Ramana, Can Small Modular Reactors Help Mitigate Climate Change?, 77 Bull. at. Sci. 207 (2021), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2021.1941600>.

³⁶ Duke Energy, Carolinas Carbon Plan Appendix L, Table L-5 at p. 10.

- 1 • Xe-100 Reactor Helium Gas-cooled High Temperature
- 2 • BWRX-300 Reactor Light Water-cooled (“BWR”)
- 3 • VOYGR Reactor Light Water-cooled (PWR), i.e., NuScale’s latest
- 4 design.

5 Duke Energy plans to use only light-water-cooled designs for the 70% target

6 in two of its portfolios.³⁷

7 **Q: HAVE ANY OF THE REACTOR DESIGNS IDENTIFIED BY DUKE**

8 **ENERGY IN APPENDIX L, TABLE L-5 OF THE CAROLINAS**

9 **CARBON PLAN BEEN APPROVED BY THE NRC?**

10 **A:** No. Only one of the reactor designs, NuScale, has provisional certification

11 for its 50 MW version; it may be granted full certification in the near future.

12 However, the VOYGR NuScale reactor listed by Duke Energy is a 77 MW

13 reactor, a capacity more than 50% above the capacity of the certified

14 reactor. This larger capacity reactor will have to be certified in a separate

15 process. The NRC website states that this version is in the pre-application

16 stage.³⁸

17 **Q: HAVE ANY REACTOR DESIGNS IDENTIFIED BY DUKE**

18 **ENERGY IN APPENDIX L, TABLE L-5 OF THE CAROLINAS**

19 **CARBON PLAN BEEN CONSTRUCTED?**

20 **A:** No.

³⁷ Duke Energy, Carolinas Carbon Plan Appendix E, Table E-39 at p. 35 and E-69 at p. 77.

³⁸ U.S. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standard Design Approval (SDA) Application – NuScale US460 (last updated on July 12, 2022), <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/smr/nuscale-720-sda.html>.

1 **Q: WHAT IS THE EARLIEST DATE WHEN ANY REACTOR DESIGN**
2 **IDENTIFIED BY DUKE ENERGY IN APPENDIX L, TABLE L-5 OF**
3 **THE CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN WILL COME ONLINE?**

4 **A:** According to Table L-5 in Appendix L, three of the listed designs are
5 “expected” to be online in 2028. However, none of these designs have been
6 certified. Two are non-light-water designs. The NuScale design has an
7 expected online date of 2029. This has been greatly delayed. In 2008,
8 NuScale officials expected an online date of 2015-2016; it took until 2016
9 for NuScale to even submit its application for certification—for the 50 MW
10 design. However, NuScale’s Idaho project, which would be the first for
11 commercial production, is now going to be based on a 77 MW reactor, that
12 has not been certified and is still in the pre-application stage. This is the
13 version of the NuScale reactor that Duke Energy has included in its list. The
14 historical record is not promising for commissioning on schedule.

15 Duke Energy should carefully evaluate this record of delays and
16 changes in preparing the schedule for the dates at which it proposes to add
17 SMRs and advanced reactors to its portfolio.

18 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS THE POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT ISSUES**
19 **WITH EACH REACTOR DESIGN IDENTIFIED BY DUKE**
20 **ENERGY IN APPENDIX L, TABLE L-5 OF THE CAROLINAS**
21 **CARBON PLAN?**

22 **A:**

- 1 • The BWRX-300 Reactor Light Water-cooled by GE Hitachi is a
2 relatively new SMR; its conceptual design only started in 2017.³⁹
3 The BWRX-300 is based on GE-HITACHI's Economical
4 Simplified Boiling Water Reactor design, which was never
5 constructed anywhere in the world and has a checkered certification
6 history; the design was changed nine times before the 10th version
7 was certified. The BWRX-300 has not been licensed for
8 construction, has not been submitted for formal certification to any
9 national safety regulator, and therefore, has never been constructed
10 anywhere in the word. It would be prudent to anticipate significant
11 delays in the "expected" 2028 commissioning date announced for
12 the first reactor.
- 13 • As noted, certification of the 77 MW VOYGR Reactor Light-
14 Water-cooled design by NuScale is in the pre-application stage and
15 has faced significant deployment delays.
- 16 • The certification of the Natrium Reactor Liquid Sodium-cooled by
17 TerraPower and GE Hitachi was in the pre-application phase as of
18 mid-August 2022.⁴⁰ It should be noted that the proposed fuel is
19 High Assay Low-Enriched Uranium ("HALEU"), which has

³⁹ Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Advances in Small Modular Reactor Technology Developments: A Supplement T: Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS) 2020 Ed. 93 (2020), https://aris.iaea.org/Publications/SMR_Book_2020.pdf.

⁴⁰ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Natrium — Project Overview (last updated on August 15, 2022), <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/licensing-activities/pre-application-activities/natrium.html>.

1 uranium enrichments between 5% and 20%.⁴¹ HALEU fuel is not
2 used for any commercial reactor in the United States and is not
3 currently commercially produced in the United States. Unlike SMR
4 designs that would use fuel of up to 5% enrichment, the current
5 practice, HALEU implies security and certification considerations
6 related to the enrichment of the fuel. Specifically, enrichment
7 greater than 10% may raise proliferation concerns because other
8 countries, including non-nuclear weapon states, may want to follow
9 the United States' example.⁴²

- 10 • Pre-application stage certification activities for the Gas-cooled
11 High Temperature Xe-100 reactor by X-energy started in 2018. The
12 reactor was still in the pre-application stage as of June 30, 2022.⁴³
13 The Xe-100 appears likely to also use HALEU. The Office of
14 Nuclear Energy is supporting the manufacture of HALEU
15 graphite fuel pebbles by X-Energy,⁴⁴ which is developing the Xe-
16 100 reactor. The pre-application White Paper on the fuel that the
17 NRC is reviewing states that the Xe-100 would use low-enriched

⁴¹ Office of Nuclear Energy, *What is High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU)?*,
<https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/what-high-assay-low-enriched-uranium-haleu>.

⁴² For a discussion on security issues associated with various levels of reactor fuel enrichment, see Edwin Lyman, "Advanced" Isn't Always Better: Assessing the Safety, Security and Environmental Impacts of Non-Light Water Reactors, Union of Concerned Scientists (March 2021),
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/ucs-rpt-AR-3.21-web_Mayrev.pdf.

⁴³ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Xe-100 — Project Overview, (last updated on June 30, 2022),
<https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced/licensing-activities/pre-application-activities/x-100.html>.

⁴⁴ Office of Nuclear Energy, X-energy's TRISO-X Fuel Fabrication Facility to Produce Fuel for Advanced Nuclear Reactors, Department of Energy pp. 4, 17 (April 8, 2022), <https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/x-energys-triso-x-fuel-fabrication-facility-produce-fuel-advanced-nuclear-reactors>.

1 uranium (“LEU”) fuel; however, the same document defines LEU
2 as “<20%” enrichment.⁴⁵ This is unusual, since it is normal practice
3 to distinguish between the LEU now used in commercial reactors,
4 which is up to 5% enrichment, and LEU which has enrichments
5 between 5% and 20%, and call it HALEU, due to its greater
6 proliferation implications. Finally, the International Atomic Energy
7 Agency, in its 2020 edition on SMRs states that the Xe-100 reactor
8 would use 15.5% enriched fuel.⁴⁶ It therefore appears that the Xe-
9 100 reactor will be using HALEU fuel and that its licensing process
10 may face the same additional fuel review as the Natrium reactor on
11 this account.

12 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, ARE DUKE ENERGY’S PORTFOLIOS**
13 **SPECULATIVE GIVEN ITS RELIANCE ON SMRS BEING**
14 **DEPLOYED AS EARLY AS 2032?**

15 **A:** Yes. The history of SMRs is replete with substantial delays and changes.
16 Certification processes are prolonged. Neither of the proposed light-water
17 designs is certified. While the light-water designs are based on the same
18 principles as current commercial reactors, their designs have been modified

⁴⁵ X-Energy, LLC, Submission of X Energy, LLC (X-energy) Xe-100 Topical Report: TRISO-X Pebble Fuel Qualification Methodology, Revision 2, Enclosure 3: X Energy, LLC Xe-100 Topical Report: TRISO-X Pebble Fuel Qualification Methodology, (Non-Proprietary), pdf. p. 24 (Sept. 2, 2021), <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2124/ML21246A289.pdf>.

⁴⁶ International Atomic Energy Agency, Advances in Small Modular Reactor Technology Developments: A Supplement to IAEA Advanced Reactors Information System (ARIS), 2020 Ed. p. 175 (Sept. 2020), https://aris.iaea.org/Publications/SMR_Book_2020.pdf.

1 in part to reduce costs. Thus, the first reactors may face more than the usual
2 amount of teething troubles; this would delay subsequent reactors.

3 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS THE POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL RISKS**
4 **ASSOCIATED WITH THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR**
5 **TECHNOLOGY?**

6 **A:** David Lochbaum, a nuclear engineer with extensive experience in the
7 nuclear industry, in Non-Governmental Organizations, and in the NRC, has
8 shown that reactor operational risks follow a “bathtub curve” – high in the
9 early years due to factors such as material imperfections and mistakes in
10 assembly, low in the middle years, and rising again with age due to age-
11 related degradation.⁴⁷

12 For instance, Three Mile Island Unit 2 was just over a year old when
13 the infamous 1979 accident occurred. Chernobyl Unit 4 was also relatively
14 new – construction was completed in 1983; the accident occurred in 1986.

15 An analysis of early risks, relative to the average, would therefore
16 be a prudent part of planning if the Commission approves the exploration
17 of new designs, especially in view of the rapid rate at which new reactor
18 designs would be commissioned.

19 New designs or modifications of existing designs raise the risk of
20 such early operational difficulties. For instance, the NuScale reactors will
21 have their steam generators inside the reactor vessel. In contrast, existing

⁴⁷ David Lochbaum, *Nuclear power in the future: risks of a lifetime*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Feb. 24 2016), <https://thebulletin.org/2016/02/nuclear-power-in-the-future-risks-of-a-lifetime/>.

1 commercial pressurized water reactors (“PWRs”) have their steam
2 generators outside the reactor vessel but within the secondary containment
3 where they can be repaired or replaced. Problems with steam generators,
4 which have had to be prematurely replaced in existing PWRs, would be
5 more complex with the steam generator inside the reactor vessel.

6 **Q: IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT DUKE ENERGY’S PORTFOLIOS**
7 **PRESENT SIGNIFICANT SCHEDULE AND COST RISKS GIVEN**
8 **ITS RELIANCE ON SMRS AND ADVANCED REACTORS BEING**
9 **DEPLOYED AS EARLY AS 2032 AND THEN EACH YEAR AFTER**
10 **THAT?**

11 **A:** Yes. I have outlined the serious and varied risks associated with reliance on
12 either light water SMRs on a schedule that is very optimistic, given the
13 many delays that even light-water SMRs have experienced. It is essential,
14 given this experience, not to take the announced dates of commercial
15 operation of first-of-a-kind reactors at face value; instead, a careful
16 evaluation of the overall history and the specific history of each reactor is
17 called for to assess the cost and schedule risks. This is necessary for light-
18 water-cooled SMRs and even more necessary for the two non-light-water
19 designs that Duke Energy has selected. As I have noted, none of these
20 designs have even been certified. Duke Energy’s timeline and schedule⁴⁸
21 make no allowance for delays in the commissioning dates of the four first-

⁴⁸ Duke Energy, Carolinas Carbon Plan Appendix L, Figures L-3 and L-4 at pp. 12-13.

1 of-a-kind reactors, not to mention making allowances for those reactors to
2 operate for some time to work out and resolve any teething troubles.

3 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS HOW RELIANCE ON BOTH NEW AND**
4 **EXISTING NUCLEAR POWER CAN DESTABILIZE**
5 **SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF THE DUKE ENERGY ELECTRICITY**
6 **SYSTEM?**

7 **A:** Numerous factors in Duke Energy's proposed Carbon Plan create risks of a
8 deterioration of reliability. Reliance on relatively long lead-time new
9 nuclear is one of them. In addition, Duke Energy would be adding about
10 10,000 MW to its already substantial North Carolina portfolio of ~~7,500~~ 5,150
11 MW; this creates additional risks.

12 Specifically, nuclear power plants need grid electricity to operate
13 safely and produce power. Plants only have enough emergency power
14 supply to keep them in safe shutdown mode. A loss of grid power over a
15 wide area with high concentrations of nuclear power plants could
16 destabilize significant parts of the Duke Energy electricity system (and
17 perhaps beyond) because a large amount of electric generating capacity
18 would be taken offline—capacity which requires grid power to be restored
19 for power generation to resume.

20 **Q: CAN YOU PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF EVENTS THAT CAN**
21 **IMPACT DUKE ENERGY'S ELECTRICITY SYSTEM IF THERE IS**
22 **RELIANCE ON BOTH NEW AND EXISTING NUCLEAR POWER?**

1 **A:** For instance, an earthquake on August 23, 2011, shut down the North Anna
2 nuclear plant in Virginia for months. The ground-shaking was felt over a
3 wide swath of eastern North America from Georgia to Maine and Quebec;
4 it was felt all over North and South Carolina – that is the entire Duke Energy
5 DEC and DEP region. A similar event (or an even larger one, comparable
6 to the 1886 Charleston Earthquake), could paralyze the electricity system
7 for a significant time. Duke Energy’s proposed Carbon Plan has not
8 analyzed such an eventuality, even though the United States Geological
9 Survey recognizes the significant earthquake potential in the Southeastern
10 United States.⁴⁹ This vulnerability is not about whether such an event might
11 trigger an accident – that is a matter for the NRC to consider. It is about the
12 increased exposure of the electricity system to a widespread nuclear plant
13 shutdown (for instance for inspections and/or potential repairs) in case of
14 an earthquake comparable to or greater than the 2011 Virginia event.

15 As another example, extreme weather events are intensifying; they
16 could cause outages in large sections of the grid. Hurricane Ida in 2021
17 provided an example of all transmission lines into a major city, New
18 Orleans, failing simultaneously. This creates risks since nuclear power
19 plants need grid energy to restart supplying power.

⁴⁹ U.S. Geological Survey, Improved Earthquake Monitoring in the Central and Eastern United States in Support of Seismic Assessments for critical facilities, Open-File Report 2011-1101 (2011), <https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2011/1101/pdf/OF11-1101.pdf>.

1 A prolonged, decades-long reliance on existing nuclear capacity
2 may also create reliability issues. It would be prudent to examine such an
3 eventuality, given the recent events in France that have led to high prices
4 and large unplanned outages. Specifically, the discovery of stress corrosion
5 cracking in reactors in late 2021 led to far less capacity being available than
6 normal. France's energy regulator has stated that it will take years to fix the
7 problem.

8 As another example, adding about 10,000 MW to the existing ~~7,500~~ 5,150
9 MW of nuclear in North Carolina would create large new demands on water
10 resources, increasing vulnerability in times of heat waves—when capacity
11 is most needed. High summer water temperatures have already caused
12 occasional de-rating of nuclear plants. For instance, some French nuclear
13 power plants were de-rated during the 2003 heat wave, significantly
14 reducing available capacity. The problem of derating due to high water
15 temperature will tend to arise during the summer peak demand season,
16 creating pressure on the grid during that critical period. A recent analysis of
17 empirical data on nuclear plant performance showed that the rate of nuclear
18 power plant outages due to climate change was more than seven times
19 greater in the decade of the 2010s compared to the 1990s. The negative
20 impacts were due to factors as varied as droughts, hurricanes, and, as noted
21 in a recent article in the journal *Nature Energy*, an “excessive presence of
22 jellyfish, which have been shown to flourish in warmer waters under the

1 effect of climate change.”⁵⁰ The quantity of water required and the
2 vulnerabilities that that would create for the grid is a critical factor for
3 assessing any decarbonization plan.

4 It should be noted that solar photovoltaic and wind power plants
5 need essentially no water for their operation. The opportunity costs imposed
6 on competing uses and resources, like fish, which would also be impacted
7 by the heating of water resources, also need to be addressed in the context
8 of a warming climate and least cost planning.

9 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT ROLE SHOULD ADVANCED**
10 **NUCLEAR ENERGY PLAY IN TRANSITIONING FROM**
11 **CARBON-INTENSIVE GENERATION SUCH AS COAL OR**
12 **NATURAL GAS?**

13 **A:** Based on a variety of factors, no reliance should be placed on SMRs and
14 non-light-water advanced nuclear energy technologies to achieve the
15 decarbonization goals of HB 951. They are costly; their schedules are likely
16 to be delayed relative to the dates in Duke Energy’s portfolios; and the risks
17 and uncertainties involved are far too large to even put reliable upper limits
18 on costs and delays. The history of the failed nuclear renaissance is most
19 relevant here. After more than 15 years, not a single reactor of the dozens
20 announced has produced any electricity to date, despite modular designs
21 and simplified licensing that combined the construction and operating

⁵⁰ Ali Ahmad, *Increase in Frequency of Nuclear Power Outages Due to Changing Climate*, 6 Nature Energy pp. 755, 756 (July 2021).

1 licenses—two separate processes in the twentieth century—into a single
2 license.

3 Moreover, renewable energy and storage are available at a much
4 lower cost. Other non-nuclear advanced technologies are available to meet
5 all the needs of replacing fossil fuel generation without resorting to costly
6 and untried new nuclear technologies with known risk factors that are
7 substantial.

8 The non-light water reactors that Duke Energy has selected face
9 added risks. There are no operational commercial reactors in the United
10 States, small or large, that use the proposed design approaches in the Xe-
11 100 and Natrium reactors. The latter is a sodium-cooled design whose
12 concept goes back to the earliest days of nuclear power. Tens of billions of
13 dollars have been spent worldwide to commercialize this design; yet,
14 neither consistently reliable operation across reactors or time periods or
15 economics of production has yet been achieved. In addition, the Natrium
16 design would add molten salt storage, which has not been used in
17 association with nuclear reactors.

18 Gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactors have also had a troubled
19 history both in the United States and Germany. While the design is not
20 vulnerable to meltdowns, it is susceptible to fires and incursions of water.

1 Past commercial experience is not promising; all four commercial reactors
2 built in the United States and Germany were shut down early.⁵¹

3 There is therefore ample reason to be even more prudent when proposing to
4 rely on non-light-water SMR designs by a date certain to meet the HB 951
5 2050 target while achieving reasonable costs.

6 **Q: IS IT YOUR POSITION THAT NEAR-TERM DEVELOPMENT**
7 **ACTIVITIES RELATED TO ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTOR**
8 **TECHNOLOGY ON DUKE ENERGY'S PART ARE NOT PRUDENT**
9 **AT THIS TIME?**

10 **A:** They are not prudent investments at this time. Given the risks, status,
11 hurdles, and history, no expenditures are justified at this time. DEP and
12 DEC witness Regis Repko states that "initial development work is needed
13 both to gather information to provide a more refined cost estimate to the
14 Commission in future proceedings, as well as to allow the Companies to be
15 positioned to implement such resources on a timeline consistent with the
16 Companies' modeled portfolios."⁵² Duke Energy should have looked at its
17 six-reactor failed nuclear renaissance experience before proposing a high
18 risk, high capacity new nuclear portfolio of reactors that do not even have
19 certification. Their prospects are poor and much lower cost alternatives are
20 available.

⁵¹ M. V. Ramana, *The checkered operational history of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors*, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 3 (2016).

⁵² Docket No. E-100, Sub 179, Direct Testimony of Regis Repko et al. for Duke Energy Progress, LLC and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, pp. 8-9 (Aug. 19, 2022).

1 In light of this, expenditure of ratepayer funds is not justified at this
2 time. Should one or more new nuclear technologies progress in an
3 unexpected positive direction in terms of certification, cost, and scheduling
4 in the next few years, the issue of new nuclear technologies can be revisited
5 at that time with due focus on the more promising reactor types.

6 **B. Technical Challenges and Operational Problems Associated**
7 **with Duke Energy's Proposed Reliance on SMRs and Advanced**
8 **Nuclear Reactors**
9

10 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS THE POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL RISKS**
11 **ASSOCIATED WITH DUKE ENERGY'S PROPOSED SMRS AND**
12 **ADVANCED NUCLEAR REACTORS?**

13 **A:** The new nuclear technologies as a set pose a significant risk given the fact
14 that they are new, have never been built for commercial operation, and
15 therefore, have never operated commercially. I have already alluded to the
16 concept of the "bathtub curve," which demonstrates that there are more
17 problems in the early and late parts of the operating life of reactors.

18 An analysis of early risks, relative to the average, would therefore
19 be a prudent part of planning if the Commission approves the exploration
20 of new designs at some point, especially in view of the rapid rate at which
21 new reactor designs are proposed to be commissioned.

22 There are also specific risks associated with the different designs,
23 especially the advanced reactors. Sodium leaks have historically plagued
24 many sodium-cooled reactors. The Monju sodium-cooled nuclear reactor is
25 an example of the "bathtub curve" as applied to this case. It was shut down

1 due to a sodium leak and fire in 1995, having been completed in 1994. It
2 remained shut until 2010, when it was reopened and suffered another
3 accident, leading to permanent shut down.⁵³

4 The poor operating history of graphite moderator reactors should
5 also be evaluated. Four reactors of this type were all shut down with
6 operating lifetimes between just 7 and 10 years. The Peach Bottom reactor
7 in the United States started having operational problems in just over a year
8 after commissioning.⁵⁴

9 New waste types may also pose issues. As noted, graphite poses a
10 risk of fires. Its storage will present different issues than those of light-water
11 reactor spent fuel. Disposal will also present challenges specific to the fuel
12 type in addition to the issues generally connected with long-lived
13 radionuclides in high-level radioactive waste. A portion of the graphite will
14 become carbon-14 during reactor operation. This is a radioactive isotope of
15 carbon; when oxidized it becomes radioactive carbon dioxide that dissolves
16 in water and is emitted to the air, thereby posing the risk of making food
17 and water radioactive. For instance, in the 1990s an EPA scientific
18 subcommittee of the Radiation Advisory Committee concluded that
19 demonstrating that the disposal of light-water reactor spent fuel in an

⁵³ For the 1995 sodium leak accident *see* Thomas B. Cochran et al., *Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status*, Int'l Panel on Fissile Materials, p. 54 (2010), <http://ipfmlibrary.org/rr08.pdf>; For the permanent shut down, *see* World Nuclear News, *Japanese government says Monju will be scrapped*, (Dec. 22, 2016), <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Japanese-government-says-Monju-will-be-scrapped-2212164.html>.

⁵⁴ M. V. Ramana, *The checkered operational history of high-temperature gas-cooled reactors*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (2016).

1 unsaturated repository zone, such as the proposed Yucca Mountain
2 repository, would meet the release limit on carbon-14 in the prevailing
3 regulation (40 CFR 191, Table 1) could pose significant challenges.⁵⁵

4 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS SOME OF THE ISSUES THE TWO MOLTEN**
5 **SALT MICRO-REACTOR DESIGNS IDENTIFIED IN APPENDIX**
6 **L, TABLE L-5 OF THE CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN WOULD**
7 **LIKELY FACE IF DUKE ENERGY PURSUES THEM?**

8 **A:** Experience with molten salt reactors is very limited. Two have been built in
9 the United States; neither was designed to generate power. The first was an
10 aircraft reactor experiment; it operated for 100 hours. The second was a
11 pilot reactor of just 8 megawatts thermal—the Molten Salt Reactor
12 Experiment—built and operated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory; the heat
13 generated by the reactor was dissipated into the air (by design); no
14 electricity was generated. This molten fluoride fuel reactor had a short, four-
15 year operational period from 1966 to 1969 (inclusive) during which it
16 experienced several problems. As my colleague Dr. M.V. Ramana and I
17 noted in our 2021 article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Over the
18 four years, its operations were interrupted 225 times due to various
19 problems, including sudden, usually unscheduled, shutdowns (called

⁵⁵ Environmental Protection Agency, An SAB Report: Review of Gaseous Release of Carbon-14: Review by the Radiation Advisory Committee, of the Release of Carbon-14 in Gaseous Form from High-Level Waste Disposal, p. 2 (1993), <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0413/ML041330429.pdf>. Disclosure: I was a member of the EPA subcommittee that reviewed the issue.

1 “scrams”) and fuel draining down the freeze valve (a component often
2 touted as a safety feature in molten-salt reactor designs)”⁵⁶

3 Molten salt waste containing fission products may also pose
4 significantly more difficult problems of long-term high-level waste than the
5 ceramic fuel pellets used in light water reactors. While the specific post-
6 closure issues with the proposed reactors will likely differ somewhat from
7 the ones in Duke Energy’s table and may be less complex in the absence of
8 uranium-233 (which is a post-closure issue for the Oak Ridge reactor), it is
9 still worth noting that post closure costs of this reactor, whose size is in
10 between the two micro-reactors in Table L-5, run into hundreds of millions
11 of dollars.⁵⁷

12 **Q: CAN YOU PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF THE AMOUNT OF**
13 **DEVELOPMENT THAT MUST FIRST OCCUR TO HAVE DUKE**
14 **ENERGY’S PROPOSED SMRS ONLINE IN 2032?**

15 **A:** The proposed reactors have to be certified, the combined construction and
16 operating licenses have to be obtained, and the first reactors listed in
17 Appendix L, Table L-5 of the Carolinas Carbon Plan have to be built on
18 time at something resembling the costs assumed by Duke Energy. Even so,
19 for Duke Energy to bring the first SMR reactor online for commercial
20 operation in mid-2032, it would have to get a construction and operating

⁵⁶ Arjun Makhijani & M. V. Ramana, *Can Small Modular Reactors Help Mitigate Climate Change?*, 77
Bull. at. Sci. 207 (2021).

⁵⁷ *Id.*

1 license in 2026, begin initial construction in early 2028, and carry out full-
2 scale construction activities starting in mid-2029, according to Duke
3 Energy's own schedule.⁵⁸ This is approximately coincident with the
4 currently projected completion of SMRs identified in Appendix L, Table L-
5 5 with no allowance for delays and no allowances for a learning curve on
6 the initial reactors to overcome the early part of the "bathtub curve."

7 **Q: CAN YOU PROVIDE EXAMPLES OF FACTORS THAT MAY**
8 **DELAY COMPLIANCE WITH THE EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS**
9 **TARGET SET OUT IN HB 951 IF ALL PORTFOLIOS PROPOSED**
10 **BY DUKE ENERGY RELY ON SMR CAPACITY?**

11 **A:** There could be a variety of delays – in certification of the reactors (since
12 none of the specific reactors identified in Appendix L, Table L-5 of the
13 Carolinas Carbon Plan are certified), for instance. Another risk is that the
14 companies proposing to build the first projects may abandon them. For
15 instance, the TVA pulled out of the mPower, Babcock & Wilcox project in
16 2017, after six years and considerable expenditures. The projects may face
17 substantial cost escalations, as has already occurred with the NuScale
18 project proposed to be built in Idaho. That project was announced as a 720
19 MW project in 2015 but was downsized to 462 MW in 2021.⁵⁹ Even so, as
20 of October 2021, 28 subscribers had signed contracts to purchase only 101

⁵⁸ Duke Energy, Carolinas Carbon Plan Appendix L, Figures L-3 and L-4 at pp. 12-13.

⁵⁹ NuclearNewsWire, *UAMPS Downsizes NuScale SMR Plans*, Nuclear News, (July 21, 2021) at <https://www.ans.org/news/article-3087/uamps-downsizes-nuscale-smr-plans/>.

1 MW, or just 22% of the *reduced* capacity; 2 utilities had signed Letters of
2 Intent (“LOI”) to explore purchasing another 38% of the reduced capacity;
3 other utilities were exploring LOIs as of October 2021.⁶⁰ The October 2021
4 contractual subscription of 101 MW was down from the “approximately
5 244 MW” of “[p]articipation” that was claimed in May 2019 by the Utah
6 Associated Municipal Power Systems.⁶¹ Further cost increases may cause
7 parties to pull out or reduce their subscriptions; they may also result in a
8 failure to get firm subscriptions for much or most of the power. These
9 eventualities may even result in project abandonment.

10 The extension of the investment tax credit under the Inflation
11 Reduction Act and the low cost of solar plus storage increases the likelihood
12 that nuclear projects will be abandoned due to the yawning cost gaps. Such
13 setbacks could also make it difficult to consider follow-on projects, such as
14 those proposed by Duke Energy, as reasonable and prudent investments.

15 **Q: SHOULD COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF HB 951**
16 **REST ON THE SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT AND**
17 **CONSTRUCTION OF NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES?**

18 **A:** No. It is far too risky and costly when there are other options available.
19 Furthermore, if there is unexpected progress in terms of cost and expedited

⁶⁰ PUET Committee, Carbon-Free Technologies: Opportunities and Challenges, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS), pdf p. 17, (Oct. 21, 2021), <https://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/October-2021-UAMPS-presentation.pdf>.

⁶¹ Leadership in Nuclear Energy Commission Meeting, Presentation by Doug Hunter, (May 16, 2019), <https://line.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019-0516-UAMPS-slides.pdf>.

1 schedules in the next few years in one or more of Duke Energy's identified
2 reactor types, the issue could be more appropriately revisited at that time.

3 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HAS DUKE ENERGY THOROUGHLY**
4 **PRESENTED TO THE COMMISSION THE POTENTIAL**
5 **TECHNICAL CHALLENGES AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS**
6 **ASSOCIATED WITH ITS PROPOSED SMRS AND ADVANCED**
7 **NUCLEAR REACTORS IN ITS CAROLINAS CARBON PLAN?**

8 **A:** No.

9 **III. RECOMMENDATIONS**

10 **Q: WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE**
11 **COMMISSION CONCERNING MODIFICATIONS TO DUKE**
12 **ENERGY'S RELIANCE ON EXISTING NUCLEAR GENERATION**
13 **AND ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY?**

14 **A:** Given the reality of Duke Energy's heavy reliance on both existing nuclear
15 generation and advanced nuclear technology in its proposed Carolinas
16 Carbon Plan, my recommendations for the Commission are as follows:

17 No more than one portfolio should include new nuclear. If such a
18 portfolio is included, the obstacles and risks should be explicitly discussed,
19 including the issues that Duke Energy has not covered or covered only in
20 passing. My opinion, especially in view of the Inflation Reduction Act
21 (which was enacted after my written submission in this docket in July

1 2022⁶²), is that it would be far better to examine a diversity of portfolios
2 without any one of them containing new nuclear power plants. Existing
3 nuclear plants can be maintained in one or more of them. The following list
4 contains four portfolios of the type and variety that should be developed in
5 detail; two of them retain existing nuclear; two do not.

6 **1. EWG Portfolio 1: Balanced Solar and Wind with Existing**
7 **Resources.**

8 A Portfolio in which onshore and offshore wind generation combine to
9 approximately equal annual solar generation, both of which would be
10 significantly larger than in the Duke Energy P2 Portfolio (with wind
11 having to increase more than solar). Balanced wind and solar generation
12 provide seasonal balance to better meet summer and winter loads with
13 lower stress on non-generation resources. Existing nuclear resources
14 would be retained. New hydrogen generation resources would be
15 included, but instead of CT and CC resources, light and medium duty
16 fuel cells would be evaluated. No new natural gas resources would be
17 built. Considerably faster transportation electrification would be
18 included in light of plans by major manufacturers and countries that are
19 major markets for vehicles. Vehicle-to-Grid (“V2G”) technology would
20 be included. While Duke Energy did not include V2G in its proposed
21 portfolios, deeming it to be in its “commercial infancy,”⁶³ it is

⁶² Initial Comments of Environmental Working Group, Attachment A.

⁶³ Duke Energy, Carolinas Carbon Plan Appendix G at p. 44.

1 noteworthy that the company has since applied to the Commission to
2 team up with Ford to implement V2G in North Carolina on a pilot basis.
3 In its application to the Commission for ratepayer funds for this
4 program, Duke Energy stated that it would start with a small pilot,
5 initially enrolling 35 to 100 vehicles.⁶⁴ Based on this experience, it
6 envisioned taking the V2G pilot to a “commercialized” pilot stage, which,
7 over five years would enroll thousands of F-150 Lightning leaseholders,
8 and reduce their lease costs by directly paying Ford when it leases the
9 vehicles.⁶⁵ Duke Energy would use the batteries in the vehicles to supply
10 power to the grid to shift demand and estimates that the commercial
11 pilot would result in a positive benefit-cost ratios for all three tests it
12 applied – the “Utility Cost Test” (“UCT”), the Total Resource Cost
13 (“TRC”) test, and the Ratepayer Impact Measure (“RIM”) test. Duke
14 Energy estimates the benefit-cost ratios to be 1.24, 2.56, and 1.24
15 respectively.⁶⁶ Duke Energy may also enroll customers with solar
16 energy, stationary battery storage, and combine that with V2G, with a
17 maximum capacity of 20 kilowatts per installation.⁶⁷ If the results are
18 positive, Duke Energy has gone even farther, stating that the “Company
19 may seek to develop full-scale commercialized offerings *during the*
20 *duration of this Pilot*, if interim measured results lead the Company to

⁶⁴ Application for Approval of Vehicle-To-Grid Pilot Program, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1275, filed Aug. 16, 2022. at p. 3.

⁶⁵ *Id.* at p. 2 and Attachment A, p. 7.

⁶⁶ *Id.* at Attachment B, p. 8.

⁶⁷ *Id.* at Exhibit 1, p. 2.

1 do so.”⁶⁸ That would put V2G, which is existing advanced technology,
2 very far ahead any of the proposed new nuclear reactors. As noted, none
3 of Duke Energy’s proposed nuclear reactor designs have been certified,
4 much less built. In fact, Duke Energy estimates that the V2G demand
5 response market could ultimately be in the range of 15% to 25% of
6 EVs.⁶⁹ When EVs become the most common type of vehicle, and
7 rooftop solar and stationary batteries are much more common, this
8 demand response approach could provide thousands of megawatts of
9 demand response power of the very kind that is most compatible with
10 variable renewable energy. Hydrogen would be produced with
11 electricity that would otherwise be curtailed and used for peaking power
12 generation loads not otherwise met by battery storage, V2G, and
13 demand response shifting. Hydrogen would not be put into existing
14 natural gas pipelines; rather it would be produced electrolytically on site
15 (preferred) or transported in dedicated pipelines if necessary.

16 **2. EWG Portfolio 2: Balanced Solar and Wind with High Resilience.**

17 This would be similar to EWG Portfolio 1 with the following
18 differences. Efficiency for existing loads (i.e., not including
19 electrification of transportation or heating conversions from gas,
20 propane, and fuel oil) would increase by 2% per year to 2030, 1.5% per
21 year from 2031 to 2035, and 1% per year from 2036-to 2050, with the

⁶⁸ *Id.* at p. 2 (emphasis added).

⁶⁹ *Id.* at Exhibit 1, p. 3.

1 appropriate higher incentives and standards put in place to achieve the
2 higher levels. There would be much more investment in efficiency in
3 low-and moderate-income households. Explicit quantitative resilience
4 criteria would be defined, including service of essential loads for a pre-
5 specified period and the number of people who would be so served in
6 emergencies. A significant fraction, or possibly all, of units of the Self-
7 Optimizing Grid (400 customers or 2 megawatts peak load) would be
8 designed as microgrids with the goal of serving essential loads within
9 the neighborhoods for a pre-determined number of days. V2G would be
10 more intensively represented and integrated with the Self-Optimizing
11 Grid. Demand response would be significantly deeper than in Duke
12 Energy's P3 portfolio; it would be generalized to offer contracts to all
13 loads that can reasonably be shifted within a 24-hour period (though
14 with the expectation of varied participation levels at specific times,
15 depending on the load). All hydrogen production would be at the power
16 station sites. Pipeline leaks would thereby be avoided.

17 **3. EWG Portfolio 3: Fully renewable with high resilience with existing**
18 **nuclear retired.**

19 This would be like EWG Portfolio 2 but existing nuclear would be
20 retired at the current license expiry dates between 2030 and the mid-
21 2040s. Deployment of renewable energy, storage, efficiency, V2G, and
22 aggregated demand response resources would be accelerated and
23 expanded to meet requirements consistent with nuclear plant retirement

1 dates. More hydrogen would be produced than in EWG Portfolio 2 and
2 EWG Portfolio 3 for use in large fuel-cell-based combined heat and
3 power plants and for heavy industries like cement plants. All the
4 hydrogen needed for electricity generation would be produced with
5 Duke Energy generated electricity that would otherwise be curtailed.
6 The option of developing medium and large-scale solar with dual
7 agricultural use, for instance for grazing (known as agrivoltaics), would
8 also be included.

9 **4. EWG Portfolio 4: Fully renewable with high resilience, existing**
10 **nuclear retired, distributed wind, and thermal storage for heating.**

11 This would be similar to EWG Portfolio 3 with the following
12 differences. There would be significant inclusion of front-of-the-meter
13 distributed wind in Self-Optimized Grid resources as well as other
14 distributed electricity production. Seasonal thermal storage would be
15 implemented as part of many self-optimized grid units, other
16 microgrids, including public purpose microgrids, and new commercial
17 and residential developments as appropriate. Seasonal thermal storage
18 can provide energy supply diversity in the summer and winter seasons
19 by complementing other types of storage; it would also further tap into
20 solar and wind that might be otherwise curtailed—a supply that would
21 be expected to be more plentiful in fully renewable portfolios.

22 **Q: DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

23 **A:** Yes.

**Summary of Testimony of Dr. Arjun Makhijani on behalf of
The Environmental Working Group**

The purpose of my testimony is, first, to address the costs, risks, and reliability of the proposed new nuclear technology and nuclear generation in the Carbon Plan filed in Docket No. E-100, Sub 179 by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC (together “Duke Energy”); second, to address the cost and schedule challenges associated with Duke Energy’s proposed reliance on Small Modular Reactors (“SMRs”) and Advanced Reactors as well as certain technical risks, given the history of such reactor programs and proposals; third, to address the need for the Commission to consider the reality and history of cost increases and delays associated with new nuclear power plants from both large and small reactors as well as the serious risks that reliance on new nuclear reactors, at present uncertified, will result in a failure to meet the targets mandated by HB 951; and fourth, to outline additional portfolios that include a fuller range of new technologies and that do not involve new nuclear reactors to enable a least cost determination within the decarbonization and reliability goals of HB 951.

The “nuclear renaissance” announced in the decade of the 2000s has been a failure. Only about 6 percent of the announced reactors are on track to be built and brought online with many years of delay and huge cost escalations (assuming Vogtle units 3 and 4 are completed). This is much worse than the approximately 50-50 record of completions of nuclear reactors in the twentieth century. Duke Energy’s efforts during the “nuclear renaissance” have been part of this “renaissance” failure: none of the six reactors Duke Energy proposed ever began construction. All were abandoned or indefinitely delayed. Duke Energy has not taken this history and the costs associated with it into account for the lessons they may hold going forward.

1 Meanwhile, several prior constructed reactors have been retired before their license
2 expiry; high operating costs have been a leading cause. For instance, NextEra estimated it
3 would save its customers an estimated \$300 million by early shutdown of its Duane Arnold
4 reactor and generating wind power instead. Other reactors, including Duke's Crystal River
5 plant, have been shut down for issues related to steam generator replacement.

6 All four portfolios of Duke Energy's proposed Carbon Plan are very similar in the
7 year 2050. New nuclear ranges from 9,900 MW to 10,200 MW, a mere 3 percent
8 difference. The combined combustion turbine and combined cycle gas-fired generation
9 capacity totals are also similar, as are the amounts of onshore wind, pumped hydro storage,
10 energy efficiency, and solar capacity. Offshore wind capacity does vary from 0 to 3,200
11 MW; however, even the 3,200 MW figure represents a small fraction of generation
12 requirements in 2050. Battery storage capacity varies somewhat across portfolios, from
13 5,900 to 7,400 MW.

14 Duke Energy's "New Supply-Side Resource Capital Cost Sensitivity Analysis"
15 fails to consider historical nuclear cost escalations. Its cumulative impact sensitivity of \$4
16 billion (present value) for a proposed portfolio of about 10 gigawatts does not reflect recent
17 reactor construction cost escalations. For instance, Vogtle units 3 and 4 in Georgia have
18 had cost escalations of around \$7 billion *per gigawatt*. By this measure, Duke Energy
19 underestimated capital cost sensitivity by well over an order of magnitude. In addition,
20 there were planned reactors that were cancelled or indefinitely postponed at significant
21 cost, including six proposed by Duke Energy. Moreover, even the very low estimate of \$4
22 billion was not examined for its impact on the mix of generation in the four proposed
23 portfolios.

1 A significant cost gap exists between nuclear and renewable power generation.
2 According to estimates by the Wall Street firm Lazard, unsubsidized utility-scale solar
3 generation costs declined from \$359 per megawatt-hour (MWh) in 2009 to \$36 per MWh
4 in 2021. Onshore wind declined from \$135 per MWh to \$38 per MWh over the same
5 period. Estimates for offshore wind range from \$66 to \$100 per MWh. Costs of utility-
6 scale solar plus large-scale storage are also declining; they dropped from \$88 per MWh in
7 2020 to \$77 per MWh in 2021, a decrease of over 12% in a single year. By contrast, the
8 estimated unsubsidized costs of nuclear energy generation have *risen* from \$123 per MWh
9 in 2009 to \$167 per MWh in 2021 (range: \$131 per MWh to \$204 per MWh). Costs of
10 nuclear in both France and the United States, the leading western nuclear energy countries,
11 have increased as more reactors were built. The 2021 cost estimate of utility-scale solar
12 with storage was less than half of the estimated cost of nuclear power, which tends to rise.
13 Actual costs of solar plus storage with the investment tax credit were only \$30 per MWh
14 in 2021. Nuclear costs, even with a comparable credit, are likely to be far higher.

15 The nuclear cost problem will be aggravated if SMRs are used to respond to the
16 variability of wind and solar by adjusting reactor output downward when renewable output
17 is high and upward when renewable output falls. That will cause their average capacity
18 factor to decrease from the usual 90% to 95% for nuclear plants. For instance, costs per
19 MWh of SMR electricity would increase by about 25% if the annual capacity factor fell
20 from 95% to 75%.

21 SMRs are relatively small, usually 300 MW or less per reactor, compared with a
22 typical 1,000 MW for large nuclear reactors. Other things being equal, smaller reactors
23 would cost more per unit of capacity due to loss of economies of scale. Higher costs have

1 resulted in most early small reactors built in the United States being retired early. Besides
2 simplification of design, the hoped-for success of SMRs depends largely upon the
3 assumption that mass manufacturing and assembly-line-style construction will compensate
4 for the loss of economies of scale. Early adopters of SMR are likely to incur higher costs
5 until a supply chain is established. Even if SMRs were to consistently achieve the same per
6 unit costs as present large reactors, they would still be economically unviable, given the
7 high costs of large reactors.

8 Duke has identified two SMRs and two Advanced Reactors in its proposed Carbon
9 Plan that are “expected” to be online in 2028 or 2029: the Natrium liquid sodium-cooled
10 reactor; Xe-100 helium gas-cooled high temperature reactor; BWRX-300 light water
11 reactor, a boiling water design; and the 77 MW VOYGR light water reactor, a pressurized
12 water design. None of these reactor designs has yet been certified by Nuclear Regulatory
13 Commission (“NRC”). The NuScale reactor has provisional certification for its 50 MW
14 version and may soon be granted full certification. But Duke Energy lists the 77 MW
15 version, which is not certified; the NRC lists it as being in the pre-application stage. The
16 BWRX-300 reactor is an SMR based on GE-Hitachi’s Economical Simplified Boiling
17 Water Reactor design, which has never been constructed anywhere in the world and which
18 has a checkered certification history. Its design was changed nine times before the tenth
19 version was certified. The BWRX-300 has not been licensed for construction or submitted
20 for formal certification to any national safety regulator. It would be prudent to anticipate
21 significant delays in the “expected” 2028 or 2029 online dates listed by Duke Energy. For
22 instance, the NuScale design has already faced significant deployment delays; NuScale had
23 initially announced a commercial operation date of 2015-2016 for its smaller version; but

1 it did not even submit an application for certification until 2016. The Sodium Reactor
2 liquid sodium-cooled was in the pre-application stage as of mid-August 2022. The
3 proposed High Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (“HALEU”) fuel (uranium enrichment
4 between 5% and 20%) is not used for any commercial reactor in the United States. It is not
5 currently commercially produced in the United States. Unlike SMR designs that would use
6 fuel of up to 5% enrichment, which is the current practice in large reactors, HALEU use
7 involves additional security and certification considerations. Pre-application stage
8 activities began in 2018 for the Gas-cooled High Temperature Xe-100 reactor by X-energy;
9 it was still in the pre-application stage as of June 30, 2022. The Xe-100 also appears likely
10 to use HALEU and therefore faces the same enrichment scrutiny. In sum, the history of
11 these designs is replete with delays and uncertainties. Duke Energy should carefully
12 evaluate this in preparing the schedule for the dates at which it proposes to add SMRs and
13 Advanced Reactors to its portfolio.

14 Reactor operational risks tend to follow a “bathtub curve”: high in the early years
15 due to factors such as material imperfections and assembly mistakes, low in the middle
16 years, and rising risks with age-related degradation. New SMR features raise the risk of
17 early operational difficulties. For instance, the steam generator is inside the reactor vessel
18 in the NuScale reactor design (as distinct from outside the reactor in current pressurized
19 water reactors (“PWR”)). Problems with steam generators, which have had to be
20 prematurely replaced in existing PWRs, would be more complex with the steam generator
21 inside the reactor vessel.

22 Duke Energy’s proposed addition of 10,000 MW to its existing North Carolina
23 portfolio of 5,150 MW could impact significant parts of its electrical system. Nuclear

1 power plants need grid electricity to operate safely and produce power. They only have
2 enough emergency power to keep them in safe shutdown mode. The loss of grid power
3 over a wide area with high concentrations of nuclear plants could therefore destabilize
4 significant parts of the Duke Energy electricity system. Detailed examples are discussed in
5 my testimony and describe how large swaths of nuclear power generation could be taken
6 offline by natural disasters such as hurricanes, which are increasing in frequency and
7 intensity with climate change, or earthquakes, even if the plants are not damaged. For
8 instance, the North Anna plant in Virginia was shut down for months following an
9 earthquake in 2011. Nuclear power generation also requires very large volumes of water
10 for operation, increasing the risk of de-rating during heat waves, the very time when the
11 plants will be most needed. The possibility of de-rating during peak summer demand
12 should be analyzed prior to increasing reliance on nuclear energy by building new plants.

13 In addition to the risks and technological challenges described previously, my
14 testimony details specific risks associated with the different designs in the proposed Carbon
15 Plan, particularly with the Advanced Reactors. Sodium leaks have historically plagued
16 sodium-cooled reactors, which have not been commercialized despite tens of billions of
17 dollars of expenditures worldwide. Graphite moderated reactors have a poor operating
18 history. Graphite also poses the risk of fires.

19 New waste types may also raise issues. Specifically, storage and disposal of new
20 waste types will present different or additional challenges to those of light-water reactor
21 spent fuel. A portion of graphite, for example, becomes carbon-14 during reactor operation.
22 This radioactive isotope of carbon, when oxidized, becomes radioactive carbon dioxide
23 that dissolves in water and is emitted into the air, posing risks of food and water

1 contamination. Experience with the molten salt micro-reactor designs, identified in
2 Appendix L, Table L-5 of the Carbon Plan, is extremely limited. Two have been built in
3 the United States; neither was designed to generate electricity. The first, an aircraft reactor
4 experiment, operated for just 100 hours. The second was a pilot reactor of 8 MW-thermal,
5 built and operated at Oak Ridge National Laboratory; it experienced more than 200
6 interruptions, including many unscheduled ones, in its four-year operational period in the
7 1960s.

8 Duke Energy's timetable proposed for the first SMR reactor online in mid-2032,
9 includes starting full scale construction activities in mid-2029 at about the same time or
10 just after the first SMRs are "expected" to come online. Duke Energy's schedule makes no
11 allowance for delays in the commissioning dates of the first-movers, not to mention making
12 allowances for those reactors to operate for some time to work out and resolve any teething
13 troubles. Finally, the extension of the investment tax credit under the Inflation Reduction
14 Act and the low cost of solar plus storage increases the likelihood that currently planned
15 nuclear projects will be abandoned. This possibility should be seriously examined before
16 SMRs or Advanced Reactors are included in any Carbon Plan.

17 There has been no new nuclear power generated from any of the dozens of reactors
18 announced in the last 15 years, despite modular designs and simplified licensing. Nuclear
19 energy costs have tended to rise; in contrast renewable energy and storage costs have
20 drastically declined and are now much lower than nuclear costs per unit of electricity
21 generation even with storage included.

22 In view of the above, I recommend that the Commission require that Duke Energy
23 develop portfolios that do not include new nuclear but include other new technologies like

1 fuel cells, vehicle-to-grid (“V2G”), and thermal energy storage. It is noteworthy that, after
2 having dismissed V2G as being in its “commercial infancy” in its proposed Carbon Plan,
3 Duke Energy has proposed a small V2G pilot that it may expand to a “commercialized”
4 pilot stage involving thousands of vehicles and, pending data, even to a full commercial
5 offering during the pilot. Four portfolios are proposed in my submitted testimony. Two of
6 the portfolios would, among other features, retain existing nuclear power plants, balance
7 solar and wind, and expand demand response. The other two would retire existing nuclear
8 plants when their licenses expire and be fully renewable with high reliability resilience
9 after that. One would also include distributed wind, including as part of some sections of
10 Duke Energy’s proposed Self-Optimized Grid units.

11 This concludes the summary of my direct testimony. Thank you for your time.

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1 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Any other
2 preliminary matters for the Commission?

3 (No response.)

4 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. You-all may
5 call your witness.

6 MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Chair
7 Mitchell. Bear with me just one moment so I can
8 get situated here. Thank you. My witness has
9 anticipated me calling him to the stand. Southern
10 Alliance for Clean Energy, Natural Resources
11 Defense Council, and the Sierra Club, jointly with
12 the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association
13 call Tyler Fitch to the stand.

14 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Good
15 morning, Mr. Fitch. Do you prefer to be sworn or
16 affirmed?

17 THE WITNESS: Sworn is okay.

18 Whereupon,

19 TYLER FITCH,
20 having first been duly sworn, was examined
21 and testified as follows:

22 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

23 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. THOMPSON:

24 Q. Mr. Fitch, please state your name, title, and

1 business address for the record.

2 A. Good morning, Commissioners. Pleasure to be
3 before you today. My name is Tyler Fitch. I'm a
4 senior associate at Synapse Energy Economics. My
5 business address is 1350 Connecticut Avenue, Northwest,
6 Number 412, Washington, DC.

7 Q. And please briefly describe your role and
8 responsibilities as Synapse Energy Economics.

9 A. I consult with public -- public interest
10 organizations and state agencies across the Southeast
11 on resource planning issues, but also resiliency, rate
12 design, and EV market design.

13 Q. And, Mr. Fitch, did you cause to be prefiled
14 in this docket on September 2, 2022, direct testimony
15 consisting of 62 pages in both confidential and public
16 versions?

17 A. I did.

18 Q. Do you have any changes or corrections to
19 your prefiled testimony at this time?

20 A. I do not.

21 Q. So if the questions put to you in your
22 testimony were asked at the hearing today, would your
23 answers be the same?

24 A. They would.

1 Q. And did you also have an exhibit to your
2 testimony?

3 A. I did.

4 Q. Was the exhibit to your testimony prepared by
5 you or under your direction?

6 A. It was prepared by me.

7 MS. THOMPSON: Chair Mitchell, I would
8 move to have both the public and confidential
9 versions of Mr. Fitch's prefiled testimony entered
10 into the record as if given orally from the stand,
11 and for his confidential testimony to remain under
12 seal.

13 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Hearing no
14 objection to that motion, it is allowed.

15 (Whereupon, the prefiled direct
16 testimony of Tyler Fitch was copied into
17 the record as if given orally from the
18 stand.)
19
20
21
22
23
24

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

In the Matter of)	
)	
Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and)	DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 179
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 2022)	
Biennial Integrated Resource Plan)	
and Carbon Plan)	
_____)	

DIRECT TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OF**TYLER FITCH****ON BEHALF OF**

**NORTH CAROLINA SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION, SOUTHERN
ALLIANCE FOR CLEAN ENERGY, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, AND THE SIERRA CLUB**

September 2, 2022

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EXHIBITS

TF-1	Resume of Tyler Fitch
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1 I. **Introduction, Qualifications, and Carbon-Free by 2050 Report**

2 Q. **PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, ORGANIZATION, AND POSITION.**

3 A. My name is Tyler Fitch. I am a Senior Associate with Synapse Energy
4 Economics, Incorporated (“Synapse”).

5 Q. **PLEASE DESCRIBE SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS.**

6 A. Synapse is a research and consulting firm specializing in energy and
7 environmental issues, including transportation electrification, electric
8 generation, transmission and distribution system reliability, ratemaking and
9 rate design, electric industry restructuring and market power, wholesale
10 electricity markets, stranded costs, efficiency, renewable energy,
11 environmental quality, and nuclear power. Synapse’s clients include state
12 consumer advocates, public utilities commission staff, attorneys general,
13 state energy offices, environmental organizations, federal government
14 agencies, and utilities.

15 Q. **SUMMARIZE YOUR WORK EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL**
16 **BACKGROUND.**

17 A. At Synapse, I conduct analysis and contribute to testimony and publications
18 that focus on a variety of issues relating to the electricity system, including:
19 integrated resource planning; ratemaking and rate design; system
20 resilience; plant economics in organized energy markets; and electric
21 vehicle (EV) market formation.

22 Much of my work is informed by modeling analyses of the electricity
23 system. These may include spreadsheet- or Python-based analysis, or

1 analysis using industry-standard electricity system models, such as
2 EnCompass or the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's System
3 Advisor Model.

4 Before joining Synapse, I worked at Vote Solar, where I led
5 regulatory intervention on rate design, valuation of distributed energy
6 resources, and resource planning in the Southeast. In my capacity as
7 regulatory director at Vote Solar and Senior Associate at Synapse, I have
8 provided expert testimony to public utilities commissions in Virginia, North
9 Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. I hold a Master of Science from the
10 University of Michigan and a Bachelor of Science in Environmental
11 Sciences from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I provide a
12 copy of my current resume, attached as Exhibit TF-1 to this testimony.

13 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS CASE?**

14 A. I am testifying on behalf of North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association,
15 Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Natural Resources Defense Council,
16 and the Sierra Club (collectively, the Coalition of Low-Cost Energy and Net-
17 Zero Intervenors or "CLEAN Intervenors").

18 **Q. HAVE YOU TESTIFIED PREVIOUSLY BEFORE THE NORTH**
19 **CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION?**

20 A. Yes. I previously provided testimony in Duke Energy Carolinas' and Duke
21 Energy Progress' most recent rate cases (Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 1214 and
22 E-2, Sub 1219).

23 **Q. PROVIDE A VERY BRIEF OVERVIEW OF YOUR TESTIMONY.**

1 A. My testimony is submitted pursuant to the North Carolina Utilities
2 Commission's July 29 order allowing expert testimony on a number of
3 topics related to the Commission's development of a Carbon Plan to meet
4 North Carolina's House Bill 951 ("HB 951") carbon-reduction
5 requirements.¹ This testimony draws from "Carbon-Free by 2050:
6 Pathways to Achieving North Carolina's Power-Sector Carbon
7 Requirements at Least Cost to Ratepayers" (the "*Carbon-Free by 2050*
8 report"), which my team at Synapse prepared for the CLEAN Intervenors in
9 this proceeding. Those parties included the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report as
10 an attachment to their comments filed on July 20, 2022.² I also identify
11 shared conclusions with other parties based on their previous submissions
12 in this proceeding and respond to testimony submitted by Duke Energy
13 witnesses.³

14 **Q. HOW IS YOUR TESTIMONY STRUCTURED?**

15 A. In Section 2, I briefly summarize my findings and recommendations for the
16 Commission.

¹ North Carolina Utilities Commission (2022, July). Order Scheduling Expert Witness Hearing, Requiring Filing of Testimony, and Establishing Discovery Guidelines. Docket No. E-100 Sub 179. Retrieved at:

<https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=8df88a56-f058-44e2-a40b-f9e712284b4a>.

² Supplemental Joint Comments of NCSEA, SACE, Sierra Club, and NRDC (July 20, 2022). Docket No. E-100, Sub 179. Retrieved at:

<https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=6b9bc4ed-5c8d-4871-8393-072d0730100f>.

³ Although I do not respond to every point in other parties' previous filings that relates to issues covered in my testimony, that does not imply agreement or disagreement with those filings. For example, many findings in the Brattle Report filed by the Clean Power Suppliers' Association regarding the need for large-scale deployment of renewables and storage are directionally similar to the findings in my report.

1 Sections 3 through 7 are organized according to the issue
2 categories identified in the Commission's July 29 order. In those sections,
3 I discuss my findings and conclusions for issues related to "Modeling—
4 Methodology, assumptions, and other modeling issues;" "Coal Unit
5 Retirement Schedule;" "Near-Term Procurement Activity—Solar, Solar
6 Plus Storage, Standalone Storage, Onshore Wind, Natural Gas
7 Generation;" "EE / DSM / Grid Edge; and "Cost."

8 For each issue category addressed, I evaluate the proposed
9 carbon plan filed with the Commission by Duke Energy Progress ("DEP")
10 and Duke Energy Carolinas ("DEC," and together "Duke Energy," "Duke" or
11 "the Companies") on May 16, 2022, describe the revisions made by
12 Synapse in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, and describe the overall
13 impact that these revisions had on our modeling results.

14 **Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE APPROACH USED TO**
15 **PERFORM THE ANALYSIS IN THE *CARBON-FREE BY 2050* REPORT.**

16 A. In preparing the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, Synapse conducted capacity
17 expansion and production cost modeling analysis of the combined Duke
18 Energy system in the Carolinas to evaluate how Duke can cost-effectively
19 meet North Carolina House Bill 951's carbon-reduction requirements while
20 delivering power reliably. The analysis I used to develop the report relies
21 on the same underlying EnCompass database that Duke used to develop
22 the portfolios in its proposed carbon plan filing, with several important
23 revisions. Specifically, my team modified several of Duke's model settings
24 to better align with modeling best practices and we updated several inputs

1 and assumptions to better represent current and likely future conditions.
2 The *Carbon-Free by 2050* report explains these modifications and presents
3 the new resource portfolios we developed based on these revisions to the
4 model. These portfolios would achieve the required carbon reductions on
5 time and more cost-effectively than any of Duke's proposed portfolios.

6 The *Carbon-Free by 2050* report includes three modeling
7 scenarios. The *Duke Resources* scenario mimics the resource pathway
8 identified by Duke Energy's Portfolio 1 with Alternate Fuel ("P1A") in its
9 proposed carbon plan filing,⁴ using Synapse's revised inputs to better
10 represent costs. Synapse selected the P1A portfolio as the basis for
11 comparison because it is the only portfolio that meets the 2030 carbon-
12 reduction requirement while assuming that firm transportation for
13 Appalachian gas cannot be secured. This assumption avoids the
14 operational risk of relying on firm gas transport that may not become
15 available, while also avoiding the risk of failure to achieve the 2030 interim
16 requirement. The *Optimized* scenario allows EnCompass to select the most
17 cost-effective portfolio based on these revised inputs that continues to meet
18 carbon-reduction and reliability requirements. Finally, the *Regional*
19 *Resources* scenario uses the same settings as the *Optimized* scenario, but
20 allows EnCompass to select Midwest wind resources, procured via power
21 purchase agreements through the PJM Interconnection ("PJM"). The report


⁴ Duke Energy Carolinas Carbon Plan Appendix E ("Appendix E"), p. 85.

1 also reviews several additional steps implemented by Duke in the
2 development of their proposed carbon plan portfolios.

3 **Q. PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS IN THE *CARBON-FREE BY***
4 ***2050* REPORT.**

5 A. The *Optimized* portfolio developed in EnCompass for the *Carbon-Free by*
6 *2050* report achieves HB 951's carbon-reduction requirements while
7 delivering power reliably at a substantial savings compared to the portfolio
8 produced by Duke Energy's P1A scenario. Figure 1, below, shows total
9 capacity by resource type in 2022 and 2050 for each scenario modeled by
10 Synapse.

Figure 1. Capacity by Resource Type, 2022 and 2050, by Scenario



Source: *Carbon-Free by 2050 Report*, p. 2.

11 Table 1, below, shows the net present value revenue requirements
12 from 2022–2050 for each scenario.

Table 1. Net Present Value Revenue Requirement by Scenario

Results (2022-2050)	<i>Duke Resources</i>	<i>Optimized</i>	<i>Regional Resources</i>
2030 NPVRR (\$B)	\$36.7	\$36.0	\$34.3
2040 NPVRR (\$B)	\$77.7	\$69.8	\$65.8
2050 NPVRR (\$B)	\$121.2	\$103.5	\$98.1

Source: Carbon-Free by 2050 Report, p. 2.

Compared to the *Duke Resources* scenario, the portfolios developed by the *Optimized* and *Regional Resources* scenarios better utilize solar, storage, and energy efficiency resources through 2050, while avoiding investment in new gas, minimizing exposure to uncertain hydrogen and small modular nuclear technologies, maintaining the Companies' prescribed reserve margin, and serving 100 percent of load in all modeled hours. As a result, when compared to the *Duke Resources* portfolio, these portfolios achieve cost savings ranging from \$700 million for the *Optimized* scenario and \$2.4 billion for the *Regional Resources* scenario by 2030 to \$17.7 billion for the *Optimized* scenario and \$23.1 billion for the *Regional Resources* scenario by 2050.

II. Findings and Recommendations

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS ON ISSUES RELATED TO "MODELING—METHODOLOGY, ASSUMPTIONS, AND OTHER MODELING ISSUES."

A. My findings are as follows:

1. The Companies' capital cost projections favor gas and nuclear resources over solar and offshore wind resources when compared to reference cost forecasts;
2. Short-term differences in Synapse and Duke Energy gas price forecasts due to differences in when gas futures forecasts were

- 1 created underscore the commodity price risk to ratepayers inherent to
- 2 gas-fired resources;
- 3 3. Enabling access to regional zero-carbon resources could unlock
- 4 substantial savings for ratepayers;
- 5 4. Duke's transmission assumptions embedded in EnCompass constrain
- 6 potential transmission solutions that could both benefit ratepayers and
- 7 facilitate deployment of carbon-free energy resources;
- 8 5. Duke's analysis includes several inputs and assumptions that could
- 9 lock in fossil resource investments, creating risk of noncompliance
- 10 with HB 951 requirements and adding additional economic and
- 11 operational risk;
- 12 6. Revised inputs used to develop the supplemental P5 and P6 portfolios
- 13 only partially address faulty assumptions in Duke's modeling; and
- 14 7. Multiple issues with Duke's EnCompass data sharing process in this
- 15 proceeding inhibited effective intervenor review and collaborative
- 16 problem-solving.

17 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE**
 18 **COMMISSION ON ISSUES RELATED TO "MODELING —**
 19 **METHODOLOGY, ASSUMPTIONS, AND OTHER MODELING ISSUES."**

20 A. I recommend that the Commission direct the following steps in further
 21 Carbon Plan modeling:

- 22 1. To the extent that the Commission deems them necessary, implement
- 23 reliability requirements as changes to model requirements rather than
- 24 manual adjustments to model outputs;
- 25 2. Use capital cost estimates from all-source requests for proposals,
- 26 where possible, and supplement with a neutral, industry-standard
- 27 reference for capital cost projections for all technology types;
- 28 3. Consider purchases of cost-effective power from neighboring regions,
- 29 including resources not to be owned by Duke Energy, to "shrink the
- 30 challenge" of meeting net load with zero-carbon power;
- 31 4. Implement additional analyses that assess the potential benefit of
- 32 additional transmission and regional coordination;
- 33 5. Make several changes to modeling inputs to avoid locking in costly
- 34 legacy and fossil resources, including:
- 35 a. a 2030 HB 951 compliance year,
- 36 b. a 15-year or longer planning horizon,

- 1 c. a more realistic assumption about availability of “advanced”
- 2 nuclear resources,
- 3 d. testing more realistic (higher) gas price forecasts,
- 4 e. more appropriate gas unit lifetimes,
- 5 f. removing “black out” years for off-shore wind, and
- 6 g. using more conservative estimates on hydrogen availability and
- 7 retrofit feasibility;

8 6. Incorporate several modeling revisions related to the proposed
 9 changes in supplemental portfolios P5 and P6, including allowing
 10 storage in solar-plus-storage configurations to charge directly from the
 11 grid; co-optimizing carbon offsets at a higher price point (if the
 12 Commission deems inclusion of offsets appropriate), and utilization of
 13 a full-period capacity optimization.

14 7. Implement several changes to the Carbon Plan’s EnCompass data
 15 sharing process in the future, focusing on allowing sufficient time for
 16 Duke and intervenors to build shared understanding and manage
 17 contingencies in sharing model data.

18 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS ON ISSUES AND**
 19 **RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO “COAL UNIT RETIREMENT**
 20 **SCHEDULE.”**

21 A. Duke Energy’s manual adjustment of coal retirement dates lacks analytical
 22 justification and would result in additional costs to ratepayers.

23 I recommend that the Commission make all efforts to implement
 24 the most economic coal retirement dates for Cliffside unit 5, Marshall units
 25 1 and 2, and Mayo unit 1, including evaluation of clean energy and zero-
 26 carbon resources to address transmission and generation concerns, in
 27 further development of a Carbon Plan.

28 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON**
 29 **ISSUES RELATED TO “NEAR-TERM PROCUREMENT ACTIVITY —**
 30 **SOLAR, SOLAR PLUS STORAGE, STANDALONE STORAGE,**
 31 **ONSHORE WIND, NATURAL GAS GENERATION.”**

32 A. I find the following:

- 1 1. The Inflation Reduction Act (“IRA”) will likely impact both the inputs
2 and outputs of resource planning analysis conducted to date in this
3 proceeding.
- 4 2. The *Carbon-Free by 2050*’s short-term action plan focuses on flexible,
5 modular solar and storage resources to chart a cost-effective, “no-
6 regrets” pathway that will protect ratepayers from the risks associated
7 with fuel price spikes and speculative technologies that have not yet
8 been commercialized. Further, this no-regrets pathway is better
9 positioned to take advantage of the cost reductions for solar, wind,
10 and battery storage made possible by the IRA.

11 In light of those findings, I recommend that the Commission’s
12 Carbon Plan avoid procurement plans that would “lock in” resource or
13 investment pathways, and instead, that the plan capitalize on no-regrets
14 renewable resources that are expected to decrease in cost as the IRA is
15 implemented. Therefore, I recommend that the Commission align near-
16 term procurement plans with the cost-effective portfolios identified by the
17 *Optimized* and *Regional Resources* scenarios and direct the Companies to
18 bolster their ability to interconnect solar and storage resources in the short
19 term.

20 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**
21 **ON ISSUES RELATED TO “EE / DSM / GRID EDGE.”**

22 A. Duke Energy’s base and high energy efficiency targets are below many of
23 its industry peers. Ratepayers could save as much as \$2.9 billion through
24 additional investment in energy efficiency.⁵

25 Accordingly, I recommend that further Carbon Plan modeling
26 expand incremental efficiency savings targets to 1.5 percent of total retail

⁵ Carbon Free by 2050 Report, Table 10: Net Present Revenue Requirement over Time, Energy Efficiency Sensitivities p. 27.

1 load and invest in utility energy efficiency programming to achieve that
2 target.

3 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS ON ISSUES RELATED TO**
4 **“COST.”**

5 A. The *Duke Resources* portfolio (which, as explained previously, simulates
6 Duke Energy’s P1_A portfolio using Synapse’s revised cost estimates) would
7 cost ratepayers \$121.2 billion on an NPVRR basis through 2050.⁶ Using
8 those same revised cost estimates, the *Optimized* and *Regional Resources*
9 portfolios presented in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report would cost \$103.5
10 billion and \$98.1 billion, respectively.

11 **III. Issues Related To “Modeling — Methodology, Assumptions, and**
12 **Other Modeling Issues”**

13 **A. *Duke Energy’s Post-Modeling Manual Changes to Portfolios Deviate***
14 ***from Best Practices and Create Costs for Ratepayers.***

15 **Q. BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE THE MANUAL CHANGES MADE BY DUKE**
16 **ENERGY TO THE PORTFOLIOS INCLUDED IN ITS PROPOSED**
17 **CARBON PLAN FILING.**

18 A. Duke Energy over-rode EnCompass’s ability to optimize for the most
19 economic resource selections in three ways: First, Duke manually delayed
20 the coal retirement dates that EnCompass identified as economically
21 optimal. Second, it replaced several hundred megawatts (“MW”) of battery
22 storage with gas combustion turbines. And third, Duke manually added gas
23 combustion turbines and small modular nuclear reactors based on


⁶ By comparison, Duke reported that this portfolio (P1_A) would only cost \$104.1 billion.

1 supplemental resource adequacy analyses.⁷ The resulting portfolios differ
 2 substantially from the economically optimal portfolio identified by
 3 EnCompass.

4 **Q. WHAT WAS THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THOSE CHANGES?**

5 A. Figure 3 shows the cumulative effect of Duke Energy's changes to its
 6 EnCompass modeling results on Duke's proposed Portfolio 1.

Figure 2. Manual Changes to Duke Energy Carbon Plan Portfolio 1 through 2035 and 2050



Source: Carbon-Free by 2050 Report, p. 35.

⁷ Pages 27-35 of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report include a more comprehensive description of Duke Energy's manual adjustments.

Through 2035, Duke Energy's overrides to EnCompass cause an additional 1 gigawatt ("GW") of gas combustion turbines to be added to the system, at the expense of 1 GW of battery storage technologies. By 2050, these manual changes result in the addition of nearly 3 GW of gas and nuclear capacity, and the removal of 2 GW of battery storage capacity. These new gas plants would then need to be converted to burn 100 percent zero-carbon hydrogen, when it is not yet known whether that conversion is feasible, or what the cost will be. Any new nuclear plants would rely on technologies that are not commercially available today. For context, 2022 generation capacity across DEC and DEP is roughly 40 GW; these manual revisions represent an eighth of 2022 generating capacity.

Q. PROVIDE YOUR EVALUATION OF WHETHER THESE CHANGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH BEST PRACTICES IN RESOURCE PLANNING.

A. No, they are not. The EnCompass economic optimization algorithm works by testing thousands of potential resource portfolios and identifying which are able to meet environmental requirements (e.g., carbon limits), energy and capacity needs, and reserve margin and reliability requirements most cost-effectively. Manual changes to the resource portfolios identified by the model are, by definition, a deviation from the economically optimal portfolio identified by EnCompass and are therefore likely to result in increased costs to ratepayers. The selective nature of the Companies' manual overrides (i.e., replacing battery storage resources with gas combustion turbines and, in some cases, new nuclear resources) underscores the departure from objective, resource-neutral economic optimization. Tech

1 Customers⁸ and the Attorney General's Office ("AGO") Strategen Report⁹
2 similarly express concerns in their reports that Duke's manual constraints
3 and "out of model adjustments" limit the utility of its modeling and result in
4 non-optimal results.

5 **Q. SUMMARIZE DUKE'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THESE CHANGES AND**
6 **PROVIDE YOUR RESPONSE.**

7 A. Duke Energy justifies these manual changes based on the results of
8 several post-EnCompass analyses.¹⁰ Duke witnesses Glen Snider, Bobby
9 McMurry, Michael Quinto and Matt Kalembe ("Snider et al.") frame capacity
10 expansion modeling as a "first screen"¹¹ and claim that the additional
11 analytical steps taken by Duke are "necessary" for demonstrating
12 reliability.¹²

13 I agree with the Duke witnesses that the capacity expansion model
14 is not the *only* necessary tool for resource planning, but I would add that it
15 is the best tool for identifying an economically optimal resource mix. As
16 explained in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, a resource-neutral way to
17 ensure reliability would be to change the reliability requirement

⁸ Gabel Associates (2022, July). Review of the Duke Carbon Plan and Presentation of a Preferred Portfolio. Prepared for Tech Customers ("Tech Customers Gabel Report"). Gabel report, pp. 10, 47-48.

⁹ Strategen Consulting (2022). Analysis of the Duke Energy 2022 Carbon Plan. Prepared for the North Carolina Attorney General's Office ("AGO Strategen report"), pp. 8-10.

¹⁰ Pages 30-34 of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* provide a summary of these post-EnCompass analyses.

¹¹ Direct Testimony of Glen Snider, Bobby McMurry, Michael Quinto and Matt Kalembe for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, p. 91, ll. 11-12.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 197, ll. 4-6.

1 *requirements* of the capacity expansion model, rather than manipulating the
2 outputs.¹³ This could include, for example, changes to planning reserve
3 margin levels or seasonality, proposing different effective load carrying
4 capability ratings to different resources, or even using a more detailed daily
5 load curve for capacity expansion modeling. Instead, the approach taken
6 by Duke in its portfolio development departs from the resource-neutral,
7 cost-optimal approach.

8 I do not agree with the Duke witnesses' assertion that the
9 Companies' post-modeling changes are commonly understood as a
10 necessary step in resource planning. The DEC and DEP 2020 Integrated
11 Resource Plans ("IRPs"), for instance, do not include any "Resource
12 Adequacy and Reliability Verification" step that incorporates additional runs
13 of the Strategic Energy & Risk Valuation Model ("SERVM") after the
14 capacity expansion model runs.¹⁴ Instead, the IRPs describe, in detail, the
15 resource adequacy study conducted by Astrapé and the selection of the 17
16 percent reserve margin--both of which informed the inputs to the IRPs,
17 rather than any changes to the outputs.¹⁵

18 Duke witnesses were only able to identify one other IRP that
19 conducted a similar analysis, which was Public Service New Mexico's

¹³ *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, pp. 32-33.

¹⁴ Duke Energy Carolinas Integrated Resource Plan 2020 Biennial Report, pp. 63-75.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

1 (“PNM”) 2020 IRP.¹⁶ PNM’s use of SERVVM in that planning process differs
2 from Duke’s in several ways, however:

- 3 3. PNM’s SERVVM analysis is done at multiple levels of assumed regional
4 coordination, rather than assuming no regional coordination;
- 5 4. PNM uses SERVVM analysis of this type to characterize potential future
6 resource adequacy issues, rather than as a justification for any
7 manual changes to resource portfolios;
- 8 5. PNM’s “No New Combustion” portfolio meets 2040 loss of load
9 expectation standards under base-case regional imports
10 assumptions.

11 Thus, the configuration, analytical function, and results of this
12 analysis are not consistent with Duke’s use of SERVVM as a post-
13 optimization portfolio editing tool.

14 **Q. PROVIDE YOUR PERSPECTIVE ON SNIDER ET AL.’S USE OF THEIR**
15 **SERVVM LOSS OF LOAD EXPECTATION ANALYTICAL MODEL ON**
16 **INTERVENOR PORTFOLIOS.¹⁷**

17 A. As with their own portfolios, the Companies’ use of SERVVM in this way
18 lacks analytical justification and departs from best practices used in other
19 resource planning processes. It also effectively undoes the increased
20 transparency afforded by using the EnCompass tool by introducing another
21 “black box” into the analytical pipeline, as identified by the AGO Strategen
22 report.¹⁸

23 **Q. BASED ON THIS FINDING, WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS**
24 **TO THE COMMISSION?**

¹⁶ Snider et al., p. 95.

¹⁷ Snider et al., pp. 202-205.

¹⁸ AGO Strategen Report, pp. 9-10.

1 A. I recommend that the Commission reject the manual changes made by
2 Duke to its portfolios because they deviate from least-cost resource
3 planning and lack an economic or resource adequacy justification. If the
4 Companies believe that additional reliability or resource adequacy analyses
5 are necessary, they should implement these in advance of capacity
6 expansion modeling (via resource adequacy studies and/or effective load
7 carrying capability studies) and allow optimization software to choose the
8 most economic resource pathway that meets reliability requirements. At
9 present, the manual revisions add dependence on gas and nuclear
10 resources with no clear benefit to ratepayers.

11 ***B. Compared to Industry-Standard References, Duke's Capital Cost***
12 ***Projections Tilt the Playing Field Toward Nuclear and Gas***
13 ***Resources.***

14 **Q. HOW DO DUKE'S COST ASSUMPTIONS COMPARE TO THOSE THAT**
15 **SYNAPSE USED IN ITS CARBON-FREE BY 2050 REPORT?**

16 A. Duke bases its capital cost forecasts on internal and external sources,
17 including Guidehouse for renewable and storage costs, Burns & McDonnell
18 for thermal costs, and energy consultants and manufacturers for other
19 resources.¹⁹ A Duke discovery response indicates that Duke sourced the
20 BWRX small modular nuclear reactor capital cost forecast, for example,
21 directly from the manufacturer.²⁰

¹⁹ Duke Energy response to Public Staff Data Request 3-3. Although this response was confidential, counsel for Duke Energy confirmed that the information in the foregoing sentence could be presented in the public, unredacted version of this testimony.


²⁰ Duke Energy response to NCSEA-SELG Data Request 3-17.

1 Synapse's *Carbon-Free by 2050* uses the National Renewable
2 Energy Laboratory's 2022 Annual Technology Baseline's ("NREL ATB")
3 capital cost projections for solar, solar plus storage, on- and off-shore wind,
4 and battery resources. For gas resources and small modular reactor
5 ("SMR") nuclear units, Synapse used cost estimates from the Energy
6 Information Administration's 2022 Annual Energy Outlook ("EIA AEO").
7 While the results of an all-source request for proposal ("RFP") would be the
8 best source of market cost data in the near term, in the absence of this
9 information, Synapse's use of publicly available, industry standard
10 resources provides a benchmark against which to evaluate Duke's cost
11 projections.²¹

12 Figure 4 shows a comparison between Synapse and Duke capital
13 cost estimates for generation resources by technology:

[BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL]

²¹ As an example, the South Carolina Public Service Commission directed Duke Energy to use NREL ATB cost forecasts in the Companies' 2020 Modified Integrated Resource Plans. See: South Carolina Public Service Commission Order No. 2021-447, retrieved at: <https://dms.psc.sc.gov/Attachments/Order/28c909bb-889f-4095-b364-1ab8359ee799>.



[END CONFIDENTIAL]

1 Duke's capital cost projections are relatively more expensive than
2 the NREL ATB reference for standalone solar, solar plus storage, offshore
3 wind and 4-hour storage resources. In contrast, Duke's estimates are less
4 expensive than the EIA AEO reference for nuclear SMRs and gas
5 combined-cycle and combustion turbine units. To an extent, deviations
6 across different forecasts for individual resource projections are to be
7 expected. However, the pattern of renewable costs that are higher than
8 industry standards and conventional fossil and steam resource costs that
9 are lower than industry standards presents cause for concern. The Tech
10 Customers also expressed concern with Duke's cost projections favoring
11 gas over renewable resources.²²

²² Tech Customers Gabel Report, p. 8.

1 **Q. WHAT IMPLICATIONS DID THESE CAPITAL COST ASSUMPTIONS**
2 **HAVE ON DUKE'S PROPOSED PORTFOLIOS?**

3 A. Capital cost projections drive the selection of resources based on
4 EnCompass' economic optimization. Differences in resource costs will
5 therefore affect which portfolio EnCompass identifies as economically
6 optimal. And of course, capital cost assumptions affect the total projected
7 net present value revenue requirement of each portfolio.

8 **Q. PROVIDE YOUR RESPONSE TO DUKE'S WITNESSES' CLAIMS THAT**
9 **CAPITAL COST ASSUMPTIONS USED IN THE CARBON-FREE BY**
10 **2050 REPORT ARE INAPPROPRIATE.²³**

11 A. Synapse's analysis used industry-standard, publicly available capital cost
12 projections developed by expert U.S. government researchers. For gas-
13 fired resources, our team confirmed that our approach was consistent with
14 the approach used by Duke for applying EIA AEO price forecasts in its own
15 analysis.²⁴ We deliberately sourced our capital cost inputs to maintain
16 transparency and neutrality in resource selection.

17 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION WITH**
18 **REGARD TO CAPITAL COST ASSUMPTIONS?**

19 A. Given the impact of capital cost projections on modeling results and
20 selected portfolios, utilities and regulators should ensure that cost
21 projections are publicly available, high-quality, and neutral across
22 resources. To achieve this, the Commission should direct Duke to issue
23 regional, all-source RFPs for energy and capacity resources for use in

²³ Snider et al., pp. 192-197.

²⁴ Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress Response to NC Public Staff Data Request 10-3.

1 resource procurement and price discovery. These prices may be
2 supplemented as needed by NREL ATB and EIA AEO for the purposes of
3 further Carbon Plan modeling and analysis.

4 ***C. Differences in Synapse and Duke's Fuel Price Forecasts Show***
5 ***Inherent Commodity Price Risk Associated with Gas-Fired***
6 ***Resources.***

7 **Q. BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE DUKE'S METHODOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING**
8 **GAS PRICE FORECASTS AND COMPARE IT TO SYNAPSE'S**
9 **METHODOLOGY.**

10 A. Duke relies on near-term gas market futures prices from NYMEX and a
11 long-term fundamental forecast based on an average of the 2021 EIA
12 Annual Energy Outlook and proprietary sources, including forecasts from
13 Wood Mackenzie and IHS, and also blends projected costs of hydrogen
14 into its price forecast.


15 Synapse used a forecasting methodology similar to Duke's, with the
16 following revisions:

- 17 (i) Synapse relied on a more recent (June 2022) set of NYMEX
18 futures prices;
- 19 (ii) Synapse used the more recent 2022 AEO instead of the 2021
20 AEO, and exclusively relied on the 2022 AEO instead of
21 averaging the AEO with proprietary sources.

22 **Q. DESCRIBE HOW THE SYNAPSE AND DUKE GAS PRICE FORECASTS**
23 **DIFFER.**

24 A. Figure 5, below, compares the short-term gas price forecasts developed
25 based on the Synapse and Duke methodologies.

26 [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL]



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[END CONFIDENTIAL]

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In the short term, Synapse and Duke's gas price forecasts sharply diverge. Synapse's use of more current data reflects the impact of recent global events on gas commodity prices.

7

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Q. WHAT IMPACT DO GAS PRICE FORECASTS HAVE ON THE RESOURCES SELECTED IN EACH PORTFOLIO AND THE COST OF EACH PORTFOLIO?

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A. Lower gas prices will result in lower total production costs. Use of a lower gas price will signal to the EnCompass model that a gas plant is relatively less expensive to operate, which will drive the model to select more gas plants. Gas plants are generally less capital-intensive than renewable projects but have large operating costs, composed mostly of fuel costs, which are passed directly to customers through the fuel rider. Therefore,

1 relying on low gas prices deflates one of the main components of the net
2 present value of revenue requirements for gas resources. This will both (1)
3 drive the model to build more gas plants than is economically optimal and
4 (2) understate the likely costs associated with operating and maintaining
5 gas plants.

6 **Q. WHY IS IT CONCERNING THAT DUKE'S FORECAST IS SO MUCH**
7 **LOWER THAN SYNAPSE'S GAS PRICE FORECAST?**

8 A. Synapse's gas price forecast better reflects the influence of recent market
9 factors and geopolitical events. Gas prices are inherently tied to commodity
10 pricing dynamics, and North Carolina ratepayers' exposure to commodity
11 price risk is directly related to the magnitude of dependence on gas fuel in
12 Duke's portfolio. Several other intervenors shared this concern with Duke's
13 price forecast, especially in light of recent global events that have driven up
14 gas prices, including the Public Staff²⁵ and the AGO.²⁶

15 ***D. Regional Wind Power Purchase Agreements Drive Substantial, Zero-***
16 ***Carbon Savings for Ratepayers.***

17 **Q. DID THE CARBON-FREE BY 2050 SCENARIOS INCLUDE**
18 **CONSIDERATION OF ANY RESOURCES OUTSIDE THE CAROLINAS?**

19 A. Yes. The *Carbon-Free by 2050* report includes a *Regional Resources*
20 scenario that allows the model to select onshore wind power purchase
21 agreements ("PPAs") from the Midcontinent Independent System Operator
22 ("MISO") region, transferred to Duke's territory through PJM.²⁷ Duke

²⁵ Public Staff Report, pp. 70-74.

²⁶ AGO Strategen Report, pp. 23-4.

²⁷ The *Carbon-Free by 2050* report includes additional details on modeling Midwest wind resources in Appendix A on page A-13.

criticized this assumption, claiming that the costs and transmission needs are too high to make this a feasible option.²⁸ In our analysis, however, even including the firm PJM border rate for these imports, EnCompass still found these PPAs to be cost-effective. Future carbon and transmission planning should draw on the North Carolina Transmission Planning Collaborative's 2021 Public Policy Study to inform transmission investments necessary to bring in low-cost Midwest wind resources.²⁹

Q. HOW DOES THE AVAILABILITY OF MIDWEST WIND PPAS IN THE REGIONAL RESOURCES PORTFOLIO AFFECT ITS COST RELATIVE TO THE OTHER PORTFOLIOS IN THE CARBON-FREE BY 2050 REPORT?

A. Table 3, below shows the differences in total cost for each scenario assessed in the *Carbon Free By 2050* report.

Table 2. Net Present Value Revenue Requirement, by Scenario

Results (2022-2050)	Duke Resources	Optimized	Regional Resources
2030 NPVRR (\$B)	\$36.7	\$36.0	\$34.3
2040 NPVRR (\$B)	\$77.7	\$69.8	\$65.8
2050 NPVRR (\$B)	\$121.2	\$103.5	\$98.1

Compared to the *Optimized* scenario, the *Regional Resources* scenario achieves incremental savings of \$1.7 billion by 2030 and \$5.4 billion by 2050.

Q. BASED ON THIS FINDING, WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION?

²⁸ Direct Testimony of Roberts and Farver, Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress, pp. 59-61.

²⁹ See: *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, p. 14.

1 A. When zero-carbon resources from outside the Carolinas are made
 2 available for selection by the model, they can provide significant cost
 3 savings to North Carolina ratepayers, on the order of billions of dollars. The
 4 Tech Customers make a similar point in their report.³⁰ Given that the
 5 Carbon Plan will be designed to identify the least-cost pathway to meet
 6 carbon requirements, and that regional resources have the potential to
 7 “shrink the challenge” of reducing carbon by cost-effectively reducing net
 8 load in the Carolinas, the Commission should consider these resources. I
 9 recommend that the Commission consider both firm and non-firm power
 10 purchase agreements of zero-carbon power from outside the Carolinas in
 11 developing the Carbon Plan and directing further modeling.

12 ***E. The Carbon Plan Should Consider a Range of Transmission Options***
 13 ***to Identify Least-Cost Resource Pathways.***

14 **Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE TRANSMISSION ASSUMPTIONS DUKE RELIED**
 15 **ON IN MODELING ITS CARBON PLAN.**

16 A. Duke’s EnCompass database, which forms the foundation for each of its
 17 proposed scenarios, includes the following embedded assumptions about
 18 regional transmission and coordination from 2022 to 2050:

- 19 1. Transmission capacity between DEC and DEP is constant over
 20 the 2022-2050 planning period, with no option to expand
 21 capacity;
- 22 2. DEC and DEP are maintained as separate balancing authorities
 23 over the 2022-2050 planning period;
- 24 3. Neither DEC nor DEP is allowed to purchase or sell energy or
 25 capacity from neighboring regions over the 2022-2050 planning
 26 period;

³⁰ Tech Customer Gabel Report, p. 8.

- 1 4. As a result, inter-regional transmission is not modeled, and any
2 economic improvements resulting from inter-regional
3 transmission are not incorporated into the analysis;
- 4 5. Neither DEC nor DEP is allowed to procure resources from
5 outside of their service areas, with the exception of onshore wind
6 in PJM for DEC;
- 7 6. The level of capacity assistance from neighbors (for purposes of
8 calculating planning reserve margin) is expected to be constant
9 over the planning period; and
- 10 7. No regionalization entities or institutions, such as energy
11 imbalance markets or regional transmission organizations, are
12 modeled over the planning period.
- 13 The only exception to the above is the inclusion of a “Future
14 purchase” resource in each portfolio that allows Duke Energy to
15 economically purchase zero-carbon power in the final years of each
16 planning portfolio.³¹

17 **Q. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE EMBEDDED**
18 **ASSUMPTIONS ON THE PORTFOLIOS PRODUCED BY DUKE?**

- 19 A. Duke’s reliance on a static transmission configuration in its EnCompass
20 modeling, and its decision not to evaluate transmission sensitivities or
21 alternatives, means that the Companies did not assess the cost, reliability,
22 operational, or carbon impacts of any of the potential transmission
23 developments enumerated above. By omitting consideration of these
24 transmission options, Duke’s proposed carbon plan filing artificially
25 constrains the resource pathways and solutions available to meet HB 951
26 requirements.

³¹ Duke Energy (2022). Carolinas Carbon Plan Modeling Analysis Overview. Docket No. E-100 Sub 179.

1 **Q. IS THIS APPROACH CONSISTENT WITH LEAST-COST RESOURCE**
2 **PLANNING?**

3 A. No, especially in the context of long-term decarbonization planning. High-
4 quality studies of power sector decarbonization consistently underscore the
5 critical role of transmission in bolstering resource adequacy and enabling
6 delivery of high-quality solar and wind resources to serve load.³² The Tech
7 Customers share our concerns with Duke's static approach, stating that
8 "Duke did not engage in a holistic portfolio and scenario-based planning
9 process or optimize its transmission strategy to address public policy and
10 reliability needs. Instead, each transmission and interconnection
11 investment category was developed piecemeal and integrated into Duke's
12 proposed carbon plan."³³

13 Duke tacitly acknowledges the problems with such an approach by
14 including "Future Purchase" resources, which come from outside the
15 region, in its portfolios in the final years of its carbon plan. This reflects the
16 critical role that regional transactions can play in reliably and cost-
17 effectively operating a low- and zero-carbon grid.

18 **Q. BASED ON THIS FINDING, WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO**
19 **THE COMMISSION?**

20 A. The Commission should ensure that carbon planning includes
21 consideration of all reasonable transmission and regional coordination

³² See: Princeton Net Zero America study (2020); MIT Value of Inter-regional Coordination study (2021); Electric Power Research Institute Powering Decarbonization: Strategies for Net-Zero CO2 emissions (2021); and NREL Seams Study (2017).

³³ Tech Customers Gabel report, p. 15.

options that could be part of a least-cost plan for ratepayers. To the extent that the Commission deems that a distinct process from integrated resource planning is required (and that the existing public policy request function of the North Carolina Transmission Planning Collaborative is unable to fulfill this role), the Commission should initiate a new proceeding for pursuing long-term, prospective regional transmission planning and consideration of regional coordination. In any case, consideration of options in this proceeding should include a wide set of transmission and coordination alternatives, rather than being constrained by a single set of assumptions embedded in the EnCompass model.

F. Long-Term Planning Should Avoid Path Dependence and Lock-In Risks.

Q. BRIEFLY INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF PATH DEPENDENCE AS IT RELATES TO RESOURCE PLANNING.

A. Path dependence is a concept where past events constrain the set of solutions or decisions that are available in the future.³⁴ A similar term, “lock-in,” describes previous events or decisions that commit an entity to future actions based on a past decision.

Given the multi-decade lifetimes of most generation resources, path dependence is a consistent feature of electricity resource planning. Historically, alternative generation options were not competitive, and load

³⁴ Liebowitz, S., & Margolis, S. (1995, April). Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, pp. 205-226. Retrieved at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1706450.

and consumer growth were relatively consistent.³⁵ But with renewable and storage costs falling, slow load growth and electrification adding uncertainty to load forecasts, and states and utilities adopting decarbonization trajectories, path dependence presents an increasing risk to ratepayers and to compliance with carbon reduction requirements. For example, near-term investments in carbon-emitting resources can preclude the ability to invest in cost-effective renewable resources. Investments in long-lived fossil infrastructure can also lock a power system into a certain level of carbon emissions for the lifetime of the resource, called “committed emissions.”³⁶

To avoid risks arising from path dependence and lock-in, utilities should prioritize least-regrets resource decisions in the short term, while minimizing or deferring decisions that would commit the utility to a given pathway in the face of uncertain planning constructs, policies, and costs.³⁷

Q. HOW DOES CAPACITY EXPANSION MODELING ASSESS THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH LOCKING IN SPECIFIC RESOURCES, SPECIFICALLY FOSSIL RESOURCES?

A. There is no single model output that can indicate the level of path dependence of one portfolio versus another. The best way to assess the

³⁵ Weston, F. (2009, May). Integrated Resource Planning: History and Principles. *The Regulatory Assistance Project*. Retrieved at:

<https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rap-weston-integratedresourceplanningoverview-2009-05-20.pdf>.

³⁶ Shearer, C., Tong, D., Fofrich, R., Davis, S. (2020, September). Committed Emissions of the U.S. Power Sector, 2000-2018. AGU Advances. Retrieved at: <https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1029/2020AV000162>.

³⁷ See: Northern States Power Company (2020). Upper Midwest Integrated Resource Plan, 2020-2034. p. 90. Retrieved at: <https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xcel-responsive/Company/Rates%20&%20Regulations/The-Resource-Plan-No-Appendices.pdf>.

1 lock-in risk of a portfolio or a resource is to run sensitivities—that is, to see
2 how it performs when you change a series of key inputs and assumptions
3 (for example, higher or lower gas prices, the cost of alternatives) and then
4 assess the results. If, for example, the decision to lock in a resource is
5 favorable under only a narrow set of conditions and will incur high costs for
6 ratepayers under many other likely conditions, then there is a high risk
7 associated with locking in that resource. On the flip side, if a resource is
8 found to perform well under a wide range of assumptions, then it is less
9 likely to lock ratepayers into otherwise avoidable costs.

10 **Q. DESCRIBE ANY PATH DEPENDENCE RISKS THAT YOU HAVE**
11 **IDENTIFIED IN DUKE'S PROPOSED CARBON PLAN ENCOMPASS**
12 **ANALYSIS AND FILING.**

13 A. I observe the following path dependence risk factors in Duke's proposed
14 carbon plan filing:

15 **1. Delay in projected achievement of HB 951's 70 percent carbon**
16 **reduction requirement.** Several portfolios in Duke's carbon plan filing
17 delay meeting HB 951's carbon reduction requirement, doing so in
18 2032 or 2034 instead of 2030. This reduces flexibility if unforeseen
19 delays occur and increases the risk of noncompliance with HB 951's
20 carbon reduction requirements.

21 **2. Short planning horizon.** Duke divided the planning horizon in its
22 EnCompass modeling into a series of 8-year segments and a final 5-
23 year segment (i.e., 2022-2029, 2030-2037, 2038-2045, and 2046-

1 2050),³⁸ Given the multi-decade transition contemplated in this
2 proceeding, an eight-year horizon is a short-term approach that will
3 not integrate long-term planning dynamics, including carbon reduction
4 requirements.

5 **3. Continued investment in gas plants.** Duke plans to continue
6 investing in gas plants, on the assumptions that (1) low-cost
7 Appalachian gas will be available to supply existing and new
8 combined-cycle plants (“CCs”); and (2) it will be economic in the future
9 to convert and operate combustion turbines on hydrogen. But both are
10 high risk assumptions: The first assumption carries risk because the
11 pipeline necessary to supply Appalachian gas is not yet completed.³⁹
12 Without the completed pipeline, Duke may not have access to
13 sufficient firm gas capacity to fuel its CCs, as the AGO notes in the
14 Strategen report.⁴⁰ The second assumption is risky because it
15 presumes that retrofits will be technically feasible and cost-effective
16 and requires hydrogen to be available at the price and quantity needed
17 to compete with other fuels. In the event that technical issues prevent
18 cost-effective turbine conversion or a sufficient supply of zero-carbon
19 hydrogen is not available, existing and planned gas plants risk
20 becoming obsolete, and the burden of paying off these stranded

³⁸ Pages B-15 and B-16 of Appendix B of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report contain more information on Duke Energy and Synapse EnCompass planning horizons.

³⁹ Snider et al., p. 178.

⁴⁰ AGO Strategen Report, p. 26.

1 assets will fall on either shareholders or Duke ratepayers. Other
2 intervenors expressed concern about the risks of Duke planning its
3 system around hydrogen, including the Public Staff⁴¹ and the AGO.⁴²

4 **4. Concurrent construction of non-commercial nuclear**
5 **technologies.** Duke's proposed portfolios include up to 21 new
6 advanced and small modular nuclear reactors to be built between
7 2033 and 2050. This schedule would require, on average, construction
8 of just over one new unit per year and would entail concurrent
9 construction on multiple units before the first unit has successfully
10 achieved operation.⁴³ Concurrent development of these uncertain,
11 not-yet-commercialized resources could lock in additional costs for
12 ratepayers in the event of cost over-runs or operational problems.
13 Synapse is not alone in its concerns around small modular nuclear
14 reactors: the Tech Customers also express similar concerns around
15 locking customers in to speculative technologies.⁴⁴

16 **Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE HOW THE CARBON-FREE BY 2050 SCENARIOS**
17 **AVOID PATH DEPENDENCY RISKS.**

18 A. The *Carbon-Free by 2050* EnCompass analysis employs the following
19 inputs and parameters to avoid path dependency risks:

⁴¹ Comments of the Public Staff ("Comments of the Public Staff") (2022, July). North Carolina Utilities Commission. Docket No. E-100, Sub 179, pp. 95-96.

⁴² AGO Strategen Report, p. 30.

⁴³ Pages A-11 and A-12 of Appendix A of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report contain additional discussion of Duke Energy's nuclear availability settings.

⁴⁴ Tech Customer Gabel, p. 58.

- 1 5. **2030 achievement date for 70 percent reduction requirement.** This
2 approach maintains the HB 951's default deadline for achievement of
3 the 70 percent carbon reduction and allows for flexibility in later
4 planning proceedings in the event that the Commission determines
5 that a delay is warranted.
- 6 6. **15-year planning horizon.** Synapse's EnCompass analysis uses a
7 15-year planning horizon, which strikes an appropriate balance
8 between computational complexity and integrating long-run portfolio
9 requirements, such as carbon reduction requirements.
- 10 7. **Adjusted lifetime and hydrogen assumptions for gas-fired**
11 **resources.** EnCompass analysis in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report
12 allows existing gas units to be retired if it is more economic to do so,
13 rather than be converted to 100 percent hydrogen combustion. Newly
14 constructed gas-fired resources are assumed to have an operating life
15 of 25 years and a depreciation lifetime of 20 years in order to avoid
16 stranded asset risk as carbon requirements decline toward zero by
17 2050.
- 18 8. **National reference cost and less ambitious deployment timeline**
19 **for non-commercial nuclear technologies.** The *Carbon-Free by*
20 *2050* report uses national reference costs and anticipates a less
21 ambitious deployment timeline for new nuclear resources to maintain
22 a conservative approach to cost assumptions for projects with a high
23 amount of uncertainty, allow for learning by doing, and avoid lock-in.

1 **Q. AFTER ACCOUNTING FOR PATH DEPENDENCE RISKS, WHAT**
2 **SELECTIONS DID ENCOMPASS ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION MAKE IN**
3 **THE *CARBON-FREE BY 2050* PORTFOLIOS?**

4 A. In the scenarios where EnCompass was allowed to economically optimize
5 resources in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, the model did not select any
6 additional gas-fired resources and opted for the retirement of some gas-
7 fired units, rather than conversion to 100 percent hydrogen combustion.⁴⁵
8 The *Regional Resources* scenario did not reach the 4-unit availability limit
9 set for additional nuclear resources.⁴⁶

10 **Q. BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE DUKE'S DISCUSSION OF "OUTCOME-**
11 **ORIENTED ASSUMPTIONS" AND PROVIDE YOUR RESPONSE.**

12 A. Duke Energy witnesses Snider et al. claim several times in testimony that
13 certain inputs to the *Carbon-Free by 2050* analysis are "outcome-
14 oriented."⁴⁷ In a sense, this description is correct: The assumptions
15 developed for the *Carbon-Free by 2050* analysis are designed to
16 approximate present and projected future conditions, with the intended
17 outcome of producing a portfolio that provides cost-effective, reliable power
18 for North Carolina ratepayers while meeting HB 951's carbon-reduction
19 requirements. This is the outcome that resource planning is designed to
20 produce, and, while Duke witnesses may disagree with the empirical or
21 analytical justification for these assumptions, the implication that the

⁴⁵ See Section 3 of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report.

⁴⁶ See Page C-3 of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, Appendix C.

⁴⁷ Snider et al., p. 185-195.

1 *Carbon-Free by 2050* assumptions are intended to produce something
2 other than cost-effective, reliable, and sustainable power is not accurate.

3 As an example, the *Carbon-Free by 2050* assumption of a 25-year
4 operating lifetime and 20-year depreciation lifetime for gas-fired resources
5 is not intended to produce a specific resource outcome, but instead is
6 based on basic risk management principles. Carbon emissions associated
7 with these resources are regulated by HB 951, which requires that
8 emissions reach zero by 2050. If the technology and infrastructure to
9 decarbonize these resources (i.e., zero-carbon hydrogen supply and
10 transport) does not develop as contemplated in Duke Energy's carbon plan
11 filing, these conservative lifetime assumptions minimize stranded asset risk
12 for Duke and its ratepayers.

13 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION RELATED**
14 **TO PATH DEPENDENCE?**

15 A. Given the potential negative impacts of path dependence in the context of
16 the Carbon Plan and the numerous risks arising from path dependence in
17 Duke's proposal, the Commission should incorporate several revisions into
18 future Carbon Plan modeling to reduce the risks associated with high path
19 dependence. These include:

- 20 1. Lengthening the optimization horizon for capacity expansion analysis;
- 21 2. Maintaining a 2030 achievement date for achieving the 70 percent
- 22 carbon reduction requirement, and applying reasonable lifetime
- 23 assumptions to new-construction gas-fired units;

1 3. Placing stringent limits on the assumed supply of zero-carbon
2 hydrogen and the technical and cost feasibility of hydrogen retrofits;
3 and

4 4. Maintaining conservative cost and availability assumptions for new
5 nuclear units.

6 ***G. Duke's Supplemental P5 and P6 Portfolios Do Not Adequately***
7 ***Address Modeling Issues Associated with Duke's Proposed***
8 ***Portfolios.***

9 **Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED THE P5 AND P6 PORTFOLIOS THAT DUKE**
10 **DESCRIBED IN ITS FILING TO THE COMMISSION ON JULY 28,⁴⁸ THE**
11 **RESULTS OF WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN DUKE'S AUGUST 19**
12 **TESTIMONY?**

13 A. Given the importance of an in-depth understanding of modeling results and
14 the short time period for intervenors to review the P5 and P6 results, I did
15 not perform a detailed review of the process of modeling those scenarios
16 or of the resulting portfolios for this testimony. However, I did review the
17 revisions to model inputs for the P5 and P6 scenarios.

18 **Q. DO THESE REVISIONS CORRECT THE MODELING ISSUES**
19 **IDENTIFIED IN THIS TESTIMONY AND THE *CARBON-FREE BY 2050***
20 **REPORT?**

21 A. No. Table 4, below, shows issues that were improved or not improved by
22 selected P5 and P6 revisions to model inputs.

⁴⁸ Duke Energy filing Re: Development of Supplemental Modeling Portfolios, Docket No. E-100 Sub 179. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=c60326e0-4390-46ef-9b92-0face09a187b>.

Table 3. Evaluation of Selected Changes Present in Duke Energy Supplemental Portfolios 5 and 6

#	Model Change	Improvement to Carbon Plan modeling?	Explanation / Comments
1	Delay of HB 951 compliance date	No	Delay of HB 951 compliance date exacerbates risk of non-compliance
3	Dynamic dispatch of solar plus storage	Yes	More precise simulation of solar plus storage capabilities; IRA may impact battery charging requirements
4	Remove cumulative limits on 4- and 6-hour batteries	Yes	Deployment limits distort final results
5	Remove H ₂ blending with gas	Yes	Insufficient support for sufficient zero-carbon hydrogen; Duke Energy's offset and hydrogen-fueled combustion turbine approach is not appropriate
6	Model solar as PPA for 45%	Yes	More precise estimate of solar costs
7	Low energy efficiency case	No	Higher level of energy efficiency is achievable and lowers total system cost
8	Remove access to Appalachian gas	Yes	Better reflects real-world conditions
13	Validate selection of gas plants through a full-period capacity expansion optimization	Yes	Still necessary, even with changes to hydrogen treatment

Q. PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON ITEM 3 ("DYNAMIC DISPATCH OF SOLAR PLUS STORAGE") FROM THE TABLE ABOVE.

1 A. I generally agree with the Public Staff's finding that Duke's fixed-dispatch
2 treatment of solar plus storage resources is an imprecise method for
3 modeling the contribution of these resources, and that dynamic dispatch
4 would provide additional insight.⁴⁹ While I relied on Duke's fixed solar-plus-
5 storage dispatch curves in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report for consistency
6 with Duke's method, I support the Public Staff's recommendation to model
7 dynamic dispatch for these resources.

8 I also agree with Public Staff's perspective that storage resources
9 deployed in a solar-plus-storage configuration should have the capability of
10 charging directly from the grid.⁵⁰ Changes to clean energy tax credits
11 resulting from the IRA will further ease configuration requirements and
12 further support grid charging.

13 **Q. PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON ITEM 5 ("REMOVE H₂**
14 **BLENDING WITH GAS") FROM THE TABLE ABOVE.**

15 A. While I think it is appropriate to apply a skeptical eye toward hydrogen
16 supply assumptions, Duke's implementation of this revision is
17 contradictory. Duke's proposed implementation details for Item 5 indicate,
18 for example, that hydrogen turbines would be removed as an option, but
19 that combustion turbines built after 2040 could operate on 100 percent

⁴⁹ Comments of the Public Staff, Duke Energy Progress, LLC and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 2022 Carbon Plan, Docket No. E-100, Sub 179. July 16, 2022. P. 119-126.

⁵⁰ Comments of the Public Staff, pp. 123-124.

hydrogen.⁵¹ These assumptions apply conflicting expectations of hydrogen availability and therefore have limited analytical value. I recommend that, in addition to a scenario without any zero-carbon hydrogen availability, the Commission direct modeling of a hydrogen scenario with very low availability (maximum 5 percent capacity factor for all hydrogen-fueled units), no option for hydrogen conversion, and conservative hydrogen cost assumptions.

Duke also discusses a different treatment of carbon emissions in its implementation details for Item 5 that is not aligned with resource planning best practices. The availability and price of carbon offsets in 2050 is uncertain, and these costs should be included alongside other relevant costs for economic optimization. I recommend that any further modeling not assume any supply of carbon offsets in the portfolio's final years. To the extent that the model is allowed to select carbon offsets, the model should include multiple price levels, including a high offset level of \$250 per ton or greater, and they should be integrated into economic optimization.

Q. PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON ITEM 7 ("LOW ENERGY EFFICIENCY CASE") FROM THE TABLE ABOVE.

A. As discussed previously, and as explained in detail in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, energy efficiency is a cost-effective resource for Duke ratepayers, and Duke should expand, rather than reduce, the impact of

⁵¹ Duke Energy filing Re: Development of Supplemental Modeling Portfolios, Docket No. E-100 Sub 179. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=c60326e0-4390-46ef-9b92-0face09a187b>.

1 energy efficiency. I also recommend that the Commission decline to use
2 the low EE case for planning purposes.

3 **Q. PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON ITEM 13 (“VALIDATE**
4 **SELECTION OF GAS PLANTS THROUGH A FULL-PERIOD CAPACITY**
5 **EXPANSION OPTIMIZATION”) FROM THE TABLE ABOVE.**

6 A. I do not agree with Duke’s statement that its treatment of hydrogen fuel
7 renders full-period optimization capacity expansion unnecessary. Even
8 without hydrogen conversion, carbon requirements are expected to put
9 pressure on gas resources to lower emissions rates, which will drive down
10 capacity factors over time. Resources with lower utilization and higher costs
11 are less attractive in an economic optimization and will be less likely to be
12 selected by the EnCompass model. With a short optimization period, the
13 model may not see the falling utilization and rising costs as it makes its
14 near-term resource planning decisions. I therefore recommend that the
15 Commission direct the Company to include a full-period capacity expansion
16 optimization.

17 **Q. BASED ON YOUR REVIEW OF PROPOSED PORTFOLIOS P5 AND P6,**
18 **DO YOU HAVE A RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION?**

19 A. I recommend that further modeling directed by the Commission implement
20 items number 4, 6, and 8 in Table 4, above. Additionally, I make the
21 following recommendations to the Commission on developing its Carbon
22 Plan and further Carbon Plan modeling:

23 1. Allow storage deployed alongside solar to charge directly from the
24 grid;

- 1 2. In scenarios that include carbon offsets or allowance costs, they
2 should be modeled at multiple price levels and included as a relevant
3 cost in capacity expansion optimization; and
4 3. Include a full-period capacity expansion optimization.

5 ***H. The 2022 Carbon Plan Modeling Process Did Not Facilitate Shared***
6 ***Understanding or Collaboration Across Stakeholders.***

7 **Q. WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF COLLABORATIVE MODELING AND**
8 **ANALYSIS IN RESOURCE PLANNING PROCEEDINGS?**

9 A. Collaborative modeling can build a shared analytical foundation (i.e.,
10 understanding of the modeling tools) for evaluating future resource needs
11 and potential resources available to meet those needs. When multiple
12 parties share this analytical foundation, they can craft robust solutions
13 together and find areas of agreement. Collaborative problem solving,
14 however, requires a commitment to sharing lessons learned and findings,
15 maintaining transparency and problem-solving on the part of all
16 participants.

17 Modeling tools that are common across stakeholders (such as
18 EnCompass in this proceeding) are valuable assets for collaboration and
19 problem-solving because they facilitate organization and sharing of vast
20 amounts of information and clarify the analytical approach to many of the
21 thorny issues present in resource planning. With the support of a well-
22 defined and resourced collaboration process, EnCompass could form the
23 backbone of effective collaboration and shared problem-solving.

1 **Q. PLEASE IDENTIFY ANY BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION**
2 **YOU OBSERVED IN THE COURSE OF YOUR WORK IN THIS**
3 **PROCEEDING.**

4 A. The Synapse team encountered several barriers in its review and analysis
5 of the EnCompass database shared by Duke in this proceeding.⁵² These
6 barriers included the following:

7 1. The data files were not properly transferred to intervenors by Duke,
8 which caused initial model runs to fail and delayed the start of our
9 modeling analysis.

10 2. There were inconsistencies between database inputs and provided
11 outputs that led to substantial delays in EnCompass modeling and
12 prevented intervenors from validating Duke's results;⁵³

13 3. Key data inputs were functionally impossible to parse without
14 additional input spreadsheets from Duke, which were only provided
15 through discovery; and

16 4. Duke conducted additional modeling steps outside of EnCompass.
17 Other parties were not able to reproduce this analysis without
18 additional licensed software (for which Synapse did not have a
19 license) and Duke did not provide a detailed explanation of how the
20 analysis was conducted.

⁵² These barriers are discussed in detail in Appendix B of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report.

⁵³ Duke Energy (2022, June). EnCompass Input Data: Declining Cost Adder Issue and Resolution. Docket No. E-100 Sub 179.

1 **Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY OTHER PARTIES THAT ENCOUNTERED**
2 **ISSUES WITH DUKE'S ENCOMPASS DATABASE?**

3 A. Yes. The Public Staff described encountering similar issues in their
4 comments to the Commission in this proceeding.⁵⁴ These issues ultimately
5 prevented the Public Staff from submitting its own proposed carbon plan in
6 this proceeding.

7 **Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF OTHER PROCEEDINGS WHERE ENCOMPASS**
8 **COLLABORATION AND VALIDATION HAS OCCURRED**
9 **SUCCESSFULLY?**

10 A. Yes. It is my understanding that utilities and stakeholders successfully
11 shared and validated resource planning model data in proceedings with
12 Xcel in Colorado, Xcel in Minnesota, and Duke Energy in Indiana.

13 **Q. PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION ON**
14 **FACILITATING MORE EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION IN FUTURE**
15 **CARBON PLAN AND RESOURCE PLANNING MODELING**
16 **PROCESSES.**

17 A. I provide the following recommendations:

18 1. **Longer collaboration process, including sharing of all data**
19 **during plan development.** Model review, sharing, and validation is
20 an effort- and time-intensive undertaking, and the results of this
21 proceeding show how just a few validation issues can seriously impact
22 stakeholders' ability to provide additional insight to the Commission.
23 EnCompass collaboration should include the sharing of contemporary
24 model data at the outset of the process and occur over a longer

⁵⁴ Comments of the Public Staff. p. 36-37.

1 timescale. This would allow parties to have substantive conversations
2 about model inputs and methodology and avoid validation issues.

3 2. **Higher transparency for model inputs.** For model inputs that are not
4 transparently derived from public sources, the utility should provide
5 the derivation of these inputs proactively, rather than through the
6 discovery process.

7 3. **Transparency for out-of-model resource planning steps.** To the
8 extent that the Commission finds the use of out-of-model planning
9 steps appropriate, the utility should take all necessary steps to render
10 the inputs, methodology, and outputs of those steps transparent for
11 collaborators.

12 IV. **Issues related to “Coal Unit Retirement Schedule”**

13 *I. Duke Energy’s Coal Retirement Methodology Delayed Coal*
14 *Retirement Dates Without Adequate Justification and at a Cost to*
15 *Ratepayers.*

16 **Q. BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE DUKE’S COAL RETIREMENT METHODOLOGY**
17 **AS IMPLEMENTED IN ITS PROPOSED CARBON PLAN FILING.**

18 A. In developing its proposed carbon plan, Duke used a multi-step process for
19 selecting coal unit retirement dates. First, it conducted capacity expansion
20 runs with fixed retirement dates to establish projected capital investments
21 and operations and maintenance costs for each unit. It used those cost
22 projections in a run that allowed EnCompass to economically retire its coal
23 units. After EnCompass selected the most economic retirement dates for
24 the coal fleet, Duke manually delayed the retirement year for several of its

1 coal units.⁵⁵ Table 5, below, shows the economic retirement year identified
 2 by Duke's EnCompass run and the retirement year proposed by Duke for
 3 each of its coal units.

Table 4. Duke Coal Units, Modeled and Proposed Retirement Dates

Unit	Super- or Sub-Critical	Construction Year	Winter Capacity (MW)	Economic Retirement Year	Proposed Retirement Year
Belews Creek 1	Super	1974	1,110	2030	2036
Belews Creek 2	Super	1974	1,110	2030	2036
Cliffside 5	Sub	1972	546	2026	2026
Marshall 1	Sub	1965	380	2026	2029
Marshall 2	Sub	1966	380	2026	2029
Marshall 3	Super	1969	658	2034	2033
Marshall 4	Super	1970	660	2034	2033
Mayo 1	Sub	1983	713	2026	2029
Roxboro 1	Sub	1966	380	2029	2029
Roxboro 2	Sub	1966	673	2029	2029
Roxboro 3	Sub	1973	689	2030	2028-2034
Roxboro 4	Sub	1980	711	2030	2028-2034

*Source: Carbon-Free by 2050, Appendix D. Proposed retirement dates are from Duke Energy Portfolio 1.*⁵⁶

4 **Q. IS THIS METHODOLOGY CONSISTENT WITH LEAST-COST**
 5 **RESOURCE PLANNING?**

6 A. No. When EnCompass retires any existing unit, it does so because the
 7 energy and capacity provided by that unit could more economically be
 8 provided by other resources. Stated another way, the costs to operate the
 9 unit exceed the value of the energy and capacity it provides. In short,
 10 EnCompass identified coal units for retirement on the schedule it did

⁵⁵ Pages 28-29 of the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report contain a summary of Duke Energy's coal retirement methodology.

⁵⁶ Although the information in Table 5 was derived in part from confidential data, counsel for Duke Energy confirmed that Table 5 could be presented in the public, unredacted version of this testimony.

1 because continuing to operate them was more expensive for ratepayers
2 than retiring them. The manual delays implemented by Duke keep these
3 units online, at ratepayers' expense. Moreover, in almost all cases Duke's
4 proposed retirement dates are years later than the "Earliest Practicable"
5 retirement years identified in the Companies' 2020 IRPs.⁵⁷ Maintaining
6 these units past their economic retirement dates could cost Duke
7 ratepayers \$1.4 billion, before accounting for fuel costs, variable operations
8 & maintenance costs, or lost securitization benefits.⁵⁸ Duke challenges our
9 estimates of the costs required to sustain its coal plants, stating that my
10 analysis overstates the costs by \$1 billion.⁵⁹ But Duke has not justified its
11 low cost assumptions, which could be proven wrong in the future. If actual
12 future fixed operations and maintenance plus ongoing capital costs exceed
13 Duke's projections, ratepayers could end up shouldering the cost premium,
14 absent a disallowance. My use of a projection based on actual incurred
15 costs, rather than a hypothetical schedule with no built-in accountability
16 mechanism, provides a reasonable and transparent basis for estimating
17 these costs.

18 **Q. DUKE ASSERTS THAT THE MANUAL DELAYS TO COAL**
19 **RETIREMENTS WERE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN RELIABILITY. HOW**
20 **DO YOU RESPOND?**

⁵⁷ See: Duke Energy Carolinas Integrated Resource Plan 2020 Biennial Report, p. 175; and Duke Energy Progress Integrated Resource Plan 2020 Biennial Report, p. 174.

⁵⁸ *Carbon-Free by 2050*, p. 29.

⁵⁹ Snider et al., pp 141-143.

1 A. There may be power supply and reliability concerns with retiring coal
2 capacity, which may require the development of replacement generation
3 and transmission resources to provide the same energy, capacity, and
4 ancillary services previously provided by the retiring coal units. Modeling
5 specific power flow requirements is not a suitable task for a resource
6 planning tool like EnCompass, and is better understood through power flow
7 modeling and approximated in EnCompass using earliest possible
8 retirement dates. The “Earliest Practicable” retirement dates developed at
9 the direction of the Commission for the Companies’ 2020 IRPs were
10 designed to accommodate construction of replacement resources. Almost
11 all of Duke’s manual adjustments in this case extend for years beyond
12 those “Earliest Practicable” dates, however, without sufficient justification
13 for why these extensions are necessary.

14 Duke witnesses Roberts and Farver contend that Duke Energy’s
15 justifications for the manual delays are sufficiently detailed, but their
16 discussion of specific unit retirements continues to rely on high-level
17 assumptions rather than detailed requirements and timelines.⁶⁰ For
18 example, witnesses Roberts and Farver repeat Duke’s assertion in its
19 proposed carbon plan that “Belews Creek units will continue to operate into
20 the 2030s” and state that Duke has not yet evaluated requirements for
21 retirement of these units: “DEC plans to evaluate transmission upgrades to

⁶⁰ Testimony of Duke Energy Witnesses Roberts and Farver, Docket No. E-100 Sub 179 (“Roberts and Farver”), p. 52-55.p

1 enable retirements as the planned retirement approaches.”⁶¹ This
 2 approach is opposed to the more appropriate approach of allowing
 3 EnCompass optimization to identify the most cost-effective retirement dates
 4 for these units.

5 **Q. DESCRIBE ANY REVISIONS TO THE COAL UNIT RETIREMENT**
 6 **DATES YOU IMPLEMENTED IN THE CARBON-FREE BY 2050**
 7 **SCENARIOS.**

8 A. In the *Optimized* and *Regional Resources* scenarios, Synapse allowed
 9 Duke’s coal units to be retired at the economic date identified by
 10 EnCompass, with no additional delay to retirement.⁶²

11 **Q. HOW DID THESE REVISIONS IMPACT THE RESULTS OF THE**
 12 **CARBON-FREE BY 2050 SCENARIOS?**

13 A. Table 6, below, shows the coal retirement dates selected by EnCompass
 14 in the *Optimized* and *Regional Resources* scenarios compared to the *Duke*
 15 *Resources* scenario.

Table 5. Retirement Year for Selected Coal Units by Scenario

Coal Unit	Capacity (MW)	Retirement Year		
		Duke Resources	Optimized	Regional Resources
Belews Creek 1-2	2,220	2036	2034	2030
Cliffside 5	546	2026	2023	2023
Marshall 1-2	760	2028	2026	2026
Marshall 3-4	1,318	2032	2032	2032
Mayo 1	713	2028	2028	2028
Roxboro 1-2	1,053	2028	2028	2028
Roxboro 3-4	1,400	2027	2027	2027

⁶¹ Roberts and Farver, p. 53, ll. 14-16.

⁶² *Carbon-Free by 2050*, pp. 12-13, 18-19.

Source: Carbon-Free by 2050, p. 17-18.

1 Even without building incremental gas combustion turbine or combined-
2 cycle resources, we find that accelerating retirement of coal units compared
3 to Duke's proposal is still in the best interest of ratepayers.⁶³

4 **Q. IS RELIABILITY MAINTAINED IN THE SYNAPSE SCENARIOS, EVEN**
5 **WITH THE ACCELERATED RETIREMENT OF SOME UNITS**
6 **COMPARED TO DUKE RESOURCES?**

7 A. Yes. Even after implementing the retirements identified above, the
8 *Optimized* and *Regional Resources* portfolios continue to meet reserve
9 margin requirements every month and meet 100 percent load in all hours
10 modeled in production cost modeling.

11 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION WITH**
12 **REGARD TO COAL RETIREMENTS?**

13 A. First, the Commission's Carbon Plan should adopt the economic retirement
14 schedule identified by EnCompass rather than delayed retirement dates.
15 For retirement years that the Companies claim are not operationally
16 feasible, the Companies should provide compelling justification of the
17 transmission and generation requirements, provide an explanation as to
18 why procurement and development of alternative resources is not feasible
19 in the given timeframe, and develop a proposed timeline for developing
20 these resources and retiring these units as early as practicable.

21 Second, the Commission should direct the Companies to begin
22 preparations for the retirement of coal units with economic retirement years

⁶³ *Carbon-Free by 2050*, pp. 18-19.

identified in the next six years. According to Duke's retirement analysis, these include Cliffside unit 5, Marshall units 1 and 2 and Mayo unit 1. For each of these units, Duke should specifically identify the transmission and generation requirements for retiring these units and make preparations for procuring and developing resources to address those requirements via all-source procurement.

Third, for the remaining coal units, the Companies should continue to use endogenous coal retirement analysis to assess the economic position of these units. The Commission should direct the Companies to develop specific generation or transmission resource requirements required for the retirement of these units to ensure expeditious retirement in the future.

V. Issues related to "Near-Term procurement activity — solar, solar plus storage, standalone storage, onshore wind, natural gas generation"

A. The Carbon-Free by 2050 Scenarios Provide a Roadmap to Near-Term Procurement in the Best Interest of Ratepayers.

Q. PROVIDE THE SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS THAT ARE INCLUDED IN THE CARBON-FREE BY 2050 REPORT.

A. Table 9, below, presents recommendations to the Commission for short-term actions to reliably meet North Carolina's carbon reduction requirements at least cost.

Table 6. Carbon-Free by 2050 Short-Term Recommendations

RESOURCE	AMOUNT	PROPOSED NEAR-TERM ACTIONS
Proposed Resource Selections: In-Service through 2030		

Energy Efficiency	1.5 percent of retail load	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand utility energy efficiency savings targets to 1.5 percent of total retail load
Distributed Energy Resources	At least 1 GW by 2035	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop and support programs to empower customer-owned energy resources to accelerate contribution to grid needs
Additional Solar	7,200 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Invest in transmission projects to unlock additional cost-effective solar power Begin procurement of 4 GW of new solar 2022-2024 with target in-service dates of 2025-2028 Develop interconnection methods that will be robust long-term
Battery Storage	5,600 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Begin procurement for 4 GW of stand-alone storage with target in-service dates of 2025-2028 Invest in operational capabilities for capitalizing on energy storage resources for grid services
Onshore Wind (in-state)	900 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage with communities on onshore wind siting Prepare for continued advancement of onshore wind, long-term
Onshore Wind (Midwest)	2,500 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage in inter-regional coordination with PJM for facilitating power purchase Integrate Midwest wind import into short-term transmission planning
Offshore Wind	800 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiate development and permitting activities for 800 MW (or larger tranches if more cost-effective), with eye toward potential additional procurement long-term
Proposed Resource Selections: Options for Long-Term Cost-Effective Carbon Reductions		
Coal Retirement	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop retirement plans for coal units consistent with economic optimization
Transmission Planning	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop processes for long-term, prospective and regional transmission planning that can cost-effectively meet economic and carbon reduction requirements of HB 951
Pumped Storage Hydro	1,700 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct feasibility study, develop EPC strategy, and apply at FERC for re-licensing
Hydrogen Planning	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop more detailed hydrogen fuel cost planning methodology Conduct studies of hydrogen transport, storage, and distribution Integrate cost of production and distribution into resource planning

Source: Carbon-Free by 2050 report, p. 4-5.

1 I summarize the conclusions and recommendations of the *Carbon-*
 2 *Free by 2050* report on pages 4-5 and 43-45 of the *Carbon-Free by 2050*
 3 report.

4 ***B. The Inflation Reduction Act Underscores the Need for Near-Term***
 5 ***Flexibility.***

6 **Q. ARE THERE ANY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE ISSUANCE OF THE**
 7 ***CARBON-FREE BY 2050* REPORT THAT MIGHT AFFECT LEAST-**
 8 ***COST PLANNING TO MEET CARBON REQUIREMENTS?***

9 A. Yes. The passage of the federal Inflation Reduction Act (“IRA”) on August
 10 16, 2022 has “major implications” for power generation in the United
 11 States,⁶⁴ and the IRA’s tax incentive and electrification provisions would
 12 directly impact many of the factors that are used as inputs into capacity
 13 expansion analysis in this proceeding. A detailed review of the IRA is
 14 beyond the scope of this testimony, but based on my current understanding
 15 of the IRA’s provisions and analyses of the impacts of the Act on the power
 16 sector,⁶⁵ I anticipate wide-ranging impacts on Carbon Plan analysis which
 17 are not fully incorporated into Duke’s proposed carbon plan filing, the

⁶⁴ Proctor, D. (2022, August 12). “Renewable Energy, Electrification Big Winners in Inflation Reduction Act.” *POWER Magazine*. Retrieved at: <https://www.powermag.com/renewable-energy-electrification-big-winners-in-inflation-reduction-act/>.

⁶⁵ See: Mahajan, M., Ashmoree, O., Rissman, J., Orvis, R., & Gopal, A. (2022, August). Modeling the Inflation Reduction Act Using the Energy Policy Simulator. *Energy Innovation*. Retrieved by: https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Modeling-the-Inflation-Reduction-Act-with-the-US-Energy-Policy-Simulator_August.pdf; Jenkins, J., Mayfield, E., Farbes, J., Jones, R., Patankar, N., Xu, Q., & Schivley, G. (2022, August). Preliminary Report; The Climate and Energy Impacts of the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. REPEAT Project, Princeton, NJ. Retrieved at: https://repeatproject.org/docs/REPEAT_IRA_Preliminary_Report_2022-08-04.pdf; and King, B., Larsen, J., & Kolus, H. (2022, July). A Congressional Climate Breakthrough. *Rhodium Group*. Retrieved at: <https://rhg.com/research/inflation-reduction-act/>.

1 *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, or initial comments by other parties in this
2 proceeding.

3 **Q. IN LIGHT OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT, HOW SHOULD THE**
4 **COMMISSION VIEW THE ANALYSES PRESENTED IN THIS**
5 **PROCEEDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS SHORT-TERM**
6 **ACTION PLAN?**

7 A. The need to incorporate impacts of recent events on integrated resource
8 planning is not unique to the IRA or this proceeding; instead, it is an
9 inevitable part of the resource planning and deliberation process. The scale
10 of changes to the energy landscape in the IRA, however, warrants
11 additional attention. As just one example, since the IRA lifts the offshore
12 wind moratorium, Duke's restrictions on OSW based on the moratorium are
13 no longer appropriate. In light of these changes, plans that maintain
14 flexibility in the short term and that are likely to take advantage of cost-
15 reductions facilitated by IRA provisions will be better able to adapt to
16 changing circumstances.

17 **Q. WHICH ACTIONS COULD THE COMMISSION DIRECT IN THE SHORT**
18 **TERM THAT WOULD MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY AND AVOID LOCK-IN?**

19 A. I recommend that the Commission prioritize the following actions in their
20 short-term execution plan:

21 1. **Invest in flexible, modular solar and storage resources.** Given
22 their modular design, relatively quick construction times, and
23 geographic flexibility, solar and storage resources represent flexible
24 options with little risk of lock-in or path dependence. Large-scale
25 deployment of solar, in particular, is a common feature of not only the
26 *Carbon-Free by 2050* portfolios, but also the portfolios proposed by
27 the Clean Power Suppliers' Association, Tech Customers and Duke.
28 Further, the tax credits extended by the IRA have a ten-year eligibility

- 1 window; efforts made to maximize the value of these credits in the
2 near term will benefit ratepayers.
- 3 2. Pursue actions that would expand resource options, including wind
4 deployment capability, transmission planning, and coal retirement.
5 These include continued development of capability for deploying on-
6 and off-shore wind resources in the Carolinas and developing
7 transmission planning processes that can unlock additional resource
8 options.
- 9 3. Avoid investments in gas and nuclear resources that would commit
10 North Carolina ratepayers to a specific resource pathway or set of
11 actions in the future. Gas combustion turbine and combined-cycle
12 resources lack the same modularity as solar and storage resources,
13 and they commit the Carolinas to supporting these resources and
14 managing additional carbon emissions for decades. Similarly, long
15 construction timelines associated with new nuclear resources could
16 lock in capital expenditure that would be more effective elsewhere.


17 **VI. Issues Related to “EE / DSM / Grid Edge.”**

18 ***A. Savings from Expanded Demand-side Resources Benefit***
19 ***Ratepayers.***

20 **Q. BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE DUKE ENERGY’S APPROACH TO DEMAND-**
21 **SIDE RESOURCES AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN ITS PROPOSED**
22 **CARBON PLAN FILING.**

- 23 A. Duke Energy modeled energy efficiency as a decrement to load based on
24 two different forecasts of annual incremental savings. Specifically, the
25 Company’s “Base” energy efficiency forecast assumes incremental annual
26 energy savings of one percent of Duke’s retail load, net of load that has
27 opted out of energy efficiency programs. The “High” forecast assumes
28 savings equivalent to 1 percent of total retail load.⁶⁶ Figure 2, below, shows
29 annual incremental savings targets for the “Base” and “High” forecasts
30 used in developing Duke’s portfolios.

⁶⁶ Appendix E, p. 16.



Source: Derived from Duke Energy response to NC Public Staff Data Request 15-2.⁶⁷

- 1 Notably, Duke Energy's base savings target anticipates a decrease in annual
2 incremental energy efficiency savings over the long-term.

3 **Q. ARE DUKE ENERGY'S ENERGY EFFICIENCY FORECASTS**
4 **REASONABLE?**

- 5 A. Yes and no. Duke Energy's "Base" forecast predicts increasing annual
6 incremental savings in the short term followed by a roughly 15-year decline
7 in annual incremental savings. Even the "High" EE forecast is just below
8 the average savings level achieved in 2018 by peer utilities as reviewed in
9 the American Council for an Energy Efficiency's 2020 Utility Energy

⁶⁷ Although this response was confidential, counsel for Duke Energy confirmed that Figure 2 could be presented in the public, unredacted version of this testimony.

1 Efficiency Scorecard.⁶⁸ However, DEC and DEP's energy efficiency
 2 savings performance comes in below more than 20 of its large utility peers,
 3 including Entergy in Arkansas, Xcel in Colorado, MidAmerican in Iowa, and
 4 Duke Energy in Ohio.⁶⁹ Importantly, while these scorecards are useful
 5 benchmarks, they are only a snapshot of recent achievements, and do not
 6 capture anticipated future energy efficiency savings driven by policy
 7 changes, technology improvements, or other factors.

8 **Q. HOW DID SYNAPSE GENERATE ITS ENERGY EFFICIENCY**
 9 **FORECAST USED IN THE CARBON-FREE BY 2050 SCENARIOS?**

10 A. Synapse identified 1.5 percent of retail load as an appropriate long-term
 11 incremental savings target for DEC and DEP to maximize customer
 12 benefits from cost-effective energy efficiency. The *Carbon-Free by 2050*
 13 scenarios use a 1.5 percent incremental savings target because it
 14 represented an achievable increase in energy efficiency savings, in line
 15 with peer utilities.⁷⁰ Multiple policy developments since 2020, including
 16 decoupling via HB 951 and the energy efficiency elements of the IRA, have
 17 also paved the way for more energy efficiency in the Carolinas.⁷¹ Synapse
 18 proportionally scaled Duke's existing utility energy efficiency programs and

⁶⁸ Relf, G., Cooper, E. Goyal, A., Waters, C. (2020, February). 2020 Utility Energy Efficiency Scorecard. American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy. P.26. Retrieved at: https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/u2004%20rev_0.pdf.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ 13 out of the 52 surveyed utilities achieved incremental savings of 1.5% or more in 2018, according to the ACEEE 2020 Utility Energy Efficiency Scorecard.

⁷¹ See: Ungar, L. & Ratner, A. (2022, August). Congress Is Set to Vote on the Largest Efficiency Investments in History. *American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy*. Retrieved at: <https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2022/08/congress-set-vote-largest-efficiency-investments-history>.

1 costs to meet that target.⁷² The result of using Synapse's forecast is that
2 the *Carbon-Free by 2050* scenarios maximize ratepayer savings from cost-
3 effective energy efficiency resources.

4 **Q. WERE THERE ANY OTHER DIFFERENCES IN DEMAND-SIDE**
5 **RESOURCES BETWEEN THE SCENARIOS YOU MODELED IN**
6 ***CARBON-FREE BY 2050* AND DUKE ENERGY CARBON PLAN**
7 **SCENARIOS?**

8 A. Yes. Synapse's load forecast relies on Duke Energy's "High" rooftop solar
9 deployment projections, rather than the Company's base projection. Duke
10 explains that the "High" rooftop solar sensitivity is intended to represent
11 continued policy support for this resource, including the extension of the
12 investment tax credit ("ITC").⁷³ Given the extension of the ITC via the IRA,
13 Synapse's use of the Duke high forecast is warranted. In EnCompass, this
14 additional demand-side solar functions as a reduction to aggregate load
15 during the hours where solar PV is generating.⁷⁴

16 **Q. WHAT WERE THE IMPACTS OF INCREASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY**
17 **ON THE *CARBON-FREE BY 2050* SCENARIOS?**

18 A. To quantify the benefit of energy efficiency in the *Carbon-Free by 2050*
19 scenarios and assess how the *Optimized* scenario would respond to lower
20 demand-side savings, Synapse evaluated a low energy efficiency
21 sensitivity which reduced incremental savings from 1.5 percent to 1 percent

⁷² The *Carbon-Free by 2050* report's Appendix A includes a discussion of Synapse's energy efficiency forecast methodology on pages A6-A8.

⁷³ Appendix E, p. 17.

⁷⁴ The *Carbon-Free by 2050* report's Appendix A includes a discussion of Synapse's rooftop solar forecast.

1 of retail load. Table 2 shows the net present value revenue requirement for
 2 the base *Optimized* scenario and the low-EE sensitivity.

Table 7: Impact of Energy Efficiency on Optimized Results

Results (2022-2050)	Optimized	Optimized Low EE
2030 NPVRR (\$B)	\$36.0	\$36.0
2040 NPVRR (\$B)	\$69.8	\$71.0
2050 NPVRR (\$B)	\$103.5	\$106.4

3 While the *Optimized* scenario and *Optimized Low EE* sensitivity are roughly
 4 equivalent in the earliest years, the 1.5 percent energy efficiency target
 5 saves customers \$2.9 billion on a net present value basis over time
 6 compared to the *Optimized Low EE* sensitivity.

7 **Q. SUMMARIZE AND RESPOND TO DUKE ENERGY WITNESSES'**
 8 **DISCUSSION OF SYNAPSE'S DEMAND-SIDE MODELING**
 9 **ASSUMPTIONS.**

10 A. Duke Energy criticizes Synapse (and other intervenors) for assuming
 11 higher levels of EE savings and behind-the-meter solar PV adoption, and
 12 therefore lower net load than in Duke's base case.⁷⁵ While Duke claims that
 13 these projections are overly optimistic and may not be achievable, evidence
 14 supports the higher projections for both energy efficiency and behind-the-
 15 meter-solar. For energy efficiency, the Companies are expected to achieve
 16 incremental savings of one percent of retail load in the short term, even
 17 without any additional programming toward a long-term goal.⁷⁶ For behind-
 18 the-meter solar, the Companies characterize their "High" projection as

⁷⁵ Snider et al., page 186.

⁷⁶ Carbon-Free by 2050 Report Appendix A, p. A-7.

1 representing a future in which policy developments such as an extension
2 of the ITC would continue to support rooftop solar growth in the Carolinas;
3 this policy development has occurred as a part of the passage of the IRA.⁷⁷

4 Duke also incorrectly claims that demand-side resource
5 projections pose a unique risk to system reliability.⁷⁸ Integrated resource
6 planning contemplates procurement of demand- *and* supply-side resources
7 with a relatively long planning horizon and an iterative cadence. Reconciling
8 actual versus projected demand-side resource procurement is a routine
9 part of resource planning, just as IRPs might evolve based on real-world
10 adjustments to supply-side procurement (e.g., construction delays of non-
11 commercialized nuclear resources). As described above, evidence
12 supports the projections used in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report as
13 reasonable for the purposes of the Carbon Plan. Using unreasonably low
14 projections would artificially suppress the contribution of demand-side
15 resources to “shrinking the challenge” of reducing carbon emissions while
16 meeting energy and capacity needs and maintaining reliability.

17 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**
18 **REGARDING DEMAND-SIDE RESOURCES.**

19 A. My analysis shows that additional investment in demand-side resources
20 can save North Carolina ratepayers billions of dollars in the long-term. This

⁷⁷ Friedman, S., Stoel, J., Sullivan, M. A., Wickett, J., & Lovelis, H. (2022, August). The IRA's transformative tax incentives for solar energy projects and manufacturing operations. *JD Supra*. Retrieved at: <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-ira-s-transformative-tax-incentives-4082010/>.

⁷⁸ Snider et al., p. 189, ll. 8-13.

1 position is supported by other intervenors, including the Attorney General⁷⁹
2 and Tech Customers.⁸⁰ Therefore, I recommend that the Commission
3 integrate higher energy efficiency and behind-the-meter solar forecasts in
4 its Carbon Plan, and direct the Companies to develop programs that are
5 able to accommodate these increased forecasts.

6 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON INCLUDING ENERGY**
7 **EFFICIENCY AS A SELECTABLE RESOURCE IN RESOURCE**
8 **PLANNING MODELING?**

9 A. When adequate pricing, timing, and deployment information is available
10 and efficiency programs are suitably flexible, including energy efficiency as
11 a selectable resource in modeling can provide an even greater level of
12 precision in resource planning. The Attorney General recommends in the
13 Strategen report that Duke allow EnCompass to select demand-side
14 resources as a potential resource in future plans.⁸¹ The results of
15 Synapse's analysis in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report indicate that
16 additional energy efficiency is cost-effective for North Carolina ratepayers;
17 I would expect that if selectable energy efficiency resources were
18 appropriately configured in the EnCompass model, it would select
19 incremental efficiency beyond the Companies' 1 percent of retail load
20 target.

⁷⁹ AGO Strategen report, pages 41-45.

⁸⁰ Tech Customers Gabel report, pages 37-42.

⁸¹ AGO Strategen report, pages 41-42.

1 VII. **Issues related to “Cost.”**

2 ***B. The Carbon-Free by 2050 Report’s Revised NPVRR Projections***
 3 ***Finds that Duke’s P1_A Portfolio is the Most Expensive for***
 4 ***Ratepayers.***

5 **Q. DID SYNAPSE MODEL ANY OF DUKE’S SCENARIOS IN THE**
 6 ***CARBON-FREE BY 2050* REPORT?**

7 A. Yes. Synapse modeled the set of resources identified by the P1_A portfolio
 8 identified in Duke’s proposed carbon plan filing. These results are
 9 presented in the *Duke Resources* scenario in the *Carbon-Free by 2050*
 10 report.

11 **Q. BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE THE REVISED INPUTS THAT SYNAPSE MADE**
 12 **IN ITS *CARBON-FREE BY 2050* REPORT THAT AFFECTED ANALYSIS**
 13 **OF THE *DUKE RESOURCES* SCENARIO.**

14 A. Synapse made several revisions to the cost inputs that affect net-present-
 15 value revenue requirement projections for the *Duke Resources*. These
 16 include:

- 17 1. Revised gas and hydrogen price forecasts, as discussed above;
- 18 2. Revised capital expenditure projections for all candidate resources, as
 19 discussed above; and
- 20 3. Revised fixed operations and maintenance costs and ongoing capital
 21 investments for existing coal plants, as discussed above.⁸²

22 **Q. HOW DID THESE REVISIONS AFFECT THE COST PROJECTIONS?**

23 A. Based on these revisions, Synapse’s analysis found that the P1_A portfolio
 24 would cost ratepayers considerably more than what Duke projected in their
 25 proposed carbon plan filing. Table 7, below, compares Duke’s net-present-

⁸² Pages 9-12 of the *Carbon-Free by 2050 Report* present a comprehensive list of revisions made by Synapse to EnCompass inputs.

1 value revenue requirement projection for portfolios P1_A with that created by
2 Synapse in the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report.

3 **Table 8. Net Present Value Revenue Requirement for P1_A, Duke vs. Synapse**

Results (2022-2050)	NPVRR
Duke Energy Carbon Plan Filing – P1 _A	\$104.1
<i>Carbon-Free by 2050</i> Report – Duke Resources	\$121.2

Source: Duke Energy Carbon Plan Appendix E, p. 90 and *Carbon-Free by 2050*, p. 24.⁸³

4 **Q. HOW DOES THAT COMPARE WITH OTHER SYNAPSE SCENARIOS IN**
5 **THE CARBON-FREE BY 2050 REPORT?**

6 A. In the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report, we found that the *Optimized* and
7 *Regional Resources* portfolios were substantially more cost-effective than
8 the *Duke Resources* portfolio. Table 8, below, shows net-present-value
9 revenue requirement for each of the portfolios over time.

Table 9. Net Present Value Revenue Requirement over Time by Scenario

Results (2022-2050)	Duke Resources	Optimized	Regional Resources
2030 NPVRR (\$B)	\$36.7	\$36.0	\$34.3
2040 NPVRR (\$B)	\$77.7	\$69.8	\$65.8
2050 NPVRR (\$B)	\$121.2	\$103.5	\$98.1

Source: *Carbon-Free by 2050*, p. 22.

10 In the short and long term, the *Duke Resources* portfolio, which mimics the
11 resources from Duke's proposed P1_A, costs substantially more to
12 ratepayers than either the *Optimized* or *Regional Resources* portfolio.

13 **Q. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

14 A. Yes, it does.

⁸³ Minor differences may result from different methodologies for aggregating costs for NPVRR.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that the parties of record on the service list have been served with the Direct Testimony of Tyler Fitch on behalf of North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club either by electronic mail or by deposit in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.

This the 2nd day of September, 2022.

s/ Gudrun Thompson

Gudrun Thompson

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1 MS. THOMPSON: And I would also move to
2 have the exhibit attached to Mr. Fitch's prefiled
3 testimony identified as premarked.

4 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. The exhibit
5 will be identified as it was when premarked.

6 (Exhibit TF-1 was identified as it was
7 marked when prefiled.)

8 Q. Mr. Fitch, did you also prepare a summary of
9 your testimony?

10 A. I did.

11 MS. THOMPSON: And, Chair Mitchell, I
12 would also move to have Mr. Fitch's summary, which
13 has been filed in the Sub 179-A docket, entered
14 into the record as though given orally from the
15 stand.

16 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. That motion
17 is allowed.

18 (Whereupon, the prefiled summary
19 testimony of Tyler Fitch was copied into
20 the record as if given orally from the
21 stand.)
22
23
24

**Summary of Testimony of Tyler Fitch on Behalf of North Carolina
Sustainable Energy Association, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy,
Sierra Club, and
Natural Resources Defense Council**

Docket No. E-100, Sub 179

1 My name is Tyler Fitch. I am a Senior Associate at Synapse Energy
2 Economics, Inc. (Synapse). In this role I employ industry-standard electricity
3 system models, such as EnCompass, to analyze the electricity system and
4 consult and advise state consumer advocates, public utilities commission staff,
5 attorneys general, state energy offices, environmental organizations, federal
6 government agencies, and utilities on integrated resource planning; ratemaking
7 and rate design; system resilience, and related topics.

8 The purpose of my testimony is to help inform the North Carolina Utilities
9 Commission (Commission), by using modeling analysis, as to the near- and
10 long-term actions necessary to achieve North Carolina's carbon-reduction
11 requirements in a reliable and least-cost manner. Based on my team's
12 reasonable revisions to Duke Energy's modeling inputs, the Synapse optimized
13 portfolios better utilize solar, storage, and energy efficiency while requiring less
14 near-term investment in new gas, small modular nuclear and hydrogen-
15 dependent resources, all while maintaining Duke Energy's planning reserve
16 margin, meeting load in all modeled hours and saving ratepayers billions of
17 dollars by 2050.

18 In light of the significant changes to the energy landscape enacted by
19 the Inflation Reduction Act, resource plans that maintain flexibility in the short
20 term while capitalizing on cost-saving opportunities will be more adaptable to a

changing landscape. Solar and battery storage resources are modular, flexible resources for which the IRA makes tax credits available. Developing robust transmission planning processes, retiring coal-fired generation, and enabling greater wind deployment now will expand the resources options available in the future. Meanwhile, investing in gas and nuclear resources now would commit ratepayers to financially supporting these resources (and to the carbon emissions from gas generation) for decades to come, tying up capital that could be more effectively spent elsewhere.

The near-term actions laid out in Table 6 in my testimony, reproduced below, are informed by the capacity expansion and production cost modeling analysis Synapse completed, developing resource portfolios consistent with House Bill 951's emission reduction requirements for the combined Duke Energy system using the EnCompass platform. In focusing on a near-term action plan, this Commission will be able to defer decisions that would commit Duke Energy to a certain level of carbon emissions or would preclude the ability to invest in more cost-effective resources which are not necessary to be made at this time.

Table 6. Carbon Free by 2050 Short-Term Recommendations

RESOURCE	AMOUNT	PROPOSED NEAR-TERM ACTIONS
Proposed Resource Selections: In-Service through 2030		
Energy Efficiency	1.5 percent of retail load	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand utility energy efficiency savings targets to 1.5 percent of total retail load
Distributed Energy Resources	At least 1 GW by 2035	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop and support programs to empower customer-owned energy resources to accelerate contribution to grid needs
Additional Solar	7,200 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Invest in transmission projects to unlock additional cost-effective solar power

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Begin procurement of 4 GW of new solar 2022-2024 with target in-service dates of 2025-2028 • Develop interconnection methods that will be robust long-term
Battery Storage	5,600 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Begin procurement for 4 GW of stand-alone storage with target in-service dates of 2025-2028 • Invest in operational capabilities for capitalizing on energy storage resources for grid services
Onshore Wind <i>(in-state)</i>	900 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage with communities on onshore wind siting • Prepare for continued advancement of onshore wind, long-term
Onshore Wind <i>(Midwest)</i>	2,500 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage in inter-regional coordination with PJM for facilitating power purchase • Integrate Midwest wind import into short-term transmission planning
Offshore Wind	800 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiate development and permitting activities for 800 MW (or larger tranches if more cost-effective), with eye toward potential additional procurement long-term
Proposed Resource Selections: Options for Long-Term Cost-Effective Carbon Reductions		
Coal Retirement	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop retirement plans for coal units consistent with economic optimization
Transmission Planning	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop processes for long-term, prospective and regional transmission planning that can cost-effectively meet economic and carbon reduction requirements of HB 951
Pumped Storage Hydro	1,700 MW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct feasibility study, develop EPC strategy, and apply at FERC for re-licensing
Hydrogen Planning	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop more detailed hydrogen fuel cost planning methodology • Conduct studies of hydrogen transport, storage, and distribution • Integrate cost of production and distribution into resource planning

- 1 My testimony also highlights how making Midwest Wind PPA resources
- 2 available for selection by the model achieved substantial additional savings.

1 Considering a broader range of transmission assumptions, such as increasing
2 transmission capacity and allowing the utilities to buy and sell energy and
3 capacity from neighbors over the planning horizon, will unlock lower-cost
4 resource pathways. Decarbonization planning is incomplete without a
5 consideration of transmission upgrades and regional coordination alternatives.

6 Duke Energy witnesses' testimony describes the results of a
7 supplemental analysis conducted by the Companies to estimate the future
8 reliability of several portfolios. The Companies found that the Synapse portfolio
9 meets requirements through 2034, allowing the Commission to continue to
10 check and adjust the plans as they evolve through the 2020s and 2030s.

11 In addition to presenting the results of Synapse's modeling of optimized
12 resource portfolios developed with EnCompass, I offer my critique of Duke
13 Energy's proposed portfolios and the methodology and assumptions used to
14 develop them.

15 Publicly available and industry standard capital cost assumptions should
16 be used to further ensure objectivity, in the absence of cost data from an all-
17 source request for proposals. The cost estimates Duke Energy uses for solar,
18 storage, and offshore wind resources are higher than industry benchmarks.
19 The cost estimates used for small modular nuclear reactors and gas combined-
20 cycle and combustion turbine units are lower than industry benchmarks. While
21 reasonable cost forecasts may deviate, a pattern of cost assumptions that favor
22 gas over renewable resources will drive the economic selection of such
23 resources by the model.

1 In the future, Duke Energy's use of EnCompass should enable all parties
2 to share an analytical foundation, but all parties must be committed to
3 transparency in order to collaborate on problem-solving. Inconsistency
4 between shared inputs and outputs, providing key additional inputs through
5 discovery only, and conducting additional steps outside of EnCompass with
6 little transparency of process created barriers to effective collaboration. By
7 sharing model data at the outset of the planning process and over a longer
8 timescale, proactively providing any inputs that are not derived from public
9 sources prior to the discovery process, and making all out-of-model
10 methodologies transparent, utilities and stakeholders should be able to validate
11 future carbon plan iterations.

12 My testimony highlights how the manual changes Duke Energy made to
13 its portfolios undermine the objective, resource-neutral, economic optimization
14 performed by EnCompass. Capacity expansion models have a long-
15 established resource adequacy regime that uses reserve margin studies and
16 effective load carrying capabilities to ensure reliability across a portfolio of
17 resources. I find that Duke Energy's manual over-rides are not appropriate or
18 consistent with established resource adequacy practices. I also detail how
19 Duke Energy's coal retirement methodology delays plant retirement dates in a
20 manner that is inconsistent with least-cost planning and at ratepayer expense.
21 While retiring coal capacity may create the need for replacement energy,
22 capacity, and ancillary service resources, replacement resources can be
23 appropriately accounted for in resource planning. Duke Energy's proposed

retirement dates are extended, by contrast without sufficient justification. To meet the economically optimal retirement schedule selected by EnCompass, Duke Energy should identify the specific transmission and generation requirements necessary for retiring those units selected to be retired within the next six years.

Synapse's EnCompass analysis also assumes an incremental energy efficient savings target that is in line with peer utilities. In contrast, Duke Energy's energy efficiency forecast falls below the savings realized by many of its peer utilities. The recent extension of the investment tax credit in the Inflation Reduction Act supports the use of Duke Energy's "High" rooftop solar adoption assumption. These assumptions are prudent for long-range planning with iterative opportunities to reconcile actual load reductions with planning projections, just as supply-side procurements will necessarily need to be adjusted to meet real-world dynamics.

Ultimately, Synapse modeling of Duke Energy's Portfolio 1-Alt, using revised inputs as outlined in my direct testimony, found that cost to ratepayers are likely to be significantly higher than projected by Duke Energy. Using the same set of inputs and assumptions that better reflect real-world conditions, Synapse's proposed portfolios would cost billions less over through 2050, as illustrated by Table 9 in my direct testimony, reproduced below.

Table 9. Net Present Value Revenue Requirement Over Time by Scenario

Results (2022-2050)	Duke Resources	Optimized	Regional Resources
2030 NPVRR (\$B)	\$36.7	\$36.0	\$34.3
2040 NPVRR (\$B)	\$77.7	\$69.8	\$65.8

2050 NPVRR (\$B)	\$121.2	\$103.5	\$98.1
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- 1 With its first Carbon Plan, the Commission is beginning a process that will
- 2 transform North Carolina's energy economy, and it's critical that the
- 3 Commission use the most accurate view of resource needs and options to
- 4 ensure that our electricity system is maximizing the benefit for everyone. My
- 5 testimony and the *Carbon-Free by 2050* report show the potential benefit to
- 6 North Carolina ratepayers when more accurate assumptions are included and
- 7 points the way toward a Carbon Plan in the public interest moving forward.

1 MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Chair
2 Mitchell. The witness is available for cross
3 examination and questions from the Commission.

4 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Avangrid?
5 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. SMITH:

6 Q. Good morning. Ben Smith representing
7 Avangrid Renewables LLC. Good morning, Mr. Fitch.
8 Just a few questions for you.

9 A. Sure.

10 Q. You led the Synapse modeling work in this
11 docket; is that correct?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And in that modeling work, you relied upon
14 some Duke inputs and assumptions; isn't that correct?

15 A. Yes, we relied on Duke's inputs and
16 assumptions as much as we could, subject to some
17 revision- -- or reasonable revisions in our modeling.

18 Q. Thank you. And isn't it true that the Duke
19 generic profile of offshore wind was one of those
20 inputs or assumptions that you relied upon?

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. Would the Synapse modeling conclusions have
23 looked any different, had you used offshore wind
24 profiles with, sort of, larger energy profile? For

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1 instance, 1,300-megawatt rather than 800 megawatts?

2 A. Sorry, I got confused by the last part of
3 your question. Are you asking about the, sort of,
4 blocks that the capacity expansion could pick, or are
5 we talking about, sort of, like dispatch curves and
6 capacity factor?

7 Q. I'm talking about the blocks, but let me
8 restate just so it's clear.

9 A. Okay.

10 Q. Would the Synapse modeling conclusions have
11 looked different had you used offshore wind profiles
12 with larger blocks?

13 A. Yes, it would and -- sorry. Go ahead. I'm
14 finished.

15 Q. Okay. And would it be fair, in your modeling
16 work, to use a generic profile with 1,300-megawatt
17 blocks rather than 800-megawatt blocks since the three
18 offshore wind sites all profile at more than 1,300
19 megawatts capacity?

20 A. Yeah, I think that's a reasonable assumption
21 to make.

22 MR. SMITH: Nothing further.

23 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. CCEBA?

24 MR. BURNS: Thank you, Madam Chair.

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1 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. BURNS:

2 Q. John Burns for CCEBA. Mr. Fitch, I have a
3 very similar line of questions, but want to discuss
4 with you the conclusions that you drew, or at least the
5 modeling results that you reached with regard to solar
6 plus storage.

7 As I understand -- and I'm looking at the
8 Duke Public Staff Panel 1 Direct Cross Exhibit 1, which
9 I'm going to hand you a copy of. Page 2 of that is
10 marked Rebuttal Table 1. I'm just gonna show this to
11 you, because it's a summation.

12 (Pause.)

13 Q. On that document, page 2 of that document,
14 there's a chart, which you're looking at the right one.
15 I handed it to you with the right one up, sorry. It
16 says page 1 of 3 in the top right corner, but it was
17 given to everybody as part of one exhibit, so.

18 When you look there, it says NCSEA, et al.;
19 do you see that line underneath the --

20 A. I do.

21 Q. -- top of the chart? And it shows solar of
22 4,000 and BESS paired with solar at zero.

23 As I understand from your response to
24 Mr. Smith, you assumed, in your modeling, the same or

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1 similar assumptions to what you saw in Duke's original
2 modeling; is that right?

3 A. That's right. And in this case we did use
4 that static dispatch curve for solar plus storage that
5 I think we've already talked about, or I think there's
6 been discussion of in this hearing already.

7 Q. Okay. If you modeled it -- based upon your
8 knowledge and experience, are you able to make any
9 projections as to whether there would have been any
10 differences to the results of your model had you
11 modeled it with the variable dispatch or the dynamic
12 dispatch?

13 A. Yeah. Yes, I can do that.

14 Q. And what would -- what would you expect those
15 results to show?

16 A. I would expect -- the way to think -- the way
17 that I think about this dispatch curve is it's single
18 method of operation for the solar plus storage resource
19 that we're talking about. And in the case where it can
20 be dynamically dispatched, we could see lots of
21 different types of adjustment based on the low curve
22 for the day, based on other resources that are online,
23 things like that. So I think using the dynamic
24 dispatch that has been discussed is sort of a strict

1 improvement to the economic value of those resources.

2 Q. And would they -- would the model that you
3 used have generated more use of solar plus storage had
4 you modeled it with dynamic dispatch?

5 A. It's difficult to comment with specificity
6 about how much -- how many more megawatts would have
7 been procured if things had been different. But what I
8 can say is that using dynamic dispatch would have put
9 upward pressure more or less on procurement for those
10 resources.

11 So to put it another way, I would expect more
12 procurement of those resource, but the magnitude of
13 that increase is very difficult to know or make
14 predictions about.

15 Q. Did you review SP5 and SP6?

16 A. I did review the inputs but not the outputs
17 in great detail.

18 Q. Okay. Thank you. That's all the questions I
19 have for you at this time. Thank you, Mr. Fitch.

20 A. Thank you.

21 CHAIR MITCHELL: CIGFUR?

22 MS. CRESS: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

23 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. CRESS:

24 Q. Good morning, Mr. Fitch. Just a couple of

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1 questions for you. First I want to turn your attention
2 to the carbon-free by 2050 report that you co-authored
3 on behalf of NCSEA, et al., as filed in this docket on
4 July 20th.

5 Do you have a copy of that with you?

6 A. I have the public version in front of me.

7 Q. Excellent. Synapse included a summary of
8 three different sensitivities it ran using EnCompass'
9 production cost modeling function; is that right?

10 A. To my recollection, we did run several. I'm
11 not sure the number is three, but around there, subject
12 to check, I suppose.

13 Q. Okay. And can you turn with me to Table 9 on
14 page 26?

15 A. (Witness peruses document.)

16 Sure.

17 Q. Excellent. And this table shows the net
18 present value revenue requirements for the high gas
19 sensitivities performed; is that right?

20 A. That's right.

21 Q. And Table 10, if you wouldn't mind turning to
22 the next page, shows the net present value revenue
23 requirement over time for the energy efficiency
24 sensitivities performed; is that correct?

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1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Can you help me understand why there is not a
3 similar table for the REGI sensitivity that was
4 performed?

5 A. I'm just gonna take a moment to review this.

6 Q. Sure.

7 A. (Witness peruses document.)

8 My recollection is that, to an extent, it's
9 difficult to account for REGI -- the REGI carbon price
10 and payback, because of that, sort of, revenue-neutral
11 nature of it. And so because of that, it would have
12 been -- this is just my recollection of our reasoning
13 here. It would have been confusing, potentially, to
14 include that table.

15 Q. So it was not included; is that correct?

16 A. That table is not included in this report.

17 Q. And it was also not produced in discovery; is
18 that correct?

19 A. Not to my -- not to my recollection.

20 Q. Thank you. No further questions.

21 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. CPSA?

22 MR. SNOWDEN: CPSA does not have any
23 questions for this witness.

24 CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. EJCAN?

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1 MR. BLUMENTHAL: Thank you, Chair
2 Mitchell.

3 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. BLUMENTHAL:

4 Q. Ethan Blumenthal with Environmental Justice
5 Community Action Network, Down East Coal Ash
6 Environment and Social Justice Collective, Redtailed
7 Hawk Coalition, and the Robeson County Cooperative for
8 Sustainable Development, thanks.

9 Just a couple of quick questions for you. If
10 you wouldn't mind turning to page 40 of your testimony
11 and reading the two sentences beginning on line 12.

12 A. I'm seeing it start, "With a short
13 optimization period"; is that right?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. Okay. "With a short optimization period, the
16 model may not see the following utilization and arising
17 costs as it makes its near-term resource planning
18 decisions." And that's in reference to gas CCs and
19 CTs. "I, therefore, recommend that the Commission
20 direct the Company to include a full period capacity
21 expansion optimization."

22 Q. Thank you. Can you, in this context, explain
23 what a short optimization period, what you're referring
24 to with that term?

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1 A. Sure. So one of the settings that you can
2 include in EnCompass, in general, is a planning period.
3 And essentially that's how far is this algorithm going
4 to look out forward to minimize or optimize on costs.
5 So you could think about doing this in the case of the
6 Carbon Plan, all 28 years or even longer than that if
7 you wanted, or you could think as short as one year.

8 And one of the reasons why we balance this is
9 because it's very computationally difficult to do it
10 over the whole capacity period, or the whole
11 optimization period, like 28 years. So what's done is
12 something called segmentation, which is splitting --
13 and I think we talked about this previously --
14 splitting the entire period into eight-year chunks,
15 something like that.

16 And I think, in general, the issue with
17 that -- in the past, when the electricity industry, in
18 general, was sort of -- had several static trends,
19 eight-year optimization periods made a lot of sense
20 because you could look at something like electricity --
21 or total load that seemed to be, you know, relatively
22 predictable at least, or gas prices that were
23 relatively predictable, but that didn't include things
24 like a decline in carbon cap, which is essentially, in

1 our modeling, producing an incredible transition in
2 resources.

3 So for that reason, in this case, the
4 planning period and the optimization period is
5 important, because using, for example, an eight-year
6 planning period, EnCompass is choosing what is optimal
7 from 2022 to 2030. And it might choose a carbon
8 emitting unit like a gas CT or a gas CC, and it would
9 see, okay, this unit might be okay to meet the 70
10 percent reduction target in 2030. But, essentially,
11 EnCompass isn't testing how it's going to do over the
12 entire period.

13 So we have to engage, especially, I think,
14 with these things like declining carbon cost caps, it's
15 really important to allow things like EnCompass to look
16 further out, have a longer horizon.

17 And so in our -- what we used in our analysis
18 was a 15-year period, which essentially splits it in
19 half, right, it's 28 years. So '22 to '37 and then '38
20 to '50. Yeah, I think my math's correct on that. So I
21 think those are some of the dynamics that are important
22 here.

23 And yeah, I think especially like the
24 sentence sort of illuminates for, I think, carbon

1 emissions in particular, it's really important to look
2 at how long our planning periods are.

3 Q. Thank you. So I think you may have addressed
4 this somewhat in your answer, but I just want to make
5 sure we have it clear. Within the optimization period,
6 how does it, or does it account for system costs and
7 benefits as they accrue past that optimization period?

8 A. Yeah, this is another good question. And
9 this segmentation, essentially there is no accounting
10 for what happens after. So in the eight-year example,
11 EnCompass is asking what resource deployment should we
12 do over the next eight years, but it's not looking at
13 2031 through 2050. And the reason you still see
14 investments in actually resources is because all the
15 capital recovery is levelized.

16 So when you include, like, a CC, for
17 instance, it's only recovering, you know, 1/35 or 1/20
18 depending on your assumptions of that every year. But
19 any case, after that period is over, there is no
20 accounting for costs or benefits for any of those
21 resources.

22 So with an eight-year period, you're modeling
23 and choosing resources for '22 to 2030 without looking
24 in the future, and then '31 to '38 without looking in

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1 the future, '39 to '46 without looking in the future,
2 on and on.

3 Q. One final question on this line.

4 So with the difference between the Duke
5 Energy portfolios using an 8-year optimization window
6 and Synapse using a 15, what would that difference have
7 on affordability of the system -- modeling
8 affordability for the system?

9 A. That's a good question, and it can be
10 difficult to answer because, again, there are so many
11 different values that we're juggling when we're putting
12 together an EnCompass model like this. So are we --
13 the longer model runs might mean it's more difficult to
14 revise the model as we go, you know, in terms of run
15 time. But more specificity in, you know, hourly
16 dispatch or something like that could help.

17 So what I would expect is, over the period, a
18 longer optimization period, like 15 years, I would
19 expect to see, in general, that over the entire period,
20 sort of '22 to '50, you would see lower costs overall.
21 But again, there's a lot of juggling and it's difficult
22 to say.

23 Q. I appreciate that. Now, just one more line
24 of questioning, if you wouldn't mind turning to page 59

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1 of your testimony. And let's go ahead and do the same,
2 I guess, first three sentences starting on line 4
3 starting with "Duke also incorrectly claims."

4 A. All right. And you want me to read?

5 Q. Yeah, please.

6 A. And you said through which line?

7 Q. Through the end of the parenthetical on 11.

8 A. Okay. "Duke also incorrectly claims that
9 demand-side resource projections pose a unique risk to
10 system reliability. Integrated resource planning
11 contemplates procurement of demand and supply-side
12 resources with a relatively long planning horizon and
13 iterative cadence. Reconciling actual versus projected
14 demand-side resource procurement is a routine part of
15 resource planning just as IRPs might evolve based on
16 real-world adjustments to supply-side procurement;
17 e.g., construction delays of non-commercialized nuclear
18 resources."

19 So I think what this set of sentences is
20 getting at is a concept that we've heard about a lot in
21 this hearing, which is the idea of checking and
22 adjusting. So, like, this is an iterative process, so
23 every two years we'll get an opportunity to say what's
24 working and what's not. And I think the point I'm

1 making here is that applies to demand-side resources as
2 well.

3 So if we set, for example, a higher target
4 for incremental savings, we'll be able to check and
5 adjust in two years and say does this -- are we meeting
6 this; are there adjustments we need to make in terms of
7 policy or anything like that. And I think the other
8 point that I'm trying to, sort of, illuminate here is
9 there's no inherent risk with demand-side resources of
10 looking -- or pulling out the drawer where demand-side
11 resources are and finding them not there when you need
12 them. Because just like any other resource, we will
13 check every two years and make sure the resource
14 adequacy is working exactly as it needs to.

15 Q. I think you somewhat got to the next
16 question, which is, so how would you compare -- when
17 utilizing a benchmark for EE/DSM, say, 1 percent of
18 achievable retail load, how would you compare the risk
19 of that benchmark being set too high versus that
20 benchmark being set too low?

21 A. Sure. And one thing I think it's really
22 important to put out here, in terms of how I'm thinking
23 about reliability with the Synapse EnCompass model that
24 folks have been assessing over the last two months or

1 so, in terms of reliability, that is a priority for
2 Synapse in our EnCompass modeling because it's table
3 stakes for any resource planning you do.

4 And the reason that we structured our model
5 the way we did with imitating as many Duke resources as
6 possible -- or excuse me, decisions as possible, was to
7 maintain that reliability. And one place where we
8 mimicked Duke's -- one place where we mimicked Duke's
9 settings precisely was on the commitment issue.

10 So just like Duke Energy's capacity expansion
11 and production cost models, the Synapse model used
12 partial commitment for capacity expansion, and it used
13 full commitment for production cost modeling. So just
14 when I'm thinking about the reliability risks, for
15 instance, of energy efficiency, I'm feeling confident
16 in what Synapse is putting out, because again, it
17 mimics Dukes choices on that precisely.

18 And in terms of energy efficiency, I think
19 the risk with having a goal that's too low is there --
20 you could be leaving money on the table, so to speak.
21 There is an issue where, if we don't have a goal -- or
22 if we don't have a target that's higher than -- or
23 that's hitting what's possible, then we may have energy
24 efficiency investments that we're not making, which our

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1 modeling shows is worse for ratepayers.

2 And I think having a lower target that's sort
3 in line, you know, with what's been achieved in
4 previous years, which is my understanding of why the
5 1 percent of retail load, it could potentially be more
6 executable or have less executability risks. But I
7 think what our modeling show is that you also leave
8 benefits for ratepayers on the table.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you. No further questions.

10 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Tech
11 Customers?

12 MR. SCHAUER: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

13 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. SCHAUER:

14 Q. Craig Schauer on behalf of the Tech
15 Customers.

16 Mr. Fitch, if you could take a look at page 4
17 of your testimony, line 20.

18 A. Just a moment.

19 (Witness peruses document.)

20 Q. You make the statement on line 20 that you
21 use the same underlying EnCompass database that Duke
22 used to develop the portfolios in its proposed Carbon
23 Plan filing; do you see that?

24 A. I do.

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1 Q. So you received the database from Duke,
2 correct?

3 A. I did.

4 Q. Did you have any challenges using that
5 database?

6 A. Yes, and I think we detail this in our
7 testimony. But we did have several challenges using
8 this database. I'll just list them, although I think
9 we've talked about them, or I think they've been
10 discussed in this hearing previously.

11 But the first was an issue with either the
12 upload of the upload of the database which caused one
13 of the files to be corrupted and meant that when, for
14 instance, our Synapse team ran the model, it did not
15 work and it threw an error. And that was actually the
16 beginning of our relationship with Anchor Power in this
17 proceeding was when that error got thrown. So that was
18 the first piece.

19 And then the second piece was a disconnect
20 between the inputs database that we received and the
21 outputs that were presented in Duke Energy's Carbon
22 Plan. And are specifically the output documents they
23 received in this EnCompass share. And this was a
24 matter of -- at least a matter of one dataset being in

1 the wrong place, more or less.

2 And unfortunately, even with that revision,
3 what we found was that even using the correct version,
4 which was 6.0.4, which we did use in the beginning
5 before deciding to switch, which if you-all recall did
6 not end super well for us in terms of timing, the
7 Synapse team was still not able to -- to validate the
8 results that Duke was showing.

9 And just to address some things that folks
10 have -- just to address how this went for us, when I
11 look at the capacity expansion configuration that Duke
12 Energy uses, they use this MIP stop basis of 25. So
13 that's 25 basis points, which is pretty low. And they
14 also use, in terms of these outages, something that's
15 called capacity duration. So instead of using
16 something like random outages for the capacity
17 expansion at least, they simply reduced the capacity --
18 or reduced the capacity of those units to approximate
19 the idea that sometimes they are offline.

20 The reason I bring those up is because the
21 MIP stop basis being so low and using this
22 approximation of outages means that there is less
23 randomness. There's very little randomness, in fact,
24 in the capacity expansion modeling. And for that

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1 reason, we expect it get precisely the same results.

2 And we did not get that.

3 It's a matter of 10s or 100 megawatts
4 potentially between years and between models, which is
5 not huge, but it does undermine confidence that, for
6 example, Synapse's database is working correctly. So
7 that was an issue as well.

8 And the last one is that, for example, the
9 capital costs were given to us in a version using this
10 real levelized fixed-cost recovery rate, which we were
11 not able to reproduce without asking for the supporting
12 spreadsheets in discovery. Which meant that for an
13 extremely important component of many of the resources
14 that were chosen, we essentially had to wait, go
15 through the discovery process in order to contend with
16 that in a meaningful way.

17 That's my memory of the issues that we had,
18 but it may not be comprehensive of all the issues, but
19 I do think I talk about them in my testimony.

20 Q. I apologize, I did not see that in your
21 testimony which is why I wanted to ask. Last question.

22 How long have you been using EnCompass?

23 A. Sure, yeah. The first project I led in
24 EnCompass started in 2021, but at Synapse -- Synapse is

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1 actually one of the first clients of Anchor Power
2 Solutions, and the relationship started in either 2015
3 or 2016, and as part of coming online at Synapse last
4 year, I received training on the EnCompass model that
5 lasted over several days. I have, like, a phone
6 call/text relationship with at least one person in
7 Anchor Power, and I obviously had the benefit of the
8 team at Synapse who had been working with this model
9 for essentially as long as it's been commercially
10 available.

11 Q. And how long has the model been commercially
12 available?

13 A. I think since 2015 or '16. That's my
14 recollection, but I'm not sure.

15 Q. Thank you. No further questions.

16 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Walmart?

17 MS. GRUNDMANN: Thank you, Chair

18 Mitchell.

19 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. GRUNDMANN:

20 Q. Good morning. My name is Carrie Grundmann on
21 behalf of Walmart. I'd like to direct you to page 41
22 of your testimony. Over the course of several pages,
23 you talk about the concept of collaborative modeling,
24 and on page 43 of your testimony, you mention some

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1 successful collaborative modeling that took place with
2 Xcel in Colorado and Minnesota and then Duke Energy in
3 Indiana.

4 Can you tell me how you're aware of those
5 three instances?

6 A. Sure. It was just consultation with my
7 teammates at Synapse who would work on those projects.
8 And because of their confidential nature, I don't have
9 a lot of specifics of exactly how those stakeholder
10 processes went, other than a characterization that they
11 resulted in validation and they were, I think,
12 effective ways to build consensus.

13 Q. So do you have any -- I think you said that
14 due to confidentiality, you may have limited, but do
15 you have any understanding as to what made those
16 process more collaborative than this particular
17 process?

18 A. Yeah. I have a couple, sort of, best
19 practices ideas that I think were common to those.

20 Q. Okay. Can you share those, please?

21 A. Sure. I think one is, simply put, time.
22 Sixty days -- or in this case, I think -- I think the
23 Duke staff were pressed to be able to put together a
24 final model in the time they needed to. And I think

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1 also the intervenors were pressed to be able to review
2 that and revise it with any level of confidence. And I
3 do think that we put together a product that is high
4 quality, but I think there was time pressure on Synapse
5 as well as all the other intervenors and consultants.
6 So I think having a longer time span is important.

7 And --

8 Q. Let me stop you there.

9 Do you have any recommendations or ideas as
10 to what amount of time you would believe would be
11 necessary?

12 A. I don't think there is a, sort of, Goldilocks
13 number that's available out there. But what I will say
14 is there is a balance. Because, for example, Duke
15 Energy will be updating this model over time, changing
16 the inputs based on, for example, the IRA. And so
17 there may be some potential inefficiencies if the
18 period is very long for collaboration.

19 But I think, for understanding this complex
20 model -- and I think we've all heard about how complex
21 this model is -- it does take weeks. It takes months
22 to really understand all the nuts and bolts and be able
23 to make changes and see what those do.

24 So I think my high-level recommendation is

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1 that I think that three-month timeline would be --
2 would be, kind of, like, the lower end of what I think
3 a really comprehensive process could look like.

4 Q. Okay. And what's another best practice that
5 would you have recommended?

6 A. I would say visibility into the model. So
7 the Duke stakeholder process that we engaged in in this
8 process where there was -- there were inputs shared
9 with us in a high-level way through sort of
10 PowerPoints. Those are helpful for understanding, at
11 high level, what sort of references, for example, Duke
12 Energy is using. Or at a high level, again what, sort
13 of, structuring decisions they'd make.

14 But the EnCompass model is very complex, and
15 not only a matter of what inputs you're using, but how
16 they're implemented. And that is very difficult to
17 explain on a PowerPoint slide. So I think what one has
18 to do to really make this an effective process is have
19 the transparency of sharing the database with enough
20 time that intervenors can really get to understand it
21 and ask questions and have, I think, sort of an open
22 dialogue about why, for example, Duke Energy made the
23 decisions it did and what alternatives are out there,
24 things like that.

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1 Q. Do you have any other recommendations, other
2 than those two?

3 A. Not right now.

4 Q. Okay. Do you happen to know whether the
5 stakeholder process that involved Duke Energy in
6 Indiana, whether that was a voluntary process or
7 whether that was something that was ordered by the
8 Commission in Indiana?

9 A. I don't know that.

10 Q. Thank you. That's all the questions I have.

11 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Public
12 Staff?

13 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. LUHR:

14 Q. Good morning. Nadia Luhr with the Public
15 Staff.

16 So you said earlier today that you mimicked
17 Duke's settings for unit commitments exactly; is that
18 correct?

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. Did you change any other settings in the
21 production cost modeling runs, such as using a typical
22 day instead of all calendar days?

23 A. Yeah. I appreciate that question. We did
24 use -- we increased the MIP stop basis from -- or to

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1 200 basis points, and we also used a typical week, is
2 what the name of that, sort of, structure is that's --
3 it's sort of -- it's -- essentially uses, like, a
4 typical seven days for a month -- hourly.

5 Q. Okay. And what might be the impact of those
6 changes on the production cost results?

7 A. I'm glad you asked that. And again, I think
8 the most -- the most important thing, or one thing I
9 really want to stress is that the commitment practice
10 was the same between the EnCompass -- or the Synapse
11 modeling and the Duke Energy modeling. So I think for
12 the MIP stop basis, I'm gonna go into the gory details
13 here. But essentially EnCompass is a linear
14 programming algorithm at its heart, and it wants to
15 work with continuous values.

16 So EnCompass would like to procure
17 386.7 megawatts of storage, but that's simply not how
18 it's done in the real world. You know, we round up to
19 400 or down to 200, something like that. And so in
20 every case, whatever the MIP stop basis is, the --
21 EnCompass will solve to this, like, exact precise
22 continuous number of, for example, resource
23 acquisitions. And then from there it sort of
24 back-solves and it says how close can we get to that,

1 sort of, like, abstract optimal portfolio using the
2 blocks that are available to us.

3 And essentially what this MIP stop basis asks
4 is how close do we need to get. So by increasing that,
5 essentially, you allow the model to find one that's
6 good enough earlier and go with it.

7 But what I do want to point out is that, in
8 all those cases, the model's solving towards this
9 optimal basis, and so I wouldn't expect to see, for
10 example, a different set of resources if you used -- or
11 a drastically different set of resources if you
12 decreased that MIP stop basis. So I think there is --
13 it, sort of, allows the model to run over a quicker
14 time frame.

15 And then the typical week structure, I think
16 it finds a happy medium between -- between the kind of,
17 like, full, as robust as you possibly can in terms of
18 hourly dispatch and the typical day -- or the typical
19 day that we've talked about in this proceeding already.
20 So again, that's sort of an abstraction that allows for
21 a faster run time.

22 Q. Thank you. And if you can turn to pages 50
23 and 51 of your testimony, to Table 6.

24 A. I hope that table is readable, I know it's

1 kind of funny that way.

2 Q. So it looks as though your portfolio adds
3 significantly higher quantities of solar and storage in
4 the near term than Duke's portfolios; is that accurate?

5 A. That's accurate.

6 Q. And in your modeling, do you use the same
7 transmission cost adders that Duke used for new
8 capacity resources?

9 A. I did.

10 Q. Do you think that the interconnection of
11 higher levels of solar and storage in the near term
12 than Duke anticipates would necessitates higher
13 transmission costs than Duke used?

14 A. Yeah, it's a good question and I'm happy to
15 talk about it. So I heard in previous discussion that
16 the transmission adder was roughly equivalent with the
17 red zone upgrades, essentially, if you sort of summed
18 up what the red zone upgrades could actuate, and
19 compare that to the transmission adder that EnCompass
20 uses, they'd be relatively similar. So I do think it's
21 a good approximation for incremental transmission.

22 But I think, to the extent possible, when
23 transmission planning is able to be coordinated for
24 sort of maximizing solar deployment, for instance,

1 within all the other requirements, so transmission
2 planning, like, reliability and resource adequacy, I
3 think there is potential room for both economies of
4 scale but also, sort of, like, marginal gains.

5 So like I said, in general I think it's a
6 good prediction for what transmission costs could be
7 because they are notoriously difficult to, sort of,
8 predict from here.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you. That's all I have.

10 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Redirect?

11 MS. THOMPSON: Yes. Thank you, Chair

12 Mitchell. Bear with me just one moment, please.

13 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MS. THOMPSON:

14 Q. Mr. Fitch, in response to a question from
15 Mr. Blumenthal, you alluded to 1 percent of retail
16 load, and I think you were alluding to that as the
17 target that Duke is using in this -- that Duke is
18 proposing.

19 Did I understand you correctly?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And do you recall that Duke's target is, in
22 fact, 1 percent of eligible load that is net of
23 opt-outs?

24 A. I do recall that.

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1 Q. Let's see. In response to Ms. Luhr and
2 Mr. Blumenthal, you mention this issue of unit
3 commitment and alluded to the fact that Synapse used
4 the same time unit commitment settings that Duke had
5 used in its EnCompass modeling.

6 Did I understand you correctly?

7 A. You did.

8 Q. Okay. There's been a fair amount of
9 confusion on this issue, I think, in this hearing, so I
10 just want to make -- make sure we clear this up,
11 hopefully once and for all.

12 Did SACE. Et al. and NCSEA provide Synapse's
13 inputs for its EnCompass modeling to Duke Energy
14 pursuant to Companies' request for intervenor modeling
15 files?

16 A. That's my understanding, yes. I provided to
17 SACE, et al. and NCSEA, and I assume that they were
18 provided, so yes.

19 Q. Thank you. So those modeling files that SACE
20 and NCSEA -- or that you provided to SACE and NCSEA
21 that we -- NCSEA that we then provided to Duke, do you
22 recall that those included a file that was named
23 Index.xlsx?

24 A. I do. And the .xlsx is just the extension,

1 that means it's an Excel spreadsheet, but yes.

2 Q. Okay. So it's a tongue-twister, so when I
3 refer to that filename henceforth, I'll just call it
4 index. What was in that index file?

5 A. So -- sure. The index file contains,
6 essentially, all of the -- let me start earlier. What
7 we're talking about is an export of the database that
8 Synapse used to put together its portfolios -- its
9 scenarios. So what needs to be included in that export
10 is the data, all, changes that we made in terms of
11 different capital costs, things like that. And then
12 what the configuration of each of the scenarios we ran
13 was. So that index file is -- has all the
14 configurations of the scenarios in it.

15 Q. And when you say it has all the
16 configurations of the scenarios, would that allow
17 someone reviewing those documents to understand what
18 settings Synapse used?

19 A. Yes, it would.

20 MS. THOMPSON: Okay. I have a couple of
21 exhibits I would like to have passed out, if I may,
22 Chair Mitchell. And I'll just ask my co-counsel to
23 assist me. If you could pass out one of each of
24 these, please.

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1 Chair Mitchell, I would like to mark the
2 document that says "Excerpt of Index.xlsx Lookup
3 Values" tab at the left-hand -- at the top left
4 corner for identification as SACE, et al. Fitch
5 Redirect Examination Exhibit 1.

6 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Document
7 will be marked as SACE, et al. Fitch Redirect
8 Examination Exhibit 1.

9 (SACE, et al. Fitch Redirect Examination
10 Exhibit 1 was marked for
11 identification.)

12 MS. THOMPSON: And then the second
13 document that says "Excerpt of Index.xlsx Scenario
14 Settings" tab at the top left, I would like to mark
15 that for identification as SACE. Et al. Fitch
16 Redirect Examination Exhibit 2.

17 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. The
18 document will be marked as SACE, et al. Fitch
19 Redirect Examination Exhibit 2.

20 MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Chair
21 Mitchell.

22 (SACE, et al. Fitch Redirect Examination
23 Exhibit 2 marked for identification.)

24 Q. Mr. Fitch, could you -- do you have copies of

1 the two documents?

2 A. I do.

3 Q. Could you please refer to SACE, et al. Fitch
4 Redirect Examination Exhibit 1? That's the one with
5 the lookup values tab in the top left corner.

6 A. I've got it.

7 Q. Do you recognize what is reproduced here in
8 the exhibit?

9 A. I do. This is an excerpt of a much longer
10 list of input descriptions and options that work, sort
11 of, as a key for understanding the scenario settings.
12 So for every option on the scenario settings tab, it
13 shows what the choices are and, sort of, what they
14 mean. So I do recognize it, yes.

15 Q. And would you agree with me that this is an
16 excerpt of the lookup values tab from the index file
17 that was shared by Synapse with NCSEA and SACE, et al.
18 and afterwards produced to Duke?

19 A. Yeah. And the lookup values tab is the same
20 for every EnCompass export, so this is -- this is in
21 that one and any other EnCompass export.

22 Q. Okay. Can you please explain what is shown
23 in each of the columns of this table that is in the
24 exhibit?

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1 A. Sure. So there are two columns on the table.
2 The left one, input description, indicate -- or has a
3 series of, sort of, categories that could be -- of
4 categories where there's multiple settings available.
5 And the right-side options indicates how much settings
6 are available. And in cases where it's not clear, what
7 each setting means.

8 And I'm not exactly sure on this, but I think
9 the scenario settings, in general, tend to be integers
10 like zero through three instead of names like full,
11 partial, and none. So in this case, there's, sort of,
12 a key there for what zero means, what one means,
13 et cetera.

14 Q. Okay. So just to make sure I'm understanding
15 you right, because you started losing me when you were
16 talking about integers, under options, those are the
17 different commitment options that can be used when
18 running EnCompass?

19 MR. BREITSCHWERDT: Chair Mitchell, I'd
20 object. I think it's not clear how this is
21 redirect, if there's some concern about how --
22 well, maybe I'll stop there. I'd object that this
23 is well beyond the scope of any questions asked,
24 and I'd like to understand how this is redirect.

1 MS. THOMPSON: Yes, Chair Mitchell,
2 thank you. There were questions from -- well,
3 there was a question from Ms. Luhr about the
4 commitment settings. And Ms. Luhr's witness,
5 Mr. Thomas, had, I think, a misapprehension that
6 was in his testimony regarding the settings that
7 Duke -- excuse me, the settings that Synapse had
8 used in modeling its portfolios. And I think this
9 is a point that needs to be cleared up in the
10 record.

11 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. I'll
12 overrule the objection.

13 Q. Moving right along. Under options, those are
14 the different commitment options that can be used when
15 running EnCompass?

16 A. That's right.

17 Q. Okay. And I will ask you, what is the
18 significance of the commitment setting when you're
19 modeling in EnCompass? Actually, strike that. I think
20 you explained that already.

21 Let's turn to the other document marked SACE,
22 et al. Fitch Redirect Examination Exhibit 2, the one
23 with scenario settings in the top left corner.

24 A. I've got it.

1 Q. Okay. Can you explain what is in -- what
2 this document is reproducing here?

3 A. Sure. So this is, again, an excerpt of a
4 much larger spreadsheet where the rows indicate a
5 series of scenarios that you've specified -- that one
6 has specified, and the columns indicate all the
7 different possible settings, some of which I talked
8 with Ms. Luhr about.

9 So in this case, this is an excerpt where it
10 has the scenarios on the left side and then one of the
11 settings that's available here, commitment option or
12 commit opt on the right.

13 Q. Okay. And what does the commit opt setting
14 indicate?

15 A. That is -- that is the commitment option
16 which is -- it's abbreviated because of string storage
17 space in the model. But yes, it means commitment
18 option.

19 Q. So it's the -- are you saying it's the unit
20 commitment setting for each of the scenarios that are
21 listed on the left-hand side?

22 A. That's probably clearer, yes.

23 Q. Okay. On the -- in the right-hand column
24 under commit opt, let's go down to optimize -- where it

1 says optimized CAPEX under scenario in the left-hand
2 column, what is that?

3 A. Sure. So that's the label that we use for
4 the capacity expansion portion of the optimized
5 scenario that we present in the carbon-free by 2050
6 report.

7 Q. Okay. And is the same true for the Duke
8 resources CAPEX and regional resources CAPEX?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. And then in the right-hand column for each of
11 those scenarios, it lists the unit commitment setting
12 as one.

13 What does that mean?

14 A. So that one is -- essentially, we use the
15 lookup values, the previous exhibit key to understand
16 what the one means. So in this case the one means
17 partial commitment.

18 Q. Okay. So just to make this abundantly clear,
19 my understanding that this spreadsheet that was
20 excerpted here shows that Synapse used the partial
21 commitment setting in capacity expansion modeling for
22 its optimized Duke resources and regional resources
23 scenarios?

24 A. That's right.

1 Q. And why did you do that?

2 A. To mimic Duke's settings with its own
3 capacity expansion scenarios in its EnCompass database.

4 Q. Okay. Looking farther down in the scenario
5 column where it says optimized PC, Duke resources PC,
6 and regional resources PC, what do those represent?

7 A. The PC stands for production cost, so those
8 are the production cost runs that inform the ultimate
9 PVRR that shows up in the carbon-free report.

10 Q. Okay. And then looking in that commit opt
11 column, it shows that Synapse used the zero unit
12 commitment setting in its production cost modeling for
13 those scenarios?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Can you remind us what that unit commitment
16 setting zero represents?

17 A. That represents full commitment. And the
18 zero is because the default values are often zero in
19 EnCompass. So if the default is full commitment, zero
20 is -- if the default is full commitment in EnCompass,
21 in general, it's zero for these, and it represents full
22 commitment.

23 Q. Okay. And was that the same setting that
24 Duke used in its production cost modeling?

1 A. It was.

2 Q. Thank you. That's all the questions I have.

3 MS. THOMPSON: Thank you, Chair
4 Mitchell.

5 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. We'll take
6 questions from Commissioners. Commissioner
7 Clodfelter? Okay. Duffley? Okay.

8 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER DUFFLEY:

9 Q. Let's see. Good morning still. So I have a
10 few questions, and it's mainly just to understand your
11 testimony and to see exactly what you're asking of the
12 Commission. So we'll go backwards, since I'm at the
13 end of your testimony. So on page 49 and 47, you're
14 talking about coal retirements and the delay of coal
15 retirements. And you ask that the Commission seek more
16 information from Duke, and for Duke to basically
17 provide more compelling justification.

18 And so can you talk to me a little bit about
19 exactly what does that look like and what additional
20 information that you think is required.

21 A. Sure. I'd be happy to. So the reason I
22 wrote this is, for example, subject to check, in the
23 Carbon Plan filing that Duke made, it indicated that
24 the Belews Creek units, for instance, would -- it

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1 indicated in this section about retirement delays that
2 those units would just -- would operate into the 2030s.
3 That's a quote from the Carbon Plan.

4 Even though I think, from the 2020 IRPs, the
5 earliest practical -- or practicable retirement date
6 for those units was 2030. So that just sort of gives
7 an example of disconnect that I saw in the Carbon Plan
8 versus this previous earliest practicable retirement
9 date. I'll try not to stumble on that word too much.

10 So I think what would be helpful to
11 understand, in terms of what is reasonable in terms of
12 delay or what's reasonable in terms of when those units
13 are retired is, what specific projects are required, or
14 what specific projects is Duke representing are
15 required to make this -- to actuate these retirements;
16 where are those in the development timeline; where are
17 their costs; how -- or what are the timeline for
18 implementation exactly, sort of, you know, is this
19 24 months, is it 18 months, and where are we today.

20 So I think it goes without saying, maybe,
21 that there are -- there can be transmission reliability
22 concerns with retiring these units, but, obviously,
23 resources can be procured to replace those. And I
24 think the place that we're flying in the dark a little

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1 bit here is what specific projects are we talking about
2 here, what's the timeline for this, where are we in
3 that on that timeline.

4 Q. Okay. Thank you. And then moving to page
5 43. Are you there?

6 A. I am, sorry.

7 Q. So you talk about the collaborative process
8 and collaboration, and I'd like, if you could, to give
9 me some context here. You mention Xcel in Colorado,
10 Xcel in Minnesota, and then Duke Energy in Indiana.

11 Are -- are -- is Xcel and Duke Energy, are
12 they leaders and first movers in sharing this -- this
13 type of resource planning model data? And then once
14 you answer that, are there other utilities doing this
15 type of collaboration, and if so, what are they doing?

16 A. Sure. That's a great question, and I will
17 not represent to my knowledge on, sort of, all the
18 resource planning and transparency practices across the
19 United States is comprehensive, but I'll do what I can
20 here.

21 My understanding is that the emergence of
22 models with the kind of transparency that allows
23 stakeholders to, kind of, get their hands dirty and
24 understand is a matter of the last couple of years.

1 And the interest for stakeholders to do that is a
2 matter of the last couple of years. So we're talking
3 this is very contemporary and there's changes in every
4 cycle that's happening across the United States.

5 So I think these are three good case studies,
6 absolutely, in terms of sharing data with the
7 stakeholders, in terms of being able to validate the
8 data, the outputs versus the inputs that we're getting,
9 things like that. So in terms of whether they're
10 leaders, it's hard to know, because this isn't
11 something I've comprehensively studied, but they are, I
12 think, good examples for us to look to here.

13 And then there are other stakeholder
14 practices that are done, and one that I'm thinking of
15 is -- unfortunately, I can't remember the name of the
16 utility, and I'd be happy to file a late-filed exhibit
17 or something like that in the Southwest that allowed,
18 for example, stakeholders to select a series of inputs
19 that the utility used in their own, sort of, production
20 of their model results. So there was, sort of, like, a
21 stakeholder scenario.

22 And that method isn't without its pitfalls,
23 but I think it can be really clarifying to
24 understanding how these decisions with inputs can

1 change what the outputs look like.

2 So I guess to answer your question, I would
3 say these are definitely -- these are good case studies
4 to look at, and I think new practices are, sort of,
5 arriving as we speak.

6 Q. Okay. Thank you for that. And then, on page
7 39, you make a recommendation regarding carbon offsets.

8 And can you further explain your reasoning
9 behind this recommendation?

10 A. Sure. So what we're doing in this case,
11 looking out to what the carbon governance is going to
12 look like in 2050, is just -- it's very difficult. I
13 mean, we've seen -- so I have sympathy for you-all, I
14 suppose. So we've seen carbon offset markets, sort of,
15 emerge and then collapse because of some issue with
16 permanence or leakage or measurement even.

17 These carbon offsets are notoriously
18 difficult to, sort of, confirm that this carbon has
19 been sequestered and will be sequestered permanently.
20 Which is, in the case of at least land-based carbon
21 offsets, what we're talking about. So I think it's a
22 question of, in these cases we'd seen some carbon
23 offset markets or values sort of emerge and collapse,
24 things like that, there hasn't really been stability

1 there yet.

2 And I think the other piece of it is that, in
3 terms of economy-wide carbon emissions projections,
4 oftentimes carbon offsets are saved, when we're talking
5 about economy-wide decarbonization, for the most
6 difficult to decarbonize sectors. Things like
7 industrial processes where, you know, metallurgical
8 coal is just something you need.

9 So -- gosh, I kind of lost my train of
10 thought there. Oh, yeah. So in using offsets for the
11 electricity sector, which is one where we have many
12 tools for decarbonization, might be premature. And I
13 think the real risk that we run here is moving forward
14 assuming that there's going to be this, for lack of a
15 better word, bailout in the final years of the plan,
16 and finding ourselves in a place where perhaps we
17 haven't procured the right resources because there may
18 not be an offset market at the end of the day. And I
19 think that's something that, you know, we talk about --
20 we use the "term stranded" assets to talk about that.

21 So I guess my concern is offsets have -- we
22 haven't seen a really stable long-term market for them
23 yet, and there is potential risks with assuming that
24 those will be there in 30 years.

1 Q. And I think you mention this in your
2 testimony as well, carbon offsets are not regulated
3 currently; is that accurate?

4 A. I'm not -- I'm not a -- I haven't done a
5 large amount of research on that topic, but I don't
6 understand there to be any, sort of, highly regulated
7 offset available today.

8 Q. Okay. Thank you.

9 A. At least not -- there are some regimes that
10 have emerged, like REGI, for example, which do some of
11 that, but in North Carolina, I haven't seen anything.
12 Or in North Carolina, I don't believe there's a highly
13 regulated high-quality offset market today.

14 Q. Okay. Thank you. On page 37, so you mention
15 on line 3 that the IRA may impact battery charging
16 requirements. And in your opinion, how -- how will
17 it -- how will it impact those requirements?

18 A. My understanding is that the investment tax
19 credit previously, before the IRA, required that solar
20 plus storage installations required the storage to
21 charge directly from the solar via DC couple, that kind
22 of thing. And I haven't done -- I haven't done a
23 really, really deep dive on the IRA to date, but my
24 understanding is that the tax credits that are

1 available through the IRA remove that requirement.

2 And so AC charging is possible in that case,
3 which makes the resource much more flexible, like the
4 dynamic dispatch that we talked about earlier.

5 Q. Okay. Thank you. And then on page 34, also
6 another just clarification question. You mention, on
7 lines 8 and 9, "The regional resources scenario did not
8 reach the four-unit availability limit set for
9 additional nuclear resources."

10 Could you explain that a bit further?

11 A. Yeah, absolutely. So one of the revisions
12 that we made to the Duke database was changing the
13 availability of SMRs, or advanced nuclear resources,
14 things like that. And part of the reason we did that
15 was we wanted to avoid concurrent development of what
16 is a resource that has not been commercially proven
17 yet. So, essentially, developing, for example, seven
18 units at the same time that take seven years could
19 increase the risk that I think the electricity system
20 sort of sustains by developing all these units at the
21 same time.

22 So what Synapse did, what we did in our
23 modeling, was restrict, essentially, so that concurrent
24 development of these resources couldn't happen, more or

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1 less. So I can't remember the dates exactly right now,
2 but what that meant was that, over the course of the
3 planning period, 2022 to 2050, there were sort of room
4 for four of these units to be built.

5 And just to clarify, that was an availability
6 constraint that Synapse put on the EnCompass database
7 that we got. And so when I say that regional resources
8 scenario did not reach that availability limit, what I
9 mean is the regional resources scenario did not build
10 four, it built less than four SMRs.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. And
12 then, on page 28, you talk about how the Commission
13 should initiate a new -- I'll wait for you to get
14 there.

15 A. Thank you.

16 Q. So you talk about how the Commission should
17 initiate a new proceeding for pursuing long-term
18 prospective regional planning and consideration of
19 regional coordination. So when you say consideration
20 of regional coordination, can you expand on this point
21 on exactly what you mean with that -- those two words?

22 A. Sure. First thing I'll say is, in general,
23 that the Commission -- this is one potential action
24 that the Commission could take to explore transmission

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1 coordination and planning. And I give it as a
2 recommendation, but I think this is -- I think the
3 Commission understands that this is a critical issue
4 and there's lots of different ways to tackle it.

5 In terms of regional coordination, what I'm
6 referring to is the concept that, especially with
7 variable renewable energy, being able to integrate that
8 energy over a larger region allows for more economic
9 value from those resources, more or less. That has
10 something do with law of large numbers, where if you
11 have these resources that are variable but you're over
12 a larger area, then on average you could get sort of
13 like a more predictable stream, things like that.

14 And in particular, when we're looking at
15 decarbonization, that's potentially a very powerful
16 tool. So I think you-all are aware that across the
17 rest of the United States there are regional
18 coordination structures like MISOs -- or ISOs and RTOs.
19 And those do provide -- those do provide and allow for
20 transmission projects that, sort of, multiple values,
21 reliability, economic value, resource adequacy, and
22 even just sort of reducing the cost of integrating more
23 zero-carbon resources.

24 So there's lots of ways to tackle, I think,

1 regional coordination, and I think that's a really
2 thorny topic, especially because implementation is so
3 difficult, which is why I proposed potentially -- or
4 recommended potentially a different proceeding. But
5 that was sort of my thinking was integrating over a
6 larger region, so to include other states around the
7 Carolinas.

8 Q. So, obviously, we're not in an RTO currently,
9 so is that proceeding, like, to look into an RTO or is
10 it -- is that correct?

11 A. You know, there's, I think, a
12 legislatively -- a legislatively initiated proceeding
13 in South Carolina that's looking at regional
14 coordination generally. And one of those is, you know,
15 full RTO, full divestment, that type of thing. But
16 there's also energy imbalance markets and things like
17 that.

18 Essentially, there are many tools in the
19 toolkit. So I'm not -- I think it might make sense to
20 look at several options instead of saying, you know,
21 yea or nay on an RTO.

22 Q. Okay. And that's where I was going next,
23 that what would you hope to accomplish out of this
24 docket.

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1 And so I was trying to figure out was it RTO,
2 were you looking at that, or an energy imbalance
3 market, or were you looking specifically for just
4 imports through or building transmission through the
5 SERTP process and the NCTPC process?

6 A. I think those are all on the table, and in
7 terms of implementation, it's difficult. But it could
8 be as simple as NCTPC using, sort of, a multivalue
9 approach instead of thinking only about -- either
10 thinking only about local reliability or public policy
11 requests. So again, there's kind of a spectrum here.

12 Q. Okay. Thank you for that.

13 (Pause.)

14 Q. And then my last clarification question is on
15 page 6.

16 A. All right. I'm there.

17 Q. Okay. So with your optimized model and your
18 regional resources model, there's a larger piece of the
19 pie from the solar.

20 And where is that solar -- it may just be
21 generic solar, but my question is, where is that solar
22 coming from? Is it coming from new build within
23 North Carolina? Or is it from resources outside of
24 North Carolina? And if it's from resources outside of

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1 North Carolina, is it coming in from PJM? Is it coming
2 in from the South?

3 A. That's a good question, and I don't think
4 it's incredibly clear, and so I'm happy to clear it up.
5 All the solar you see there and the storage is all
6 within region. It's all within the Duke Energy DEC/DEP
7 balancing authority. So none of that's being imported.
8 And, essentially, what we're seeing here is EnCompass
9 selecting that much solar subject to the transmission
10 adder and the deployment limitations we've talked
11 about. But all of that is within region, yeah.

12 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.

13 A. Thank you.

14 CHAIR MITCHELL: Who has questions?

15 Okay. Commissioner Brown-Bland.

16 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND:

17 Q. Just a couple here.

18 So what -- is there a deduction or an
19 inference that you would have the Commission draw with
20 regard to the difficulties experienced, in terms of
21 running the model?

22 A. I would say that this is the North Carolina
23 Utilities Commission's first run with EnCompass in an
24 IRP. And it's Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy

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1 Progress' first run, and for many intervenors, it's
2 their first look at it. So I think learning is -- I
3 think growing pains are something that we should
4 expect. But I think I try to give recommendations in
5 my testimony for ways that we could improve it.

6 Q. So it's more -- what you want the Commission
7 to get out of it is more educational than informational
8 base?

9 A. Well, in terms of what I think is good, is
10 going to lead to potentially smoother proceedings and
11 more shared understanding and more collaborative
12 problem solving in the future, I think things like more
13 transparency, longer timelines are going to be
14 important, and I think will at least give us a better
15 shot at coming to a Carbon Plan that's, you know, in
16 the best public interest.

17 Q. And do you have a -- sort of the same
18 question as a certain deduction or inference that the
19 Commission should draw from the fact that Synapse had
20 an inability, at least, to validate Duke's numbers?

21 A. I would say I'm confident in my team. I'm
22 confident in Synapse as an organization. I'm confident
23 that our approach to the EnCompass model was the
24 appropriate one in all cases. Or at least the

1 appropriate one in terms of import and validation. And
2 my thinking is that -- is that the validation issue
3 could likely be from some other input problem where
4 there was one tiny change that was made somewhere deep
5 inside the model that was a difference between what we
6 got and what the outputs looked like that we also got.

7 I think simply put, these are really complex
8 models, and moving them from place to place is
9 difficult. And even maintaining version control
10 when -- I'm not sure how big the Duke Energy modeling
11 team is, but I'm assuming it's big, that's difficult.

12 So in terms of a deduction that I would
13 have -- that I would have the Commission take, I would
14 say I do think it's -- I do think the validation issue
15 is a problem, because it's hard to be confident that
16 our models are running correctly when that's not the
17 case. But I think I might chalk it up to just the
18 time, the compressed timeline on this.

19 Q. So do you or don't you -- is the inability to
20 validate significant to the -- the results that we see
21 with the scenarios?

22 A. I would say it does. The reason that we
23 validate is to make sure that our model works exactly
24 like Duke Energy's model does. And I think we and the

1 intervenors got very close, very, very close to
2 validating and getting exactly the same result. And so
3 for that reason, I do have confidence that, you know,
4 for example, the Synapse EnCompass scenarios do model
5 appropriately.

6 But the lack of validation creates a risk
7 that there's some tiny piece of this that's working in
8 a way that's not expected. And that's just -- that's
9 just an unfortunate thing we have to work with here.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

12 Commissioner Hughes?

13 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER HUGHES:

14 Q. I have a modeling itch I hope you can
15 scratch. You're the first modeling specialist I've had
16 since I started worrying about this. But, you know,
17 we're being asked to infer a lot of -- a lot of value
18 and information from these present value numbers. And
19 in some cases, there's large deltas, but in some cases,
20 really small deltas. So I'm just curious if you could
21 say a little bit about something we haven't heard a lot
22 about, which is the discount factor that's used for
23 calculating these.

24 And then kind of on a related note, the

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1 inflation factor that's used. I saw, in here, you talk
2 a little bit about inflation of PPAs, but -- in your
3 model write-up. But could you just talk a little bit
4 about those? And there was any test, because we're in
5 this weird macro world of kind of changing those, and
6 does it change the order of everything?

7 A. Yeah, these are good questions. I'm happy to
8 talk about them. And I know you said you have a
9 modeling itch, but I think I may be a little
10 long-winded, so I hope I don't scratch too much.

11 But I would say, on the inflation, which is
12 the easier one, when we were configuring this model,
13 inflation wasn't the, sort of, public policy issue that
14 we're hearing about in the newspaper on a regular
15 basis. And so we used what is typical for us, which is
16 taking some kind of long-term inflation estimate that's
17 produced by one of the branch banks of the federal
18 reserve. So something like 2.5 percent, and we just
19 apply that to everything basically.

20 The inflation issues that we're seeing today
21 are difficult because broad-based inflation that sort
22 of affects the value of the dollar on everything might
23 not change differentially to resources subject to the
24 same inflation. Differentially, there might not

1 actually be that much difference if they're subject to
2 inflation.

3 But I think it is something to keep in mind
4 here. And one part of modeling is -- one part of
5 modeling is that keeping -- it's very difficult to get
6 the most up-to-date thing into your model as quickly as
7 possible.

8 In terms of the PVRR, it's a really good
9 question, and I'm glad you're focusing on it. The way
10 that we calculate it, which I believe is the way that
11 Duke calculates it, is using a discount rate that's
12 equal to the weighted average cost of capital for Duke
13 Energy. So you calculate an annual cost of, you know,
14 carrying all these capital investments of fuel, all
15 that stuff, and then over time you discount by the
16 weighted average cost of capital.

17 That can be helpful and is what I understand
18 to be very common across resource planning, in general,
19 but I think if you really dug into it, there might
20 be -- some people might recommend, you know, a social
21 discount level that's less, because obviously, we're
22 talking about ratepayer dollars here.

23 So it's an interesting policy question. I
24 think we, sort of, default to the weighted average cost

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1 of capital because that's -- I guess that's sort of the
2 structure that we adopt here. But it's a good
3 question.

4 Q. Yeah. You got an issue that I've had since
5 I've been here is that, you know, is the customers'
6 discount factor -- discount rate the same as a major
7 corporation. And I'm thinking of our average customer.
8 I'm not sure that's the case, but that goes down a
9 rabbit hole that I don't want to pull this group into.
10 But I appreciate that.

11 Just a follow-up on the inflation. One of
12 the things that we've heard, sort of, as strategies for
13 making different choices, and it comes up a lot, is the
14 idea, you know, of hedging, of locking things in. So,
15 I mean, the thing that I noticed was, particularly for
16 your PPAs, you do, kind of, inflate those.

17 A. Uh-huh.

18 Q. But from what I understand, one of the
19 advantages of a PPA is, in general, the way I think
20 we've structured them in the past, is to lock in a
21 rate, and it doesn't inflate. So it's actually
22 becoming a much better deal as you -- you know, as you
23 move forward than, say, something that is gonna require
24 the payment of fuel cost and those kind of things.

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1 So I don't know if this is a small issue or a
2 big issue, I'm not sure if this issue makes sense, but
3 I just -- I just wondered like how are those things
4 treated? Again, you know, I'm not sure how big a deal
5 it is in this particular model, but you're up here and
6 might as well.

7 A. I'd say my understanding is that PPAs can be
8 structured to the, sort of, the cost of --
9 cost-per-megawatt hour can be structured to either
10 increase with inflation or stay flat. And I think, as
11 a conservative approach, we just chose to inflate those
12 numbers, just because that would avoid this issue where
13 maybe they were undervalued at the end or over time.

14 But I think I wouldn't expect it to have a
15 very large effect on the -- on the results, in part
16 because the -- in part because there aren't that many
17 PPAs that are available because of -- because of the
18 third party and Duke Energy ownership issues. But it's
19 definitely something we can look into. And I think
20 depending on the structures that are dominant in terms
21 of PPAs in the Carolinas, it might make sense to use
22 something different. I think there's just two separate
23 ways of approximating what a PPA looks like.

24 Q. Okay. I'll stop there. I don't want to pull

1 people in. But I really appreciate those things.

2 Thanks. No other questions.

3 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner McKissick?

4 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER MCKISSICK:

5 Q. Just a few questions for you, and I certainly
6 appreciate your testimony.

7 I think you said early on in your testimony
8 you became familiar with EnCompass around 2015, and
9 that you began using it in 2021; is that correct?

10 A. I apologize if I misspoke. I meant to say
11 that Synapse Energy Economics, the consulting firm,
12 started their practice with EnCompass in 2015 or 2016.
13 And I came on to Synapse in 2021 and began my training
14 then.

15 Q. I see. So when you joined them in 2021,
16 that's when you became familiar with EnCompass?

17 A. Yeah. And I'd been -- I'd analyzed the
18 results of IRPs in the past, so I had some familiarity
19 there. But that was my introduction to the, kind of,
20 like, guts of EnCompass in particular.

21 Q. And I take it Synapse usually is looking at
22 results of EnCompass and comparing it against what
23 alternative outcomes might be typically?

24 A. Synapse typically -- I think that's a fair

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1 characterization. Typically we -- especially when we
2 have another EnCompass database to look at that a
3 company produces. We can look at that one, assess what
4 we think of those assumptions, change those to the
5 extent that we want to, and then see how that affects
6 the portfolio that, sort of, emerges on the other side.

7 Q. And with that overview and experience, based
8 upon the way Duke has used EnCompass, what do you find
9 to be perhaps concerning? And when I say that, I'm
10 thinking perhaps limitations that were done or
11 adjustments outside of the model, if you could speak to
12 that.

13 A. Well, that's a pretty large topic, and I'm
14 trying to think about how to best answer it here. I
15 would say in -- there's a couple of different ways to
16 think about this. There are several quantitative input
17 assumptions, like capital costs or gas -- gas
18 projections that we -- we thought could be revised and
19 we made revisions in our model. And I think there is
20 also assumptions about how much deployment is possible,
21 which is something you need to do to get your model to
22 be actionable like we've talked about, and we made
23 revisions on those too.

24 I think, in general, my concern is when

1 several things are kept in stasis -- kept stable, just
2 as they are today, things like, for example, energy
3 efficiency where there's -- you know, Duke Energy
4 Carolinas, I think, hit 1 percent of retail a year ago,
5 and there's really like an expectation of growth --
6 essentially, by locking those kind of predictions in
7 and saying, you know, this is in stasis here and we're
8 gonna expect that continues like that through the rest
9 of the future. That's lost opportunity to capitalize
10 on those types of resources.

11 And so I think that's true for demand-side
12 resources, in general. It's very difficult to model,
13 but I also think it's important to think about what the
14 capabilities are there.

15 And then another one that's very difficult to
16 model but was sort of kept status quo in these models
17 was the, sort of, transmission regime that we're
18 working with here. Again, these are thorny questions,
19 but I think they -- we should think about what
20 assumptions are being embedded when we are thinking
21 about the analytical value of this tool.

22 Q. And in terms of the number of, I guess, solar
23 interconnections that might be imposed or that were
24 imposed with the way Duke kind of adjusted the model,

1 what were your thoughts about that?

2 A. So that's another case where I think the fact
3 that our model procured more solar than Duke's when
4 we -- when using the assumptions that we did indicates
5 that EnCompass thinks that there is, you know, economic
6 value to be had by procuring these resources. And to
7 make the inference, there's economic value left on the
8 table when that procurement doesn't happen, you know,
9 in a way similar to what we sort of project here.

10 So I think that's kind of the major issue is
11 the risk of losing out on these resources that provide,
12 you know, important value here. In terms of what I --
13 what I used to create the projections that I did, I'd
14 say I looked at the -- I looked at the developments
15 that have happened recently with interconnection, like
16 the move to clustering, for example, and looked at,
17 sort of, historically what Duke Energy's
18 interconnection has looked like and made, essentially,
19 a reasonable assumption that there was, you know,
20 greater ability to do this.

21 I think even things like -- even things like
22 transmission planning that work a little differently,
23 or the -- yeah, there's potentially many process
24 improvements we could make that could make the

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1 interconnection easier. And if we lock in, again, the
2 deployment that we have today, then we assume that none
3 of those happen, more or less, and I think that's a
4 risk.

5 Q. Okay. Now, on page 50 of your testimony, at
6 the very bottom there's a Table 6 relating to
7 carbon-free by 2050 short-term recommendations. Now,
8 what I want you to do are two things. First, I want
9 you to review what you have in this chart; and then
10 secondly, I'd like you to contrast it to what Duke has
11 as it relates to its portfolios and the recommendations
12 that they have, in terms of what might be done
13 near-term.

14 A. I just want to make sure I understand your
15 question. You're saying you'd like to review this
16 table and compare and contrast with what that looks
17 like in the Duke --

18 Q. Yes, exactly.

19 A. Okay. I will -- I'll do my best here, but
20 what I'll say is I didn't -- I didn't review the
21 results of the SP5 and SP6 portfolios in great detail.
22 And I also don't have, for example, Duke's Short-Term
23 Action Plan in front of me, so this is going to be high
24 level, I guess.

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1 MS. THOMPSON: Commission McKissick --
2 Chair Mitchell, may I approach the witness with a
3 copy of what's been marked and I think admitted
4 Modeling and Near-Term Actions Panel Rebuttal
5 Exhibit 1, which is a chart that might aid
6 Mr. Fitch in having an efficient answer to the
7 question?

8 CHAIR MITCHELL: You may.

9 MS. THOMPSON: Thank you.

10 (Pause.)

11 THE WITNESS: All right. So I'll just
12 kind of go row by row here.

13 Q. Sure.

14 A. All right. On energy efficiency, obviously,
15 what we're looking at here is 1.5 percent of retail
16 load as an incremental savings target, and that is
17 higher than both Duke's base and high projections. And
18 that -- the way that we modeled it, sort of, ramps up
19 to there in 2030, I think, is when it hits 1.5 percent.
20 So that's a greater investment energy efficiency.

21 For distributed energy resources, the
22 EnCompass scenarios we used Duke Energy's high DER
23 adoption, which anticipates a little bit of
24 acceleration in the rate over a '22 to 2050. Yeah,

1 2022 to 2050. So at 2035, it's -- there's some
2 separation between Duke's projections and what I --
3 what we have, but I think it's meaningful, so more
4 DERs.

5 Additional solar, there's already been a lot
6 of, I think, hearing time on this, but the Synapse
7 models anticipate more procurement of solar. So, in
8 particular, I think we're talking about 4 gigawatts
9 2022, 2024 procurement timeline. So that's greater
10 than I think what -- what Duke Energy has, sort of,
11 projected.

12 And similar for battery storage. I think our
13 model sees a lot of value in battery storage to
14 integrate these resources and provide capacity, so we
15 procure a lot of this.

16 For onshore wind, it's very helpful to have
17 this now. Based on -- based on this exhibit that
18 Ms. Thompson handed me, it looks roughly the same, and
19 I think that's -- this shows that there is value and
20 diversity of variable renewable energy resources.

21 And then for onshore wind Midwest, this is a
22 resource that Synapse introduced into the model that's
23 a PPA, a sort of third-party-owned solar that's
24 procured through PJM. And we included the firm

1 point-to-point cost of importing these resources, which
2 is quite high, to be clear. And we found that our
3 model selected that significantly. Just showing, I
4 guess, the value of regional procurement, in general.

5 And then for offshore wind, I believe ours is
6 broadly consistent with what Duke Energy has. Let
7 me -- yes, I think that's right. I can keep going
8 through the -- the kind of options for long-term
9 procurement if that's helpful.

10 Q. I think you've touched upon most of the
11 issues I was concerned about or had interest in. Now,
12 let's talk a little bit about the -- what I'll call
13 onshore wind in with PJM.

14 I mean, you factored in the additional
15 substantial cost, what's related to transmission
16 upgrades or improvements that would be necessary for
17 that to occur in your model; is that correct?

18 A. Yeah. We used PJM's firm point-to-point
19 transmission costs, which I'm hesitant to rattle off
20 the numbers, so I won't. But we did use that, and we
21 had an inflate at 2.5 percent over year-to-year, and it
22 was every year incurred.

23 Q. And even with that adjustment, it showed as
24 if that was a viable option that automatically kicked

1 in a newer model projection?

2 A. That's right. And I think that speaks to
3 just the value -- or just the capacity factor of the
4 Midwest wind. I mean, driving through there you get a
5 sense of what the power of that wind is like. And for
6 that reason, capacity factors and even costs are --
7 capacity factors are high, costs are low, and for that
8 reason it's cheap zero-carbon energy.

9 Q. Very good. Well, I think you've covered the
10 things I was concerned about, in terms of contrasting
11 and comparison, so appreciate your testimony. Thank
12 you. No further questions.

13 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

14 Commissioner Kemerait?

15 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER KEMERAIT:

16 Q. Thank you. And most of my questions have now
17 been answered. I just have one follow-up clarifying
18 question, and it relates to energy efficiency, and I
19 don't think you need to look at it, but the table on
20 page 37 where you state, "Higher level of energy
21 efficiency is achievable and lowers total system cost."

22 And I think that your -- your testimony is
23 that Duke's proposal of 1 percent of eligible retail
24 load being the target would leave benefits for

1 ratepayers on the table, I think is what you said
2 earlier. So Duke's testimony several days ago, or last
3 week, was that the 1 percent would be the target that
4 they would try to improve upon that, if possible.

5 And so with that kind of assumption of
6 1 percent and hopefully improving upon that, can you
7 describe whether your view about leaving benefits to
8 ratepayers on the table would still be valid based upon
9 that idea, try to do better if possible than the --
10 from the 1 percent?

11 A. That's a great question, and this is a tricky
12 issue that spans IRP and I think rate design and rate
13 case issues, which I know are also going to be
14 something under your consideration soon. I'd say that
15 what we're showing here is the economic value of wind.
16 There is more energy efficiency and demand-side
17 resources available. And I think that's helpful to the
18 Commission to just say, to the extent that we can
19 continue to procure this at a similar price to what
20 Duke's paying for now, it's good, it makes sense.

21 But I think implementation is a difficult
22 thing with energy efficiency. And I think the tools
23 that the Commission could use to do that include just
24 gathering data on this topic, and potentially could be

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1 something that could be subject -- and I don't want to
2 get into this in detail, but it could be something that
3 could be subject to the performance-based ratemaking.
4 But I think this is sort of before the Commission
5 today.

6 So I think there's -- my worry with "we'll
7 see what we can do" is that it's very difficult to hold
8 someone accountable to "we'll see what we can do." So
9 I think, you know, setting incremental higher targets
10 and all -- using the other tools that are available to
11 the Commission could be a way to find some
12 accountability and potentially access some of these
13 benefits.

14 Q. Okay. Thank you.

15 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Hughes?

16 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER HUGHES:

17 Q. Yeah, another modeling itch related to how
18 you're modeling EE and DSM.

19 Are you familiar with the cost recovery
20 mechanism that we have in North Carolina at all?

21 A. I wouldn't -- I don't think I can testify
22 with a lot of confidence on that mechanism.

23 Q. Well -- so when you're mod- -- when you're
24 modeling the cost of EE and DSM, customer cost --

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1 because that's what we're talking about, is the PVRR --
2 are you just taking, sort of, a historic cost and
3 inflating it? Are you taking whatever Duke had in
4 their model and just inflating it? Or are you making
5 any kind of -- so you're not -- you're not looking at
6 actually how we pass it on to the actual individual
7 customer?

8 A. So what we did in this case was we used the
9 cost stream that was identified in Duke Energy's
10 modeling. It's sort of the -- you know,
11 programatically, what kind of procurement are we doing,
12 what are we expecting in terms of behavioral energy
13 efficiency savings, and we did proportionately scale
14 that up to meet the 1.5 percent of retail load. And we
15 did the same thing for attended costs for each of the
16 categories. And then those are a separate cost stream
17 that we integrated into the PVRR at the end there.

18 So I think broadly, for the purposes of how
19 the PVRR was calculated in Duke Energy's versus
20 Synapse's, they're consistent. I don't have as much
21 confidence on exactly how that implements into the
22 rider -- or the mechanism, rather.

23 Q. No, no, I appreciate that, but you did it the
24 same way, so I think we have a chance with the Duke

1 Modeling Panel hopefully later today. Thanks.

2 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

3 Commissioner Clodfelter?

4 EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER:

5 Q. Mr. Fitch, I do have one question for you,
6 just to be sure I was understanding something correctly
7 that's in your official report, the carbon-free by
8 2050. Do you have that?

9 A. I do.

10 Q. I just -- I think -- I think I understand it
11 correctly, but I want you to confirm that with me in
12 Appendix B, page 15.

13 A. I'm making my way there. Okay.

14 Q. You talk about the different results from
15 running Version 6.0.9 and 6.0.4. And I think I
16 understand what you're telling me there is that, in
17 6.0.9, the model was assuming that the listed units
18 there would run on 100 percent gas, whereas in 6 --
19 what I want to confirm is that, in 6.0.4, the model
20 assumes that the units co-fire at the existing actual
21 percentages that those units are capable of today,
22 right?

23 A. That's right, yeah.

24 Q. So what I'm seeing in Table B-1, then, is the

1 present value revenue requirement difference between
2 running those units 100 percent on gas and running them
3 as they are currently configured to run.

4 Am I understanding that table correctly?

5 A. That's my -- that's my -- that's my
6 understanding of the table, yes, is that it assumes
7 that -- my understanding is this is a physical
8 constraint of these units, that they're not able to run
9 actually 100 percent on gas today, but there's some
10 co-firing that has to happen for these specific units.
11 And in the 6.0.9, there was a bug where it was able to
12 run completely on gas.

13 So the change in PVRR that we're looking at,
14 the increase is just because there is a -- we're adding
15 coal back into the mix, which just a higher
16 dollar-per-megawatt-hour, sort of, fuel. So more or
17 less what I'm saying is I think that your understanding
18 is correct.

19 Q. Okay. That's what I wanted to be sure of.
20 Thank you.

21 A. Thank for allowing that clarification.

22 EXAMINATION BY CHAIR MITCHELL:

23 Q. Okay. I have just a few questions for you.
24 Let's stick with the coal retirements just for a

1 minute.

2 So is it your -- is it Synapse's position or
3 is it your position that the Companies' out-of-model
4 delays for those coal units -- for certain coal units
5 was inappropriate?

6 A. I would say it was not sufficiently justified
7 in the current filing.

8 Q. Okay. So do I understand correctly -- and
9 correct me if I'm wrong here, but do I understand
10 correctly that the modeling that you-all did allowed
11 the model or the -- let me say it differently.

12 The portfolio you-all came up with --
13 portfolios you-all came up with allowed the model to
14 select the retirement dates for the coal units?

15 A. That's right, yeah. So we've talked about
16 endogeneity, this is another example of that.

17 Q. Okay. And, sort of, having corrected the
18 issue that Commissioner Clodfelter just discussed with
19 you that's set forth on B-15, the modeling that you-all
20 did allowed the model to select the retirement dates
21 taking into account that some of those units co-fire?

22 A. Yeah, that's right.

23 Q. Okay. And on page 49 of your testimony, you
24 indicate that, as I understand it, that when the

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1 Companies delay retirement dates out of model, they
2 should provide compelling justification for doing so.
3 And you specifically mention transmission and
4 generation retirements, feasibility of a procurement of
5 development -- and development of alternative
6 resources, and timelines for developing resources and
7 retiring the units as early as practicable.

8 You -- did you -- have you heard any of the
9 testimony given in this hearing room by any of the Duke
10 panels on this issue?

11 A. I've heard a significant amount of the
12 testimony, but I'm not -- I haven't heard all of it and
13 I'm not exactly sure if you're referencing a single
14 topic, what that -- what was said.

15 Q. Well -- okay. On this -- on the issue of the
16 retirement dates for certain coal units.

17 Do you -- I mean, is it your position that
18 the Companies haven't provided compelling justification
19 for those out-of-model delays?

20 A. Based on what I reviewed, that is my --
21 that's correct.

22 Q. Okay. Okay. Let me move on. Ms. Luhr asked
23 you a couple of questions, and one of them was, did
24 Synapse use a typical week structure. I think that's

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1 what she said, at least that's what I'm remembering.

2 What is a typical week structure? What does
3 that mean? Why is that important? Help me understand
4 how that even fits into what we're talking about.

5 A. Sure. So I think what Ms. Luhr asked me, my
6 recollection is that she asked if we used the typical
7 day structure, which is similar. Which is one of
8 several options for, sort of, like, time-of-day
9 structures you could use. And Duke Energy has, in
10 their testimony, talked at length about the potential
11 issues with the typical day. And I think we -- I
12 believe, in the Snider rebuttal testimony, there is
13 several graphs that sort of indicate there's this peak
14 and there's a valley, and that type of thing.

15 So that's typical day. And what that
16 attempts to do is, for a given month, include sort of
17 the highest -- the peak demand for that month, and also
18 what the lowest point at that month looks like. And
19 the reason that's important is because there are, you
20 know, minimum capacities for some of these units, and
21 so you want -- one wants to get a sense of what minimum
22 load looks like.

23 So the typical week, essentially, condenses
24 the four weeks of every month into seven days, seven

1 24-hour periods, and then runs hourly dispatch on that.
2 So it's kind of -- it avoids some of the artifacts of
3 the typical day structure, but it allows for a little
4 more flexibility in terms of run time.

5 Q. So it's just easier on the model to do
6 typical week versus typical day, meaning that sort of
7 the practical limitations of the model that we've
8 discussed earlier in this hearing. Okay. I'm just
9 trying to understand.

10 So did -- and I think you were shaking your
11 head yes, but if I -- I'm trying to understand the
12 difference between the typical day structure and the
13 typical week structure.

14 A. Sure.

15 Q. And is it -- so Duke used typical day?

16 A. Yeah. I mean, I'll just try to make this as
17 clear as I can. What Duke Energy used was typical --
18 typical day for capacity expansion. And it used 8760
19 for production cost. 8760 being every hour of the
20 year. And I guess the thing to say about typical day,
21 week, and 8760 is typical day includes this
22 artifact-type thing that includes, like, a sharp peak
23 and a trough and that kind of thing. And the typical
24 week, I think, does a similar kind of -- a similar kind

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1 of summing together, but it integrates over seven days.

2 So in Synapse's view, those days are
3 represented -- or that week is, sort of, representative
4 of the month and avoids some of the pitfalls of what
5 you see in typical day, but it also avoids having to
6 run 8760, basically.

7 So just -- yeah, just to be completely clear,
8 Duke used typical day for CAPEX and 8760 for production
9 cost. And we used typical day for CAPEX and typical
10 week for production cost. And I think the other thing
11 to say about typical week is, especially with the
12 storage unit redeployment that we're talking about,
13 it's important to have consecutive days, and that's why
14 I think it was important to do, to use something that
15 has consecutive days, like typical week.

16 Q. Explain that -- that last sentence.

17 A. Sorry. Essentially, if you -- if one was
18 modeling a single day for -- and had a lot of storage
19 on the system, one could more or less deplete the
20 storage over the course of the day and then find that
21 everything is fine, everything works okay. But there
22 may be an issue with the, sort of, total amount of
23 banked energy that's available.

24 So using consecutive days allows you to more

1 robustly check if those issues are going to be -- are
2 gonna limit the model's operation in some way.

3 Q. Okay. But does using a week versus a day
4 obfuscate the issue that Duke testified about, about
5 there could be days when the battery isn't charged
6 because -- due to weather? And so if you're looking at
7 a week versus a day, you might be ascribing more value
8 to the battery than it can provide to the system? Or
9 am I just misunderstanding the issues?

10 A. I think -- I think the more consecutive days
11 you model, the closer to accuracy, or the closer to
12 real-world operations you get. So I would say that
13 typical week is -- allows for, kind of, like, a better
14 understanding of storage operations compared to typical
15 day. But I don't think it would include any
16 inappropriate -- I don't think it's overvalued I guess
17 is what I'm saying.

18 Q. Okay. And so really the different -- so for
19 the difference between the Synapse modeling and the
20 Duke modeling is in the production cost aspect of the
21 modeling. So Duke's looking at every single hour --

22 A. Uh-huh.

23 Q. -- and Synapse is looking at a week?

24 A. Uh-huh.

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1 Q. And in my mind, and I am not a modeler, but
2 looking at every hour provides the most granularity,
3 the most information that you can then extrapolate
4 from -- versus looking at a week.

5 So why -- help me understand, and you may
6 have already said this and I'm just -- you're gonna
7 have to say it again, why is looking at a -- why does
8 looking at a week versus every hour give you a better
9 picture of ultimate costs, production costs?

10 A. I think it's a balancing decision that has to
11 do with, kind of, like, the realities of modeling run
12 time, things like that. So that's definitely an aspect
13 that comes in here. The difficult thing for -- let's
14 see. Our understanding is that typical week would not
15 introduce any sort of artifacts that would overvalue
16 something like storage. We feel like it's sufficient
17 for that.

18 I mean, we could think about it as -- trying
19 to do math off the top of my head, but I think it's,
20 like, 2- or 3,000 hours versus 8,000 hours, something
21 like that.

22 Q. Okay. And do you -- did you-all discuss this
23 anywhere in your -- either in your -- I didn't see it
24 in your testimony, and I could have missed it, and I

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1 didn't see it in the report.

2 A. I don't think that the typical week -- the
3 typical week description, we don't go into that detail,
4 no.

5 Q. Okay. Okay. All right.

6 A. It might be helpful to say that, when we
7 found the model issue, the model versioning issue, the
8 6.0.4 to 6.0.9 issue, and we were given the extension
9 of five days, we did have to rerun every single run
10 over that five days. And that was, like, a
11 24-hour-per-day process. And we were running things as
12 quickly as we could and including them in the reports.
13 So the typical week was helpful, or the typical week
14 allowed for some more flexibility there --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- in terms of just -- yeah, integrating the
17 version change.

18 Q. Okay. Understood.

19 CHAIR MITCHELL: Let's see. All right.

20 I think that is all for me. What we're gonna do is
21 break for lunch, so we'll be off the record. We
22 will come back on the record at 1:30 and we will
23 resume with questions on Commissioners' questions.
24 And I'll just say it again, 1:30.

(The hearing was adjourned at 12:45 p.m.
and set to reconvene at 1:30 p.m. on
Monday, September 26, 2022.)

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
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA)
COUNTY OF WAKE)

I, Joann Bunze, RPR, the officer before whom the foregoing hearing was conducted, do hereby certify that any witnesses whose testimony may appear in the foregoing hearing were duly sworn; that the foregoing proceedings were taken by me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewritten format under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

This the 29th day of September, 2022.



JOANN BUNZE, RPR

Notary Public #200707300112

