PLACE: Held via Videoconference

DATE: Thursday, September 17, 2020

TIME: 2: 30 P. M. - 5: 31 P. M.

DOCKET NO.: E-7, Sub 1214

E-7, Sub 1213

E-7, Sub 1187

BEFORE: Chair Charlotte A. Mitchell, Presiding

Commissioner ToNola D. Brown-Bland

Commissioner Lyons Gray

Commissioner Daniel G. Clodfelter

Commissioner Kimberly W. Duffley

Commissioner Jeffrey A. Hughes

Commissioner Floyd B. McKissick, Jr.

IN THE MATTER OF:

DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1214

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, for Adjustment of Rates and Charges Applicable to Electric Utility Service in North Carolina



DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1213

Petition of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,

for Approval of Prepaid Advantage Program

DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1187

Application of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
for an Accounting Order to Defer Incremental Storm

Damage Expenses Incurred as a Result of Hurricanes

Florence and Michael and Winter Storm Diego

VOLUME 28

		-
		Page 6
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	Page 11	
1	PROCEEDINGS	
2	CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Let's go	
3	back on the record, please. We will proceed with	
4	cross examination by the Attorney General's Office.	
5	Ms. Townsend.	
6	MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you,	
7	Chair Mitchell.	
8	Whereupon,	
9	JAMES WELLS AND MARCIA E. WILLIAMS,	
10	having previously been duly affirmed, were examined	
11	and continued testifying as follows:	
12	CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. TOWNSEND:	
13	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Wells, Ms. Williams.	
14	Welcome to the wonderful world of this hearing.	
15	A. (James Wells) Thank you.	
16	Q. You're welcome. Mr. Wells, I'm going to	
17	start with you.	
18	A. All right.	
19	Q. Okay. I assume you were listening to	
20	Ms. Bednarcik's testimony, right?	
21	A. I did hear portions of it. I did not hear	
22	any of the confidential, I wasn't tied into that, but I	

 $\mbox{did}\mbox{ hear most of the rest of the testimony}.$

All right. And you're aware that she

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directed me to ask you certain questions pertaining to the subject of wells; are you aware of that?

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A. Sure. Yes, ma'am.

4 5 Q. Okay. So I'm going to be asking you questions understanding that you are not a hydrogeologist, correct?

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A. So I do have responsibility for the groundwater. So I'm not a hydrogeologist, but I -- in my role, as you know, the EHS programs, I'm responsible for all environmental programs, all environmental compliance programs enterprise-wide, so that includes groundwater, but also air water waste. So I rely on any -- you know, each of those different disciplines, I rely on expertise. And with -- you know, specific to groundwater, I have a groundwater team that reports up to me that has their geologists, engineers, and environmental managers. And they also hire consultants who are hydrogeos and geologists and other -- and we also rely on university professors with some very niche expertise.

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So all of those type -- I rely on that expertise to bring me the facts and assist with informing decisions, and they're engaged with those -- that expertise in evaluating my decisions.

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- Q. Okay. First of all, I want to establish that all North Carolina sites require a groundwater monitoring program under CAMA; is that correct?
- A. CAMA does require a groundwater monitoring program; that is correct.
- Q. Okay. And in going over the various sites with Ms. Bednarcik, we talked about Allen. And that -- at Allen, the CAMA groundwater monitoring network comprises a sampling of 136 wells, 33 quarterly, and 103 semiannually; does that sound correct?
- A. It -- you know, I would -- subject to check, I'm -- that sounds very --
 - Q. 0kay.
- A. Sounds reasonable. Sounds like consistent with what I would expect, yes.
- Q. Okay. And can you tell us when this network requirement under CAMA began?
- A. So groundwater assessments were required under CAMA upon the enactment of CAMA in 2014.
 - 0. 0kay.
 - A. All stations.
- Q. All right. And so when were the -- when was the well supposed to be in place and operating under this requirement?

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- Α. Did you say when were the wells required?
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- Q. Ri aht.
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- Q. And based on Allen's network, which 0kay.

- When were they supposed to be operating and starting to give out data?
- You know, I don't recall, specifically. remember the framework, generally, which is, you know, to establish a groundwater -- a pond enactment CAMA. It was a requirement to development an assessment plan, and -- which would include what you're referring to as the groundwater monitoring network. And that would be submitted to the state, and the state would have to approve. And then that, I believe, would -- a day would be triggered off of DEQ's approval. I don't know that there's an express requirement there. But I do know, with respect to corrective action, for instance, we have to begin implementation of corrective action within X days of DEQ's approval of the plan.
- 0. So was there an actual timetable All right. to establish the Allen network when it had to be completed?
- Α. I think there was. I would have to pull CAMA and look. It seems like there was a timetable.
 - 0. Okay.
 - Α. But I would have to check that.

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Session Date: 9/17/2020

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tell you that. 0. 1 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent? Well, I mean, you know, first I'd like to Α.

was 136 wells, how many monitoring wells were in place

I don't know the exact numbers. I couldn't

that were able to be used as part of that network?

start with -- I mean, I probably want to give a little more background to that, because I don't know the percentage. I would have to -- I mean, to get some specifics, I'd have to look at some records. But the whole concept of groundwater monitoring is this -honestly, it's this iterative approach. So, for instance, if you look at the federal CCR rule, it sets forth that beginning monitoring network of a minimum of one up, three down, which you heard Ms. Williams refer to.

So this is 2015 federal rule, one well upstream, upgradient, three wells down. Those are the Now, you do more to have additional mi ni mum. characterization, but that's the starting point. With respect to Allen, obviously, we had the early wells, which were -- we've already discussed in the '80s. But with respect to Allen, we then had a voluntary network that we established in the 2000 time frame. I think it

was 2004. That be -- and so there is a set of wells.

And then additional wells are installed around the 2010 time frame. And, again, you know, I'd have to have documents for specifics, but the point is, more wells go in then.

And then we're working with the state on all those results. There's some various processes being worked through. And, at some point, CAMA came along. And then CAMA said do an additional -- a full assessment. So now it's starting you down the assessment path. So, normally, you do a detection-level monitoring, you see what you have. If you start to pick something up, then you move toward assessment. And that's where we were at when CAMA came along, moving toward assessment. And assessment then means you do a full assessment to understand the full extent of the impacts. And that's where we were at in 2014.

So then you see these additional wells in place just for the assessment purpose, not that initial detection monitoring network which is where we were at prior to this.

Q. My question was, were you able to use any of these prior wells that were established in the '80s, or

the '90s, or 2010, or whenever, or did you have to put in an additional 136 wells?

- A. There -- we would have used -- first of all, all the data would have been informed. So all of it's useful. And the wells that were installed would have been useful, and I believe continued in use unless there was something wrong with the well or for some reason it wasn't providing accurate information. So I believe all the wells, to the extent they were still operable, would have been used in the development of the assessment plan, which is the additional monitoring network.
- Q. Where would we find that information as to how many wells were, in fact, still there and useful?
- A. I believe there has been some discovery responses. It's just a lot here. But I believe there have been some responses with respect to when the wells went in and when -- any that would have been abandoned since then. And I don't know if it said why, but I believe it showed the wells installed, and then the -- if any had been abandoned. Typically abandoned would mean that it was no longer functional or was providing some other issues. We had to re-drill a well, or who knows what could be going on. But I filed a discovery

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response that summarized all that.

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Q. All right. Did Duke install these wells, or were they -- the new additional wells, or were they

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installed by a third party?

would have done the oversight.

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We would have managed third-party contractors to install. We would have provided the oversight and we would have provided the -- well, with -- I say we. We would have hired -- we had consultants who assisted us with developing the monitoring network. And then we would have -- with respect to the drilling work, actually installation, that would have been done by drillers that we would have hired. And -- but Duke

- And who determined the number and the location of the wells in these networks?
- Α. So that is -- you know, I spoke earlier about, you know, how the groundwater team works, but we would have done that with our in-house subject matter experts, expertise at each of the different sites, in conjunction with consultants. We hired various consultants to assist with this based on their qualifications and experience in these areas. And then as I say also, some university professors assisted where we needed that.

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And all of that -- so that may have been the initial work. We also had other -- we would have had other reviewers that we hired or engaged with at times with specific expertise to review it to ensure -- you know, often just seeking them to challenge, to ensure we've got it right or we've got it technically as strong as we can make it for its intended purposes. And then all of that would have been submitted to the state for their review.

And then there would have been back and forth with the state on any concerns, questions, recommendations. Out of them, would have made the adjustments for that, and then ultimately implemented what was approved with the state.

- Q. So when you talked earlier about an assessment plan that you submitted to the state, that assessment plan would have indicated what Duke and/or its third-party helpers would indicate thought how many wells were needed at any particular site?
- A. I don't remember specifically how it's laid out, but in general, that's what it would be. It wouldn't just be, hey, we need 20 wells. It would say here's what we want to do, we want to evaluate -- here's what we know to date, you know, everything we

Page 20

Session Date: 9/17/2020

know about the geology, what we know about groundwater flow, what we know from past data, what we know, and given what we know, we wanted to move into an assessment. So let's look to understand -- continue to build on that.

So we needed to find a well network that's going to provide some additional information, and that's really a next step. Now, it doesn't stop suspect at therefore, I want 40 wells all sentry lined along this line. It looks at depth, it looks at what's going on with the geology that might create different formations with respect to the flow. It looks at a lot of different technical factors as to how groundwater might be flowing, and making sure that we're getting an adequate characterization of what's going on using wells in this very large area. You're just one -- you're dipping a straw in one spot versus -- but you got a long area you're trying to cover. So you're trying to cover a large area as effectively as you can.

And then that's just really the first step.

Again, groundwater assessment corrective action is iterative. So we would have done the assessment plan.

And even since then, would have continued once we get data back from that first set of wells we thought we

needed per the original assessment plan. That would provide additional information, and potentially more wells or different depths. And all of that would be --continue to be an iterative process with the state. End goal to understand the full picture of what's going on with respect to groundwater and use that to inform the corrective action plan.

- Q. So if I'm understanding you correctly, then, a number of wells that was used in this case, 136 at Allen, was based on information supplied by DEC to DEQ; is that correct?
- A. So again, kind of the full picture. It would have been -- there would have been back and forth with DEQ. Certainly, we would have proposed, brought a lot of data together, and then there would have been back and forth with DEQ on whether -- what they thought. You know, they may say, hey, I'd like -- I think this well should be moved 30 feet this way, or I think you need three more wells in this area because I've got some questions about this. Those are the kind of back and forth that would have gone on.
- Q. But the base information, obviously, had to be supplied by Duke, correct?
 - A. There would have been a starting point, I

believe, where we would have taken it to the state; that's right, and then --

- Q. Thank you.
- A. -- and then get the conversation going.
- Q. Okay. Allen also has a CCR groundwater monitoring network consisting of 48 wells. Plus, according to the CAMA report, there were an additional 24 monitoring wells voluntarily sampled.

First of all, when did the CCR groundwater monitoring network requirement begin; when did that one begin?

- A. The CCR groundwater monitoring network would have been a part of the CCR rule when it was finalized, which I believe was 2015.
- Q. All right. And was that network requirement for all of the sites at the same time?
- A. It would have set forth a groundwater requirement in terms of a performance standard that we need to demonstrate by a date certain. We either were or were not meeting a perform standard by a date certain. And then you had to have a number of monitoring events in order to demonstrate that. So that was the setup. And that would have applied to all of the CCR units that were subject to the rule at the

Page 23

Session Date: 9/17/2020

time.

- Q. So the performance standard --
- A. (Marcia E. Williams) If I could just jump in for one second. I think it was about 30 months. Initially, EPA had proposed a year to get that monitoring well system in, but I think it got changed to two years from the effective date of the rule to get the monitoring well system installed, the data collected, and sampling and analysis provided to the --provided. Which, of course, North Carolina chose to engage on that. The rule, you know, was essentially self-implementing at that point. But that's the rough time frame.
- Q. Thank you. Is there any overlap of the wells that are used for sampling at the CAMA groundwater network and the CCR groundwater network?
 - A. (James Wells) Yes.
- Q. Okay. And my understanding is that the original CCR GR -- groundwater monitoring network was to provide what they call detection monitoring, correct?
 - A. The CCR monitoring, did you say?
 - 0. Yes.
 - A. Okay. Yes. And that was the process I was

referring to. I mean, it's -- I'm referring to generally groundwater, what I'm seeing over the years, not just any specific state or federal, but a process that looks like detection assessment, corrective action. Those are common kind of different phases of groundwater monitoring that we see.

- Q. And the detection monitoring phase is what?
- A. So the detection phase is I think what you referred to in the CCR rule, is that you initially install a detection monitoring network.
- Q. Okay. And that would have been, for Allen, the 48 wells, correct?
- A. I don't know if the 48 included some additional assessment wells. I don't know what the -- I don't know, without looking, you know, at all the sites, there were various wells put in at different times for different reasons. But in the federal rule, 2015, effective at the end of 2015, the CCR rule came into play. It did set forth a requirement that we begin doing some detection monitoring.
- Q. Okay. And because of contaminants detected at levels above applicable groundwater protection standards at every site, the sites were all placed in the CCR assessment monitoring program, correct?

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Correct. Here's the one key point. Α. CCR -- I mean, a big difference, I think, between when you think about the 2L rule versus the CCR rule, the 2L rule has always had this compliance boundary that applied since '84 time frame. A compliance boundary around the basin that was 500 feet from the baseline, horizontal. Just strictly horizontal, nothing vertical or anything of that nature.

So with respect to the stay, that's where your compliance boundary lied, and you built a lot of your assessment. And even your ongoing monitoring through the years was premised on the idea that your compliance is at that 500 feet from the waste boundary. CCR came along, it's different. It works at the waste boundary. So it established an attention network at the waste boundary, and not the 500 feet, and installed the wells there. And it did have some different parameters to this.

But in any event, that's the -- the detections went in there. So at the waste boundary, if you have a detection above the standard that I was referring to, the performance standard with respect to detection monitoring, then you move to assessment. all of our -- I believe all of our units would have

exceeded -- had a detection above the detection limits applicable at the waste boundary and moved us into assessment monitoring at those facilities.

- Q. And what additional requirements were imposed for assessment monitoring versus detection monitoring?
- A. It is a different set -- slightly different set of parameters that it has you -- as I recall, you look at as well as additional wells to determine. It may drive some additional wells depending on what you're seeing. I think it's -- it can vary depending on what you're seeing and what the parameters are.
- Q. Okay. The number of wells in the various sites in the network groundwater monitoring system varied both for the CAMA and for CCR.

Can you explain why, for instance, Cliffside, which covers approximately 1,500 acres, as opposed to Allen's 2,000 acres, required 253 wells, over twice as many wells in the CAMA network, and an additional 70 wells in the CCR network in Allen? Can you explain the difference?

A. Well, it can -- I mean, what drives the number of wells is driven by a number of factors which I think are some of the things I talked about. For instance, the geology, the groundwater flow, the

conductivity. Various things can affect the way -where you want wells in order to do an adequate
characterization.

The other thing is just the real estate, meaning where are the units, waste units compared with other waste units. You know, if you look at Allen, for instance, they're all kind of in one spot. You've got the active basin, the retired basin, they all sit together. Cliffside, if you look at it, you've got one unit on one side of the plant, one on the other side of the plant, and another unit, you know, kind of offset.

So all of that would drive -- if you want to characterize these units, it could require more wells if they've got -- if they're separated apart further. But there's also -- I mean, just describing, it kind of really shows how this stuff can vary from professional judgment as well. So we may see, for instance, working with one -- you know, again it's a groundwater subject matter expert with the state in one region may have a different view on how they want to approach those sites versus, you know, you may work in a different region with a different person, and it could even -- so even who you're working with at the state can drive, you know, kind of differences of opinion on how -- where

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things go and number of wells that are needed, all those things to factor.

- 0. So these assessment plans that you were giving were given to the various regions; is that correct, rather than to the DEQ -- the main DEQ headquarters?
- They went to both. So the whole structure in Α. DEQ, we do have -- they do have regional groundwater folks with expertise in that area. And then they roll up sort to a centralized oversight, particularly all -with respect to all the groundwater, there's sort of a couple of centralized folks that oversee all the regions. Oversee in the sense that they help coordinate the submittals, and the responses, and comments, and, you know, talking through all the technical issues and coordinating meetings. And then -- and they're groundwater folks as well. I mean, all that obviously ultimately rolls up to what I consider headquarters, senior DEQ management.

But the regional hydrogeologists are -- I mean, you know, they're there with -- they had the authority, they are -- I mean, they're a big part of understanding technically what is appropriate and needed in light of what we -- you know, what's the

right level of assessment. So they have a big part of it, but it's also joined centrally to keep -- try to, you know, have some consistency.

- Q. Could you tell us what the approximate cost of a well for these network wells were?
 - A. I don't have that figure.
 - Q. You have no idea?
- A. I do have -- I have an idea. I'm not -- I think I'm not sure. I mean, it can vary so much. For instance, a bedrock well can take a long time to drill. You know, you may be -- I've seen drills that are real -- you know, they only can get so much depth per day because they're in bedrock. And when you've got a drill that's parked on something like that, this deep well that's in bedrock, that cost can be significant.

You may also -- you may have another well that is relatively shallow and simple to put together and develop. I mean, even after you drill the well, then you have to do -- there's steps to make sure the well is not only constructed properly, but then developed and other things just to make sure it's providing accurate data.

Q. So what would be an approximate range from the shallow well to the much more complex deep well?

A. You know, I would really -- I would prefer to have numbers for you with respect to that. And perhaps there's a -- you know, on a break, if we're still going, I could see what I can find on that. My sense is it was -- you know, I'm reluctant to throw out a number that I don't feel good at. But it was -- I would -- if I had to put something out, I think it's like the 10 to 40,000 range.

- Q. Okay. All right. Turning to your --
- A. I would like to -- just so the record is clear, I would really like to -- you know, I wouldn't rely on that number. That would be -- that would need to be verified.
 - Q. Understood.
- A. I just -- you know, there is a range here, but maybe something close to that.
- Q. I don't think you need to go to your testimony, but on page 15 you say something to the effect that the environmental regulatory regime has involved the science knowledge, and regulatory priorities have changed. Sound familiar?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. However, one environmental regulatory regime, the North Carolina 2L rules, haven't changed

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since 1984 -- or -- yes, 1989 when it added its corrective action provision, correct?

- A. Well, 2L has changed. The rule which you're referring to. I mean, there have been changes to it over the years.
- Q. Okay. It added the compliance boundary and the corrective action program, correct?
- A. Well, and additional parameters have been added to the 2L list. I mean, I think it started with something like -- and again, it all -- you'd have to check, but I think in the early '80s maybe it was 17 parameters, and now there's probably 150, you know.

 And what -- you know, and the concentrations associated with different parameters would have changed with time. And again, it's all part of that -- yeah, I think it is representative of the evolution of environmental regs as a whole.
- Q. Okay. Basic premise against degradation of the groundwater has stayed the same since 1979; has it not?
 - A. Can you restate? I'm sorry.
- Q. I said the basic premise of the 2L rules that prohibits degradation of groundwater has stayed the same since 1979; has it not?

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When the -- I believe, when the 2L rule was Α. promulgated, it would have established standards with the goal that you would not have exceedances beyond those standards outside of the compliance boundary. And I did include in my testimony, there's some discussion about that that is applicable to ash basins and historical sites that were built pre-2L and how they would be handled.

And the recognition that there is some chance that you already have these groundwater impacts when this rule comes in, and that they will work with permittees on that through the permit program to establish the permit controls as needed, as appropriate. And that did play out at some facilities throughout the -- you know, that's what we -- we saw some of the permitting come into place in the early ' 90s.

- If we could go to AGO prefiled Cross Q. Okay. Exam Exhibit 15.
 - Α. (Witness peruses document.) 0kay. I'm there.
 - 0. Waiting for Chair Mitchell.

MS. TOWNSEND: Are you with me? If we could have that marked as AGO Wells/Williams

Page 34

Session Date: 9/17/2020

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page 13 of that document, you'll see that DEQ has made its position on the subject of change unknown in this brief on the 2L rules on page 13 that says -- let's In the first full paragraph of -- fourth line, it starts with "groundwater assessment and corrective action"; are you there?

- Α. I am. I see that.
- 0. "Are legal requirements that flow from the existence of a violation of the 2L standards. They are not, themselves, used to determine whether a violation has occurred"; is that correct?
 - Α. That's what that reads, yes.
 - 0. And then it says:

"It is irrelevant in this context that, as the Utilities Commission noted, requirements changed over time. The fact that any party may have failed to conform itself to new standards once those standards became enforceable does not negate any violations of those new standards."

Is that accurately stated?

- Α. That is read accurately, yes.
- And if you'll go back a few pages to Q. Okay. page 10.
 - Α. 0kay.

authori ty. "

Session Date: 9/17/2020

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Q. And the very first sentence, it says:

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"Whether an enforcement agency chooses to enforce immediately or to defer enforcement does not inform whether a violation has occurred. It only speaks to the agency's enforcement discretion, not its

Do you agree with that statement?

- A. I agree that you read that accurately, yes.
- Q. Okay. And in its brief, it also puts forth its position on the difference between an exceedance and a violation under the 2L rules, and that's on page 9.
 - A. Okay. I see that.
- Q. Okay. And it says -- well, let's read the second full paragraph:

"Most tellingly, witness Wells incorrectly restated critical language in the groundwater rules. Witness Wells explained in the passage above that, upon the detection of exceedance, the," quote, "owner/operator must assess the extent of the exceedance. That is inaccurate.' Groundwater rules mandate instead that, in such circumstances, the owner/operator must assess the extent of the violation."

of discussion. I think there are a couple key points

that I want to make sure are clear in this instance.

One, there was a lot of discussion in the

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past case about what's a violation, and what's an exceedance, and what does it mean. And we did have some discussion, and I've had it in the same case here, that where we have groundwater impacts -- and I think this is very clear, and amicus lays that out very clearly as well -- where you have impacts to groundwater, that is not a violation unless you are outside of the compliance boundary and above the standard. So in the last case, there was a lot of data being thrown around that was inside the basin, at the edge of the basin, but it was inside the compliance boundary and the term was being used very loosely. there was an effort to have some clarity around that.

More specifically -- and this was in my testimony, and this is ultimately what the Commission also in its 2017 opinion, it also directed, as I understood, in their ruling. Whether -- with respect to a violation, if there is an activity -- if you conduct an activity that causes an exceedance of the concentration of ash-related constituents outside of the compliance boundary to exceed the standard, then that activity is a violation of the 2L standard. activity violates the standard.

Q. And where would we find that?

A. It's in the 2L rule. So this is the 2L rule. I'm summarizing the 2L rule. We can pull it up if you'd like. I think it's like 103(b), but we can look at it specifically. I summarize it with respect to ash basins, but we can quote the -- we can pull the rule up and look at it.

So an activity -- because if you conduct an activity that causes an exceedance of the 2L standards, that activity is the violation. So that's the way the 2L structure, as I read them, and it's -- again, we could pull the language up.

the Commission -- so this is where in my last testimony I indicated, that's the standard with respect to what's a violation. But more importantly, that's not what's in front of the Commission. What's in front of the Commission is whether or not that is indicative of or evidence of mismanagement, or wrongdoing, or fault. And what I was indicating is that the violation of the 2L standard for these historical sites that were built before the groundwater rules, before the Clean Water Act, '50s, '60s, '70s time frame, that were designed, constructed, operated not only consistent with the law but consistent with industry standard and beyond. And

we even operated, in my mind, in some instances beyond industry standard throughout those years.

So with respect to a basin that's been operated -- built, constructed, and operated consistent with laws and industry standard, now that we find the groundwater exceedance that results in a violation of the standard, that is not evidence of mismanagement, and it shouldn't be used against the Company to punish the Company. It's, instead, an indication of where we are in that evolution of regs, and time, and the science.

And with respect to discovery of this, the expectation is we take the next steps. That is the assessment; that is the corrective action; that is the hundreds of wells that you referred to. And that that is the appropriate action upon discovery of this. Notify the state and then assess the extent of the exceedance of the standard. And again, that activity that exceeds the standard is a violation.

And that was a lot of discussion that went on last time where I ultimate -- what I ultimately was indicating is that it didn't matter what you call it. The question before the Commission is whether or not it's evidence of mismanagement. And the Commission

Page 41

Session Date: 9/17/2020

heard that, and if you read the opinion, they do state that. That the seeps -- they heard all the things that are being discussed here and the groundwater and found that, even if whatever -- violation, or an exceedance of the standard outside the boundary, whatever the language is that gets used, it's not evidence of mismanagement. And that was my point.

You know, the second point -- and there's a lot of in this amicus brief about it -- is I was referring to -- and you had me read this enforcement language. When I talked about enforcement, it was in the context of Duke, it was in the context of utility basins. Not 2L as a whole. What this amicus is discussing is enforcement as a whole, and the authority to bring enforcement under 2L. And I have no objection to that.

What I was referring to is that when Duke went to the state in 2009, in 2010 and was saying here's what we're seeing in our groundwater, and we want to start moving toward the next steps, DEQ was trying to figure out what 2L read, what it meant, what the interpretations of the rule were. You may know they had some back and forth with the Attorney

General's Office trying to get some interpretations of

Page 42

Session Date: 9/17/2020

the 2L rule. Ultimately culminated in the 2011 policy memorandum, the Ted Bush policy. He was head of aquifer protection. That laid out a flow chart of how the state would react upon these detections that exceeded the 2L standard. And it had you walk through assessment, corrective action, determination of background.

So they built the flow chart specifically for these historical sites, and unique to historical sites that were properly operated up to that point, but now have discoveries of these groundwater contaminations outside compliance boundary. And -- and in it, it is structured such that enforcement would not come absent failure to take the assessment and corrective action steps.

That -- so the 2011 memorandum, the policy of DEQ is what I was relying on for that position. That's further substantiated in the DEQ settlement, the Sutton settlement, which refers to the policy and affirms it was the policy. At the time, it was an accurate policy. It further discusses the intent of the policy was that penalties would not be -- upon a discovery, if the flow chart is followed, assessment corrective action and penalties, that that's the action that would

be appropriate in lieu of penalties. So that's set forth in the Sutton settlement.

The other thing I'd mention is CAMA follows the same structure. CAMA is enacted in 2014, it supersedes the policy, and it too works the same way. Detection, assessment, corrective action without an enforcement provision with respect to that discovery. And that's not inconsistent with other regulatory regimes that are particularly remedial in nature like this, where they act on almost a no-fault basis to impose cleanup obligations consistent with public policy, irrespective of whether or not the operator was fully compliant with the law.

So 2L was consistent with that, the Sutton policy, 2011 memo all support that that's the interpretation that was being applied to Duke in this light.

And the only other thing I'd mention is the CCR rule works the same way. There are federal statutes, regulatory statutes, remedial statutes work the same way, and Ms. Williams has talked about some of that.

Q. All right. I think we can agree to disagree, Mr. Wells. Going to Ms. Williams.

Based on your discussion with Ms. Luhr, I have a few questions for clarification, if I may.

First of all, the CCR rule ultimately determined that coal ash would not be treated as a hazardous waste; is that correct?

- A. (Marcia E. Williams) At this point, it is not treated as a hazardous waste, and EPA essentially deferred its final decision on the bevel of intention.
- Q. Thank you. And as you indicated, the EPA gave the states control under RCRA to deal with solid waste facilities, correct?
- A. What EPA did was develop a set of minimum standards nationally that defined what was a protective solid waste facility. And it did that largely in narrative form. And the enforcers of that were the states or citizens, either one, who felt that any individual facility was not meeting it, then they could -- they could take action. So states were taking actions. And in some cases there were citizen suits. EPA did not have actual enforcement authority, but EPA continued to provide guidance to the states on interpretation of various issues.
- Q. All right. So in North Carolina, it enacted its Solid Waste Management Act in 1982 and has the

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authority to enforce that act, correct?

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I can't -- subject to check. I can't -- I don't recall when North Carolina enacted its solid But again, for impoundments -- coal ash waste law. impoundments, they were regulating them under their Clean Water Act as a waste water treatment system and using the NPDES authority. I would say, you know, at least about third of the states did it that way, and other states did cover them under solid waste regulations.

- Q. Okay. And the EPA is not the entity that legislated the 2L rules in 1979, was it?
- No, they are not. Although they are the Α. entity that has included corrective action in the final CCR rule. And as Mr. Wells said, that is set up to require detection monitoring, moving to assessment monitoring, moving to corrective action where necessary to protect health or the environment. And so the requirement is there. It's not a violation under the federal rule. The only violation is if you don't do those steps that are necessary to protect health and the environment.

And that's the same way that EPA set it up for its hazardous waste regulations. Everybody was

required to monitor groundwater in those rules, and everybody was required to meet health protective standards. But if you failed to meet the health protective standards, EPA did not assume that there was mismanagement. EPA said, well, now you got to clean it up, basically. You got to assess it, you got to clean it up. So there's no mismanagement or assumption of bad behavior in the way the federal regs look at necessary assessment and cleanup.

- Q. All right. And if you would go to Hart Number 10, Exhibit Number 10.
 - A. Is this directed at me or at Mr. Wells?
- Q. At you, Ms. Williams. I'm talking to you now.
 - A. (Witness peruses document.)

 Okay. I have it.
- Q. All right. And Hart Number 10 is the actual 1979 2L rules that were first -- when they were first promulgated; is that correct?
 - A. Yes, that's what it looks to be.
- Q. All right. And if you would -- well, let me read to you what the General Assembly said about these 2L rules and why they were enacted, and tell me whether or not that's your understanding. It says:

"Only in the very last few years has pollution been recognized as a major threat to the quality of the groundwaters of the state. The increasing incidents and potential for pollution results primarily from the change in the use of land from principally agricultural and civil cultural activities to residential, commercial, and industrial activities.

"This change in land use has resulted in a large and continuing increase in the amount of waste disposed of on the land and in the number of other sources of pollution, such as landfills, waste disposal and processing facilities, chemical stockpiles, chemical and hydrocarbon spills, and concentrations of septic tanks.

"Although the land in such of the state is capable of cycling many types of waste, unlimited and uncontrolled pollution sources will result in not only pollution of the groundwaters, but eventual pollution of the surface waters as well. Poorly managed groundwater development is having a significant impact on the groundwater quality in some parts of the state."

Did I read that correctly?

A. Yes. Except I think one word which you may

have misread, but it's not important.

Q. Thank you. All right. Turning to your testimony, pages 92 to 97, you distinguish between various laws and regulations stating that:

"Some deal with compliance obligations addressing facility and waste unit design and operational obligations, while others, such as the North Carolina 2L rules, are remedial in nature and apparently" --

And I don't mean to overstep, but if I'm reading your testimony correctly, it appears that you consider the 2L rules to play a less important role?

A. I think you are reading it incorrectly.

That's not my intent at all. It's just there's two -there's the kinds of requirements that get identified
up front as to what's necessary to be protective. And
those regulations and those permits are designed to
ensure that you end up with a protective outcome, not
only of groundwater but of soil, of sediments, of air,
et cetera.

And you have a different category of rules, which I think when I mentioned it earlier I said you could think of them as environmental performance standards. In my report, I call them remedial or

Page 49

Session Date: 9/17/2020

response laws. They're very important laws, but they're doing -- they're doing -- they're almost a check on everything else. Because they're saying, if you're doing all the things that is believed to be appropriate proactively, but you still have an issue that can be attributed to a particular activity, you need to address that activity if it exceeds health and environmental protective levels.

But it does go to the issue of the purpose of those laws. Typically, the purpose of these kind of laws is to make sure that you address anything that is not being adequately addressed by the proactive requirements the people believe will be sufficient to protect the environment. So it's of kind of a circle, but they are a different type of a regulation or a law, and so that's what I was trying to explain in my testimony.

- Q. Okay. I would expect that the state

 legislator expected those laws to be considered

 important and to be complied with; would you agree with

 that?
- A. Well, I certainly would agree that I think they're important. And I do believe that the reason that EPA has taken so much time, which they did

Page 50

Session Date: 9/17/2020

initially during my tenure back in the '80s, to lay out what that process should be to do the investigation, and the detection, and then the assessment, and then a whole lot of information on corrective action, which EPA worked very closely with the states on in this process, was to lay out a reasonable way to implement these laws, which are very important laws.

But I think it goes to what Mr. Wells said, and EPA has gone to great lengths to say you got to clean this up. We don't like it. We don't want it there. But knowledge is changing over time, and we have to acknowledge, if knowledge is changing and what we thought was protective historically is no longer protective, then we need a process to get it assessed and cleaned up. And that was really the purpose of -- I'm going to speak for federal. I'm not going to speak for the State of North Carolina. I'm just telling you that the 2L laws -- law looks very similar to a whole raft of laws that exist both federally, including Superfund, and exist in many other states.

And other states sometimes implemented the way North Carolina does. I worked in many states where, for example, they'll issue a groundwater permit similar to an NPDES permit, but it controls what's

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allowed to be discharged to groundwater. So states do it differently, but I'm just trying to develop a distinction between these proactive compliance operational requirements, and what you do to check whether they're good enough and what you do then if they're not.

- 0. Okay. On page 90 --
- Α. (James Wells) Ms. Townsend, I did -- I -- I did -- I mean, if it's okay. Just to make -- I also wanted to be clear. I think I was, but with respect to the 2L, as I was discussing the application of that rule to Duke, it was in context of historical sites, not 2L on the whole. I have no opinion on that. I was speaking to -- specific to historical sites as set forth within the body of the 2011 policy. It talks about its application, and that that flow chart and that policy flow is specific to historical sites. And the Sutton settlement is consistent with that, as is So I was -- I just want to make sure that's CAMA. clear. I'm speaking with reference to the Duke historical ash management basins here, not broader.
 - 0. Thank you. Okay.

Ms. Williams, on page 97, you state:

"The parties who exceed the 2L standards are

paragraph -- you're more than welcome to read the whole

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letter if you want. I don't think it's necessary, but that's your call. But if you'll look at the second paragraph of the letter, it says:

"At this time, the section was to only address whether or not the 2L standards are being exceeded at the compliance boundary. If, indeed, it's found that the landfill does cause an exceedance of the 2L standards, then the landfill will need to be cl osed. "

Is that what it says?

- Yes, you've read it accurately. Α.
- Q. Okay. And then it goes into -- the third paragraph talks about -- starting with the 2L standard, which is the fourth -- in the fourth line there. you see where I am? Okay.

"The 2L standard has been exceeded at well MW3 for manganese and for pH consistently, according to our records. The manganese has been recorded at three times the 2L standard and seems to be increasing over time."

Is that accurate?

- Α. Yes, you read that accurately.
- 0. Okay. Then, at the very last paragraph, it says:

Page 54

Session Date: 9/17/2020

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"The intent of this letter is to make clear some important issues which need immediate attention before a final review of this can be completed."

Is that accurate?

- Α. Yes.
- It appears from this letter from the Q. regulator that they were ready to require closure of a landfill for exceedance at -- exceedances at the landfill, including one well that has exceedances three times the manganese level of the standard for manganese; is that correct?
- Α. Well, I think it would be perhaps more appropriate to ask Mr. Wells about background of this letter since I'm not familiar with the details. the letter clearly looks like they're at least requesting some additional information and analysis, and have said that it may be necessary to close the landfill as a corrective action in this case, yes. I mean, that's how I'm reading it.
- 0. Thank you. And that's all the 0kay. questions I have. Thank you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Ms. Lee? MS. LEE: Thank you, Chair Mitchell.

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. LEE:

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Good afternoon, Mr. Wells and Ms. Williams. 0. My name is Bridget Lee, and I'll be asking questions today on behalf of the Sierra Club. Most of my questions will be for Mr. Wells, and I'll have a few at the end for Ms. Williams.

Now, appreciating that we've all been together for some time, I've tried my best to frame my questions to elicit yes or no answers. So if you'll do your best to listen to the question that I ask and to answer directly, I think we'll be able to make sure that we don't need to come back together again 0kay? tomorrow.

- (James Wells) Fair enough. Α.
- 0. Starting with you, Mr. Wells. You testified that, quote:

Unlike ash basins or impoundments were the accepted approach employed across the power industry at the times when the basins were built"; is that right? I'm looking at page 11, starting line 9 of your rebuttal.

- Α. (Witness peruses document.) That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And in the 1980s, weren't some utilities employing dry handling techniques for coal

Page 56

Session Date: 9/17/2020

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ash?

- A. 1980s, I believe there were probably some that were -- I mean, there may have been some that went to dry -- I mean, for instance, we went to dry ash handling at Belews in the '80s.
 - Q. Okay.
 - A. We didn't build any basins after '82.
 - Q. 0kay. So --
- A. From there, I think it was a transfer to landfills, and if there were opportunities or other drivers to look at dry fly, I think that was things that were looked at for planning purposes.
- Q. Thank you. So while unlined ponds might have been more common in the Southeast region, other options were available and being employed in other parts of the country; is that right?
- A. I mean, I think it -- in other parts of the country, I mean, even within Duke, you know, we employed other options where --
 - Q. Okay.
 - A. -- it was appropriate.
- Q. Okay. And speaking generally, not getting into dollars and cents here, but would it be cheaper to dump coal ash into a stream valley or other low-lying

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I don't know what the cost in the '50s, or

the '60s, or the '70s would have looked like for a comparison of that nature. I do know that the basins, based on the design documents that I've seen, which are published on our website, indicate that these were

manner to ensure appropriate safety features and that

engineered. They were -- the dams are engineered in a

lined storage unit? Α. Well, I don't know what you mean by the term "dump." I don't know what you mean by "stream." I don't know what you mean by "low-lying area." I don't

area on the Company's property rather than build a

- know what you're implying.
- 0. Okay. So by dump, I mean deposit, take the bottom ash from the bottom of the boiler and sluice it into an area. Stream valley. I believe a number of Duke's power plants are of course located next to lakes and rivers, so many of those properties have tributaries to those lakes and rivers on them. Any of the beds of those tributaries is what I mean by a stream valley or other low-lying area.
 - Α. And what's the question?
- 0. Is it cheaper to put coal ash in those places rather than build a lined storage unit?

there won't be a release.

The -- with respect to a low-lying area, it was, in essence, an area that -- where a dam would have been built near the lake for purposes of sluicing from the boiler to this area to collect. From what I have seen in the drawings, I don't know what they did with respect to the flows, but it appears the flows were redirected to -- out of the -- meaning natural stormwater flows, redirected to ensure that, you know, we weren't flowing into the basin there in a way that would not meet the purposes of the basin, which was to receive the sluiced ash.

So the cost of what they did, I would imagine, was not insignificant. But I, obviously, don't know what those costs were. And, you know, the other piece I would add is '50s, '60s concepts of liners, I'm not sure even what that would have looked like. I'm almost sure it wouldn't have been a discussion that even sounded anything like what we would be talking about a liner today.

- Q. Okay. But the Company did continue to build or to deposit ash in unlined ponds up until the '80s; is that right?
 - A. We continued to operate the basins consistent

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Session Date: 9/17/2020

with the permits that were issued. And -- you know, 2 every five years. And, of course, we also had the additional studies that were progressing with time with the development of this knowledge of what's going on and the additional monitoring. So all of that is playing a part, and in particular with our interaction 6 with the regulator on the things that we're seeing: 8 additional monitoring being added, exchange of information, exchange of data, questions like what you 10 saw with respect to the past exhibit. You know, an exchange between the regulator about what we were 12 seeing, which I think ultimately there it was 13 determined that it was not an issue. But in any event, 14 that was the exchange that went on. 15

Q. Okay. And you mentioned dams being constructed at the Company's ponds.

Is it true that those dams were often constructed out of coal ash itself?

- Α. At which facility?
- 0. At any of the facilities.
- Do you mean at the Duke facilities? Α.
- Yes. 0.
- Α. I don't -- what I saw from the drawings, it looked to me like it was typically a bottom -- I mean,

I -- so I just looked at Allen a while back. I'll give you an example. It shows a borrow area in the drawings of where the soil was being borrowed from and creating -- it would have been at least part of what I think was intended for the dam.

So my understanding in what I've seen, and I don't -- I -- without -- I'm not -- I am aware that some utilities had times when they expanded used ash in their dams, I don't know that that was a practice at Duke.

- Q. Okay. And, Mr. Wells, were you present yesterday when my colleague and Ms. Bednarcik were discussing the Company's timeline upon construction?
 - A. So vaguely remember that.
- Q. Okay. Sure. So Ms. Bednarcik testified that she did not have available to her details about the design or engineering of the basins constructed between 1951 and 1972. Do you have details about that design and engineering?
- A. The details I would have are what are available on the website. That's where I -- that's what I've reviewed.
- Q. Okay. So no additional homework looking at historical documents, just what was submitted under the

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- A. There were, though, some specific driver -- you're referring to the Sutton '84 pond?
 - Q. That's right.
- A. There were some drivers there. And one of the things that we've talk about in my testimony is that when we did have -- you know, if you follow the Company's logic on a lot of things. But when there was an indication of a risk or a potential impact that was beyond what we were seeing, we weren't seeing any evidence of significant groundwater impacts or anything that suggested, you know, we were working outside of -- we were migrating outside of the immediate vicinity of the basin. At Sutton, that was an exception, which I'm sure we'll discuss on the next case.

So there was -- where the Company saw a need for additional action to ensure adequate protection of the public health and environment, it took those steps, and the Sutton '84 liner was --

Q. Thank you.

MS. LEE: Bless you, Terri. I think you're unmuted.

MS. TOWNSEND: Thank you. I just realized that. I apologize.

Q. Mr. Wells, you are aware, of course, are you

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not, of the plea agreement into which the Company entered with the federal government that includes admissions of criminal negligence, violations of the Clean Water Act with respect to coal ash handling?

The plea agreement, I'm very familiar with. Α. That was --

0. 0kay.

-- part of even my job over the last years, Α. and the -- you know, it was a big part of last case. You know, we talked about it at length. And, you know, obviously, in that case, the witness case, any of those facts are part of -- in terms of the recovery, that's relevant here. But I think what the plea does represent is us very much cooperating with the federal government, working toward resolution, finding some common ground, and establishing a path forward.

And, in fact, you know, a lot of the facts, the statement of facts that's been read here, I've read a piece of it I think this morning, it's been read by other witnesses. But, you know, obviously, those facts speak for what they were in that given period of time and aren't representative of the Company as a whole. The Company took responsibility, entered the pleas, cooperated.

The Commission, in the last case, considered those facts and ultimately, you know, imposed a management plea -- a management penalty, which I think, in part, was based on that. So, you know, I understand that, and also the -- I mean, I would just indicate, you know, we have completed -- you know, that was entered into five years ago, five-plus years ago. We've completed probation, we completed all the obligations there, and really we are in a very good place moving forward here.

Q. Okay. Thank you. And understanding that that document speaks for itself, I won't have us go through paragraph by paragraph, but just a couple quick questions about your understanding of it.

Is it your understanding that the Company admitted to criminal violations that were not directly related to the Dan River spill?

- A. Criminal negligence on some other items outside the Dan River spill, itself, that's correct.

 And, you know, kind of everything we just discussed, in terms of the contents in the past case.
- Q. Okay. And for those specific actions to which the Company did admit criminal negligence, would you consider those actions consistent with applicable

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regulatory requirements?

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I -- if you could clarify. What do you mean

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standards and environmental regulations.

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your rebuttal testimony, you testified that DEC has

Well, I believe it was -- pull the page in

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met -- quote:

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DEC has managed CCR consistent with industry

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Α. Yes.

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0. So even those instances where the Company

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admitted criminal negligence, that was, in your

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opinion, consistent with regulatory requirements?

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I think you're referring to the River Bend Α.

14 seep. I mean, perhaps that's what you're referring to.

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That was one of the items that was included in the

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statement of facts that supported the plea. And, you

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know, I think my point here is we have tens of

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thousands of compliance obligations on this fleet, and

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with respect to the ash basins that I manage current

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And that's just in a given time period. If you day.

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look from the time of inception from the '50s to now, I

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can't manage the number of compliance missteps that

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On the whole, over that period, without

exist.

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question, the management of our basins has been very strong, very powerful, consistent with industry standard, consistent with the regs. No doubt there would -- if I looked back, I would find periods of time where we had mishaps, we had instances where we had to adjust. We thought we had it under whatever management system, and then we find we aren't, and we need to make a right adjustment, and that's what was done. So the plea represents that period of time, snapshot in time for that with respect to the entire, you know, 78-year period. I think on the whole we've, I think, performed very well, consistent with regs, consistent with the law, and consistent with the standards.

Q. Okay. Thank you for that answer.

The Company was aware that unlined ponds had the potential to impact groundwater and surface water back in the '80s; is that right?

- A. Yes, I think that's correct.
- Q. Okay. Is it the Company's position that it need only take action to prevent or mitigate impacts to groundwater when those impacts represent significant risk of environmental harm?
 - A. No. I don't think so.
 - Q. 0kay.

A. I mean, here's why. I think you imply through significant that there's something less than --you know, something you take no action on. The standards are set forth in the reg in terms of standard. There are limits and the compliance boundary. And if we find that we are outside of compliance boundary and above the regs, then no doubt that would drive action toward corrective action, irrespective -- I mean, it's a regulatory requirement, so that's regardless of if that's presenting a risk to the public health. And that's what we're doing today.

So there are instances where there's not a significant risk to the public health. Nevertheless, you have a regulatory requirement that you're not meeting, or you're at risk of not meeting. And even if there's no risk to health, even if there's no risk to the surface water, even if it's not hitting any wells, that regulatory requirement to clean up because you're outside that standard, that is something you do and will do. And that's what we're doing now.

There are other instances where you may find there is no significant risk of a regulatory risk, and maybe even no significant risk to the public health as you said. But as you review the data and review the

Page 68

Session Date: 9/17/2020

facts, there's a potential that could develop. And maybe -- you know, there are instances I could point you to where, as opposed to just investigating and maybe proving a negative, or you may just take the steps. You may support the steps just to provide that certainty for people. Even if you don't believe there's a risk there or you don't anticipate a risk, but it would be an extensive work to demonstrate that.

We've done that with respect to waterlines in

We've done that with respect to waterlines in some instances. You know, the risk isn't there, the evident of an impact isn't there, but there's also an issue there. So even though there's no significant impact there, we're still taking proactive steps to resolve an issue associated with it. We've done that at other facilities in DEP, and we'll talk about it when the time comes. But in any event, there are times that there are so many different, I think, fact patterns that can play, and they all got to be looked at.

But on a whole, Duke is looking at meeting regs minimum, then doing whatever else is needed to manage the risk with respect to public health and the environment or regulatory compliance issues. And then, on top of that, you know, asking what is also the right

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And those are the steps that I saw the Company taking from the '80s up until today.

Q. 0kay. Thank you for that answer. I think you might have just answered some of my upcoming questions, so I'll just go through them real quick and maybe just give me a quick yes/no.

Would you agree, Mr. Wells, that in addition to the abatement of pollution and contamination, the North Carolina 2L rules were also intended to prevent pollution and contamination?

Well, I think it's as I've discussed. think it established limits which are performance standard, and then establishes that you cannot conduct an activity that would cause an exceedance of constituents above the 2L concentrations outside the compliance boundary. So, I mean, it's -- so it's setting up that performance standard with an eye toward things. Particularly if you were going to design a basin today, a lot of requirements would be built in into your -- even into your design, into the way you engineer it with an eye toward ensuring you will meet that performance standard in the coming years.

0. And would you agree that those 2L rules are also intended to maintain and preserve water

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quality?

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A. I mean, the purpose of the 2L rules is to ensure -- I mean, they're established there for all the reasons that I think we've reviewed with respect to the 2L.

- Q. Okay.
- A. The language within the rule.
- Q. Okay. Shifting gears a little bit, have you evaluated whether any groundwater impacts could have been avoided or mitigated if the Company had ended its storage of coal ash in wet ponds earlier?
- A. Well, I mean, I think the first thing to make sure you understand what you're talking about with respect to storage of -- I think you said coal ash in impoundments earlier, what that means, what that takes. So you would -- these are all permitted for a number of waste streams. Not just ash. And with respect to ash, not just dry ash. It includes bottom ash. So all of these are very big propositions that you're talking about. So if you do make that conversion, you have to find real estate for another retention basin to receive these wastewaters. There's a large volume of water.

You have to convert to dry fly. You have to convert to dry bottom. You have to divert all the

stormwater that flows that -- you know, there are sheet flows still going in just as a result of the terrain. Have you to find a way to divert that. You have to establish alternative wastewater treatment systems that don't exist, and build those in to manage the additional wastewaters that are going in. I think you're familiar with the low volume waste and other things of that nature.

So once you build all that, then now you may be in a position to move toward no longer sluicing to the basin. And you may be able to move the basin toward closure. And as you do that, you then look at the groundwater, and whatever is there even at closure is still there. So now you still have, at that time, after you go through that action, you still have that groundwater impact. And you still have whatever action is needed at that time to remediate pursuant to the 2L standard, which is where we're at today.

- Q. The sooner you close, the fewer coal ash constituents will enter the groundwater, right?
- A. You know, not necessarily. And I say that because -- and this is, I think, a bit of discussion.

 Isn't this plume just growing? And I've indicated it's not. And I say that because we've done model after

model. I mean, I have models submitted to the state, very sophisticated groundwater models, and if I could simplify it, if you were to look at the site, look at a basin, you would see a plume, a yellow picture around the basin where we have impacts. And in some areas it exceeds -- you know, it's outside of the 500-foot compliance boundary, which is those in the areas we're moving toward corrective action.

But that is a very -- if you model that, five years, 10 years, no action, meaning it just would continue on, it looks the same. If you do it with closure in place, closure through excavation, this looks the same. It's when you move in and do that corrective action that you -- I mean, not the exact same. It begins to reduce over time. Let's say 50 years out you begin to -- but not in a substantial way, right? Where you see the action is when you get in there and do corrective action on the groundwater, itself.

So depending on what the state of the impact is at that time to restore all that at that time, which could have been the '80s, '90s if that's that what you're referring to, you would still be going in and doing that level of effort to remove that groundwater.

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- Q. Okay.
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- A. Make Sense?
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- Q. Oh, sorry. Please finish.

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sense or not.

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my original question of whether anyone has evaluated

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at.

I guess from your answer I'm understanding

you describing that evaluation maybe as difficult, but

I just -- I was asking if that was making

It does make sense. But just to go back to

A. Conduct specifically --

has anyone actually tried to conduct it?

- Q. Evaluating whether groundwater impacts, there were any that could have been avoided or mitigated if the Company had switched to dry handling sooner.
- A. Well, I think that -- I mean, I think the model here is that you have a groundwater impact at or near the basin. And that that's -- as it flows away from the basin, it's attenuated with the soil. So, I mean, that was sort of what the premise of the understanding of the '80s was. And that's -- you know, we do see that that's still the case. You know, there is attenuation going on. But now you do see the plume where it is. We have much more -- wells studied. What

Page 74

Session Date: 9/17/2020

existed in the '90s, specifically to that, we didn't have as -- what I would consider to be the same level of monitoring that would present that picture to us. So what was it back then, I don't know.

There were certainly impacts to the -- to the -- at the basin early, it's just they weren't expanding or migrating. I mean, when I say early, meaning when we were looking in the '80s, that's what you saw, right? You saw -- I mean, you guys -- I think some of, you know, Hart knows and cited some wells there that were inside the basin that indicated there was groundwater impacts there.

But, you know, the question is was it migrating. I think you'd have to understand when that occurred, and I -- in the end of the day, I don't believe that -- I think your corrective action would have -- it would have looked similar in different time frame. But to have been doing work to restore the groundwater and gone in and done it. I don't believe there's, like, it's worse, or it would have been worse if we -- or less worse -- it would have been better if we'd have moved earlier. I don't know that there's any evidence to support that.

I just don't know. What we see today is, you

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know, that impacted area is still at the basin and still attenuates as it goes, but it is outside the compliance boundary and warrants corrective action.

0. Okay. Let me ask a slightly different questi on.

Have you analyzed whether an earlier shift to dry handling would have resulted in different closure costs today?

- Α. I have not looked at --
- 0. Has anyone at the Company?
- I don't know. I don't know the answer to Α. Now, I mean, I would assume, if you had to look that. at all that, you'd have to -- you have to look at all the factors, right? I mean, running dry fly, now you got to have landfills, and you got operating costs over the time from that, in addition to just the capital shift to go to dry fly. I mean, I'm sure there are just many factors that, you know, both capital and O&M versus -- it would be a part of that analysis, but -and then anything that would suggest how that affects closure, I think, would just be incredibly speculative.
 - Q. 0kay.
- Because the basins predated all of this, and Α. I think there's -- I mean, I think your organization,

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for instance, has taken a very strong position that those basins that -- where there's any groundwater potentially flowing in a way that it might be impacted, their only option is to excavate. And that -- so we could have converted to dry fly in all sites in the '80s, and that still wouldn't -- what I understood the Sierra Club's position, still would have required the level of closure we're looking at today.

- Q. Okay. And an earlier switch to dry handling of bottom ash would mean fewer tons in the ponds today, would it not?
- A. The -- remember the way that basins worked is you -- ash was sluiced there, and then at times it was dredged out. So what's the total -- you know, at times things, I think, were dredged, or moved, or managed differently, but -- so I can't say across the board that's true.
- Q. Understood. And between the prior rate case and this one, the Company was ordered to excavate all the ash from its ponds and has since agreed to do -- to excavate most of the ash; is that right?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Okay. And the excavation costs can be measured in dollars per ton; is that right?

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- I think there are a lot of factors that drive the costs, but I think there are some generalities around, you know, cost per ton or cost per cubic foot with respect to excavation. I think that's right.
- 0. Okay. Thank you so much, Mr. Wells. Those are all my questions for you. And now I just have a few more for Ms. Williams.
- Α. (Marcia E. Williams) I wonder if before you begin your questions, I just have a handful of small points I wanted to supplement with what Mr. Wells was saying on some of the questions you asked him. I mean, they go to the topics you were asking him, so.
- I mean, you know what, if Duke counsel would 0. like to ask you those questions on redirect to clarify for him --

MR. MARZO: Chair --

- 0. -- I'm happy with the answers that Mr. Wells has given to my questions, and they were directed towards him.
 - MR. MARZO: Chair Mitchell, we typically allow, when there are panels, for the other panel member, if they have some information to provide, to provide it. And Ms. Williams seems to have some information that would be responsive to the

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1 2 question. I just ask that she be allowed to provide and summarize it now.

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CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

Ms. Williams, Mr. Wells, I would ask that, if

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counsel asks the panel a question or asks a witness

a question that you feel you're better suited to

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answer or you have something of material value to

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add to your panelist's -- your co-panelist's

response, please do so at the time the question is

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asked, just in the interests of facilitating,

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understanding, and a clear record. And again,

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hearing -- making the most efficient use of our

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hearing time.

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Ms. Williams, I'll allow you to proceed

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and make the points that you need to make in

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but I would ask -- just ask that you do so, please,

response to the questions that Ms. Lee has asked,

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ma'am, in an efficient manner so that Ms. Lee can

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get to the remainder of her questions and we can

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move on with the hearing. Thank you.

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thought about trying to intervene, but the question

THE WITNESS: I will. I apologize.

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flow was going so quickly, I thought it was better

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to let it finish. I just have a handful of things

that I thought might be helpful.

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One, the trend towards dry fly ash that has been discussed here and was originally discussed in the EPRI manual was largely because EPA made a determination in 1982 that for new -- for new facilities, dry ash management was necessary for fly ash, not for bottom ash. So that was kind of what was driving that trend initially in the early years. And because it was limited to fly ash, even for new facilities that might have gone to dry fly ash handling, they would still have had to deal with wet bottom ash handling because the technology was not evolved at the same time.

The second point I wanted to make is the switch to landfills, which would have gone with dry fly ash, would most likely, in that time frame, have gone to unlined landfills, because at that time there were not a lot of lined landfills being built and operated. And, in fact, again, when EPA looked in 1986, only 12.5 percent of industrial landfills of any type were lined. So for the most part, they were unlined.

And then the third point I was going to mention is that you had asked a number of questions

about cost, Ms. Lee, in terms of the difference between lined and unlined units, both lined and unlined impoundments, and lined and unlined landfills. And I was just going to point out that, in the 1988 EPA report to Congress, as of that date, there's a fair amount of information provided with regard to cost -- information cost per ton. And a lot of these are overlapping ranges, so you can't really say that the cost per ton is necessarily less expensive for an unlined unit or for a landfill versus a surface impoundment. So it's just Exhibit 6.6 in that document, and it is a joint exhibit, and it does provide a number of the costs. So that's all I wanted to supplement.

Q. Thank you for that. Moving on, I use a sort of intro, but now that we've begun, I apologize for the out of orderness of this.

But, Ms. Williams, you've never been employed by Duke Energy, correct?

- A. That is correct.
- Q. Okay. And for the last 30 years, you've been acting as a consultant primarily, correct?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Okay. Could you please turn to your résumé,

Session Date: 9/17/2020

Page 81 and that is Exhibit 1 of Williams' rebuttal. Just let

2 me know when you're there.

- A. (Witness peruses document.)
 Okay.
- Q. Okay. I see you included a list of proceedings in which you've offered expert testimony, correct? It starts on page 8 of the résumé.
 - A. Yes.
- Q. Okay. And it's a pretty long list. It starts at page 8 and continues to page 12, and we certainly don't need to talk through each of these, but I did just want to ask you a very few questions about a couple.

I'm looking at page 9 of the résumé, and the fourth bullet from the bottom of the page identifies a 2003 Colorado case, Carol Antolovich vs. Brown Group Retail; do you see that?

- A. I do.
- Q. Okay. This was a class action suit brought by homeowners who live near a chemical storage facility and where toxic chemicals were found in plaintiff's groundwater, soil, and in the indoor air of their homes, correct?
 - A. It was a manufacturing facility, it wasn't --

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Page 82

- I mean, I don't know what you mean by chemical storage facility, but it was a manufacturing facility.
 - 0. Were they storing chemicals on site?
- Α. They used chemicals on site. I don't Yes. recall -- I don't recall that there was any landfilling, but I think there was chemicals on site.
- 0. Okay. Sure. And on whose behalf did you offer testimony in that case?
- Α. I offered testimony on behalf of Brown Group Retail.
- Q. 0kay. And that is the owner of the manufacturing facility or the owner of the property?
 - Α. Yes.
- 0. Okay. Looking at the next page, this is page 10 of the exhibit, the fourth bullet identifies a 2007 West Virginia case, Perrine vs. DuPont; do you see that one, Ms. Williams?
 - Α. Yes.
- This was also a class action, and it dealt 0. with homeowners' exposure to hazardous substances released by DuPont from a zinc smelter in West Virginia; does that sound about right?
 - Α. That's my memory, yes.
 - Q. And --

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At this point I don't have an -- I don't have a -- there were a couple different related cases. don't have a completely distinct memory of the details of those issues.

- 0. Okay. This case is probably close to 20 years more recent than your work at EPA, though, ri ght?
 - Α. Yes. I left EPA in 1988.
- Q. Okay. And on whose behalf did you offer testimony in the DuPont case?
 - Α. My testimony was on behalf of DuPont.
- Q. Thank you. And if we could turn to 0kay. the next page, this is page 11 of the exhibit. I'm looking at the first bullet on that page which identifies a 2010 Florida case, Nancy Sher vs. Raytheon Company; do you see that one?
 - Α. Yes.
- Q. Okay. I believe this was another class action brought by homeowners in Florida against Raytheon for groundwater contamination emanating from that company's storage of hazardous wastes; is that correct?
- Α. The case -- as all these cases, in terms of what I'm asked to testify on, is the evolution of

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knowledge as to when certain practices were understood to be related to groundwater contamination and other standard of care or standard of practice issues.

Q. Okay. But -- sorry, just for the clarity of the record, if you could answer my question.

Was this case about groundwater contamination emanating from Raytheon's storage of hazardous waste?

MR. MARZO: Madam Chair, I'm going to object just to relevance of this line of cross.

It's late in the day.

MS. LEE: Chair Mitchell, I am almost done. And I believe this is quite relevant. The Company has offered Ms. Williams as an expert on environmental regulatory matters, and has directly pointed to her consultant years.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Ms. Lee,
I'm going to overrule the objection. Proceed with
the questions, the witness may answer it.

THE WITNESS: The issue involved with the Raytheon case was a contaminant called 1,4-dioxane, which was a new contaminant that hadn't been recognized until roughly in the time frame of this case, and that's what this case was dealing with. I would like to put on the record

that I have worked for many entities on both sides of most issues -- most of these kinds of issues, including environmental groups and homeowners. So I don't think -- you're welcome to, obviously, highlight the cases you want, but I have worked for the government of the United States, the government of Mexico, the government of Canada, and for plaintiffs in suits.

- Q. On this list of testimony, can you point to any plaintiffs work you did?
- A. Well, I've got -- a lot of what's on here is plaintiffs work, but it's not plaintiffs work if you're talking about neighbors. But yes, I -- the plaintiffs work that I've done on behalf of -- well, one was involving the port of Houston against a bunch of chemical facilities. And once that I've done for neighbors have generally settled before they've gotten to either deposition or trial.
- Q. I see. Okay. Last one. I'm looking at the sixth bullet on the page we're looking at now, which identifies a New York case, Doris Baity vs. General Electric; do you see that, Ms. Williams?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. Okay. I believe this was another toxic tort

Page 86

Session Date: 9/17/2020

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class action brought by homeowners, this time against GE for contamination emanating from waste disposal activities. Does that sound about right?

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Α. The answer is it did involve that. But what I -- as I recall, the issues were narrower than that in terms of at least what I was dealing this. And at this point, as I said, I can't --

- 0. Okay.
- Α. -- give you the detailed discussion.
- 0. Fair enough. Companies like DuPont, and Raytheon, and GE wouldn't hire a consultant who might conclude that their actions resulted in contamination of environmental harm or who disagree with their perspective on regulatory requirements, would they?
 - Α. My testimony --

MR. MARZO: I'm going to object. Well, I'll let Ms. Williams answer, but that calls for speculation as to what DuPont would do and not do, and they're not here testifying.

MS. LEE: That's fine. I'll withdraw the question. I have nothing further, Chair Mitchell. Thank you for your time, Ms. Williams and Mr. Wells.

> CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. We had

Page 87

Session Date: 9/17/2020

originally -- we were originally scheduled to end at 4:30 today. We are close to 4:30. We have a ways to go before we can -- we are in a position to conclude the hearing. What I would like to do at this point is take a break for our court reporter. Let's take a 10-minute break. We will come back on the record, and I would like to take us until 5:30 today. That should give us plenty of time to finish up the remaining portions of this hearing. But again, let's go off the record now. We will go back on at 4:20.

(At this time, a recess was taken from 4:08 p.m. to 4:20 p.m.)

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Let's go back on the record, please. Mr. Marzo, you're up on redirect.

MR. MARZO: Chair Mitchell, I have no redirect. I do want to let the Chair know, and I know you mentioned a moment ago that you were extending the hearing, that we have talked to the witnesses, and they are here as long as the Commission's pleasure is to question them.

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Thank you, sir. All right.

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Session Date: 9/17/2020

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We will move to questions by the Commissioners, beginning with Commissioner Brown-Bland.

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EXAMINATION BY COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND:

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Q. Good afternoon. And I think my questions will start and be directed towards witness Wells.

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A. (James Wells) Yes, ma'am.

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first of these storage basins, I believe the

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evidence is Duke constructed the first one in 1956.

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1975, was there ever -- to your knowledge, in terms of

So just for my curiosity, as I believe the

And my question is, so between 1956 and, say,

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what you've reviewed, was there ever discussions about

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whether there was any reason or value to dig up the

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unlined basins and handle CCRs in a different manner?

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A. There was not. Nothing that I've seen.

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Q. And then if you break that up and say between

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1975 and 2000, was there ever any discussion amongst

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the folks at the Company as to any possibility of

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digging up the storage ponds, impoundments?

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up. I do recall seeing documents that discussed -- I

I did not see anything specific to digging

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mean, I'll give you an example. I saw -- I recall in a

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discussion about conversion and dry fly at Marshall

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based on a commercial opportunity to recycle ash. So I've seen things that look like that. Nothing that would have been as specific as an analysis to excavate a basin during that time period.

And I did see -- of course, post 2000 I saw planning documents that I think we've talked about in a case before, so I do recall seeing those as well.

- Q. And so prior to 2000, as far as you know, there was never, you know, any real thought given to digging up a storage basin?
- A. Well, I don't know -- I don't know that there was a discussion about closure, generally, that I've seen, and what that would entail, and what those options would be. I don't know that there was discussions along those lines. There was the concept of taking a basin inactive, I believe, is more in line of what that discussion or thought process was.

 Inactive, meaning no longer sluicing to it. And normally what that meant, at that time, was to allow it to dewater and revegetate and no further action until such time as closure -- there was clarity around closure, which you start seeing in the 2002. 2010, you know, once we got into the modern days is when you start seeing some of that.

Q. When was the first time that you know of that seriously considering digging up one of the basins or ponds came up?

A. Well, I think from the time that closure was beginning to get discussed in its -- in a way that it -- there was real guidance and standards being established. So you're into the, you know, development of the CCR and into the modern days. I think when that started, then the dialogue around, okay, does that -- what does that mean, closure. And in some instances does it mean excavate; does it mean cap in place; does it mean hybrid approaches? That's where all those, I think, different options starting being looked at.

I believe from inception of that discussion, there was a camp that viewed excavation as the preferred option. Meaning camp, meaning there were folks that that would have been their approach from the beginning of that dialogue.

Q. All right. And then with regard to your direct testimony and, you know, the testimony you've given live today, is it your testimony and opinion that it would not have been reasonable for Duke to believe that the basins and ponds with CCRs in them would pose any health or environmental harm at any point?

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- I think I need to -- I'm sorry, I had trouble following that. Would it have been -- can you restate? I'm sorry.
- In your opinion, is it -- are you saying that 0. it would not have been reasonable for Duke to believe, at any point, that the basins and ponds would pose any health or environmental harm?
- I think my opinion was focused on the data Α. that was -- that -- what the data was telling the Duke people with respect to decisions. And the fact that the data was not indicating a risk to the public health based on what they were evaluating, the analysis that were done at that point. So there -- I was saying it was reasonable, in my mind, that they would not be seeing that based on the data this was in front of them.
- 0. And was it reasonable that -- to believe that -- or did it -- or would it have not have been reasonable to believe that the basins or ponds would have leakages or seepage?
- Α. I think they did believe that the pond No. was permeating through the bottom of the basin and having a localized impact to the groundwater in or around the vicinity of the basin. I think that --

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that -- but the point was that that is an impact. mean, by definition, you're impacting the groundwater. But there -- but that doesn't imply or doesn't mean That doesn't mean risk to the public health in harm. and of itself. It's meaning risk to the public health in terms of the drinking water receptor or to a surface And I think, in the '80s, that's what they were eval uati ng.

So I think it was reasonable. I think what I saw is they were concluding there was an impact, it was localized, but it -- so it would have been -- I guess to answer your question, it would have been reasonable. And I think they did reasonably conclude that there was some water from the basin that is permeating through the surrounding soils in the immediate vicinity. any of the -- but they also went on to understand -and what does that mean with respect to risk to public health or the environment? And that's -- I think that was the analysis that was ongoing.

0. As opposed, I guess, from your testimony to believing that there was a potential -- potential for impact versus a likelihood of risk. And I guess that's why I'm asking, would sort of the inverse be true, that it would not have been reasonable for the Company to

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believe -- are you saying the Company would have been unreasonable in any belief that -- or any camp that might have believed that the ponds would have caused harm or would have leaked; is that what you mean by impact?

- A. Well, I think I was more indicating what was -- what ended up being -- I mean, what was evident from what the thinking was of the Company at the time based on those studies and finding those reasonable. I didn't see an alternative opinion. And my view on that is, you know, I believe there would have been, you know, some good analysis of the data, and ultimately a decision going forward after that full analysis. And so -- and again, I've already indicated, you kind of view that holistically. There are a lot of factors that come into play. By my indication, that's the analysis, and I thought that was reasonable.
- Q. So even as far back as 1996, having groundwater samples in hand that show the presence of CCRs related to contamination and possible seepages and exceedance at Allen, Belews Creek, Dan River, Marshall, and Lee, even having that made the -- made the potential that you talk about in your testimony significant enough that the Company put its

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insurance -- insurer on notice of potential environmental claims.

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Do you agree with that?

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They did. And you know, Commissioner, I Α. understand again, they were citing to those impacts that I'm talking about. Impacts at the basin. then the next question is, is it creating a regulatory issue with respect to a potential for migration beyond the basin that could ultimately lead to a cleanup or corrective action obligation. And I -- so I did read that as providing the insurers on notice that we have And there is some potential mand we don't know, thi s. and they need to file something because they're solving -- they're settling a case or moving a case, a different case, different set of facts, but absent mentioning this now, which there is this potential -there's a potential, then you could forego your rights, right? So there has to be some reservation of rights, so let's make sure we bring that in as we bring this claim. Otherwise, we may be construed as waiving it.

But I didn't see they had evidence in front

of them suggesting there was anything what they --

different from what they were already seeing, which was

that localized impact, but not suggesting that this is

public health.

insignificant?

Q. And you -- when you say impact or potential for impact, it seems to me that the testimony was driving at, and maybe I was reading this wrong, but it was driving at that that potential for impact was

something that's migrating or creating a risk to the

A. No. I just wanted to be clear what -- terms, you know, can mean a lot of things. And, you know, impacts -- you know, imagine any -- anything from the basin that reaches groundwater is an impact. I mean, it's just -- it could be directly beneath the basin. And then before that impacted area migrates any further where it would present a risk, say, to a surface water 1,000 feet away or a drinking water well in the event that were in the path, if it attenuates, then we're -- while there was an impact, that impact does not appear to be presenting a risk.

So wouldn't downplay the impact, but I would be -- you know, what I am referring to is impact doesn't mean either; one, harm, or risk to public health in terms of receptors or surface water bodies in the ecosystem as a whole; or two, a regulatory risk.

So in this sense, it's the fact that you may

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have impact beneath the basin, if you have a compliance boundary, your regulatory compliance is 500 feet out. So it's not insignificant, but it's a consideration, and then that leads to additional considerations as to what that additional risk looks like and whether there's additional action warranted based on what you're seeing.

- Q. All right. Would you agree or disagree that the General Assembly required the Company to excavate and move the CCRs from Dan River and River Bend into lined basins based on a potential for impact resulting from having the CCRs in the unlined basins?
- A. I don't know the specific basis Dan River -- and I agree River Bend and Dan River were considered sites that had to be excavated and placed in a lined -- what I would refer to as a modern some type of D-type I and fill requirements with liners. So there was a requirement to dig and replace. Now, the basis for that, I don't know. I do know they were located near water bodies, and, you know, I do recall at the time some consideration of concepts of, you know, being near a water body presents a risk, similar to Dan River was near the water body and resulted in a release.

 Anything that's -- you know, if we're near the water

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body, that's risk in and of itself in the event, for instance, a dam were to fail or something to that effect.

Q. So I'm trying to explore what it is you mean for us to get out of your language there that a potential impact versus a likelihood of significant harm. Seems that, if it's a potential, you somehow think that should curb what the Company might do to rectify the situation?

Α. No. I think that, if there's a potential, then that is what the Company would evaluate to understand whether they're realizing that risk. And what I was referring to with the potential and the significance of that is I've read the historical documents. The '70s documents, and this is, you know, Aragon, Los Alamos, others in that era, they speak to these concepts of -- at a national level wastewater treatment units like these are presenting a risk. There is some potential for groundwater impacts. And then the Company says, okay, we have a potential. think the Companies recognize that, and that's why they initiated the analysis in 70 days of Allen. And I think that's why they initiated the work with A. D. Little. I mean, cooperated with the work with

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A. D. Little. That was an EPA study.

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And I think that's why they did the leachate studies at all the sites. I think they were beginning to say let's understand if this potential is real at our sites. Because the quidance says this could be a potential for your site, and you should consider it, you know, that -- so that to me is what I was referring to as potential. And the next steps are what the Company did in the '80s based on that. And then they realized, I mean, I think the data there was indicated that there was an impact at the groundwater.

So there's potential, so we did the study. We found localized in the vicinity of the basin, the impact is showing. They asked is it migrating. So I think the next step is, remember, you've got --North Carolina today and, you know, is built around this concept that you've got a basin and a compliance boundary. So there's an anticipated and authorized impact in this area.

So now you got -- you go back to this analysis in the '80s, it's indicating there's an impact, but it's in the localized area, so they're asking is it migrating. And that was the conclusion, which is saying you've got it here, but there's no

indication of migration, and we believe that it's not migrating because of this attenuation. And they go into a lot of discussion about how things were attenuating before they go. And then predicting, you know, future migration in the coming decades. Draw some conclusions with respect to arsenic.

So that was where I was referring to is, you know, potential analyzed to understand and then finding yes, impact, now what does this mean in terms of potential harm. Harm meaning impacts to the surface water, to receptors, and then that regulatory risk. You know, irrespective that, the compliance obligation and the compliance boundary.

So that evaluation would support that that was not -- those points weren't at risk. And then, subsequently, similar concepts, similar, I think, analysis in following that type of logic.

- Q. But you think, based on your knowledge, that DEO's order of excavation at Allen, I think Belews, Cliffside, and Marshall, that they would have ordered that based on a likelihood of a significant risk, or do you think it was merely on the potential for impact that you discuss?
 - A. I think the order -- you know, I think it was

Page 100

Session Date: 9/17/2020

largely based on the idea that they viewed it as more protective than a cap. There were just a lot of, I think, comments from the public and, you know, at the -- probably at the regulatory level, discussion around a solution that was more protective than a cap. And, ultimately, they believed excavation was that solution.

- Q. More protective based on --
- A. I think it's any --
- Q. -- impact or based on a likelihood of risk?
- A. Right. I think -- I mean, I think you just have to look at what was there. I mean, the groundwater data was in front of them at that time, exactly what we have. And you recognize what we have there is impacted area at the basin, and in some areas exceeding at the compliance boundary. You know, the point was outside the compliance boundary, which means that that activity is violating the 2L standards at that point, and they're evaluating that. Now, with respect to modeling of that plume, it's not indicating that it's creating a public health risk. You know, that it's not indicating that it's hitting surface waters or that it's in a way that is impactful, meaning create -- you know, having an impact on ecosystem or

water quality standards.

that's not existing.

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Nevertheless, it's there. From a regulatory standpoint, there's an action required. So I think they're evaluating that they have the groundwater, so they know, and at the same time they've also, at this point -- you know, the other question would be, well, is there a receptor at risk. That would be a big deal if we thought there was potential that impact could begin to affect a receptor in terms of a drinking water well. And the data, again, indicated to them that

But, you know, I think ultimately they're looking at this and saying, look, this is an old basin, it does have these impacted areas, there are -- it is ash, there is a river nearby, there are -- you know, it is a dam. So risk isn't zero, regardless of what you do here. So they chose to go the more protective path given all of those risks. And, I mean, that's my view of the decision point.

Q. But on the risk scale, I think in terms of your rebuttal of some of the other witnesses: Junis, Quarles, Hart -- on the risk scale, I read the testimony and the use of the potential for impact to suggest that wasn't enough to have the Company to act

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Session Date: 9/17/2020

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on; is that what you're trying -- is that your testimony?

acting to understand that potential and determine if it was, in fact, an issue. But then you have to do the look-back to understand, well, what's that mean in that era. So the way I might look at it today is different, say, in 2020, you know, with the CCR rule, et cetera. I may look at that -- and public understanding of groundwater and what all that means, certainly would be

No, no. I think the potential required

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But if you were to evaluate in a 1980s -- if you could do that, then you put yourself in those shoes and say there's a potential, then what action's warranted. And that's where I see that very proactive voluntary action at Allen is telling in the sense that they're evaluating that potential. And then they're drawing conclusions based on very, you know, scientific data and real data, not just speculation, and using that to drive decisions.

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So I saw that as reasonable understanding of trying to evaluate the potential. And then finding some impact, but then trying to determine, now, does that mean -- what does that mean with respect to our

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Page 103

Session Date: 9/17/2020

risk and an obligation from either a regulatory
perspective or a risk to the public health, which would
be something we would want to act on very quickly.

So I think I was saying potential is can drive action, and I think they did here, and the action, as I saw it, was very appropriate for where they landed.

- Q. So you mentioned the Little report, and as I understand it, Allen was used -- and the studies from Allen were used as part of that Little report?
 - A. That's correct.
- Q. Do you know why Allen was a chosen location to assist with that report? Was that by Duke's choice, or the folks who were in charge of the study, did they request Allen? How did it come to be Allen?
- A. I don't know the specifics. I know -- I mean, on the face of the document, it indicates Allen was the chosen site because they felt that it was reflective of a common wastewater treatment unit, in terms of what was in there, and how it was managed, and what the waste streams were, and the fact that it was located in the Piedmont region. So they felt it was representative of a lot of the basins in the Southeast along this -- you know, there were a lot of basins in

the Southeast and a lot of them in the Piedmont region.

So I think from the contract -- EPA contract perspective, they thought it was a really good site to bring a lot of information that would then be useful for a broader analysis or conclusions based on what they were seeing. So I think it fit well with a representative site for them, for a good portion of the industry.

And then I think, two, what I've typically seen with these -- some of these studies is that there's Duke involvement in the sense that -- I mean, Duke volunteers and works with the study in order to provide access, and data, and do what's necessary to support the study. So on that, it would indicate to me -- I mean, it wasn't like an EPA unilateral authority come in, I'm going to begin sampling and done the study; it would have been more common where Duke may have been approached and it would have been a yes, let's do this. And at that point, we were already doing some internal groundwater study, and I understand that was all shared with the A. D. Little team as you look at the reports.

So I think it -- you know, my sense from all that was that it would have been a very cooperative,

you know, collaborative work. And then, if you read the A. D. Little report, there is on the front few pages, there's acknowledgements to a lot of different people for their participation and, you know, and Duke is in that list.

- Q. So in your answer, when you say "they," you're referring to the EPA as if you think the EPA selected the site?
 - A. I am --
- Q. Are you saying it was a cooperation between the Company and EPA to kind of find the one, and they agreed on Allen or?
- A. (Marcia E. Williams) I think I could add a little bit of perhaps perspective on this. EPA was looking -- EPA, at the time, was looking for a small number of sites that represented different situations across the country. So they wanted some that were unlined, you know, perhaps some that were lined. They were looking for a variety of case summaries. And I think they -- if I recall, I think we worked with EPRI to get a list initially. And I think, if you look in the report, there actually is a discussion of a much larger set of sites that were originally looked at, and then they screened the sites to try and find sites that

looked like they would be representative of these different situations and conditions.

So I think that's how Allen ultimately got chosen. It was ultimately A. D. Little and EPA that made the decision on the sites.

Q. All right. Thank you for that.

Do we know why -- I mean, I'm just trying to think through it -- why Allen as opposed to, say, River Bend or another location; do we know, do we have any insight?

- A. The only thing that I could add on that, and I'm not -- I believe this is correct, but I'm -- is that because the site already had done monitoring before this study started, that was a positive. And I think the other thing is they were interested in the fact that there was a variety -- there were several ash ponds and so different ages of ash ponds were at that facility are some of the things that come to mind.
- Q. All right. Thank you. Mr. Wells, do you think, in your opinion, the Company had a reasonable belief, you know, throughout the '90s, throughout the decade of the 2000s, and on up to 2015 that its method of CCR storage treatment and handling using the unlined facilities was going to be or would remain a permanent

solution and a permanent resting place for the CCRs?

A. (James Wells) I think they were reasonable in the operation. I mean, based on my review and based on the data that was in front of them, and in the context of what the regulatory construct as well as industry standard were at the time. I do believe that they were reasonable in their operations of the basins during that period.

With respect to sort of forever, I -- I think, as you get into the 2000s and later, you are beginning to talk about closure. And certainly as you get closer to, say, 2010 and beyond, now there's a lot of real decision going on about what is closure, and what is the guidance, and how do you do this. And because these -- I mean, it was just unique, they didn't have a regulatory -- any regulatory guidance or a regulatory requirement for closure.

But yes, I think they were reasonable to operate up to that point, not to say we'll run them forever, but to that point. You know, and a lot --

Q. What's that point, did you mean? What's that point -- where you may not -- when the Company may have come to realize these weren't going to be a permanent solution, these basins?

A. Right. I think you're beginning to see in the 2000 and beyond a discussion of, if we need additional ash management, what are the real estate needs for that. And at that point, you know, we hadn't built a basin since '82. There was no -- they would not -- based on the records I'm seeing, nobody's saying we're going to go build another basin. But I think the discussions at that point are, if we need more ash management space, we need real estate and we need -- you know, we'll follow what we think is going to be the future requirement, which is closer to lined operations.

So, you know, they're mindful of that, and so I think that's what you're seeing. And I think it was reasonable up to that point. But now they also realize -- when you say what is up to that point; there's a lifetime to the pond. I mean, there is an amount, a capacity of the pond that will, at a point, drive it to closure. Question is, what's going to be closure?

Q. When you say future, I take it you -- and real estate needs, you're talking about subsequent deposits of the ash. But with regard to the ash that had already been in place in the unlined basins, at

what point was there a thought that those might not remain the permanent -- the last place for that ash?

- A. Well, as I can tell it, I think it's when you start seeing that dialogue around closure.
 - Q. When is that?
- A. I think -- again, I think you're beginning -that -- you're starting to see that discussion, as I
 can tell, in the 2010 and later time frame, and it's
 ramping up even more with time. You know, that's when
 the Company was working with DEQ to ask what do we do
 for closure; how do you define closure; what does this
 mean. And there was some -- I understand the state was
 working on some guidance on closure. I understand the
 Company was working for -- you know, with a draft
 closure plan at that time, which they thought might be
 a less complex one, one of the easier ones to see if
 that could start to refine what the key points are that
 would answer those questions. What is closure?

And it was recognized even then that that was likely to be a very significant challenge. For instance, if we were pursuing a cap, which is where we're starting to have this discussion, I think, after 2010, it was a concept of a cap in place was being pursued, or hybrid-type closures where you would move

some of the ash in small footprint and cap it. It was anticipated that that was going to be challenged, and guidance as it was developed was going to be significant challenge.

time frame, 2013, a lot of starting to mature the thinking there, beginning to work toward what is closure, what's the long-term closure of these.

Working with the agency to get a sense of that, having an eye on the CCR rule and its developments on -- you know, you've already got a draft, we anticipate a final very soon. And also recognizing that all of this is very much a contentious issue with respect to the environmental community, and a hard drive for them with respect to what they believed was the appropriate closure.

Q. So the Company, as part of the industry, was involved in efforts with the EPA -- I mean, there's been testimony about the evolving nature of the science and so forth. But also the law was evolving and their interests were seeking to define the CCRs as hazardous or not, or other parts of that broader discussion.

The Company was involved in those discussions at the federal, legislative, and regulatory levels; was

Page 111

Session Date: 9/17/2020

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A. We were -- I think -- I can't -- I don't know

the specific involvement. You mean with respect to development of the regulations?

- Q. Yes. And having influence on how those might come out or what those might look like.
- (Marcia E. Williams) One thing I could add Α. on this that might be helpful. EPA, between the proposed rule when EPA asked for comments from all interested parties, there was -- there were like 500,000 entities that commented. So EPA received a huge number of comments. I mean, I believe that Duke did submit comments, but it's one of the largest groups of comments that I think the agency has received on any of its rules that it was trying to, you know, sort through and deal with between 2010 when it had published three very different approaches to how EPA might finalize the rule, both in terms of whether it was hazardous or not, but what kind of closure requirements would be put into place federally and what kind of -- you know, whether or not excavation would be So EPA was trying to deal with all of that to try and come to a conclusion, which it finally did, of course, in early 2015.

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Α. (James Wells) And I do believe --Commissioner, I believe we -- my recollection is Duke did submit comments to the draft rule, and that is how we would have engaged with respect to, you know, the rulemaking. And also, we were members of industry groups that would have also had some comment and likely some dialogue with EPA on some of their issues as well as other -- I know other industry groups would have done the same. But I believe that would have been the Duke involvement in that.

> (Reporter interruption due to Commissioner Brown-Bland's Webex feed freezing.)

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Let's give her a few seconds here. She's had intermittent --COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: I'm back. CHAIR MITCHELL: She's back. All right.

- All right. And I could hear -- Mr. Wells, I Q. could hear you talking, but I couldn't hear your answer, so if you could remember, could you clue me in?
- Α. I'll do my best. I think I was largely just following up on Ms. Williams. I do believe Duke submitted comments to that rule, and it -- I don't specifically recall that, but I believe we did. And

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that would have been, I believe, how we would have interacted with EPA and what manner on that. Also we would have been involved with utility groups that would have had interaction with the EPA with respect to the position of various utilities on the -- or the group with respect to the rule, as did -- I'm sure other trade groups did the same in terms of their interaction.

Q. So I think those efforts are consistent with your earlier testimony that around the 2011 time frame, possibly 2010, but during that time frame, the Company began to at least think about previously deposited ash might have to be moved; is that in the back of --

A. I think they're thinking around that time that closure guidance is beginning to -- we're starting to refine the thinking as to what is the closure on these basins. And we're beginning to see regulatory clarity on that, both at the state and potentially the federal level through this rule. Now, what that means with respect to what is closure, if that meant this ash is going to be here for the long-term, or does it mean it is there but we put a permanent cap on it. You know, a lined -- a liner over top and a cap, longer term groundwater monitoring; you know, consolidate to a

smaller footprint. Various options of what that may end up looking like. But definitely I believe that is the time frame where some of that was starting to get refined, and then you see even more of that in the '13, '14 time frame.

- Q. Was the Company expecting change, or were you really expecting things to remain the same?
- A. Well, in my mind, it's highly speculative at that point. It's so wide. I mean, I'll just give you an example, for instance. That -- I know we've talked about the concept of hazardous waste, subtitle C. If the rule landed on subtitle C, it is just unbelievable how big that impact is for something to be managed -- to be considered a hazardous waste. Because it kicks in, you know, these concepts of what they call treatment storage disposal facility requirements under RCRA, which is very big. So the impact would have just been unbelievable.

Compare that to other options that are being proposed, which one was subtitle D, which is almost like a standard solid waste non-haz -- nonhazardous. And then one subtitle D prime, and I can't remember which one played. But one was basically do nothing. You know, we continue to operate, and if you do close,

it may end up being potentially what we've done in the past, which is dewater, de- -- you know, inactivate the pond, dewater, and naturally vegetate, potentially a cover. You know it's just hard. The range at that point was just so wide and speculative.

But we were trying to get it to a point that it was landing on something that provided that certainty, and clarity, and coverage from the regulatory standpoint. So that if we did get agreement with the state, for instance, on what is the closure and the closure plan, if we got that approved, now you've got the certainty that -- and the confidence to move forward to actually do it and not have to go back and redo something and spend twice the money or find that you didn't meet, you know, various nuanced requirements within what the rule ended up being.

- Q. Were steps taken in the interim, you know, internally to be ready for a change?
- A. Internally, there was -- I mean, I think there was a lot of discussion about all the regs, and part of the planning process. And I think you see it in some of the planning documents that have been part of the case, if you -- the ten-year planning. And those -- even over time, I think we had some various

topics with respect to some of the coal ash discussion out of -- I think it was the EHS coal management concept. All of those reflect that. You know, the Company's keeping an eye on this incredible uncertainty that can go a lot of different ways, and is watching and trying to work with it. And refining its planning with an eye toward where we -- it looked like things were going to land.

That's what it looked like to me. That was -- I mean, you say are they getting ready; it seemed like that's exactly what they were doing. They had planning going on and had an eye on this uncertainty. It was -- you know, with time, was starting to -- you're getting some sense or some feel of how this is starting to refine into what will ultimately be the requirements. I think that's what they were trying to do.

- Q. And going back to your earlier testimony, in your opinion that we were looking at a potential for a likelihood of a significant risk, did you think it was a wise decision for DEC to settle with DEQ to excavate at Allen, Belews Creek, Cliffside, and Marshall?
- A. In the final settlement of just recently, you're referring to?

Q. Yes. Are we still talking about -- is it still your opinion that it was still, even at that point, just a potential for impact?

A. It's not my opinion that there was a potential for impact there, no. I mean, at that point, we're in 2020, 2019, 2018, the time period that all this was current. We have a lot of groundwater monitoring. I mean, you've seen the number of wells we've done. We're into assessment under CAMA, we're developing corrective action plans, there are a lot of wells, we have a very clear picture of what's going on. So we understand the impact there.

Now, I think what you may have been also -maybe you're also referring to the potential for, is
this creating a risk to the public health, in terms of
is it impacting a well and surface water. And our
models say that it's not. So is it still wise for us
to -- you know, did I think it was appropriate for us
to go forward and settle? The answer to that is yes, I
do think it was very reasonable.

And I say this because the ultimate decision on this is with the regulator. You know, it's just the way it is. They drive what they believe is necessary and adequately protective based on their review, and

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they have incredible -- wide discretion to exercise that. That's their duty. And we did present a lot of technical cases of our position that we believe was adequate. We made an incredible record on that. They evaluated in fairness. They evaluated. They have a lot of very highly qualified people, as do we. And in the end, they felt it was more protective for the state to move in this direction based on comment, public comments, public hearings and everything else.

So they did their duty, and did what they needed to do. We still have, you know, technical arguments that would support what we believe. But in the end, it's their authority. And they've decided what is appropriate for the state, and at this point, that's the cost for it -- that's the cost for us to do business with the state and continue to be a utility.

So that -- in my mind, it was also important to maintain this relationship with the state. So, I mean, that was also a huge part for me, is we have a very strong relationship with the state. Strong in the sense of they -- we are -- we communicate, we exchange tech -- we have good strong discussions on technical debates. We find ways to resolve them, and we keep things moving forward in a positive way. And I wanted

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Session Date: 9/17/2020

Page 119

to keep that pattern now and in the future.

Q. I agree with that. We need to keep things moving forward and working together. Did -- so you would think that the General Assembly's requirement that the Company provide the residents within a half mile of the CCR base, connections to municipal or county water systems or water treatment systems, you would think that was based on a real significant risk?

Α. Well, again, the risk wasn't -- didn't -- it wasn't present in the well data. So, I mean, here -at that point now we've got a -- we had done, you know, receptor surveys to understand all the wells within a half mile of any facility, all private wells. And we sampled all those wells, and none of those wells are indicating an impact to the basins. The data is there. But -- you know, and I think we've talked a little about this. It's almost -- there's -- it's almost more challenging at times to have what we have here, which is secondary -- naturally occurring standards as opposed to, say, a dry cleaner that has a -- you know, I need a perchloroethylene-type substance that's hit groundwater. If you sample it and you find that, there is a very clear source.

naturally occurring compounds or elements or constituents, you begin to talk about, well, who did this. And if it's iron and manganese, and a secondary standard, then you begin to -- you're starting to really -- you got to make sure you do a good analysis, or you end up creating issues that aren't there. For instance, cleaning up, you know, what is a naturally occurring standard would be inappropriate, if it's truly naturally occurring, at the ratepayer's expense.

with respect to the off-site wells, once you make that move to sample wells, and you know you're looking for constituents that are naturally occurring, and you know they commonly fall high above the published 2L standard, you know you also are getting ready to concern neighbors. Because no matter -- I mean, a lot of people know, they live near the basin, and then they get a hit -- you know, vanadium, and then they find out it's above standard, and they understand vanadium is a constituent of ash, but it's also naturally occurring. You're creating concern with those neighbors.

Now, ultimately, all of that -- you know, wasn't just analyzing -- I used the vanadium standard.

You can see a Duke University study did a full analysis

Page 121

Session Date: 9/17/2020

of all the wells for vanadium and determined it wasn't associated with the basins. So the science supports that there's nothing there. But it doesn't matter.

You've already concerned the neighbors. And, in fact, in this case, DHHS, the Department of Human Health and Services, sent letters from where those standards were exceeding, irrespective of naturally occurring, because they don't -- they're thinking about health, not whether this was from the basins. They sent letters that said do not drink, your well's not safe.

So now you have these well owners upset, you

So now you have these well owners upset, you know, naturally concerned. And then subsequently they issue a letter that says, no, you're okay. They rescind the do not drink. So there's a lot of confusion at the neighbors' level. And I saw the General Assembly's move as an opportunity to bring some peace to those neighbors, build some confidence back with the neighbors, you know, and take away any concerns that they have with respect to what their well is.

Q. But aren't you describing -- so if they were dealing with something more --

CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner

Brown-Bland, we are losing -- we've lost connection

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to you. Let's give her -- let's give her a few seconds to come back.

(Pause.)

CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. Well, it appears that we have lost Commissioner Brown-Bland, so I would ask that -- all right.

Commissioner Gray, do you have any questions for the witnesses?

COMMISSIONER GRAY: I do not have any questions for the witnesses.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: I'm back.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner

Brown-Bland. All right. Please proceed.

- Q. So, Mr. Wells, I was just asking you, you would agree that they were dealing with more than a potential for impact in the water connection requirements?
- A. Well, I think my point was that we had verified there was no impact there with respect to impact to the off-site neighbors. And at that point, my view of it was they were dealing with the neighbors' concerns with what the results were telling them in the do not drink letters from DHHS that were based on the naturally occurring constituents in their wells being

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Session Date: 9/17/2020

above the 2L standards for various parameters.

about the regulators. And we talked about perhaps the DEQ had a soft approach, not really punitive, but wanting to get correction done and working with the parties to get the right -- so whether DEQ had a strict enforcement approach or not, or perhaps based on a recognition that DEQ's approach was a little softer, wasn't it the Company's decision -- in not taking actions to eliminate seeps, wasn't that really a business decision to accept the risk of harm that might result from any continuing seeps?

All right. Earlier we had some discussions

A. With respect to the -- okay. I understand the question. So -- right. I think this is a reflection of that evolution of, again, an understanding of the seeps and that EPA began to say these may be subject to the Clean Water Act. It wasn't clear that it was. We did begin to look to DEQ to assist with understanding that. And I understand your question is, well, should you have taken additional action. Well, that did occur. It took, you know, time before we got there, but it did occur. And again, if there's not an indication that these seeps are presenting a risk to the surface waters, remember, the

surface waters are being sampled continuously. And, you know, upstream, downstream for all water quality, as well as the fishery studies, and everything else that's going on. So it's not a -- for instance, a public health risk. The question is whether these were a regulatory risk again. You know, we got to make sure we aren't creating a regulatory compliance risk.

So that's where we were trying to get the permitting coverage. In some instances where we could, in that interim period, we did install -- we took actions while we were seeking that regulatory coverage to find ways to collect or contain seeps. And in most instances, it was pumping systems we would try to send in -- you know, we would create -- we built infrastructure to collect and try to send it back to the basin until we got the regulatory clarity on how we wanted to manage these going forward.

So those were built in various facilities where it was appropriate. It is a significant effort and -- you know, so those did take some time.

Q. All right. And we kind of touched on this before, but just to be clear.

In your opinion, and based on your knowledge and professional judgment, can you give us a date when

Page 125

Session Date: 9/17/2020

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it was reasonably known to the Company that it would be wise or prudent to dispose of CCRs by means other than unlined basins?

Α. Well, with respect to thinking going forward, the -- I think moving -- you know, once we have a federal rule that's beginning to set specific requirements around the management of the basins, and CAMA is established to provide similar guidance, and we also are understanding where we're at on our groundwater monitoring and the application of corrective action to those, with all of that as a point where you're shifting toward closure and an investment of other infrastructure to manage this -- and very significant investment, obviously, to manage. mind, we're there now, in terms of support of the necessary investment to manage the ash in the time manner that we are. So that all occurred with the development of CAMA and CCR, definitely.

- Q. So I understand that to mean that, not until the CCR rule was final did you -- did you have the idea that it would have been prudent to dispose of CCRs in a way other than unlined basins; are you saying it took up until 2015?
 - A. Right. So I think what I'm saying -- first

Page 126

Session Date: 9/17/2020

of all, for new operations, that's different, right? I mean, we didn't build basins from the early '80s. The question is whether you continue to operate what we had. And through all those years we're doing all that monitoring, all those things, there aren't any red flags that are indicating there is something here that is sufficient to justify or to take you that direction. You watch, though, the evolution of the '80s' 90s, 2000, 2010, that's where I think you're starting to see it.

Now, if you even look at the CCR rule, for instance, which is; one, federal EPA; but also it's based in large part on the industry as a whole. It's still supporting continued operation of basins where they meet certain criteria. So there's still even a concept there that was viewing continued operations.

Now, our sites, what we're seeing, our groundwater impacts, and all that's developing, you know, what we're really working the agency in the 2010, '11 time frame, and understanding that groundwater impact and what might be needed in terms of corrective action. But the corrective action at that point, we're -- could still be at just an MNA, meaning a modern natural attenuation. There's still so many

options as to what that means. But, certainly, once you get into CAMA and CCR space, now you're seeing -- you know, here's the clarity of exactly what is the proper management of ash basins going forward. Sorry go ahead.

Q. When we got into CAMA after the Dan River spill, I think, are we saying that it -- that it's at the point where we have some action like that, that it -- is that -- that -- does it take that -- is that a missing element for the Company -- that the Company needed in order to be able to think we need to do something different?

A. No. I mean, I think it would have been dependent on the facts. What I'm referring to is those facts weren't present. So facts that would have driven -- would have presented a risk to public health without question would have been a point that would have -- you know, likely that would have been a site-specific driver. But that would have been a strong basis not to continue to operate that basin at that site.

If we were seeing something more widespread in terms of a risk, it may make it even more universal or a more broad determination. What I'm saying is that

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didn't exist. I mean, now, at Belews, you know, '85 or early '80s there was a shift, you know, and that shift was based on seeing some impacts to surface water. So what I was --

- Q. That's -- well, I'll stop you right there, because that's my next question. So you can incorporate it as you continue to explain. But what were the -- what were the facts that were known to the Company that led to the -- that led the Company to decide, in 1985, to convert to dry ash handling at Belews Creek?
- A. So there again, as I had indicated earlier, surface waters would have been studied, they would have been sampled, and -- for water quality, meaning, you know, there are concentrations of parameters in surface water bodies that are called the water quality standards. And you look if you're discharging into there, you monitor that water body, or we monitored that water body to ensure we weren't seeing anything approaching the water quality standards, or having an impact in a way that could potentially exceed a water quality standard.

So that's one standard we would have looked at as an indicator for a possible action. This

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Page 129

Session Date: 9/17/2020

probably warrants some action if we start to see an 2 impact of surface water. The other thing we did at 3 surface waters is we did fishery studies, you know, to understand the reproduction of the capabilities of the Maintaining a thriving fishery. fi shery. looked -- we would have taken various years' samples of 6 fish and determine -- you know, there's a scientific 8 approach that's beyond my abilities. But in essence, studying the fishery and make sure it's healthy.

And at Belews, we began to see an impact there of selenium. And it wasn't from groundwater, it was from -- remember I referred to this pipe that comes out of the basin, it goes straight to, and there it went straight to Belews Lake. And one of the concerns with a lake versus a river is it -- you know, it's a very closed system. And the selenium we were discharging, we would then suck it back in, and then discharge it again. And ultimately you're kind of cycling up selenium in that lake.

That started -- we started seeing that, and we started detecting some impacts to the fishery as well in terms of reproductive capability. And it's -when that was discovered, then the Company took action to remove that discharge to Belews Lake, move to some

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dry fly, and find another way to manage its ash in a way that was less impactful.

- Q. But there was no legal requirement at that time to convert to dry ash; that's just the way the Company decided to handle --
- Α. They did, based on that risk that they were seeing. And I guess it was my -- as opposed to we weren't seeing elsewhere. We didn't see that with respect to groundwater, or surface water, or fisheries.
- And did the Commission allow recovery of costs associated with the conversion?
- Α. You know, I don't know. I don't know that the Commission didn't. And I think it would have been a very -- and I think, based on recognizing that risk, based on our operation, that to me was a very reasonable step for the Company to take.
- 0. You would imagine that the Company just came to the Commission and made its case for recovery, or tried to make its case?
- I don't -- I think so. I don't know the '80s Α. well or kind of rate cases general.
- All right. Were there studies, reports, or cost-benefit analyses performed by the Company, other than the 1985 study which was called the coal ash

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disposal and water quality study? Were there other studies prior to the decision to convert to dry ash there at Belews?

A. You know, the only other thing I remember, I thought, as I did see something in the record that referred to they were very -- weighing various cost options. In other words, there could have been -- there were other ways that they could manage the selenium issue potentially versus dry fly, and they were looking at what those options are. Regardless, they were looking to address the environmental issue they were seeing. And they had options to do it.

And one, I know they moved the outfall out of the lake and moved it into the Dan River, which added some value. But also, I think there was a market at the time for some ash that was a factor that also supported dry fly approach as opposed to, say, a treatment system -- additional treatment at the discharge. I remember seeing a document that is weighing all of that and ultimately landed on the dry fly.

- 0. So there --
- A. That may be the document you're referring to; I'm not sure.

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So do you know if there were other documents Q. or that's --

- Α. I was -- I was saying the document I'm referring to may be the one you're referring to. But those are the factors I saw it considering. It was a potential ash market, they have moved outfall to Dan They were also evaluating other wastewater treatment, and they were weighing those options. And I think that may be the same document you're referring to, but if so, that's the only one I'm aware of.
- Would you be -- would you have access to or be able to look back if you had a little bit of time to see if there were other studies or benefit analysis during this time period that informed the decision to convert to dry ash?
 - Α. Yes. Yes, ma'am.
- And then similar set of questions with 0. respect to Marshall.

What were the facts that led to that conversion, and were there other -- were there studies and reports that helped inform that decision?

- Α. Yes.
- 0. So --
- Oh, you're asking if I'm aware of them. I'm Α.

Page 133

1 sorry.

- Q. And what were the facts, yes.
- A. I -- I believe witness Bednarcik had some of this information. I wasn't as well versed on some of that. I will tell you I understood the -- Marshall was -- I mean, there were -- there was a market available. And I'm kind of hesitant to -- my -- my details are a little -- I don't have full confidence in what I think are the facts there. I had a high degree of confident what I think it was. I think it was a market-driven opportunity, but.
- Q. Well, so let me do this. I would ask you to take a look and see if you find that there were other studies, reports, or cost-benefit analyses that the Company or those working on behalf of the Company performed or had that helped to inform the decision about converting to dry ash handling at Belews and Marshall.

And I would follow that also with a request for a late-filed exhibit, same type of information with respect to whether there were similar studies, or analyses, et cetera done on the prospect of converting any of the coal-fired plants to a dry ash handling process.

Page 134

Session Date: 9/17/2020

Let me see. And again, do you have any knowledge that the Company was ever denied any of its costs for disposing of CCRs?

- A. I do not have -- I would not have looked at that, and I have no knowledge of it.
- Q. All right. Earlier when you were talking with the Public Staff and we were talking about seeps, and you were talking about some of the voluntary actions that the Company had taken.

In 2014, was there -- did the -- what were the reasons that the Company sought to have seeps permitted in the NPDES permit?

A. I think the biggest reason was regulatory clarity on this issue. I mean, if we -- I think there was an open question: Are these subject to the Clean Water Act, and if so, do they require permitting? And that began with the 2010 handling memo out of EPA to the states to evaluate that issue. And then when we had gone to the state, you know, it was -- again, it wasn't a priority for them, because they didn't see that as a -- for all the reasons that were in my testimony.

So in 2014, you know, at that point we still have -- I mean, to the extent the state says we don't

want to permit it, we wanted clarity that either it required permitting, in which case we would permit, or take additional steps -- you know, make the investment for additional steps, or get consideration, understand that it does not require permitting, make a regulatory determination one way or the other. And we had that very broad set of, you know, areas of wetness that weren't -- we didn't have that clarity.

And we needed that in order to ensure compliance. You know, this is all hallmarks of a strong environmental compliance program, which is what we were driving to.

- Q. But before you went to DEQ seeking to get the seeps permitted, had there been -- was the Company aware that the -- that there was citizen suits in the offing, or had they been filed or threatened in federal court?
- A. I believe they would have been. I think timing-wise, yes, I think they did precede that effort.
- Q. And would that have had some impact on the reason you might have gone to DEQ at that time?
- A. I think it certainly would have been part of the consideration. And again, the concept being this is an area that we don't have clarity as to what the

regulatory requirements are, and there's exposure here that we want to get resolved. And either want to do it through a permit or through a regulatory determination. And then we can rely -- once we have that, we can rely on that to drive additional investments, if needed, or other steps.

- Q. And with regard to the -- I think we -- the acronym is SOC, but that consent -- special order consent --
 - A. Yes.
- Q. -- in order to get that, didn't the Company have to admit that it polluted the waters of the state through the seeps from its coal ash impoundments and pay a penalty?
- A. Right. The -- I think I had some discussion on this earlier. I think part of the authority for the state to enter into that SOC was that there be a discussion about the pollutants to waters of the state. They needed -- either has to be -- I think a number of things can trigger it in order to establish the authority in the state, but one of those was that. So if you imagine that, though, the waters of the state are different than the waters of the U.S.

And the Clean Water Act and permitting is

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Page 137

Session Date: 9/17/2020

tied to the waters of the U.S. and discharge these navigable waters. When they say there's pollutants to a water of the state, that can -- waters of the state are nearly anything. You know, that's a different, much broader definition. I mean, not everything. It's like everything else. It has some interpretations. But any -- again, any molecule of anything that might be an ash contamination, that might reach an area that the state deems the water of the state satisfies that.

So in terms of an admission, that is -- it may be that it's sitting stationary and not affecting anything with respect to navigable waters or waters of the U.S., but nevertheless, it could still meet that definition. And the state needed that in order to have the authority to enter into the agreement, so we agreed to it.

0. All right. And then, Ms. Williams --CHAIR MITCHELL: All right.

Commissioner Brown-Bland, I'm going to stop you right there, please, ma'am. We've come to the end of our day today. I was overly optimistic that we --

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: I'm not too far from done, but I hear you.

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Page 138

Session Date: 9/17/2020

CHAIR MITCHELL: I was overly optimistic that we'd cross the finish line, and we've got to come back tomorrow regardless for the remaining Commissioners and questions on Commissioners' questions. So we will come back tomorrow morning at 9:30, and we will cross the finish line tomorrow.

All right. Thank you everybody for hanging in longer this afternoon. A special thanks to our court reporter. And we'll see you in the morning at 9:30. We are adjourned.

(The hearing was adjourned at 5:31 p.m. and set to reconvene at 9:30 a.m. on Friday, September 18, 2020.)

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

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3 STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA)

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whom the foregoing hearing was taken, do hereby certify that the witnesses whose testimony appear in the foregoing hearing were duly affirmed; that the testimony of said witnesses were taken by me to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this hearing was taken, and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

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This the 21st day of September, 2020.

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Soam Ounge

JOANN BUNZE, RPR

Notary Public #200707300112