

**BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION
DOCKET NO. E-2, SUB 1219**

**In the Matter of)
Application of Duke Energy Progress, LLC)
For Adjustment of Rates and Charges)
Applicable to Electric Service)
In North Carolina)**

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
JAMES VAN NOSTRAND
AND
TYLER FITCH
ON BEHALF OF
VOTE SOLAR**

APRIL 13, 2020

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

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LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

JMV-TF-1: Background and Qualifications of James M. Van Nostrand

JMV-TF-2: Background and Qualifications of Tyler Fitch

JMV-TF-3: North Carolina Climate Science Report, Findings and Executive Summary

JMV-TF-4: Con Edison Climate Change Vulnerability Study

JMV-TF-5: Literature Review of Climate Risks

JMV-TF-6: North Carolina Executive Order 80

JMV-TF-7: Comparison of Climate Risk Assessments

1

1. INTRODUCTION

2

A. JAMES M. VAN NOSTRAND

3

Q. Please state your name, title and employer.

4

A. My name is James M. Van Nostrand. I am an Energy Policy Expert for EQ

5

Research, a consulting firm based out of Cary, North Carolina. I am also a Professor

6

of Law at the West Virginia University College of Law, where I teach energy and

7

environmental law and Direct the Center for Energy and Sustainable Development.

8

Q. On whose behalf are you submitting this direct testimony?

9

A. I am submitting this testimony on behalf of Vote Solar.

10

Q. Please state your educational and professional experience.

11

A. Exhibit JMV-TF-1 sets forth my educational background and professional

12

experience.

13

B. TYLER FITCH

14

Q. Please state your name, title, and employer.

15

A. My name is Tyler Fitch. I am Southeast Regulatory Manager for Vote Solar.

16

Q. On whose behalf are you submitting this direct testimony?

17

A. I am submitting this testimony on behalf of Vote Solar.

18

Q. Please state your educational and professional experience.

19

A. Exhibit JMV-TF-2 sets forth my educational background and professional

20

experience.

21

C. OVERVIEW OF JOINT TESTIMONY

22

Q. Does each sponsoring witness adopt the whole of this testimony?

1 A. Yes. However, Mr. Fitch is not a lawyer and defers to Mr. Van Nostrand regarding
2 any portion of this testimony that could be perceived as requiring legal training to
3 answer.

4 **Q. Please summarize your testimony.**

5 A. This testimony focuses on the Grid Improvement Plan proposed by Duke Energy
6 Progress (“the Company”) and its request to recover the costs of the Plan through
7 deferral to a regulatory asset. In particular, our testimony examines the extent to
8 which the Company has integrated the impact of climate change-related risks in its
9 Grid Improvement Plan. Since 2017, risks related to climate change have emerged
10 as a material factor in electric utility operations. Recent developments in climate
11 risk assessment, scrutiny from shareholders, and regulatory momentum underscore
12 the need to manage these risks. Given the exposure faced by the Company to
13 climate change-related risks due to, among other things, the vulnerability of its
14 physical assets to more frequent and intense extreme weather events as well as the
15 impact of increasing temperatures on its system, prudent utility practice requires
16 that these risks be considered as part of any long-term plan for transmission and
17 distribution investments. Our testimony concludes that the Company’s analysis of
18 climate change-related risks in connection with its Grid Improvement Plan is
19 woefully inadequate, and the Company likely has fallen short of sustaining its
20 burden of proof to demonstrate that the proposed expenditures associated with the
21 Plan are necessary and reasonable. Our testimony concludes with several
22 recommendations to improve the integration of climate change-related risks in the

1 Company's long-term system planning, as well as a possible regulatory mechanism
2 that would provide incentives for implementation of these recommendations.

3 Our testimony reaches the following conclusions:

- 4 • Climate-related risks, emerging in many vectors, have a material and substantial
5 bearing on the Company's operations today and will continue to affect
6 operations in the future. Collaborative processes in North Carolina are currently
7 underway to assess these risks and their implications for the electric grid.
- 8 • The Company faces demonstrable physical risks from climate change and
9 increasing scrutiny on climate risk management from relevant financial
10 institutions.
- 11 • As a potential foundational investment for the 21st century grid, any grid
12 modernization plan should consider best climate resilience practices alongside
13 grid modernization best practices. This includes the fair assessment of
14 distributed energy resources as climate resilience and grid modernization
15 solutions.
- 16 • The Grid Improvement Plan, as filed, does not assess or respond to climate-
17 related risks, nor does it adhere to grid modernization best practices. As a result,
18 the Company's proposal does not provide enough information to indicate that
19 the Plan is a prudent investment.

20 Our testimony includes the following recommendations:

- 1 • The North Carolina Utilities Commission (“the Commission”) should direct the
2 Company to assess and manage climate-related risks across its operations and
3 assets, in accordance with prudent utility practice.
- 4 • The Commission should make clear that it will hold the Company accountable
5 for applying this standard to Grid Improvement Plan investments by the
6 Company.
- 7 • The Commission should direct the Company to participate in ongoing
8 Department of Environmental Quality stakeholder processes around grid
9 modernization and integrate data, findings, and recommendations into its grid
10 modernization investments. The Commission should further require that the
11 Company file a report by December 31, 2020 identifying any gaps in knowledge
12 that need to be filled through further collaboration.
- 13 • The Commission should require the Company to develop large distribution
14 investments such as the Grid Improvement Plan through an integrated
15 distribution planning (“IDP”) or integrated systems & operations planning
16 (“ISOP”) process moving forward.
- 17 • To the extent that Grid Improvement Plan projects are authorized for deferred
18 accounting, the Commission should impose performance-based conditions on
19 the recovery of such deferred amounts in rates, such as through adjustments to
20 the weighted average cost of capital applied to the unamortized balance of
21 deferred amounts.
- 22

1 **Q. How is your testimony organized?**

2 A. The testimony is presented in several sections:

- 3 • **Section 2** provides context for the Grid Improvement Plan based on the
4 Company's recent Power/Forward proposal, grid modernization best practices,
5 and the response of the Commission. It also describes Vote Solar's experience
6 as a stakeholder in the Company's Grid Improvement Plan stakeholder process.
- 7 • **Section 3** introduces the concept of climate-related risks, and demonstrates the
8 extent to which such risks are at play in the Company's application. Section 3
9 includes a comprehensive review of the Company's exposure to such risks and
10 best practices for managing them.
- 11 • **Section 4** identifies several policy and regulatory developments in North
12 Carolina that may have bearing on any grid modernization process.
- 13 • **Section 5** presents a review of the Grid Improvement Plan's development based
14 on grid modernization and climate resilience best practices as well as ongoing
15 North Carolina developments.
- 16 • **Section 6** offers a specific discussion of the Company's request for deferred
17 accounting, integrated systems planning, and the role of climate-related risks at
18 the Commission.
- 19 • **Section 7** briefly discusses how the Company's customers would benefit from
20 the integration of climate-related risks in long-term system planning.
- 21 • **Section 8** provides our conclusions and recommendations to the Commission.

1 **2. POWER/FORWARD, STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT, AND THE**
2 **DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRID IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

3 **Q. Does the Grid Improvement Plan represent the Company’s first proposed**
4 **comprehensive investment plan for its transmission and distribution**
5 **infrastructure?**

6 A. No. The Company proposed the Power/Forward program in its last rate case.

7 **Q. What was Power/Forward?**

8 A. Power/Forward was a 10-year, \$13 billion grid modernization plan for the Duke
9 Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress transmission and distribution system
10 proposed in the Company’s 2017 General Rate Case.¹ Like the Grid Improvement
11 Plan, the stated goals of Power/Forward included improving reliability and
12 integrating distributed resources.² Although no extraordinary regulatory treatment
13 was sought in the Duke Energy Progress case, the subsequent Duke Energy
14 Carolinas General Rate Case proposed a Grid Reliability and Resiliency Rider or
15 deferral into a regulatory asset for recovering Power/Forward costs.³

16

¹ Direct Testimony of David B. Fountain on behalf of Duke Energy Progress, Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=2e602d93-a288-4a6f-8c7c-d8684a747d91>.

² Direct Testimony of Robert M. Simpson III on behalf of Duke Energy Progress, Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=2e602d93-a288-4a6f-8c7c-d8684a747d91>.

³ Direct Testimony of Jane L. McManeus on behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=4701a724-c7aa-4ff0-bc30-1da295d6f57f>.

1 **Q. What was Vote Solar’s role in that proceeding?**

2 A. Vote Solar’s then Regulatory Director, Dr. Caroline Golin, testified on behalf of
3 the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association in both the Duke Energy
4 Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress proceedings. Her testimony assessed the
5 appropriate treatment of a capital-intensive proposal, the prudence of the
6 Power/Forward program (according to the program’s overall cost-effectiveness)
7 and its satisfaction of grid modernization best practices, namely:

- 8 • Clear and Measurable Goals
- 9 • Stakeholder Engagement
- 10 • Integrated Distribution Planning
- 11 • Cost/Benefit Analysis⁴

12 Dr. Golin’s assessment found that Power/Forward was not justified on an
13 economic or engineering basis and that it failed to implement any of the grid
14 modernization best practices listed above. In the Duke Energy Carolinas rate case,
15 Dr. Golin recommended that the Commission deny Duke Energy Carolinas’s
16 proposal and proactively establish a separate proceeding for a stakeholder-driven,
17 staff-facilitated process for evaluating grid modernization investments.⁵

⁴ Direct Testimony of Caroline Golin on Behalf of North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association (“NCSEA”), Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=4dc8a933-d7c8-4ace-b9ab-e53b8e5690d5>.

⁵ Direct Testimony of Caroline Golin on Behalf of NCSEA, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146. Retrieved at https://votesolar.org/files/2215/1741/2799/Direct_Testimony_of_Caroline_Golin_2.pdf.

1 **Q. Do you agree with Dr. Golin’s identification of best practices and**
2 **establishment of a separate proceeding for grid modernization programs?**

3 A. We do. These best practices are supported by grid modernization experts who have
4 presented them across the Southeast and across the country.⁶

5 **Q. What did the Commission find in its decision on the Power/Forward proposal?**

6 A. The Company did not seek recovery of investments relating to Power/Forward in
7 the previous rate case, but the Commission nevertheless found that “[b]ased on the
8 full record in this docket, the Commission concludes, however, that the Company
9 has not yet provided compelling evidence that the proposed grid investment plan
10 will result in meaningful benefits to ratepayers despite its cost.”⁷ The Commission
11 noted that it would reconsider the proposal after an agreed-upon technical workshop
12 and the outcome in Duke Energy Carolinas’s general rate case proceeding.⁸

⁶ Alvarez, P., & Stephens, D., (2019, January). Modernizing the Grid in the Public Interest: Getting a Smarter Grid at the Least Cost for South Carolina Customers. *GridLab*. Retrieved at http://gridlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/GridLab_SC_GridMod.pdf;

Aggarwal, S., & O’Boyle, M., (2017, February). Getting the Most out of Grid Modernization. Energy Innovation. Retrieved at <http://ipu.msu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Grid-Modernization-Metrics-and-Outcomes-2017.pdf>;

Migden-Ostrander, J., & Hauser, S., (2018, September). Grid Modernization and New Utility Business Model. *Regulatory Assistance Project & GridWise Alliance*. Presentation given to Clean Energy Legislative Academy. Retrieved at https://www.raonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/rap_migden_cnee_legislator_academy_2018_sep_11.pdf;

Migden-Ostrander, J., Littell, D., Shipley, J., Kadoch, C., Slinger, J., (2018, February). Recommendations for Ohio’s Power Forward Inquiry. *Regulatory Assistance Project*. Retrieved at <https://www.raonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/rap-recommendations-ohio-power-forward-inquiry-2018-february-final2.pdf>.

⁷ Order Accepting Stipulation, Deciding Contested Issues, and Granting Partial Rate Increase, Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142 et al. p. 99. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=d2b2a1a0-dae1-45de-af9c-c987d4aeddc8>.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 100.

1 In the Duke Energy Carolinas Rate Case, the Commission noted that, given that the
2 Duke Energy Carolinas controls the timing of the investments and that regulatory
3 lag has not been an issue for these types of investments in the past, a rider would
4 be inappropriate for grid investments.⁹ Further, the Commission found that the
5 reasons cited by Duke Energy Carolinas to justify the Program do not qualify as
6 extraordinary:

7 “The Commission finds and concludes that the reasons DEC
8 says underlie the need for Power Forward are not unique or
9 extraordinary to DEC, nor are they unique or extraordinary
10 to North Carolina. Weather, customer disruption, physical
11 and cyber security, and aging assets are all issues the
12 Company... [has] to confront in the normal course of
13 providing electric service. The Commission further finds
14 that ... a number of the Power Forward programs and
15 projects ... are the kinds of activities in which the Company
16 engages or should engage on a routine and continuous basis.
17 Therefore, the Commission must conclude that Power
18 Forward costs are not appropriate to be considered for
19 deferral accounting.”¹⁰

20 While the Commission found arguments for a separate proceeding
21 “compelling,” it ultimately directed the Company to utilize existing dockets for grid
22 modernization proposals, of which one (the “Smart Grid Technology Plan” docket)
23 is no longer active. The Commission also directed the Duke Energy Carolinas to
24 “engage and collaborate with stakeholders” to address issues raised in the
25 proceeding.¹¹ In his testimony in this proceeding, Witness Oliver identifies the

⁹ Order Accepting Stipulation, Deciding Contested Issues, and Requiring Revenue Reduction, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146 et al. p. 142-145. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=80a5a760-f3e8-4c9a-a7a6-282d791f3f23>.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

1 Commission’s Order in the Duke Energy Carolinas Rate Case as relevant guidance
2 for present grid improvement investments.¹²

3 **Q. How did the Company engage and collaborate with stakeholders between the**
4 **conclusion of the previous rate case and this one?**

5 A. Since the last rate case, the Company held three in-person stakeholder workshops
6 that were facilitated by a third party and conducted a series of webinars. Company
7 Witness Oliver describes the objectives of the first stakeholder workshop as to
8 “[d]evelop understanding of proposed investments; hear and explore stakeholder
9 feedback; and support a collaborative process going forward.”¹³

10 **Q. In what capacity did Vote Solar participate in the Grid Improvement Plan**
11 **stakeholder process?**

12 A. Vote Solar participated in all three of the in-person stakeholder workshops held by
13 the Company and observed several of the Company’s webinars.

14 **Q. What is Vote Solar’s interest in the grid modernization broadly and the Grid**
15 **Improvement Plan specifically?**

16 A. As with Dr. Golin’s previous testimony, Vote Solar’s position is that decisions on
17 how states pursue grid modernization represent critical opportunities for our
18 electric grid. Done correctly, the modernization of the grid can enable a system
19 where customers see economic benefits, distributed energy resources are evaluated
20 fairly, innovative solutions have a chance to compete with traditional investments,

¹² Direct Witness of Company Witness Jay W. Oliver (“Oliver Direct”), p. 41, ll. 20 to p. 42, l. 20.

¹³ Oliver Direct, p. 43, ll. 11-13.

1 the grid’s environmental impact is reduced, and energy service is more reliable and
2 resilient to shocks and stressors. An unacceptable grid modernization proposal, on
3 the other hand, could create more costs for customers than benefits, and could fail
4 to deliver on promised benefits. As the onset of climate-related risks affects the risk
5 profile for many grid stakeholders, the need to get grid modernization right is even
6 more urgent. Vote Solar participated in the stakeholder process in pursuit of a grid
7 modernization process in North Carolina that adheres to the best practices cited in
8 Dr. Golin’s testimony and ultimately one that works toward a more dynamic,
9 resilient, and distributed grid.

10 **Q. Mr. Fitch, please characterize your experience as a stakeholder in this**
11 **collaboration process.**

12 A. I will characterize my direct experience as an in-person stakeholder in the third
13 workshop and webinars, and base my review of the first and second workshop on
14 pre-read packets and workshop readout reports provided as exhibits in this
15 proceeding by Witness Oliver. I found the stakeholder workshops valuable insofar
16 as they clarified the Company’s justification of its proposal and provided an
17 opportunity for stakeholders to share perspectives and goals for a grid
18 modernization process. I cannot characterize the workshops as “collaborative” in
19 the true definitional sense of a process where stakeholders and the Company work
20 together toward a shared goal.. In general, the prevailing feeling among
21 stakeholders during workshops was unidirectional information-sharing by the
22 Company. Stakeholders did not appear to play a role in choosing which investments

1 should be selected, or shaping the process by which the Grid Improvement Plan
2 was developed.

3 Relatedly, I was surprised to find that the Company invited stakeholder
4 input only after the Company had developed the Grid Improvement Plan.¹⁴ This
5 approach leaves stakeholders out of the most important elements of the grid
6 modernization process—defining a shared set of goals and criteria for success,
7 identifying possible solutions, and developing a process for selecting those
8 solutions. In effect, the Plan was “already baked” by the time stakeholders were
9 given a chance to share ideas.

10 This procedural element may be a reason that management of climate-
11 related risks—an element that several stakeholders called for—was not included in
12 the Plan.¹⁵ The Company in fact explicitly stated that it intended to avoid the term
13 “climate change,” and the topic would be addressed only to the extent climate
14 change risks were captured as part of the megatrend identified as “Environmental
15 Trends” and “Impact of Weather Events.”¹⁶

16 **Q. Mr. Fitch, is it clear the extent to which differences between programs**
17 **proposed in the Power/Forward and the Grid Improvement Plan were driven**
18 **by stakeholder input?**

¹⁴ Oliver Direct, p. 29, l. 18 to p. 30, l. 18.

¹⁵ Oliver Direct Ex. 13, p. 12.

¹⁶ Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 29.

1 A. No. Witness Oliver represents that the stakeholder process led to the Company's
2 creation of the Megatrends,¹⁷ but the excerpt of the Commission's 2018 order cited
3 above shows that several of these Megatrends were previously used to justify the
4 Power/Forward plan. In any case, the Plan's similarity to Power/Forward (further
5 discussed below) suggest that the Megatrends were a *post hoc* justification
6 developed by the Company to justify the path it had already decided to pursue.

7 Company Witness Oliver cites several other changes to the plan as
8 stakeholder-driven,¹⁸ but a review of the workshop readout demonstrates more
9 nuance at play: Targeted undergrounding was reduced, but the workshop readout
10 report described this project as changing "priority";¹⁹ and the distribution hardening
11 & resiliency program was reduced in size, but the term "distribution hardening"
12 does not appear in the workshop readout report.²⁰

13 **Q. Based on the workshop readout reports, what were other stakeholders'**
14 **responses to the stakeholder process?**

15 A. The Company rolled out its Grid Improvement Plan proposal at the second
16 stakeholder workshop in November 2018. The readout report registers that
17 stakeholders had a mixed, at best, view of the Plan, as shown in Figure 1. Key
18 takeaways from the workshop included a note that stakeholders asked the Company

¹⁷ Oliver Direct, p. 43, ll. 19-20.


¹⁸ Oliver Direct, p. 43, ll. 20-22.

¹⁹ Oliver Direct, Exhibit 11, p. 12-13.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1-44.

1 to explicitly include climate change as a megatrend and to better understand the
2 DER-enablement implications of its proposal.²¹

3 **Figure 1. Stakeholder Sentiment of Grid Improvement Plan.²²**



4 The third stakeholder workshop represented more of a “deep dive” into the
5 cost-benefit methodology of several proposed programs, presented in the context
6 of the Company’s stated intention to file a rate case application including a Grid
7 Improvement Plan in the next several months.²³ At the last workshop before the
8 Plan’s submission to the Commission, the role of stakeholder input was still unclear
9 to stakeholders:

10 “Several stakeholders felt unclear about the impact from
11 current stakeholder engagement, and if/how stakeholder
12 input has and will be meaningfully used in the GIP riling. In
13 response, many stakeholders requested to see evidence

²¹ Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 12.

²² Figure is directly taken from Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 22.

²³ Oliver Direct, Ex. 16, p. 6: “Several stakeholders were skeptical about how a “clean slate” for stakeholder engagement could be realized after the filing this year.”

1 and/or explicit explanations demonstrating how stakeholder
2 feedback has thus far been incorporated.”²⁴

3 Of course, stakeholders at the Grid Improvement Plan workshops showed a
4 wide range of opinions and interests, and the summary above is not meant to be
5 comprehensive. It does, however, point to a trend of stakeholders (Vote Solar
6 included) finding that the process did not meaningfully incorporate stakeholder
7 input into proposed investments.

8 **Q. Mr. Fitch, did the stakeholder process the Company conducted in advance of**
9 **this rate case adhere to stakeholder best practices or a reasonable expectation**
10 **of engagement and collaboration?**

11 A. No. The stakeholder process did not allow stakeholders to set goals for the Plan or
12 work with the Company to identify criteria for evaluating solutions. Especially for
13 the third workshop, stakeholder input was unlikely to alter the Company’s proposal
14 to the Commission. Although the Company to my knowledge has not committed to
15 a cyclical, ongoing stakeholder process, the potential for that type of process
16 through the Company’s proposed phases is possible. Overall, however, the
17 stakeholder process did not adhere to these best practices.

18

²⁴ Oliver Direct, Ex. 16., p. 5-6.

1 **Q. Please compare the Company’s proposed Grid Improvement Plan to its**
2 **previous Power/Forward plan.**

3 A. The Company provided a comparison between the Grid Improvement Plan and
4 Power/Forward during its April 2019 webinar,²⁵ and provided a more precise
5 comparison between the programs in discovery.²⁶ Every program that made up
6 Power/Forward is replicated in the Grid Improvement Plan, although the total
7 budgets for targeted undergrounding and “incremental distribution hardening &
8 resilience” have decreased substantially. Several new programs populate the GIP,
9 including security measures, Integrated Volt-Var Control (“IVVC”), integrated
10 systems & operations planning, and support for energy storage and EVs. Even so,
11 over 80 percent of the capital investment that comprises the Grid Investment Plan
12 is derived from projects that were also a part of Power/Forward.²⁷ The Grid
13 Improvement Plan thus largely incorporates the same projects included in
14 Power/Forward, although the Grid Improvement Plan’s scope is much smaller than
15 Power/Forward’s (3 years versus 10 years). At the same time, however, it should
16 be noted that the Company has described at least one more “phase” of the Grid
17 Improvement Plan.²⁸

²⁵ Oliver Direct, Ex. 14 p. 10.

²⁶ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request -1-2.

²⁷ *Ibid.* Investment in SOG, Incremental Transmission H&R, Transmission Bank Replacement, Oil Breaker Replacement, T&D Communications, Distribution System Automation, Transmission System Intelligence, and T&D Enterprise systems totals \$1.952 billion, which is ~84% of the \$2.3 billion budget.

²⁸ Oliver Direct, p. 47, ll. 9 to p. 48, ll. 18.

1 **Q. Mr. Fitch, how did the Company portray its Integrated Systems & Operations**
2 **Planning (“ISOP”) project in Company meetings and webinars?**

3 A. ISOP presentations²⁹ portrayed ISOP as a way to integrate planning processes
4 across generation, transmission, distribution, and customer services,³⁰ and
5 identified capabilities of the Advanced Distribution Planning component of ISOP
6 to include “optimized selection of both traditional and non-traditional solutions.”³¹

7 **Q. What appears to be the relationship between ISOP and the Grid Improvement**
8 **Plan?**

9 A. ISOP is an identified component of the Grid Improvement Plan. It is not apparent
10 from the Company’s materials how the Grid Improvement Plan projects will be
11 sequenced in their implementation, despite the clear value that the capabilities of
12 ISOP, ADP, and Morecast would bring toward identifying grid needs and placing
13 solutions.

²⁹ Mr. Fitch reviewed Duke Energy’s presentation of ISOP to the Commission on August 28, 2019, and observed the ISOP webinar on January 30, 2020.

³⁰ Duke Energy (2019, August), Integrated Systems & Operations Planning (ISOP) Technical Conference. *North Carolina Utilities Commission*, p. 5. Retrieved at: <https://www.duke-energy.com/media/pdfs/our-company/isop/isop-ncuc-conference-overview-rev0.pdf?la=en>.

³¹ Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC (2019, August). Response to Commission Questions in July 23, 2019 Order Docket No. E-100, Sub 157. Retrieved at <https://www.duke-energy.com/media/pdfs/our-company/isop/e100-sub157-decdep-response-to-ncuc-questions.pdf?la=en>.

1 **3. ONSET OF CLIMATE-RELATED RISK AND FUNDAMENTAL**
2 **CHANGES IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR**

3 **A. Introducing Climate-Related Risks**

4 **Q. Why is climate change relevant to the Company’s general rate case**
5 **application?**

6 A. In its response to Vote Solar’s motion to compel responses to discovery in the Duke
7 Energy Carolinas Rate Case, the Duke Energy Carolinas acknowledged that the
8 words climate change or global warming do not appear in its application,³² and
9 posited that the scope of this proceeding is “limited to the costs, revenues, rates,
10 and regulatory mechanisms reflected in its application.”³³ We agree that the focus
11 of this proceeding should not be about climate change, but there is no question that
12 climate-related risks clearly influence the costs, revenues, rates, and regulatory
13 mechanisms in DEC’s application. The same statements apply to the Company’s
14 application in this proceeding. Whether or not the Company explicitly uses the term
15 “climate-related” or “climate change” in its application, the physical impacts of
16 climate change and the financial, regulatory, and societal responses to it have real,
17 material implications for the Company and the prudence of current proposals in its
18 Application. The following items in the Company’s application have climate-
19 related risk implications:

³² Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC’s Response to Opposition to Motion to Compel Discovery, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146, p. 2.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 4.

- 1 • The Grid Improvement Plan. The Plan purports to “mitigate the impact
2 of major storm events,”³⁴ and “support more rooftop solar, battery
3 storage, electric vehicles, and microgrids.”³⁵ Storm and flood risks are
4 likely to change due to climate change,³⁶ and Executive Order 80³⁷ and
5 the Clean Energy Plan,³⁸ both of which cite climate-related risks as a
6 driver, urge adoption of policies that are intended to increase customers’
7 use of rooftop solar, battery storage, electric vehicles and microgrids.
- 8 • Storm costs from Hurricanes Florence and Michael and Winter Storm
9 Diego.³⁹ The frequency and intensity of those storms is increasing,
10 which the Company acknowledges.⁴⁰ But if the Company does not
11 update storm preparation to account for this reality there will be
12 implications for the Company’s assets⁴¹ and the ability of its customers
13 to cope with the impacts of those storms.⁴² Given the Brunswick nuclear
14 plant’s exposure to floods as during Hurricane Florence,⁴³ there is
15 reason to be particularly attentive to this concern.
- 16 • Investments to upgrade Company assets to reduce carbon emissions.⁴⁴
17 Switching to lower-carbon fuels reduces regulatory climate-related risk
18 in the future. The application notes this fact when it explains that the

³⁴ Duke Energy Progress, LLC Application to Adjust Retail Rates, Request for an Accounting Order, and to Consolidate Dockets (“DEP Application”). p. 10.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D., (2020, January). North Carolina Climate Science Report. Presentation given to North Carolina Climate Change Interagency Council, p. 28. Retrieved at <https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/interagency-council/Jan-22-2020--Interagency-Climate-Council-presentation-rev.pdf>.

³⁷ State of North Carolina Exec. Order No. 80, (2018, October).

³⁸ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (2019, October), North Carolina Clean Energy Plan: Transitioning to a 21st Century Electricity System. Retrieved at: https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/NC_Clean_Energy_Plan_OCT_2019_.pdf.

³⁹ DEP Application, p. 5.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 10.

⁴¹ Morehouse, C., (2020, January), “Ameren, Xcel, Dominion, Duke among most at-risk from changing climate: Moody’s.” *Utility Dive*. Retrieved at <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ameren-xcel-dominion-duke-among-most-at-risk-from-changing-climate-mood/570789/>.

⁴² ConEdison (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. p. 31. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

⁴³ Murawski, J., (2018, September). “Floods limit access to Duke’s Brunswick nuclear plant; crews use porta-potties, cots.” *The News & Observer*. Retrieved at: <https://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/article218530735.html>.

⁴⁴ DEP Application, p. 5, #9.

1 investments will “further reduce carbon emissions across the Carolinas
2 for the benefit of customers.”⁴⁵

- 3 • Accelerated depreciation for coal assets.⁴⁶ Again, this acts as a hedge
4 against potential climate regulation, and the application and Witness
5 DeMay argue that investing in cleaner energy sources is done “for the
6 benefit of [the Company’s] customers.”^{47,48}
- 7 • The Company’s return on equity.⁴⁹ Witness Hevert does not mention
8 that Moody’s credit opinions for the Company in 2019 mention its
9 “carbon transition risk,”⁵⁰ thereby failing to capture a recent significant
10 pivot in how the financial industry views climate-related risks.

11 These items show that the Company’s decisions today are influenced by
12 climate-related risks and affect the Company’s future exposure to those risks. This
13 is not an exhaustive list of climate-related risks to the Company; climate-related
14 risks operate through multiple vectors beyond physical impacts and are complex
15 and inter-related. Avoidance of, or, conversely, engagement with, these risks is very
16 likely to impact the Company’s operations and financial position, as we discuss
17 below.

18 In response to discovery on how it manages climate-related risks, the
19 Company states that “[it], as well as its stakeholders, are unable to say with
20 certainty what the future impacts of climate change may or may not be.”⁵¹ This is
21 neither a responsible nor a mainstream approach to risk management. As expressed

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 8.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 9.

⁴⁸ Direct Testimony of Company Witness Stephen G. De May (“De May Direct”), p. 14, l. 14

⁴⁹ DEP Application. p. 14.

⁵⁰ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-24.

⁵¹ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-12,.

1 by State Street CEO Ronald O’Hanley in his recent statement to the *Wall Street*
2 *Journal* on climate-related risks:

3 “Does anyone know with certainty or precision what the
4 scope and pace of climate change might mean for long-term
5 investments? No. But that is the textbook definition of risk:
6 More things can happen than will happen.”⁵²

7 As in any business, risk management is fundamental to prudent business
8 practice. As we demonstrate, the Company and Commission are better equipped
9 than ever before to consider the material risks associated with climate change.

10 **Q. What are climate-related risks?**

11 A. Climate-related risks refer to the potential negative impacts of climate change on a
12 firm or organization. Risks may emerge as a result of the physical shocks and
13 stresses of climate change (physical risks), or the social and economic response to
14 those impacts (transition risks). Importantly, the risks discussed here are those
15 borne by the firm alone, not by its customers or society as a whole. As such, the
16 climate-related risks described here are no different than any other business risk
17 that a firm might assess and manage in the course of prudent operation.

18 Due to the carbon emissions embedded in conventional electricity
19 generation and the nature of transmission and distribution infrastructure, electric

⁵² O’Hanley, R., (2020, January). Sustainability Is Part of Good Risk Assessment. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved at https://www.wsj.com/articles/sustainability-is-part-of-good-risk-assessment-11580413295#comments_sector.

1 utilities are among the most vulnerable industries to climate-related risk.⁵³ Climate-
2 related risks that electric utilities face are categorized below:

- 3 • **Physical:** Impacts to assets and operations from physical climate impacts.
- 4 • **Financial:** Impacts to cost-of-capital due to climate-related exposure and
5 confidence in risk management.
- 6 • **Economic:** Risk of stranded assets or decreased sales due to increased viability
7 of alternatives.
- 8 • **Regulatory:** Impacts to operating and capital costs from changing regulations.
- 9 • **Reputational:** Potential loss of goodwill due to perceived response to climate
10 change.

11 Although these categories may be helpful for identifying different types of
12 risk, it should be noted that climate-related risks are complex and interconnected.⁵⁴
13 It is therefore important to understand these risks as related to each other and
14 specifically related to climate change.

15 For each dimension of risk, we summarize the mechanism by which it
16 impacts utility operations, provide an overview of state-of-the-art efforts to
17 characterize the risk, and describe the Company's potential exposure.

⁵³ The Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures identified the energy sector, including electric utilities, as one of four non-financial groups with “the highest likelihood of climate-related financial impacts.” Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures, (2017, June). Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosures. P. 16. Retrieved at: <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf>.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

1 **Q. Does the broader business and financial community consider these risks**
2 **material? Has the perception or assessment of these risks changed since the**
3 **Company’s last rate case?**

4 A. The answer is “yes” to both questions. While climate change and its attendant
5 business risks may be a lightning rod topic for some, Company witness DeMay
6 observes—and we agree—that “[t]he energy sector is in a period of transformation
7 and profound change,” due to technological advancements, environmental
8 mandates, notions of resiliency, and changing customer expectations.⁵⁵ Climate-
9 related risks encapsulate these transformative changes, and the industry has reached
10 a tipping point since the Company’s last rate case application in 2017. Six key
11 developments are driving this transformation:

12 First, a common framework for understanding, disclosing, and managing
13 climate-related risks is emerging. At the request of the G20, the Financial Stability
14 Board formed the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”)
15 in 2015 to develop a universal framework for risk disclosure. The TCFD’s final
16 recommendations were published on June 15, 2017—six weeks after the Company
17 submitted its application for the 2017 rate case.⁵⁶ Since then, TCFD’s

⁵⁵ De May Direct, p. 5, ll. 18-21.

⁵⁶ Duke Energy Progress, LLC. Application to Adjust Retail Rates and Request for an Accounting Order. Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=7e497cdb-bbfb-491d-ba4c-d52764d37112>.

1 recommendations have become the international standard, adopted by almost 800
2 organizations representing over \$118 trillion in assets.⁵⁷

3 Second, awareness of the here-and-now risks of climate change to electric
4 utilities—and the urgent need to mitigate those risks—have materialized since
5 2017. The California wildfires and related PG&E bankruptcy and large-scale public
6 service power shutoffs in response to fire risks have galvanized public conversation
7 about the role of electric utilities in mitigating climate impacts.⁵⁸ One Wall Street
8 Journal headline aptly summarizes the new orientation toward climate-related
9 damages: “For the Economy, Climate Risks are No Longer Theoretical.”⁵⁹

10 Public and private institutions have responded to these impacts. Since 2017,
11 seven US states made commitments to 100 percent renewable energy,⁶⁰ and eleven
12 of the country’s largest utility holding companies, including Duke Energy, have
13 announced deep emissions reduction goals.⁶¹ In section 4, we address the related
14 developments in North Carolina policy, including Executive Order 80 and the

⁵⁷ Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, (2019, May). 2019 Status Report. pp. 2. Retrieved at <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/tcfd-2019-status-report/>.

⁵⁸ Gold, R., (2019, January), PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the Last. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-first-climate-change-bankruptcy-11547820006>.

⁵⁹ Ip, G., (2019, January), For the Economy Climate Risks Are No Longer Theoretical. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-the-economy-climate-risks-are-no-longer-theoretical-11579174209>.

⁶⁰ UCLA Luskin Center for Innovation, (2019, November), Progress Toward 100% Clean Energy in Cities & States Across the US. Retrieved at <https://innovation.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/100-Clean-Energy-Progress-Report-UCLA-2.pdf>.

⁶¹ Gearino, D., (2019, October), Utilities Are Promising Net Zero Carbon Emissions, But Don’t Expect Big Changes Soon. *InsideClimateNews*. Retrieved at <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15102019/utilities-zero-emissions-plans-urgency-coal-gas-duke-dte-xcel>.

1 Clean Energy Plan, which bring a similar awareness and anticipation of climate
2 change’s physical, social, and economic changes into this jurisdiction.

3 Third, major financial institutions are taking the onset of climate-related
4 risks seriously. The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, understanding
5 the implications of these risks, created a climate-related financial risk
6 subcommittee to provide insights and recommendations to market regulators and
7 participants.⁶² Larry Fink, CEO of the world’s largest asset manager BlackRock,
8 recently addressed climate-related risks as the driver of a “fundamental re-shaping
9 of finance” in his annual letter to global CEOs.⁶³ Fink’s letter, and research from
10 BlackRock’s Investment Institute,⁶⁴ also contend that climate-risks are already
11 present in utility stocks, but they haven’t been adequately evaluated by investors.
12 As those risks become clearer, Fink writes that “[i]n the near future—and sooner
13 than most anticipate—there will be a significant re-allocation of capital.”⁶⁵
14 BlackRock’s position as one of the largest and most influential investors in the
15 world lends credence to these claims. Notably, BlackRock is the 2nd largest
16 individual shareholder in Duke Energy Corporation.

⁶² Litterman, R., (2019, December), Remarks to the Market Risk Advisory Committee. *U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission*. Retrieved at https://www.cftc.gov/media/3181/MRAC_Litterman121119/download.

⁶³ Fink, L., (2020, January), A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance. *BlackRock*. Retrieved at: <https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter>

⁶⁴ Bertolotti, A., Basu, D., Akallal, K., Deese, B., (2019, March), Climate Risk in the US Electric Utility Sector: A Case Study. *BlackRock Investment Institute*. Retrieved at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3347746.

⁶⁵ Fink, 2020.

1 Institutional investors see managing climate-related risks as part of their
2 fiduciary duty to protect the long-term health of their investments. In February
3 2019, twenty of the world’s largest institutional investors, representing over \$1.8
4 trillion in assets, sent a letter to Duke Energy and other electric utilities indicating
5 that “[a]s long-term investors, we view these [climate-related] risks as significant
6 and material,” and calling on firms to set a net-zero by 2050 goal over the next six
7 months.⁶⁶ Duke Energy Corporation published its net-zero by 2050 goal seven
8 months later, in September 2019.⁶⁷

9 Fourth, analytical capability to understand climate risks at a granular level
10 has improved dramatically in the last several years. Analysts are capable of
11 projecting climate-related risks and impacts on a single-county level.⁶⁸ One recent
12 study of electric utilities viewed risks on a generating plant-by-plant basis.⁶⁹ The
13 credit rating agencies of Moody’s and S&P are increasing their in-house analytical
14 capacity on this front, and in January 2020 Moody’s released its first
15 comprehensive assessment of climate risk for electric utilities.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ California Public Employees Retirement System et al., (2019, February). *Institutional Investor Statement Regarding Decarbonization of Electric Utilities*. Retrieved at <https://www.climatemajority.us/investorstatement-20190228>.

⁶⁷ Duke Energy (2019, September). Duke Energy aims to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Retrieved at <https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-aims-to-achieve-net-zero-carbon-emissions-by-2050>.

⁶⁸ Larsen, K., Larsen, J., Delgado, M., Herndon, W., Mohan, S., (2017, January) Assessing the Effect of Rising Temperatures: The Cost of Climate Change to the U.S. Power Sector. Rhodium Group, p. 10-19. Retrieved at https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_PowerSectorImpactsOfClimateChange_Jan2017-1.pdf.

⁶⁹ Bertolotti, et al. (2019).

⁷⁰ Morehouse, C. (2020, January). Ameren, Xcel, Dominion, Duke among most at-risk from changing climate: Moody’s. *Utility Dive*. Retrieved at: <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ameren-xcel-dominion-duke-among-most-at-risk-from-changing-climate-mood/570789/>.

1 Fifth, state regulatory regimes are developing best practices for
2 understanding vulnerability to climate-related risks and crafting specific
3 implementation plans for addressing them. In North Carolina, Governor Roy
4 Cooper’s Executive Order 80 initiated a process that includes a comprehensive
5 climate risk assessment, which was released to the public on March 11, 2020.⁷¹ The
6 executive summary of that assessment is provided as Exhibit JMV-TF-3. After
7 Superstorm Sandy, the New York Public Service Commission convened a Grid
8 Hardening & Resiliency Collaborative to reach consensus on risks to the Con
9 Edison system and approaches to managing them—a move that has been hailed as
10 a “nationwide model”⁷² and an innovative approach⁷³ for managing climate-related
11 risks. In partnership with the collaborative, Con Edison released its Climate Change
12 Vulnerability Study in December 2019. This study represents a leap forward in the
13 depth of analysis of climate-related risks, and the utility will develop an

⁷¹ North Carolina Institute for Climate Studies (2020, March). The North Carolina Science Report. Retrieved at: <https://ncics.org/cics-news/the-north-carolina-climate-science-report/>.

⁷² Ralff-Douglas, K., (2016, June). Climate Adaptation in the Electric Sector: Vulnerability Assessments & Resiliency Plans. *California Public Utility Commission*, p. 5. Retrieved at [https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPD_Work_Products_\(2014_forward\)/PPD%20-%20Climate%20Adaptation%20Plans.pdf](https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Policy_and_Planning/PPD_Work/PPD_Work_Products_(2014_forward)/PPD%20-%20Climate%20Adaptation%20Plans.pdf);

Case 13-E-0030 *et al.*; Con Edison’s Electric, Gas, and Stream Rates -- Order Approving Electric, Gas, and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint Proposal (2014, February). State of New York Public Service Commission. Retrieved at: [https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20\(1\).pdf](https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20(1).pdf)

⁷³ Columbia Law School, (2014, February). Center for Climate Change Law Helps Secure Novel Pact with Con Edison. Retrieved at: https://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2014/february2014/Con-Ed-climate-change-measures.

1 implementation plan to address risks throughout 2020. A copy of the Climate
2 Change Vulnerability Study is provided as Exhibit JMV-TF-4.

3 Sixth, analysts and investors are urging firms to take action in the short-
4 term. The U.S. Global Change Research Project concludes that utilities are already
5 subject to climate-related physical risks.⁷⁴ The United Nations Principles for
6 Responsible Investment summarize the point succinctly: “Failure to consider all
7 long-term investment value drivers, including [environmental, social, and
8 governance] issues, is a failure of fiduciary duty.”⁷⁵

9 To recap, there is a common understanding of climate-related risks;
10 investors and the public are taking these risks seriously; new analytical tools render
11 climate risks understandable; a collaborative model for addressing risks exists; and
12 there is value to a proactive approach. Recognition and management of these risks
13 will transform how utilities undertake prudent planning and operations. These
14 developments also mean that firms and regulators now have the tools to act.

15 **Q. What materials have you reviewed in preparation of this testimony?**

16 A. We reviewed literature from the following categories to inform this testimony:

- 17 • Duke Energy Progress and Duke Energy Corporation statements on climate
18 change and climate-related risks;

⁷⁴ Zamuda, C., et al. (2018). Energy Supply, Delivery, and Demand in *Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II*. U.S. Global Change Research Program, pp. 174-201. Doi: [10.7930/NCA4.2018.CH4](https://doi.org/10.7930/NCA4.2018.CH4).

⁷⁵ United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment (2019, November). Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century Final Report. Retrieved at: <https://www.unpri.org/fiduciary-duty-in-the-21st-century-final-report/4998.article#.Xc0f5YqtBhQ.twitter>.

- 1 • Decisions by North Carolina policymakers that might inform future climate-
2 related regulatory risk;
- 3 • Financial institution discussion and business decisions on climate-related risks;
- 4 • Guidance from financial advisory organizations on prudent business practice
5 around disclosing and managing climate-related risks;
- 6 • Research assessing the nature of climate-related risks and best practices on
7 avoiding them from top research organizations;
- 8 • Case studies of other electric utilities and utility commissions weighing their
9 own response to climate-related risks.

10 In total, our review spanned 130 sources from 97 organizations. While the
11 review presented here is not exhaustive or universal, the documents assembled
12 paint a clear picture of the current state of recognizing climate-related risks and the
13 institutional response to them. A list of sources consulted during the literature
14 review is available in Exhibit JMV-TF-5.

15 **B. Physical Risks**

16 **Q. Please define climate-related physical risks and describe how they are**
17 **expected to impact the electric utility industry.**

18 A. Climate-related physical risks are risks to assets or operations due to physical
19 phenomena impacted by climate change. These physical changes can manifest as
20 rising sea levels and flood risk, increasing ambient temperatures and heat waves,
21 changing precipitation patterns, and/or increasing frequency and intensity of
22 extreme weather events. Just as weather and climate have always affected the day-

1 to-day operations and long-term planning of electric utilities, the industry is already
2 affected by the changing climate at the generation, transmission, and distribution
3 levels.⁷⁶

4 Climate change impacts that will have the most substantial risk implications
5 for the electric industry are listed below.

- 6 • **Extreme Weather Events:** More frequent and severe but less predictable
7 storms (and, in coastal areas, attendant storm surges) will result in damage to
8 infrastructure and increases in storm damages. Ratepayers are likely to see
9 decreased reliability and the potential for long outages.⁷⁷
- 10 • **Increased Temperatures:** Increased ambient temperatures will reduce
11 performance and reliability of electricity infrastructure.⁷⁸ Customer demand is
12 projected to increase as cooling loads increase, but become less predictable.⁷⁹
13 Longer, more intense heat waves present health risks for utility workers. High
14 temperature and high cooling load will present sustained stress to the grid.⁸⁰
- 15 • **Changes in Precipitation:** Although not necessarily applicable to the
16 Company's service territory, projected precipitation patterns as a result of

⁷⁶ Zamuda, C., et al. (2018).

⁷⁷ McKinsey Global Institute (2020, January). Climate risk and response :Physical hazards and socioeconomic impacts. Retrieved at: <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/climate-risk-and-response-physical-hazards-and-socioeconomic-impacts>.

⁷⁸ Bertolotti et al., p. 5.

⁷⁹ ConEdison (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. p. 12. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

⁸⁰ Larsen, K., Larsen, J., Delgado, M., Herndon, W., Mohan, S, (2017, January) Assessing the Effect of Rising Temperatures: The Cost of Climate Change to the U.S. Power Sector. Rhodium Group, p. 10-19. Retrieved at https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/RHG_PowerSectorImpactsOfClimateChange_Jan2017-1.pdf.

1 climate change are likely to lead to drier conditions in the southern and western
2 parts of the United States, with intermittent episodes of heavy precipitation.⁸¹

3 A lack of steady water supply could severely impede the operation of nuclear
4 and conventional thermal plants, which rely on an available stream of water for
5 cooling.⁸² Droughts may also increase the risk of wildfire, with clear and
6 present implications for utilities' transmission and distribution.⁸³

7 • **Sea-level Rise and Flooding:** Especially in combination with extreme weather
8 events, higher sea levels increase the risk of inundation for coastal assets.⁸⁴

9 While electricity infrastructure is designed to withstand a range of
10 conditions, future conditions are projected to exceed historical ranges.
11 Understanding and planning for future conditions, and not just relying on historical
12 benchmarks, is becoming necessary to avoid premature asset replacement and
13 stranded assets.⁸⁵

14 Analysts estimate that these damages can be material in the case of electric
15 utilities. In a review of the financial materiality of climate-related physical risks to
16 electric utilities, BlackRock Investment Institute placed the increased frequency

⁸¹ Nanavati, P., & Gundlach, J., (2016, September), The Electric Grid and its Regulators—FERC and State Public Utility Commissions. Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, p. 14.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁸³ Bertolotti *et al.*, p. 4.

⁸⁴ Nanavati & Gundlach, pp. 19.

⁸⁵ Chung, J., (2020, January). *Ameren, Xcel, Dominion, Duke among most at-risk from changing climate: Moody's* (interview by Catherine Morehouse for Utility Dive); Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D., (2020, January). North Carolina Climate Science Report. Presentation given to North Carolina Climate Change Interagency Council, p. 33. Retrieved at <https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/interagency-council/Jan-22-2020--Interagency-Climate-Council-presentation-rev.pdf>

1 and severity of hurricanes as a “10” on a 1-10 scale.⁸⁶ Another estimate found that
2 storm damages were, on average, likely to increase by 23 percent to \$1.7 billion per
3 year by 2050.⁸⁷ It is now possible to examine climate risks at the granularity of
4 individual generating plants.⁸⁸

5 Insurers are increasingly exposed to risks of increasing claims and payouts
6 as the incidence of climate-related events grows.⁸⁹ After California’s 2018 climate-
7 related⁹⁰ wildfire season, which included over 13,000 homes and businesses
8 destroyed and 46,000 insurance claims,⁹¹ analysts were concerned that California
9 utilities might be “uninsurable.”⁹²

10 **Q. How will climate-related physical risks affect the Company specifically?**

11 A. The Company’s location in North Carolina largely determines its exposure to
12 climate-related risks. Although all utilities will be subject to the risks above,

⁸⁶ BlackRock, (2019, April), Getting Physical: Scenario Analysis for Assessing Climate-Related Risks. p.17. Retrieved at <https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/literature/whitepaper/bii-physical-climate-risks-april-2019.pdf>.

⁸⁷ Brody, S., Rogers, M., Siccardo, G., (2019, April), Why, and how, utilities should start to manage climate-change risk. McKinsey & Company, p. 3. Retrieved at: <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/why-and-how-utilities-should-start-to-manage-climate-change-risk>.

⁸⁸ Bertolotti, et al.

⁸⁹ Flavelle, C. (2019, August). As Wildfires Get Worse, Insurers Pull Back from Riskiest Areas. *New York Times*. Retrieved at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/20/climate/fire-insurance-renewal.html>.

⁹⁰ Shrimali, G. (2019, October). In California, More than 340,000 Lose Wildfire Insurance. *High Country News*. Retrieved at <https://www.hcn.org/articles/wildfire-in-california-more-than-340000-lose-wildfire-insurance>.

⁹¹ Bernstein, S., & Barlyn, S., (2019, January). Insurance losses for California Wildfires top \$11.4 Billion. *Reuters*. Retrieved at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-fire-claims/insurance-losses-for-california-wildfires-top-114-billion-idUSKCN1PM2CF>.

⁹² Jaffe, A., Busby, J., Blackburn, J., Copeland, C., Law, S., Ogden, J., & Griffin, P., (2019, September). Impact of Climate Risk on the Energy System. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved at https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Impact%20of%20Climate%20Risk%20on%20the%20Energy%20System_0.pdf.

1 Southeast utilities are particularly exposed to more frequent and severe storms and
2 hurricanes.⁹³

3 High-quality, in-depth studies of climate impacts focused specifically on
4 North Carolina are in progress. As directed by Section 9 of Governor Roy Cooper’s
5 Executive Order 80, leading North Carolina institutions have released a North
6 Carolina Climate Science Report that assesses the state of the science and makes
7 projections for North Carolina-specific impacts.⁹⁴ Findings from the report indicate
8 that, “[l]arge changes in North Carolina’s climate—much larger than at any time in
9 the state’s history—are *very likely* by the end of this century under both the lower
10 and higher [emissions] scenarios.”⁹⁵ Authors of the report presenting to the North
11 Carolina Climate Change Interagency Council found it is “*very likely* [90-100%
12 probability]” that NC temperatures will increase in all seasons, extreme
13 precipitation frequency and intensity will increase, and that heavy precipitations
14 accompanying hurricanes passing over North Carolina will increase.⁹⁶ As a result,
15 climate design standards for North Carolina infrastructure will be outdated by the
16 middle of this century⁹⁷—likely within the design lifetime of investments proposed
17 under the Grid Improvement Plan. The North Carolina Climate Science report was

⁹³ Zamuda, C., et al.

⁹⁴ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (2019). NC Climate Science Report Development. Retrieved at <https://deq.nc.gov/nc-climate-science-report-development>.

⁹⁵ Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D., (2020, January), emphasis in original.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, emphasis in original.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

1 released to the public on March 11, 2020,⁹⁸ and its executive summary is attached
2 as Exhibit JMV-TF-3. It is a key input into the North Carolina Climate Risk
3 Assessment and Resiliency Plan, which is currently in development.

4 Financial observers have already been paying careful attention to utilities'
5 climate-related physical risks. When S&P announced a negative outlook for Duke
6 Energy Corporation in 2019, it noted that “[t]he company also operates its utilities
7 in regions of the U.S. that are prone to frequent hurricanes, which could increase
8 the company’s risk exposure because climate change is intensifying the severity
9 and frequency of these natural disasters globally.”⁹⁹ Moody’s and S&P mentioned
10 hurricanes or named storms in ratings of the Company in each year 2017-2019.¹⁰⁰

11 Beyond broad characterizations, credit rating agencies are using
12 increasingly powerful analytical methods for understanding climate risks, finding
13 that Duke Energy’s footprint in the Carolinas in particular is exposed to climate-
14 related risks. Moody’s published its first review of climate-related risks for electric
15 utilities in January 2020 and found Duke Energy a top risk for hurricane threats.¹⁰¹

16 Materials submitted by the Company in this proceeding validate the
17 findings reported by Moody’s. Figure 2 below disaggregates system average

⁹⁸ North Carolina Institute for Climate Studies (2020, March). The North Carolina Science Report. Retrieved at: <https://ncics.org/cics-news/the-north-carolina-climate-science-report/>.


⁹⁹ S&P Global Ratings, (2019, May), Research Update: Duke Energy Corp. and Subs. Outlook Revised To Negative On Coal Ash Risks, Regulatory-Lag, And Project Delays. P. 4. Retrieved at Company Response to Public Staff Data Request 38-5.

¹⁰⁰ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-24.

¹⁰¹ Morehouse, 2020.

1 interruption duration index (“SAIDI”) in regular operation and during Major Event
2 Days, which include but are not exclusively related to weather events.

3 **Figure 2: Duke Energy Progress System Average Interruption Duration Index**
4 **(SAIDI) with and without Major Event Days (MEDs)¹⁰²**



5
6 The Company’s SAIDI trend over the last ten years shows a relatively flat
7 SAIDI during normal operations, but increasing SAIDI impacts from major event
8 days. While the major event days’ occurrence is inherently stochastic, experts have
9 found a statistically significant increase in major event days over time.¹⁰³ For
10 context, the average customer was without power for 250 minutes in 2018,¹⁰⁴ and

¹⁰² Graph compiled using MED and non-MED SAIDI figures from Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-25.

¹⁰³ Larsen, P., Sweeney, P., Hamachi-LaCommare, K., Eto, J., (2014, April). Exploring the Reliability of U.S Electric Utilities. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, p. 29. Retrieved at http://www.usaee.org/usaee2014/submissions/OnlineProceedings/IAEE_ConferencePaper_01Apr2014.pdf.

¹⁰⁴ US Energy Information Administration (“EIA”), (2018, April), “Average frequency and duration of electric distribution outages vary by states.” Retrieved at <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=35652>.

1 the cumulative improvement projected for phase one of the Grid Improvement Plan
2 would reduce SAIDI by 49.23 minutes per customer.¹⁰⁵

3 **C. Financial Risks**

4 **Q. Please define climate-related financial risks and summarize how they are**
5 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

6 A. Climate-related financial risks refer to impacts on the ability of a firm to access
7 reliable and affordable financing due to climate change. Financial risks can be
8 difficult to disaggregate from other risks because financial institutions' climate-
9 related reasons for up- or down-grading a firm will often be linked to other climate-
10 related impacts (e.g. downgrading a California utility due to exposure to wildfire
11 risks). But the unique impacts of financial actions, and specific pathways by which
12 these risks are expressed (e.g. downgrades, disinvestment, votes against board
13 members, changes to stock price), merit treating financial risks as a separate
14 category.

15 Investors are already paying special attention to electric utilities and their
16 responses to climate-related risks. The Climate Action 100+, a global group of
17 investors with over \$35 trillion under management, identified 32 electric utilities as
18 part of the hundred largest greenhouse gas emitters in the world.¹⁰⁶ Duke Energy
19 Corporation is listed as one of the focus companies in the Climate Action 100+.

¹⁰⁵ Company response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-26.

¹⁰⁶ Climate Action 100+, (2019). *2019 Progress Report*. Retrieved at
<https://climateaction100.files.wordpress.com/2019/10/progressreport2019.pdf>.

1 Credit rating agencies have already integrated a review of climate-risk, as a
2 part of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) review, into their credit
3 ratings. S&P found in its lookback over ratings published 2015-2017 that
4 environment and climate (“E&C”) risks played an important role in over 700 cases,
5 and over 100 listed E&C risks as a key factor. Of cases where E&C risks were a
6 key factor, over 40 percent resulted in downgrades.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, S&P
7 demonstrates that prudent management of energy & climate risk represents an
8 opportunity for firms—20 upgrades listed E&C issues as a key factor.¹⁰⁸

9 Investors like BlackRock and Morgan Stanley are also building analytical
10 capacity to understand the distribution of climate-related risks. BlackRock and the
11 Rhodium Group are using their plant-level climate risk findings to generate
12 company-level climate-risk indices.¹⁰⁹ Using those indices, they find that climate-
13 resilient utilities trade at a slight premium, while the most risk-exposed utilities
14 trade at a discount.¹¹⁰ An academic analysis of the relationship between climate
15 risk, risk management, and financial health found similar results:

16 “We document a positive correlation between cost of debt
17 and carbon risk for firms [without awareness of climate
18 risks]. Further, this association is economically meaningful,
19 with a one standard deviation increase in carbon risk
20 mapping into between a 38 and 62 basis point increase in the

¹⁰⁷ Williams, J., & Wilkins, M., (2017, November), How Environmental And Climate Risks And Opportunities Factor Into Global Corporate Ratings – An Update. *S&P Global Ratings*. Retrieved at Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-13, Docket No. E-7 Sub 1146.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Bertolotti et al.

¹¹⁰ BlackRock, 2019.

1 cost of debt. Equally, we find that the penalty is effectively
2 negated for firms exhibiting carbon risk awareness.”¹¹¹

3 **Q. How might climate-related financial risks affect the Company specifically?**

4 A. Duke Energy Corporation’s largest individual shareholders have taken strong
5 positions on risks related to climate change and their likely response. Table 1 below
6 demonstrates a selection of Duke Energy’s creditors and their position on climate
7 risks.

8 **Table 1: Selection of Duke Energy Investors and Positions on Climate Risk**

Shareholder	% Share of DUK	Climate-related Risk Position
Vanguard Group	8.19%*	“Many companies remain far beyond on their [climate-related risk] journey and have room to improve their disclosure and better educate their board on climate-related risks.” ¹¹²
Blackrock Fund Advisors	5.3%*	“In absence of robust disclosures, investors, including BlackRock, will increasingly conclude that companies are not adequately managing risk.” ¹¹³
State Street Advisors	5.15%*	“The vast majority of companies are taking a short-term, tactical approach to climate risk; they are failing to identify the long-term threats and opportunities created by a shift to a low-carbon economy and to incorporate this thinking into their boards’ strategic planning.” ¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Jung, J., Herbohn, K., Clarkson, P., (2018, July), “Carbon Risk, Carbon Risk Awareness, and the Cost of Debt Financing.” *Journal of Business Ethics*.

¹¹² Vanguard (2019). Investment Stewardship 2019 Annual Report.

¹¹³ Fink, 2020.

¹¹⁴ State Street Global Advisors, (2019, June), Climate-Related Disclosures in Oil and Gas, Mining, and Utilities: The Current State and Opportunities for Improvement. Retrieved at

		Sent a letter to boards (January 2020) advising they would “take appropriate voting action” against board members of major US firms if they rated poorly on SSGA’s ESG score and did not articulate how they would improve it. ¹¹⁵
New York City Employees’ Retirement System	**	Sent a letter to Duke Energy advocating for an ambitious climate goal. “This initiative makes clear that mobilizing for the planet goes hand-in-hand with protecting our pensions, and we need these commitments now.” ¹¹⁶

1 *: Top three individual investors
 2 **: Investment share outside of top 10 are not published.

3 Credit rating agencies Moody’s and S&P mention climate-related physical,
 4 regulatory, and economic risks in their updates on the Company and Duke Energy
 5 Corporation.¹¹⁷ In and of themselves, the risks recorded in these updates may have
 6 negative impacts on the Company’s business operations. But the financial
 7 community’s awareness of these risks, and its potential reaction to those risks
 8 through stock price movement, shareholder action, and changes to credit ratings,
 9 present a unique challenge to the Company’s business risks.

10 **D. Economic Risks**

<https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2019/06/climate-disclosure-assesment.pdf>.

¹¹⁵ Wigglesworth, R., (2020, January), “State Street vows to turn up the heat on ESG standards.” *Financial Times*. Retrieved at <https://www.ft.com/content/cb1e2684-4152-11ea-a047-cae9bd51ceba>.

¹¹⁶ Kerber, R., (2019, February), “Big U.S. pension funds ask electric utilities for de-carbonization plans.” *Reuters*. Retrieved at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-utilities-investors/big-u-s-pension-funds-ask-electric-utilities-for-decarbonization-plans-idUSKCN1QH27D>.

¹¹⁷ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-24.

1 **Q. Please define climate-related economic risks and summarize how they are**
2 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

3 A. Climate-related economic risks are divided into technology risks and market risk.
4 Technology risks refer to exposure of a firm’s assets and operations from disruptive
5 or innovative technologies that develop and mature through societal responses to
6 climate change. In the electric utility sector, the principal technology risk is that of
7 low- or no-carbon generation technologies like wind and solar displacing
8 conventional generation and therefore “stranding” those assets’ ability to recover
9 their capital investment. As an example, NIPSCO and Tri-State recently recognized
10 and corrected for climate-related technology risk by committing to shut down
11 legacy coal assets in favor of a shift to renewables.¹¹⁸ Analyses sponsored by both
12 companies demonstrate the prudence of this decision: it will save money for these
13 companies and ultimately for ratepayers.

14 Market risk refers generally to risks created by markets adapting to climate
15 change. These risks are subtle and complex, especially in the energy sector, but one
16 illustration might be customers opting out of typical utility service to pursue
17 renewable options. Because of this complexity, this testimony will not analyze or
18 evaluate market risks.

¹¹⁸ McMahon, J., (2019, July), “In Conservative Indiana, Utility Chooses Renewables Over Gas As It Retires Coal Early.” *Forbes*. Retrieved at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/07/02/mike-pences-indiana-chooses-renewables-over-gas-as-it-retires-coal-early/#7cb3265243b4>;

Best, A., (2020, January), “Tri-State CEO says wholesaler’s clean energy transition will pay dividends.” *Energy News Network*. Retrieved at: <https://energynews.us/2020/01/21/west/tri-state-ceo-says-wholesalers-clean-energy-transition-will-pay-dividends/>.

1 Analysts have focused particular attention on technology risks for utilities
2 operating legacy coal assets. One analysis by Energy Innovation found that by
3 2025, new wind and solar would be less expensive than running 70percent of all
4 coal assets in the United States.¹¹⁹ Subsequent studies from Morgan Stanley and
5 Moody’s have corroborated those results.¹²⁰

6 The same principle applies to gas generation. A study from the Rocky
7 Mountain Institute found that a portfolio of clean energy technologies would deliver
8 the same energy at a lower cost than 90 percent of gas-fired power plant capacity.
9 The report ends with a recommendation to state utility regulators: “[a]ccount for
10 the significant risk that uneconomic gas generation will increase customer rates.”¹²¹

11 **Q. How might climate-related economic risks affect the Company specifically?**

12 A. The same national trends regarding coal and gas assets are also relevant in North
13 Carolina. For coal assets, “[t]he trend is so strong that it is hard to imagine
14 Southeastern utilities not relying heavily on solar and complementary load shifting
15 resources to replace the coal and save customers money.”¹²²

¹¹⁹ Gimon, E., O’Boyle, M., Clack, Ct., McKee, S., (2019, March), The Coal Cost Crossover: Economic Viability of Existing Coal Compared to New Local Wind and Solar Resources. *Energy Innovation and Vibrant Clean Energy*. Retrieved at https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Coal-Cost-Crossover_Energy-Innovation_VCE_FINAL.pdf.

¹²⁰ Smyth, J., (2019, December), “Financial analysts expect decarbonization will benefit utility ratepayers and shareholders.” *Energy and Policy Institute*. Retrieved at: <https://www.energyandpolicy.org/financial-analysts-expect-decarbonization-will-benefit-utility-ratepayers-and-shareholders/>.

¹²¹ Teplin, C., Dyson, M., Engel, A., Glazer, G., (2019), The Growing Market for Clean Energy Portfolios: Economic Opportunities for a Shift from New Gas-Fired Generation to Clean Energy Across the United States Electricity Industry. *Rocky Mountain Institute*, <https://rmi.org/cep-reports>.

¹²² Gimon, et al.

1 In many cases, multiple climate-related trends can come together to cause
2 an economic shift—a shift that the Duke Energy is already acknowledging. In
3 describing the forces that led to the Company’s decision to retire several coal plants,
4 the Duke Energy Carolinas cites the following trends:

- 5 • On-going price declines and efficiency improvements of potential
6 replacement including CTs, renewables and energy storage alternatives;
- 7 • Potential for increasing regulatory drivers including the release of the
8 NC DEQ Climate Plan, NC Executive Order 80, and NCUC 2018 IRP
9 Order requiring evaluation of accelerated coal plant retirements in
10 future IRPs; and
- 11 • Potential for federal or state CO₂ legislation.¹²³

12 Credit rating analysts are paying special attention to the Company’s
13 climate-related economic risks. Moody’s 2019 credit rating for the Company found
14 that “[DEC] has a moderate carbon transition risk within the regulated utility sector
15 because, as an integrated utility, its generation ownership places it at a higher risk
16 profile than transmission and distribution companies.”¹²⁴

17 Informally, Duke Energy Corporation officials have responded to the threat
18 posed by renewables to gas generation and the inconsistency of gas generation with
19 a carbon goal by proposing shorter depreciation periods for new gas generation—

¹²³ Duke Energy Carolinas Response to Tech Customers Data Request 3-26, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214.
¹²⁴ Moody’s Investor Service, (2019, March), “Duke Energy Progress, LLC.” Retrieved at Company’s
Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-24.

1 including periods as short as 15 years.¹²⁵ The necessary result of a shorter operating
2 life, of course, is faster recovery of capital investment, driving higher annual costs
3 and a higher average cost per kilowatt-hour. Duke Energy’s potential decision to
4 accelerate depreciation and increase ratepayer costs for these plants is, in and of
5 itself, an example of climate-related risks increasing costs for ratepayers. These
6 higher costs also increase the likelihood that renewables might be a more cost-
7 effective option.

8 The risks of distributed generation referred to in Witness Hevert’s testimony
9 are examples of technology risk.¹²⁶ Hevert’s testimony does not, however,
10 acknowledge the benefits of customer-owned generation, which reduces the
11 Company’s exposure to climate-related risks as renewables come onto the grid. It
12 is clear that distributed energy resources offer resilience benefits, and actors at the
13 state and federal level are developing increasingly precise methods for valuing
14 resiliency.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Morehouse, C., (2019, October), Duke VP likens gas plant buildout strategy to 15-year home mortgage on path to zero carbon.” *Utility Dive*. Retrieved at <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-vp-likens-gas-plant-buildout-strategy-to-15-year-home-mortgage-on-path/565328/>.

¹²⁶ Direct Testimony of Robert B. Hevert (“Hevert Direct”), p. 48, l. 12-18.

¹²⁷ National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, (2019, April). The Value of Resilience for Distributed Energy Resources: An Overview of Current Analytical Practices. Retrieved at: <https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/531AD059-9CC0-BAF6-127B-99BCB5F02198>.

1 **E. Regulatory Risks**

2 **Q. Please define climate-related regulatory risks and summarize how they are**
3 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

4 A. Climate-related regulatory risks refer to negative impacts on a given firm due to
5 policy changes that either seek to constrain actions that would exacerbate climate
6 change, or incentivize actions that would ameliorate its impacts. Greenhouse gas
7 emissions, for example, have until recently been an inextricable part of the electric
8 utility industry, so a clear regulatory risk to electric utilities is constraints on these
9 emissions or requirements to procure energy from renewable sources.

10 The United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (“UNPRI”) uses
11 a framework called the Inevitable Policy Response (“IPR”) to understand
12 regulatory risk. This framework uses a more probabilistic model of climate policy:
13 Instead of using a scenario-based “climate policy” and “no climate policy”
14 approach, IPR asks when such a policy might be put in place. Using this framework,
15 UNPRI found that a two-degree policy scenario (i.e., a scenario assuming an
16 increase of two degrees Celsius in world temperatures) would on average lead to a
17 4 percent decrease in valuation for electric utilities. It also found electric utilities to
18 have the widest variation in valuation adjustment by firm of any sector analyzed,
19 with some firms decreasing in valuation by over 30 percent, and others increasing
20 by the same margin.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ UN Principles for Responsible Investment (2019), Impacts of the Inevitable Policy Response on Equity Markets. Retrieved at <https://www.unpri.org/download?ac=9857>.

1 Financial observers are paying close attention to firms' policy, legal, and
2 regulatory risks and their prudent management. S&P's lookback on the role of
3 environment and climate factors in their credit ratings found that physical risks
4 were the most cited type of risk, but policy risks were a close second—and the two
5 of them were drivers of S&P rating decisions more than all other listed climate-
6 related risks and opportunities combined.¹²⁹

7 **Q. How might climate-related regulatory risks affect the Company specifically?**

8 A. Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions at the state or federal level would directly
9 impact the Company's operations and planning. As the single largest owner of coal
10 and gas generation capacity in 2018¹³⁰ and largest carbon emitter in the nation
11 among electric power producers in 2019,¹³¹ Duke Energy Corporation would likely
12 face a substantial regulatory burden from passage of an emissions reduction scheme
13 at any level. The share of generation capacity served by conventional generation
14 (coal and gas) for the Company is approximately 50 percent, and according to its
15 integrated resource plan ("IRP") that figure will in fact increase to 60 percent
16 through 2034 (although the share of conventional generation will shift from coal to
17 gas).¹³²

¹²⁹ Williams & Wilkins.

¹³⁰ Dholakia, G., (2019, December). Duke Energy tops operating US coal, gas capacity ownership. *S&P Global*. Retrieved at: <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/w4jueneo16bxoihgp-fhya2>.

¹³¹ Van Atten, C., Saha, A., Hellgren, L., Langlois, T, (2019, June), Benchmarking Air Emissions of the 100 Largest Electric Power Producers in the United States. *MJ Bradley*. Retrieved at https://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/Presentation_of_Results_2019.pdf.

¹³² Duke Energy Progress (2019, September), Integrated Resource Plan: Update Report. pp. 9, Chart 2-A. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=7f4b3176-95d8-425d-a36b-390e1e57a175>.

1 Speculating on the likelihood of a federal climate policy is outside of the
2 scope of this testimony, but recent developments at the state level, as discussed
3 more in-depth in Section 4, suggest an increasing level of ambition by the states
4 regarding greenhouse gas policy.

5 Preparation for uncertain outcomes is key to risk management and
6 particularly apt for understanding regulatory risks. The Company, for example,
7 already orients its planning around a tax on emissions beginning in 2025.¹³³ The
8 level of tax used in the Company’s planning starts at one-eighth the level of the tax
9 proposed in September 2019 by the Climate Leadership Council, which counts
10 Exelon, ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, and Vistra as members.¹³⁴

¹³³ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-27.

¹³⁴ Climate Leadership Council (2019, September). Our Plan. Retrieved at <https://clcouncil.org/our-plan/>.

1 **F. Reputational Risks**

2 **Q. Please define climate-related reputational risks and summarize how they are**
3 **expected to impact the electric utilities industry.**

4 A. Climate-related reputational risks represent those tied to “changing customer or
5 community perceptions of an organization’s contribution to or detracting from the
6 transition to a lower-carbon economy.”¹³⁵ Electric utilities risk damage to their
7 reputation if their response to climate change is out of line with stakeholders’
8 expectations, from inadequate storm repair to continued investment in conventional
9 electric generation technology without emissions controls.

10 Increasingly, electric utilities are managing their reputational risk by
11 making commitments or announcements to decrease their greenhouse gas
12 emissions. These announcements may increase goodwill, and potentially decrease
13 the likelihood of new regulatory regimes that might mandate a decrease in
14 emissions. At the same time, announcements in and of themselves may introduce
15 reputational risks if firms do not appear to be honoring their public commitments.

16 **Q. How might climate-related reputational risks affect the Company specifically?**

17 A. A recent poll found North Carolina voters favor action to reduce carbon
18 emissions,¹³⁶ and Duke Energy Corporation’s recent shareholder resolutions show

¹³⁵ TCFD [Recommendations](#), p. 6.

¹³⁶ Global Strategy Group (2019, October). Regulating North Carolina’s Carbon Pollution: Research Findings Prepared by Global Strategy Group for EDF Action. P. 6. Retrieved at https://www.edfaction.org/sites/edactionfund.org/files/u141/nc_carbon_limits_survey_analysis.pdf.

1 similar sentiment among the Company's shareholders.¹³⁷ As long as the Company's
2 operations continue to emit carbon, the Company will likely be exposed to
3 reputational risks. The Company also faces scrutiny due to ongoing coal ash
4 remediation issues.¹³⁸

5 Duke Energy Corporation announced its non-binding net-zero-by-2050
6 goal on September 17, 2019, establishing its presence in a growing cohort of large
7 utility holding companies with ambitious carbon goals.¹³⁹ As discussed above,
8 carbon announcements such as this one may mitigate some reputational risks but
9 exacerbate others. Although the Corporation's goal is enterprise-wide, the
10 Company would presumably need to follow a similar emissions path for the
11 Corporation to meet its goals. However, the Company's projections in this case do
12 not show that the Company will achieve them. Figure 3 shows the Company's
13 projected carbon emissions as consistent with the higher carbon emissions
14 contemplated in its IRP, in millions of tons of CO₂ emitted annually, compared to
15 the emissions pathway needed to achieve the Corporation's goals for DEC.


¹³⁷ Duke Energy (2019). Shareholder Proposals. Retrieved at: <https://www.duke-energy.com/proxy/ /media/pdfs/our-company/investors/proxy/shareholder-proposal.pdf?la=en>.

¹³⁸ Sorg, L. (2020, January). DEQ, Duke Energy, community groups strike deal on largest coal ash cleanup in US. *NC Policy Watch*. Retrieved at: <http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2020/01/02/deq-duke-energy-community-groups-strike-deal-on-largest-coal-ash-cleanup-in-us/>.

¹³⁹ Gearino, D.

1
2

Figure 3: DEP Projected Emissions versus Pathway Consistent with Corporate Goals¹⁴⁰



3

4 Thus, the emissions projected for purposes of this case do not comply with stated
5 goals. Even worse, these projected carbon emissions are used to determine the value
6 of carbon reductions created by the Grid Improvement Plan in the Company’s cost-
7 benefit analyses.¹⁴¹ The result of these two decisions is that the Grid Improvement
8 Plan’s cost-benefit analysis is “taking credit” for carbon reduction that would not
9 occur if the Company followed a path to achieving its carbon goal. The clear
10 disconnect between the Corporation’s public communications and the Company’s
11 statements in this proceeding represents a substantial reputational risk.

¹⁴⁰ Graph compiled using projected annual CO2 emissions from Company response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-27 and Duke Energy Corporation’s September 17, 2019 net-zero carbon emissions announcement.

¹⁴¹ Oliver Direct, Ex. 7.

1 **G. Commission Consideration of Climate Risk**

2 **Q. Based on your review of the literature and financial statements, are these risks**
3 **material?**

4 A. Yes. Based on a review of the available literature, the Company's filings, and the
5 findings shown above, we assess climate-related risks are material to any electric
6 utility's investments, costs, and operations, and they are specifically material to the
7 Company in this proceeding.

8 **Q. Does this testimony represent a comprehensive evaluation of the company's**
9 **vulnerability to climate risks?**

10 A. No. A comprehensive assessment of the Company's climate-related risks and the
11 opportunities available in addressing those risks would require more operational
12 data than is available to the public, consensus from a range of stakeholders, and a
13 substantial analytical burden. As examples, the New York Storm Hardening &
14 Resiliency Collaborative and Con Edison's Climate Change Vulnerability Study
15 represent best practices in field of climate-related physical risks.

16 **Q. How might the Commission view the TCFD climate-related risk framework?**

17 A. As a regulator, the Commission has an important role to play in ensuring emergent
18 risks are managed. (In fact, World Bank case studies on utility climate adaptation
19 find that regulatory support is invaluable in incenting firms to act on long-term

1 risks.)¹⁴² At a minimum, the Commission may want to ensure that firms it regulates
2 are aware of these risks and that its expectations of management are clear. The
3 Commission could then support firms in meeting those expectations through
4 information sharing and regulatory innovation. The Commission could use the
5 TCFD framework as a tool-kit for categorizing risks and setting expectations for
6 prudent management.

7 **Q. Is the management of climate-related risks a critical component for keeping**
8 **rates low for customers?**

9 A. Yes. Managing climate-related risks is and will be integral to minimizing the costs
10 imposed on customers associated with the impacts of climate change and ensuring
11 the provision of safe and adequate utility service. Like any other business risk, the
12 prudent management of climate risk will minimize those cost to the Company and,
13 therefore, to customers.

14 Unlike other business risks, however, customers have their own direct
15 exposure to climate-related risks. Proactive action is necessary to ensure that
16 customers are best protected from climate-related risks and that they get reliable
17 service when they need it most. Managing climate-related risks is in the interest of
18 the Company and the public, a proposition that the Company seems to endorse
19 based on its discovery responses.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Audinet, P. (2014). Climate Risk Management Approaches in the Electricity Sector. *World Bank Group*. Retrieved at <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/metadata/publications/climate-risk-management-approaches-in-the-electricity-sector-lessons-from-early-adapters>.

¹⁴³ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-20.

1 **Q. If the Commission or the Company adopted the climate-related risk**
2 **framework, would the Company be expected to undertake major changes in**
3 **its operations immediately?**

4 A. No. Climate-related risks would represent an additional input to the Company’s
5 existing decision-making process. Decision-makers at the Company, and the
6 associated oversight by regulators, would still weigh risks and opportunities across
7 multiple dimensions when making business decisions.

8 **Q. Do climate-related risks warrant considering an increase to the Company’s**
9 **allowed return on equity?**

10 A. No. First, climate-related risks may be described as “asymmetrical” risks—that is,
11 prudent management may avoid a decline in return on equity, but is less likely to
12 result in a higher return on equity. Experts at the Brattle Group have noted that
13 these risks are not suitable for addressing through a simple risk premium.¹⁴⁴
14 Second, exposure of the Company to these risks is at least partially dependent on
15 the actions it takes in the operation and planning of its enterprise. Therefore, the
16 risk for the Company is present only to the extent that it continues to pursue
17 business decisions that ignore that risk. The same experts at the Brattle group note
18 that “[i]t often may be easier to mitigate a risk directly rather than to measure its
19 marginal effect on the cost of capital.”¹⁴⁵ The California Public Utilities

¹⁴⁴ Brattle Group, (2017), *Compensating Risk in Evolving Utility Business Models*. Pp. 14. Retrieved at https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/7264_compensating_risk_in_evolution_utility_business_models_august_2017.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

1 Commission addressed a similar issue with regard to wildfire risk and concluded:
2 “The standard set in *Bluefield* and *Hope** is that investor-owned utilities should not
3 be rewarded with an ROE that is inflated due to imprudent actions.”¹⁴⁶

4 **H. Emerging Best Practices for Managing Climate-Related Risks**

5 **Q. Based on your review of the climate-related risk literature, have you identified**
6 **best practices for managing climate-related risks?**

7 A. Yes. The Task Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures recommends that
8 firms exposed to climate-related risks and opportunities embed their climate
9 strategy into the core of their business practices, then disclose to investors how they
10 do so. TCFD recommends that accountability for climate strategy be embedded into
11 the firm’s board and management governance structure; that the firm’s strategy at
12 all levels be informed by climate risks and scenario-based planning around
13 accelerated transitions; that risk management at all levels integrate climate-related
14 risks; and that the firm’s reported metrics and targets include exposure to climate
15 risks and total carbon emissions.¹⁴⁷ As a non-financial sector with special exposure
16 to physical and transition risks, TCFD recommends additional disclosures for

* *Bluefield* and *Hope* refers to *Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia* (“*Bluefield*”), 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and *Federal Power Commission et al v. Hope Natural Gas Co.* (“*Hope*”), 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). These two cases set the precedent for a regulated utility’s right to earn a reasonable rate of return on investments.

¹⁴⁶ California Public Utilities Commission, (2019, December). Decision on Test Year 2020 Cost of Capital for the Major Energy Companies. Application 19-04-014 et al. p. 36 (italics added). Retrieved at: <http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M322/K633/322633896.PDF>.

¹⁴⁷ Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, (2017). Final Report: Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. Retrieved at: <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf>.

1 electric utilities, including disclosure of internal carbon prices and capital
2 expenditures on low-carbon generation assets.¹⁴⁸

3 **Q. Do climate-related risks apply only to the Company's generation assets?**

4 A. No. In fact, climate-related risks span the whole of the Company's operations, from
5 generation to consumer programs. Investments within the Grid Improvement Plan,
6 for instance, are subject to climate-related physical risks (as we describe in Section
7 5). To the extent that the Grid Improvement Plan enables a transition to a de-
8 carbonized and resilient grid, the investments also have implications for the
9 Company's financial, economic, regulatory, and reputational risks.

10 **Q. How have electric utilities responded to the onset of climate-related physical
11 risks?**

12 A. Even as early as 2014, electric utilities understood the need for guidance and
13 recommendations on resilience to climate-related physical risks.¹⁴⁹ In 2015, the US
14 Department of Energy convened the *Partnership for Energy Sector Climate
15 Resilience*, a collaborative of 19 electric utilities supported by DOE in developing
16 best practices for understanding climate-related vulnerabilities and establishing
17 climate resilience.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, (2017). Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. Retrieved at: <https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FINAL-TCFD-Annex-Amended-121517.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ Edison Electric Institute, (2014, March). *Before and After the Storm: A compilation of recent studies, programs, and policies related to storm hardening and resiliency*. Retrieved at <https://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/electricreliability/mutualassistance/Documents/BeforeandAftertheStorm.pdf>.

¹⁵⁰ US Department of Energy, (2016, September). *Climate Change and the Electricity Sector: Guide for Climate Change Resilience Planning*. Retrieved at:

1 The partnership’s *Guide for Climate Change Resilience Planning* describes
2 a two-step process for resiliency. First, utilities should conduct a vulnerability
3 assessment to understand their exposure and sensitivity to climate risks. Second,
4 with the vulnerability assessment as an input, utilities can create a resilience plan
5 that responds to those identified vulnerabilities, reviewing a wide range of
6 resilience measures and using a systematic cost-benefit methodology that includes
7 appropriate co-benefits.¹⁵¹ This two-step process ensures that resiliency measures
8 are designed with granular, up-to-date, high-quality information on vulnerabilities;
9 use of a systematic cost-benefit analysis ensures that all resilience measures are
10 fairly evaluated.

11 **Q. Are there any examples or case studies of that would illustrate the**
12 **implementation of best practices in climate-informed planning?**

13 A. Yes. The work of the New York Storm Hardening & Resiliency Collaborative
14 (consisting of Con Edison, Department of Public Service Staff, the City of New
15 York, several environmental NGOs, and others) that emerged out of a settlement in
16 Con Edison’s 2013 rate case represents a good example of best practice in the
17 industry. In its order approving Con Edison and public staff’s settlement in the 2013
18 rate case, the New York Public Service Commission found that “[t]he Con Edison
19 Resiliency Collaborative has provided a valuable focus for innovative approaches

https://toolkit.climate.gov/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Electricity%20Sector%20Guide%20for%20Climate%20Change%20Resilience%20Planning%20September%202016_0.pdf

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

1 to the 21st century challenges to the utility system, and its work should continue, in
2 public where appropriate.”¹⁵² The Collaborative reviewed Con Edison’s proposed
3 storm hardening investments, and also created a framework for climate
4 vulnerability assessment, examined the applicability of non-wires resiliency
5 strategies, and developed a robust cost-benefit analysis.¹⁵³

6 Con Edison’s complete climate risk vulnerability study was published in
7 December 2019. The vulnerability study presents a comprehensive, forward-
8 looking assessment of physical risks of climate change (including, for example,
9 risks to workers due to higher frequency and intensity of heat waves) through an
10 integrated framework of physical climate impacts, risks to assets and operations,
11 and potential resilient solutions.¹⁵⁴ The study’s use of the best available climate
12 science—analyzed through a transparent, risk-based approach and considering a
13 wide range of resilience solutions over the transmission and distribution system—
14 represents a step forward for the industry.¹⁵⁵ The follow-up Climate Change
15 Resilience Plan is due from Con Edison in December 2020.

¹⁵² Case 13-E-0030 *et al.*; Con Edison’s Electric, Gas, and Stream Rates -- Order Approving Electric, Gas, and Steam Rate Plans in Accord with Joint Proposal (2014, February). State of New York Public Service Commission. Retrieved at: [https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20\(1\).pdf](https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/docs/Final-Order-2014-02-21%20(1).pdf).

¹⁵³ Case 13-E-0030 *et al.*; Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Storm Hardening and Resiliency Collaborative Phase Three Report. (2015, September).

¹⁵⁴ ConEdison, (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

¹⁵⁵ M.J. Bradley & Associates, (2019, December). Key Considerations for Electric Sector Climate Resilience Policy and Investments. Retrieved at https://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/MJB%26A_KeyConsiderationsforClimateResiliencePolicyandInvestment.pdf.

1 **Q. Based on the material you have reviewed, have you identified best practices**
2 **for climate resilience?**

3 A. Yes, with one caveat. First and foremost, climate-related risk management in
4 electric utility distribution investments to date has focused exclusively on climate-
5 related physical risks, without integrating financial, economic, regulatory, or
6 reputational risks into risk assessment. Among the many co-benefits that enabling
7 renewable distributed energy resources provides, for example, is that they provide
8 a hedge to a given firm's regulatory and reputational risk.

9 Based on our review of emerging climate resilience plans, climate resilience
10 plans proceed through two steps:

11 • **Forward-looking, high-quality vulnerability assessment.** The U.S.
12 Department of Energy's North American Energy Resilience Model
13 urges utilities to "transition from the current reactive state-of-practice to
14 a new energy planning and operations paradigm in which we proactively
15 anticipate [damage], predict associated outages, and recommend
16 optimal mitigation strategies."¹⁵⁶ Utilities need to understand their
17 exposure and vulnerability to climate-related risks before they can cost-
18 effectively address them. Climate resilience plans undergo vulnerability
19 studies that look at a wide variety of risks, integrate the most up-to-date
20 scientific work on the matter, and project potential impacts of these risks

¹⁵⁶ Con Edison (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study. P. 63.

1 on specific assets in the future. High-quality vulnerability assessments
2 both identify where the need for intervention is the greatest and provide
3 a value “cost” input into the screen for solutions.

4 • **Informed, inclusive, and fair solution selection.** The process for
5 identifying and selecting solutions should be robust, to ensure a true
6 “no-regrets” approach. Solutions screens should be informed by the
7 utility’s vulnerability assessment, and they should include a
8 stakeholder-informed wide range of traditional and non-traditional
9 solutions. Finally, utilities and stakeholders should work together and
10 agree on a cost-benefit methodology before considering any single
11 intervention.

12 These steps are supported, in an optimal scenario, by collaboration with
13 stakeholders throughout the process, including while setting a scope and goals for
14 the climate resilience plan. Climate resilience plans are also iterative; as technology
15 develops and vulnerabilities change, resilience plans must be updated.

1 **4. DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA’S BUSINESS AND POLICY**
2 **ENVIRONMENT SINCE THE COMPANY’S MOST RECENT RATE CASE**

3 **Q. What policy developments, within North Carolina or with Duke Energy**
4 **Corporation, have occurred since the Company filed its last rate case?**

5 A. Three trends since 2017 are relevant to the Company’s climate-related risks. First,
6 state executive and regulatory agencies have announced or commenced new
7 programs with implications for the state’s electric utility industry. Second, Duke
8 Energy Corporation made its non-binding carbon reduction goal announcement in
9 September 2019. Third, ongoing, collaborative processes in North Carolina are
10 creating state-of-the-art climate vulnerability data with implications for designing
11 a more resilient electric grid for North Carolina.

12 **Q. Please describe Executive Order 80 (“EO 80”).**

13 A. In order to “build resilient communities and develop strategies to mitigate and
14 prepare for climate-related impacts in North Carolina,” Governor Cooper’s
15 Executive Order 80 pledges the state to, among other things, reduce statewide
16 emissions by 40 percent by 2025.¹⁵⁷ Importantly, the Executive Order directs
17 several executive agencies to develop plans for reducing emissions from the energy
18 and transportation sectors. An Interagency Council convened by the Executive
19 Order may also recommend new and updated goals and actions to meaningfully
20 address climate change. Executive Order 80 is provided as Exhibit JMV-TF-6.

21

¹⁵⁷ State of North Carolina Exec. Order No. 80, (2018, October).

1 **Q. Please describe the Clean Energy Plan (“CEP”).**

2 A. The Clean Energy Plan is a collaborative, stakeholder-driven plan to “foster and
3 encourage the utilization of clean energy resources,” developed by the Department
4 of Environmental Quality as directed by Executive Order 80.¹⁵⁸ After a year of
5 conducting workshops and soliciting input from a diverse range of stakeholders,
6 DEQ published its complete CEP in October 2019. The CEP sets ambitious goals
7 for the energy sector, then presents several pathways to work toward those goals
8 alongside short- and long-term actions over the next five years to move along those
9 pathways. While the CEP itself is a complex document with six strategies and over
10 35 distinct recommendations, the key features of the Plan are summarized in Table
11 2.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

1

Table 2. Key Features of the Clean Energy Plan¹⁵⁹

Goals	Key Recommendations	Relevant Stakeholders		
Reduce electric power sector emissions by 70% by 2030 and to net-zero by 2050;	Develop carbon reduction policy designs for retiring uneconomic coal; other market-based clean energy policy options	Legislature	NCUC	Governor's Office
Foster long-term energy affordability and price stability for residents and businesses;	Better align utility incentives with public interest, grid needs, and state policy.	State Agencies	Investor-Owned Utilities	Co-ops / Public Utilities
Accelerate clean energy innovation and deployment to create economic opportunities across the state	Modernize the grid to support clean energy resource adoption, resilience, other public interests.	Local Gvmnts	Academia	Business

2 **Q. What are the implications of Executive Order 80 and the Clean Energy Plan**
 3 **on the Company's climate-related risk?**

4 A. EO 80 and the CEP provide a meaningful signal for North Carolina regulatory
 5 agencies. They establish the procurement of clean energy and reduction of
 6 statewide emissions as a public policy objective and empower regulatory agencies
 7 to act in furtherance of that objective.

¹⁵⁹ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (2019, October), North Carolina Clean Energy Plan: Transitioning to a 21st Century Electricity System. Retrieved at: https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/NC_Clean_Energy_Plan_OCT_2019_.pdf.

1 It is important to note that neither EO 80 nor the CEP has binding, legal
2 enforceability for its goals. Nevertheless, the two actions may be seen as a
3 directional signal for the future of climate policy in North Carolina.

4 The CEP also invites investor-owned utilities to act as partners in
5 implementation. While it may be reasonable to see incipient carbon regulations as
6 a regulatory risk, the Company's participation may represent a regulatory
7 opportunity. Strategies B and C of the CEP seek to align interests between
8 stakeholders on the 21st century utility business model and the future of utility
9 system planning. By collaborating on innovative new regulatory mechanisms with
10 public stakeholders, the Company could actually reduce regulatory lag and risks of
11 other regulatory impacts to business operations.

12 DEQ's responsibility to develop a climate risk assessment and support
13 communities in developing resilience also has implications to the Company. To the
14 extent that electric system resiliency is a component of community resiliency, the
15 Company will necessarily be a relevant party in communities' adaptation and
16 resiliency plans.

17 Finally, EO 80 empowers the interagency council to recommend updated
18 goals to meaningfully address climate change as appropriate. Therefore, while
19 currently ongoing agency work in support of Executive Order 80 may already add
20 climate-related regulatory risk and opportunities, there is potential for on-going
21 long-term policy engagement between the Company and North Carolina executive
22 agencies.

1 **Q. Are there any public statements that the Company or its holding corporation**
2 **has made that might impact the Commission’s view of the Company’s**
3 **application?**

4 A. Duke Energy Corporation published its non-binding net-zero carbon announcement
5 on September 17, 2019.¹⁶⁰ In the announcement, the corporation projects it will
6 decrease carbon emissions by 50 percent by 2030, with a goal of net-zero carbon
7 emissions by 2050.

8 **Q. What are the implications of Duke Energy Corporation’s carbon**
9 **announcement on the Company’s climate-related risk?**

10 A. While the Company is not explicitly required to meet Duke Energy Corporation’s
11 goals, the goal’s ambitious timeline all but requires that the Company follow a
12 similar emissions pathway if Duke Energy Corporation is to achieve its goals. As
13 briefly discussed above, the carbon announcement has an impact on the Company’s
14 risk profile; while the urgency and regulatory burden of a regulatory or legislative
15 mandate may be decreased by Duke Energy Corporation’s commitment, Duke is
16 also liable to sustain reputational damage and potential regulatory blowback if it is
17 perceived to be missing its goals.

¹⁶⁰ “Duke Energy aims to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.” (2019, September), *Duke Energy News Center*. Retrieved at <https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-aims-to-achieve-net-zero-carbon-emissions-by-2050>.

1 **Q. Are there ongoing processes to understand climate vulnerability and resiliency**
2 **to infrastructure in North Carolina?**

3 A. Yes. Work is currently underway within two projects related to both infrastructure
4 and climate change in North Carolina, the results of which will be relevant for the
5 Company's business operations. First, as directed by EO 80, the North Carolina
6 Department of Environmental Quality is currently developing a North Carolina
7 Risk Assessment and Resiliency Plan that will specifically address built
8 infrastructure. As a part of the Risk Assessment and Resiliency Plan, the North
9 Carolina Institute for Climate Research developed a high-quality climate science
10 report that describes the physical impacts of climate change on North Carolina.¹⁶¹

11 Second, in part thanks to a grant from the U.S. Department of Energy, the
12 North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, NC Department of
13 Environmental Quality, and UNC Charlotte's Energy Production Infrastructure
14 Center are participating in a two-year joint research project called "Planning an
15 Affordable, Resilient, and Sustainable Grid in North Carolina."¹⁶² Among other
16 things, the project will take stakeholder input, assess new metrics for evaluating
17 grid resiliency, and "enable a more decentralized, resilient grid." Both of these
18 processes represent opportunities for the Company to meaningfully engage with

¹⁶¹ Kunkel, K., & Easterling, D.

¹⁶² N.C. Clean Energy Technology Center (2020, January). Planning an Affordable, Resilient, and Sustainable Grid in North Carolina. Retrieved at: <https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/2020/01/29/planning-an-affordable-resilient-and-sustainable-grid-in-north-carolina-2/>.

- 1 stakeholders who are generating meaningful, relevant information for a resilient,
- 2 21st century grid in North Carolina.

1 underscore the importance of the Company getting its investments in the grid right.
2 The 21st century grid should be resilient to climate-related physical risks, but at the
3 same time it must enable a more dynamic, communicative, and distributed energy
4 system. And, being critical infrastructure for North Carolina, it must be reactive to
5 ongoing physical, regulatory, and technical developments in the state. It’s for this
6 reason that the Department of Environmental Quality combines “grid
7 modernization” and “grid resilience and flexibility” together in its Clean Energy
8 Plan.¹⁶³

9 The GIP, then, must play multiple roles for the North Carolina electric
10 system. In the previous sections of this testimony, we have explored best practices
11 for grid modernization and climate resilience. We re-produce those best practices,
12 in no specific order, in Table 3 below:

13 **Table 3: Best Practices for Climate Resilience and Grid Modernization**

Climate Resilience	Grid Modernization
Forward-looking, high quality vulnerability assessment	Clear, Measurable Goals
	Integrated Distribution Planning
Informed, inclusive, and fair solutions selection	Stakeholder Engagement
	Cost/benefit analysis

¹⁶³ North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (2019, October). North Carolina Clean Energy Plan. P. 82. Retrieved at https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/clean-energy-plan/NC_Clean_Energy_Plan_OCT_2019_.pdf.

1 **A. Grid Modernization**

2 **Q. Please review the Grid Improvement Plan against grid modernization best**
 3 **practices.**

4 **A. Our review of the GIP against grid modernization best practices is summarized in**
 5 **Table 4, below:**

6 **Table 4. Grid Improvement Plan’s performance versus Grid Modernization Best**
 7 **Practices**

Best Practice	Grid Improvement Plan performance	Implications
Clear, measurable goals	Plan presents “Megatrends” but no measurable goals.	Unclear what ‘success’ looks like; no way to hold Company accountable; unclear benefits for ratepayers.
Integrated Distribution Planning	Plan will develop capability, but Phase I will not use it.	Plan does not adequately assess potential of NWAs; potential for sub-optimal investment.
Stakeholder Engagement	Company conducted several workshops; use of stakeholder input is not evident from application or stakeholder process.	Plan is less likely to incorporate a wide range of perspectives and value propositions
Cost-benefit analysis	Company does use cost-benefit analysis; no judgment of cost-benefit analysis in this testimony	No implications evaluated in this testimony

8 **Q. Please explain the assessment of the GIP and its implications in Table 4.**

9 **A. Clear, Measurable Goals:** As a \$1.3 billion incremental investment in the grid
 10 with inevitable ratepayer cost implications, the GIP must demonstrate that the

1 benefit provided to customers is worth the cost. The best way to do that is through
2 clear, measurable goals and commitment to outcomes that benefit all stakeholders.
3 These keep expectations for all parties aligned, and quantified goals allow
4 stakeholders and regulators to track the Company’s progress throughout the plan.

5 In lieu of stated goals, the Company offers its Megatrends¹⁶⁴ and
6 Implications.¹⁶⁵ The Megatrends represent actual trends that are playing out on the
7 grid, but we find their use alongside the Implications in this case to justify the Grid
8 Improvement Plan to be inappropriate. The Company’s analysis of the Megatrends
9 provides no systematic, quantitative understanding of their impacts on the grid—
10 thereby making effective “baselining” impossible. Notwithstanding the lack of an
11 appropriate baseline, the Company does not set any goals for the Plan or metrics by
12 which the Company, regulators, stakeholders, or ratepayers could assess the
13 progress of the GIP or hold the Company accountable. The Company declines to
14 demonstrate how any given project within the Plan relates to the Megatrends.¹⁶⁶ In
15 light of the Plan’s similarity to Power/Forward, it is difficult to ascertain how the
16 development of the GIP was affected in any way by the Megatrends concept. In this
17 way, the Megatrends may be characterized as *post hoc* justification for
18 Power/Forward projects, rather than a representation of discrete problems that must
19 be addressed with targeted solutions.

¹⁶⁴ Oliver, Ex. 2.

¹⁶⁵ Oliver, Ex. 3.

¹⁶⁶ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-21.

1 **Integrated Distribution Planning (“IDP”):** Simply put, integrated
2 distribution planning is the element that enables utilities to “modernize” their grid.
3 The analytical capability that is a hallmark of IDP processes allows electric utilities
4 to understand grid operations at a more granular level, work with the distribution
5 grid as an integrated system, and as a result precisely take advantage of distributed
6 resources and place grid modernization solutions. The Company has proposed IDP
7 components as a part of the GIP, but these components will be pursued alongside,
8 rather than in advance of, massive capital investment in the grid. Pursuing \$1.3
9 billion in distribution-level investments¹⁶⁷ (just before these IDP capabilities are
10 online) risks premature deployment of these assets and therefore a sub-optimal cost-
11 benefit for all stakeholders, including the Company.

12 **Stakeholder engagement:** Stakeholder engagement for the GIP has been
13 reviewed above. The process executed by the Company did not adhere to best
14 practices for an effective process and appears to have minimally incorporated
15 stakeholder input.

16 **Cost-benefit analysis:** This review will not cover cost-benefit analysis in
17 depth. Similarly, cost-benefit analysis has not been the focus of this testimony and
18 will not be reviewed.

¹⁶⁷ Oliver Direct, Ex. 10, p. 3.

1 **Q. The Company claims that the projects included as part of the GIP are “no-**
2 **regrets,” “foundational” projects. Do you agree with that characterization?**

3 A. No. First, the “modernize” projects that Witness Oliver describes as
4 “foundational”¹⁶⁸ represent just over a quarter of the total budget of the Plan.¹⁶⁹
5 Even describing the Plan in the Company’s terms, it would be inappropriate to
6 describe the entire plan as “foundational.”

7 Second, many of the projects proposed under the GIP fall into what GridLab
8 calls “geographical” projects—physical infrastructure installed in specific
9 geographical areas to extend some grid capability.¹⁷⁰ GridLab’s report points out
10 that the “need” to extend new capabilities to these areas should emerge from a high-
11 quality, risk-based assessment of vulnerability of current operations.
12 “Foundational” investments are those that make such a need assessment possible,
13 or enable the ‘capability’ that is being extended through geographical investment.
14 ISOP is the paramount example of a “foundational” investment. The Company’s
15 proposed Self-Optimizing Grid, for example, would not qualify as “foundational.”
16 Some of the projects categorized as “modernize” by the Company, such as
17 distribution system and transmission system automation, would also fall into the
18 “geographical” category.

¹⁶⁸ Oliver Direct, p. 30, l. 7.

¹⁶⁹ Oliver Direct Ex. 12, p. 97.

¹⁷⁰ Alvarez, P., & Stephens, D., p. 16.

1 **Q. Does the Company acknowledge that making investments without all**
2 **necessary information could lead to sub-optimal or imprudent investment?**

3 A. Yes. In a response to a stakeholder question, the Company responded that it was
4 confident “with 85% certainty” that ISOP would not render GIP investments
5 obsolete.¹⁷¹ This figure was clearly not intended as a precise estimate, but it
6 provides a helpful estimate for understanding potential losses. To put this number
7 into context, if 15 percent of GIP investment were rendered obsolete by ISOP
8 capabilities, the Grid Improvement Plan as proposed would immediately result in
9 stranded distribution assets worth just under \$200 million.¹⁷² The Company must
10 take this risk seriously, and its failure to do so in this proposal represents a major
11 oversight.

12 **Q. Does the GIP’s use of Megatrends and implications represent a prudent**
13 **management of climate-related risks?**

14 A. In short, no. The Company has failed to demonstrate how any specific projects
15 addresses climate-related impacts,¹⁷³ and its approach does not acknowledge the
16 interconnectedness of climate-related risks across generation, transmission, and
17 distribution functions. Making new investments in distribution infrastructure
18 without a systematic assessment or climate-specific data gathering is an insufficient
19 response to climate-related risks. The Company’s current approach of willful

¹⁷¹ Oliver Direct Ex. 13, p. 43.

¹⁷² Oliver Direct, Ex. 10, p. 3.

¹⁷³ Company Response to Vote Solar DR 1-7 and 1-8.

1 avoidance of climate analysis is inadequate, if not imprudent, and exposes the
2 currently proposed grid investments to unnecessary and manageable risks.

3 **B. Climate Resilience**

4 **Q. Please review the GIP against grid modernization best practices.**

5 A. Our review of the GIP against climate resilience plan best practices is summarized
6 in Table 5, below.

7 **Table 5. Grid Improvement Plan’s performance versus Climate Resilience Best**
8 **Practices**

Best Practice	Grid Improvement Plan performance	Implications
Forward-looking, high-quality vulnerability assessment	Plan did not utilize any meaningful climate risk assessment.	Ongoing physical risks to grid assets and reliability; less cost-effective projects.
Informed, Inclusive, and Fair Solutions Selection	Plan uses a solutions-first approach and cost-benefit analysis developed after the fact.	Non-‘traditional’ alternatives likely excluded from Plan; missing potential co-benefits.

9 **Q. Does the Company explicitly acknowledge the presence of climate-related**
10 **risks or make any attempt to systematically manage them in its application or**
11 **in discovery?**

12 A. No. As noted above, the Company has represented that it has incorporated climate-
13 related risk only to the extent that it is included as part of the “Megatrends”

1 identified by the Company,¹⁷⁴ although it also stated that it is “without knowledge”
2 as to the role of climate change in weather events.¹⁷⁵

3 **Q. Please explain your assessment of the GIP and the implications of the Plan in**
4 **Table 5.**

5 A. **High-quality Risk Assessment:** We conducted an in-depth comparison of risk
6 assessment and solution selection between the GIP and Con Edison’s Climate
7 Change Vulnerability Study. The results of that comparison are presented in Exhibit
8 JMV-TF-7. Con Edison’s climate vulnerability study estimated that climate risks
9 would cost the utility between \$1.3 and \$4.6 billion by 2050,¹⁷⁶ while the Company,
10 for its part, has presented no quantitative risks of climate-related risks. As an
11 example of a potential risk identified by Con Edison but ignored by the Company,
12 Con Edison estimates that flood risks may exceed design specifications by as early
13 as 2030.¹⁷⁷

14 The comparison shows that, compared to the industry standard and even a
15 reasonable understanding of climate-related risks, the Company did not complete
16 any systematic climate risk assessment of its assets or operations. There may be
17 individual examinations of factors that may be impacted by climate change, such
18 as flood risk, but those analyses are backward-looking and do not incorporate likely

¹⁷⁴ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-3.

¹⁷⁵ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-6.

¹⁷⁶ Consolidated Edison Company of New York Inc. (“ConEd”), (2019, December). Climate Change Vulnerability Study (“ConEd Climate Study”). P. 4. Retrieved at <https://www.coned.com/-/media/files/coned/documents/our-energy-future/our-energy-projects/climate-change-resiliency-plan/climate-change-vulnerability-study.pdf>.

¹⁷⁷ ConEd Climate Study, p.5.

1 future climate impacts.¹⁷⁸ The Company’s risk assessment is mostly represented by
2 the “Implications” of its Megatrends, which are simply too high-level and
3 qualitative to precisely design a programmatic intervention. In comparison, the Con
4 Edison Vulnerability Study pursued an asset-level risk screen, mirroring the
5 granularity of studies conducted by financial institutions and discussed earlier in
6 this testimony.¹⁷⁹

7 Like any other business risk, when climate-related risks are not managed,
8 the Company (and therefore its customers) are more exposed to negative outcomes.
9 And, as we have discussed above, physical risks may spill over into insurance,
10 financial, reputational, or regulatory risks.

11 **Informed, Inclusive, and Fair Solutions Selection:** Witness Oliver
12 summarizes the process by which the GIP was developed in his testimony.¹⁸⁰ The
13 process was not conducted in collaboration with stakeholders; beyond identifying
14 the existence of the Megatrends, there are no stated goals; solutions are not
15 informed by high quality vulnerability assessment; selection criteria are not
16 defined, beyond vague programmatic terminology;¹⁸¹ there is no indication for how
17 the geography or scale of any given intervention was decided; “tools” are a narrow
18 range of traditional solutions; and cost-benefit was performed after the fact, rather

¹⁷⁸ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-12.

¹⁷⁹ Bertolotti et al.

¹⁸⁰ Oliver Direct, p. 29, l.18 – p. 30, l. 18.

¹⁸¹ Oliver Direct, Ex. 5.

1 than designed in advance of the consideration of any particular project and used as
2 a screening tool.

3 This approach constrains what is possible under the GIP. It leaves very little
4 room for assessment of co-benefits, pre-determines a narrow set of potential
5 solutions, and ignores non-wires or non-standard alternatives.

6 **C. North Carolina Context**

7 **Q. Does this process acknowledge the other, ongoing processes to quantify grid**
8 **vulnerability, modernize the electric system, or increase resilience in North**
9 **Carolina?**

10 A. No. Witness Oliver’s testimony does not mention “Clean Energy Plan” or
11 “Executive Order 80,” nor does it refer to either ongoing research project we
12 discuss above.¹⁸² Although one of the identified Megatrends is “Environmental
13 Trends” or “Environmental Commitments,” its description of these environmental
14 commitments is exclusively backward-looking.¹⁸³ Discussion of environmental
15 commitments in Oliver Exhibit 4 do not mention the Clean Energy Plan or
16 Executive Order 80.

17 **Q. What are the implications of this omission?**

18 A. It’s an unfortunate disconnect between a potentially large investment of assets on
19 the grid through the GIP, unfolding at the same time as many simultaneous
20 conversations are developing in the North Carolina policy community. For the

¹⁸² Oliver Direct.

¹⁸³ Oliver Direct, Exhibit 4.

1 Company, not engaging with these processes misses an opportunity to gain working
2 knowledge that could inform the details of the Plan, and increases the potential for
3 obsolescence, stranded assets, or increased costs because of an operations and
4 communication disconnect between Company practice and regulatory policy.

5 **D. Review Overall**

6 **Q. Do you see an opportunity for an effective grid modernization and climate**
7 **resiliency proposal at this time in North Carolina?**

8 A. Yes. We agree that recent trends are changing the way customers use the grid and,
9 as we demonstrate above, climate-related risks and opportunities will shape the
10 electric utility business moving into the future. At the same time, a natural synergy
11 exists between the Company's engagement in integrated planning and circuit-level
12 analysis through ISOP and Advanced Distribution Planning and the vibrant policy
13 conversation in North Carolina discussing the very nature of the grid in the 21st
14 century. And, as we document in Section 2, best practices from other states and
15 proceedings are emerging to light the way toward a clear grid modernization and
16 climate resiliency plan that has benefits for all stakeholders. A truly collaborative
17 grid modernization process that creates goals and accountability in partnership with
18 stakeholders, gathers all of critical information (including climate-risk-related and
19 distribution operations information) needed for grid planning first, then selects
20 projects through an open and transparent process, could deliver substantial, lasting
21 benefits for all stakeholders.

1 **Q. Does the GIP deliver on the potential for a well-designed grid modernization**
2 **or climate resilience plan?**

3 A. No. As we discussed above, the Company does not have the input from stakeholders
4 (including state executive agencies), climate-related factors, or distribution-level
5 analysis it needs to design a true no-regrets Plan. Partly as a result, the Plan does
6 not contain overall goals or tracking metrics that would allow stakeholders and
7 regulators to maintain reliability. Finally, instead of engaging in an open,
8 transparent assessment of solutions and investments (including non-wires
9 alternatives and distributed energy resources), the majority of the Plan consists of
10 solutions that were proposed under Power/Forward.¹⁸⁴

11 As a result, there is a massive potential opportunity cost for proceeding with
12 this plan. At a time when best practices are emerging from a changing national
13 landscape, the Company's own sophisticated distribution planning capabilities are
14 coming online, and stakeholders are proactively pursuing deep, informed
15 engagement, the Company's proposal does not take advantage of those
16 developments. According to the Company's informal assessment, the opportunity
17 costs from declining to inform its Plan with advanced distribution planning could
18 be around \$200 million, as described above.¹⁸⁵ Because the Company has not
19 undertaken an assessment of its climate risks, that opportunity cost remains
20 unquantified.

¹⁸⁴ Company Response to Vote Solar Data Request 1-2.

¹⁸⁵ Oliver Direct, Ex. 13, p. 43.

1 **Q. Do you believe that a positive benefit-cost ratio is sufficient justification for**
2 **moving forward with any given project?**

3 A. No. Cost-benefit analyses answer the question, “How does this investment compare
4 to business-as-usual, or no intervention at all?” As stakeholders in the
5 modernization of the grid, the answer we should be more concerned with is “how
6 does this investment compare to a well-executed grid modernization and climate
7 resilience plan in the public interest?” Against this counterfactual, a project with a
8 positive benefit-to-cost ratio might still represent a missed opportunity. Because the
9 Company did not effectively pursue a climate vulnerability study, stakeholder
10 input, or integrated distribution planning, it lacks the information needed to conduct
11 such a comparison.

12 **Q. What role could distributed energy resources (DERs) play in grid**
13 **modernization and climate resilience?**

14 A. DERs bring unique benefits to both grid modernization and climate resilience
15 program goals. A comprehensive grid modernization or climate resilience plan
16 should ensure that DERs are fully valued versus traditional solutions.

17 In a climate resiliency context, DERs provide the critical service of
18 generating energy close to load. When distribution or transmission systems are not
19 working at full capacity, such as during extreme weather events, “islandable” DERs
20 can continue to provide power to ratepayers.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ ConEd Climate Study, p. 49.

1 In a grid modernization context, DERs may be able to fulfill distribution
2 system operational needs more cost effectively than traditional investments, or
3 defer the need for incremental investments in distribution assets. In this context,
4 DERs are often referred to as non-wires alternatives (“NWAs”) or non-traditional
5 solutions (“NTS”). A recent Duke Energy webinar demonstrating the anticipated
6 functionality of ISOP explained that ISOP analytical capability would be able to
7 weigh benefits of DERs versus traditional solutions and identify where NWAs
8 might be more cost-effective.¹⁸⁷ A typical deferred investment by NWAs is
9 increased line capacity, which is a major component of the Self-Optimizing Grid
10 GIP project.¹⁸⁸

11 **Q. Do you believe the Grid Improvement Plan appropriately considered DERs**
12 **and NWAs in the development of potential solutions?**

13 A. No. DERs and NWAs are disruptive solutions, and they require proactive analysis
14 and planning to be fully valued in utility planning. First, the utility needs the data
15 to understand DER benefits. That includes both climate vulnerability, ascertained
16 through a vulnerability study as demonstrated above, and detailed distribution
17 operations data created through an integrated distribution planning process. Then,
18 the utility should use a systematic solutions selection process that incorporates

¹⁸⁷ Duke Energy (2020, January). ISOP Stakeholder Webinar. Retrieved at: <https://www.duke-energy.com/ /media/pdfs/our-company/200062/isop-webinar-1-presentation.pdf?la=en>.

¹⁸⁸ Oliver, Ex. 10.

1 climate and distribution data, puts a value on co-benefits, and fairly values DERs
2 against traditional solutions.

3 The Company did not pursue these steps before developing the GIP. By
4 pursuing its grid modernization planning in this manner, the Company constrained
5 the role of DERs in its Plan and likely lost potential cost-effectiveness benefits for
6 both the Company and its customers.

7 **Q. Are there any programs proposed in the GIP that you approve?**

8 A. Yes. The Integrated Systems & Operations Planning program is a truly innovative
9 program that could enable a more dynamic grid, and its Advanced Distribution
10 Planning and Morecast components both represent major steps forward in
11 analytical capacities for distribution planning. We support this program.

12 Similarly, IVVC is a program with a high benefit-to-cost ratio and many
13 clear benefits. We support the Company's investment in this program.

1 **Q. Why is deferral accounting considered extraordinary relief in regulatory**
2 **practice?**

3 A. The strong presumption is that general rate proceedings are the primary forum for
4 evaluating the prudence of utility investments, updating the utility rate base to
5 reflect the addition of such investments, and capturing in rates the impact on
6 operating expenses, depreciation and return associated with such investments. In the
7 case of large capital investments, the use of an allowance for funds used during
8 construction (“AFUDC”) typically provides adequate compensation for a utility’s
9 undertaking of significant multi-year investments. Through AFUDC, the utility is
10 allowed to capitalize the financing costs of such investments prior to their
11 completion and inclusion in rate base, with such capitalized costs being added to
12 the original investment upon which the utility is allowed to earn a return and which
13 is amortized over time through depreciation. This is the ordinary and routine
14 ratemaking process for large capital investments.

15 **Q. Why is the Company seeking extraordinary treatment for the GIP investments**
16 **made in years 2020 through 2022 in this case?**

17 A. The Company contends that costs related to the GIP are “major, non-routine
18 investments, that produce substantial customer benefit,” and that this description
19 “meets the Commission’s traditional test for deferral.” Company Witness Smith
20 also claims that absent deferral the Company will “experience a significant adverse

1 earnings impact.”¹⁹¹ According to the Company’s testimony, in the absence of the
2 requested deferred accounting treatment, the “earnings degradation is expected to
3 grow to over 100 basis points by 2022, the third year of the plan.”¹⁹²

4 **Q. Is the relief sought in this case similar to the relief sought in the last case with**
5 **the Power/Forward grid investment and modernization initiative?**

6 A. No. Although Power/Forward was mentioned in the previous rate case, no
7 extraordinary regulatory treatment was sought.¹⁹³ However, relief sought in this
8 case is similar to the relief sought by Duke Energy Carolinas in its most recent rate
9 case. As discussed above, in its previous rate case, DEC sought permission to
10 recover Power/Forward costs through either a bill rider or deferral into a regulatory
11 asset for similar cited reasons.¹⁹⁴

12 **Q. Why did the Commission deny extraordinary treatment of expenses incurred**
13 **outside of the test year in the previous rate case?**

14 A. As cited above, the Commission found that “the reasons DEC says underlie the
15 need to Power Forward are not unique or extraordinary... [they] are all issues the
16 Company [has] to confront in the normal course of providing electric service... A

¹⁹¹ Smith Direct, p. 39, ll. 2-9.

¹⁹² Smith Direct, p. 39, ll. 3-5.

¹⁹³ Order Accepting Stipulation, Deciding Contested Issues, and Granting Partial Rate Increase, Docket No. E-2, Sub 1142. Retrieved at: <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=d2b2a1a0-dae1-45de-af9c-c987d4aeddc8>.

¹⁹⁴ Order Accepting Stipulation, Deciding Contested Issues, and Requiring Revenue Reduction, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146 et al. p. 142-145. Retrieved at <https://starw1.ncuc.net/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=80a5a760-f3e8-4c9a-a7a6-282d791f3f23>.

1 number of the Power Forward programs ...are the kinds of activities in which the
2 Company engages or should engage on a routine and continuous basis.”¹⁹⁵
3

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

1 **Q. Are you aware of Senate Bill 559, which was passed by the North Carolina**
2 **General Assembly in 2019?**

3 A. Yes. My understanding of Senate Bill 559 is that a major feature eliminated from
4 the bill before it passed would have authorized utilities to request, and the
5 Commission to grant, multi-year rate plans.

6 **Q. Would a multi-year rate plan provide a means for addressing situation for**
7 **which the Company is seeking extraordinary relief for these GIP expenses**
8 **incurred outside of the test year?**

9 A. Yes. While the elements of a multi-year rate plan would typically be established
10 through the ratemaking process, a likely element would be the periodic updating of
11 the utility's rate base to reflect anticipated major capital investments, such as the
12 GIP. Allowing the utility to update its rate base to include such investments (and
13 the associated expenses) would go a long way towards eliminating the impact of
14 regulatory lag, which seems to be the primary motivation in the Company's request
15 for deferred accounting in this case. According to the Company, in the absence of
16 deferred accounting, its earned return on equity would erode by 100 basis points by
17 the end of the third year of the GIP. (Of course, that assumes the Company would
18 not file more frequent rate cases as a means of updating its rate base, which is
19 another tool available to a utility to minimize the impact of regulatory lag.)

1 **Q. Based on your knowledge of other states, do multi-year rate plans provide a**
2 **more appropriate basis for regulatory consideration of forward year**
3 **investments, such as those sought here?**

4 A. Multi-year rate plans are certainly one means of addressing the issue, assuming
5 there is the statutory authority for entering into such plans. (Even in the absence of
6 express statutory authority, it is sometimes possible for multi-year rate plans to be
7 implemented through agreement by all parties in a proceeding, as is commonly
8 done through settlements in rate cases involving the New York electric utilities.)
9 As part of a multi-year rate plan, I would expect to see a mechanism established
10 that would provide the same level of scrutiny for evaluating the prudence of forward
11 year investments. In other words, the traditional general rate case process provides
12 a good forum for closely scrutinizing the reasonableness of the expenditures and
13 whether the utility has borne its burden of proof in showing that it is undertaking
14 such investments in a manner that minimizes the long-term costs for its customers.
15 Any multi-year rate plan would need to include a process that includes these
16 essential protections for customers. We discuss this in the following section.

17 **Q. Why would a major, comprehensive grid investment scheme like GIP not fit**
18 **within a utility's ordinary course of seeking cost recovery through rate cases?**

19 A. It typically would, for the reasons stated above, and the Company has the burden
20 to show why the extraordinary remedy of deferred accounting is necessary. As
21 noted above, the Company's position is that the GIP comprises "major, non-routine
22 investments, that produce substantial customer benefit," and that its request "meets

1 the Commission's traditional test for deferral." Whether or not the Company's
2 proposal is acceptable to the Commission, of course, is entirely up to the
3 Commission; as discussed below, the Commission has substantial discretion in
4 deciding whether or not to allow deferred accounting, and to define the terms under
5 which deferred accounting will be allowed.

6 **Q. When generation and transmission projects are proposed, which are often**
7 **multiple-year construction projects with long lead times, does the Commission**
8 **have a process for determining whether the project is necessary?**

9 A. Yes. It is fairly common for utilities to be required to secure a Certificate of Public
10 Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN"), which requires the utility to demonstrate
11 that the generating or transmission project is necessary and that the costs are
12 reasonable. North Carolina has a similar requirement in the case of generating
13 plants (NC GS 110.1) and transmission lines (NC GS 62-105a).

14 **Q. Do major, comprehensive grid investment schemes like the GIP fall within a**
15 **regulatory gap?**

16 A. I think the Company has made a decent case that the current ratemaking
17 mechanisms available to it do not fit well with the type of projects comprising the
18 GIP. As described in the Company's testimony, most of the projects included
19 within the GIP do not, because of their magnitude and duration, qualify for the
20 AFUDC treatment that was mentioned earlier. There will be some earnings erosion
21 associated with implementing the GIP in the absence of deferred accounting or a
22 multi-year rate plan that includes periodic updating of the Company's rate base. In

1 addition to the earnings impacts, there is probably a strong basis for providing a
2 regulatory forum for evaluating and approving a comprehensive multi-year
3 program that does not fit neatly within the standard general rate case.

4 **Q. Are major, comprehensive grid investment schemes like the GIP more**
5 **prevalent around the country in the last decade?**

6 A. Yes, there are several states that are moving towards a more comprehensive grid
7 planning process, given the fundamental changes that are underway in the electric
8 utility industry. For the most part, this process is necessary to accommodate the
9 expanded use of DERs given the failure of traditional planning processes to
10 integrate DERs into long-term planning (which historically was based on one-way
11 power flows from the utility's large, centralized generating stations to end use
12 customers). Both California and New York are well down the path of requiring
13 utilities to engage with stakeholders in distribution system planning which, among
14 other things, identifies the opportunities for strategic deployment of DERs by third
15 parties that can result in lower costs to ratepayers over time. Another driver for
16 comprehensive grid planning is addressing the impacts of climate change, which
17 similarly requires a departure from the traditional planning model that was based
18 largely on historical trends in customer and load growth rather than considering the
19 impact of rising temperatures and sea level, and the increasing frequency of extreme
20 weather events.

21 **Q. Does a deferral accounting request, such as the Company has proposed here**
22 **for the GIP expenses incurred in the years 2020 through 2022, provide the**

1 **Commission the same opportunity to evaluate the reasonableness of the**
2 **proposed investments before they are built as a CPCN process?**

3 A. No. Deferred accounting, almost by its very nature, does not produce the same level
4 of regulatory scrutiny as is afforded by the traditional ratemaking processes of
5 general rate cases and the CPCN process.

6 **Q. Does the practice of using the extraordinary relief of deferral accounting for**
7 **the GIP shift risks to ratepayers?**

8 A. Yes. In general, ratepayers' interests are well-served by the reliance on traditional
9 general rate cases for setting rates, and the associated regulatory lag that produces
10 a strong incentive for a utility to manage its costs. Streamlining that process through
11 the use of deferred accounting reduces the regulatory oversight that results from the
12 general rate case process, and largely eliminates the economic incentive from
13 regulatory lag to manage costs.

14 **Q. Going forward, do you have any recommendations for addressing this current**
15 **regulatory gap to provide better oversight of forward year investment schemes**
16 **for the Commission and steady revenue recovery for the Company?**

17 A. Yes. As discussed in the next section, we recommend a regulatory scheme that
18 involves (1) a rigorous planning process that, among other things, properly
19 integrates the impacts of climate change, and (2) addresses the Company's
20 legitimate concerns about rate recovery while providing strong incentives for the
21 Company to engage in a planning process that is geared toward minimizing the

1 costs borne by its customers over time (which necessarily requires the integration
2 of climate change impacts).

3 **B. Need for an Integrated System Planning Process**

4 **Q. Please describe the integrated system planning that you are recommending.**

5 A. Future investments in the Company's grid must be subject to a process that
6 thoroughly considers the impacts of such investments in addressing, and
7 minimizing, climate change-related impacts. Given what we know about the impact
8 of past extreme weather events on the Company's system, it is imperative that any
9 future grid investment be evaluated in light of the Company's vulnerability to
10 climate-driven risks, and how such investments address those risks. Such an
11 analysis is essential if the Commission is to fulfill its obligation to minimize the
12 long-term rate impacts to the Company's customers, and to maximize the reliability
13 (at reasonable costs) of the electric service provided to the Company's customers.

14 **Q. Is there any precedent of a utility commission initiating such a process as an
15 outcome of a general rate case proceeding?**

16 A. Yes. The process with which we are most familiar is the Con Edison rate proceeding
17 initiated in New York in early 2013, following the impact of Superstorm Sandy.

18 **Q. How is the Con Edison rate case example similar to the current case?**

19 A. Following Superstorm Sandy in October 2012, Con Edison in January 2013 filed a
20 massive general rate request proposing to "harden the utility's system" in response
21 to Con Edison's experience in coping with Superstorm Sandy. Among other things,
22 Con Edison promised to spend \$1 billion over the next four years to harden its

1 system in response to what it learned during Superstorm Sandy. In response, several
2 environmental organizations filed testimony as the “Clean Energy Parties” to
3 propose a different strategy, based on lessons learned in terms of “where the lights
4 stayed on” during Superstorm Sandy (i.e., areas served by microgrids and DERs).
5 Among other things, the Clean Energy Parties proposed that Con Edison’s proposed
6 grid expenditures be subjected to a rigorous examination of their resilience benefits,
7 by subjecting the expenditures to examination by a Storm Hardening and Resiliency
8 Collaborative. In other words, rather than following a “business as usual” approach
9 of spending money to harden the system in light of the most recent extreme weather
10 event, the utility was expected to evaluate its T&D expenditures in a manner that
11 would improve its grid resilience in light of climate change and the increasing
12 frequency of extreme weather events. That process ultimately led to the
13 development of the Climate Change Vulnerability Study, which was released by
14 Con Edison in December 2019 and is attached as Exhibit JMV-TF-4.

1 **Q. In what ways does the climate resilience grid investment strategy outlined in**
2 **the Con Edison Climate Change Vulnerability Study similar to the GIP?**

3 A. There is very little similarity to the rigorous process followed by Con Edison in its
4 Climate Change Vulnerability Study to the process followed by the Company in
5 developing its GIP. In contrast to the Company's failure to consider the impact of
6 likely trends with respect to temperature, sea level rise or the frequency of extreme
7 weather events, the Climate Change Vulnerability Study performed by Con Edison
8 considered the range of scenarios involving, among other things, anticipated
9 temperature, humidity and sea level increases, as well as the frequency of extreme
10 weather events, and evaluated the value of its grid investments according to the
11 resilience benefits that such investments would provide to the grid.

12 **Q. Compared to the recommended grid investment strategy outlined in the Con**
13 **Edison report, does the GIP present a comprehensive strategy to approach**
14 **resiliency on a system-wide basis?**

15 A. No, the Company's Grid Improvement Plan is woefully deficient with respect to
16 the integration of climate change impacts in its long-term planning, for the reasons
17 discussed in the preceding section.

18 **Q. Based on your experience, what process provides the best means to match the**
19 **state policy goals with the Company's stated investment strategy and**
20 **objectives?**

21 A. As described in the preceding sections of this testimony, North Carolina has
22 recognized the imminent threat associated with climate change, and has articulated

1 broad policy objectives that are consistent with minimizing that threat—through
2 mitigation measures such as reduction in GHG emissions—as well as the measures
3 necessary to address adaptation to the “new normal” going forward. The
4 Company’s GIP neither addresses the mitigation possibilities nor the adaptation
5 measures that are necessary to cope with climate change-related risks through
6 achieving increased resilience in the Company’s network.

7 **C. Prudency and Burden of Proof in Light of Climate-Related Risks**

8 **Q. What is the utility’s obligation to address the risks associated with climate**
9 **change in its rate filings?**

10 A. Nothing is different about the utility’s obligation to demonstrate that its actions—
11 as incorporated in its rate proposals—reflect the investments and expenditures that
12 result in the lowest costs to customers over time. In order to recover their proposed
13 expenditures in rates, utilities generally must demonstrate that they are prudently
14 managing their expenses, and proceeding down a path of making investments and
15 incurring expenditures that result in reasonable rates to customers over time. The
16 risks associated with climate change now need to be part of that ratemaking
17 equation. If utilities fail to take climate change risks into account, and continue to
18 make investments in T&D infrastructure or incur other expenditures that fail to
19 improve the resilience of the utility grid in the face of climate change, they run the
20 risk of having those investments disallowed as imprudent. As a matter of prudent
21 utility practice, utilities have the obligation to demonstrate that they have integrated

1 the risks associated with climate change into their long-term planning for T&D
2 investments, and the associated expenditures.

3 **Q. How does the threat of climate change affect the utility's burden of proof in**
4 **rate proceedings?**

5 A. If a utility fails to demonstrate that it is proceeding down a path that takes climate
6 change-related risks into account and minimizes the costs to customers after taking
7 those associated climate change-related risks into account, their T&D investments
8 (and associated expenditures) are subject to disallowance. It is the "new normal"
9 with respect to prudent utility practice. It is no longer acceptable to expect to
10 recover in rates the investments that are made, if such investments are not mindful
11 of the impacts of climate change and are not designed to improve grid resilience in
12 light of such climate change.

13 **Q. How would you define adequate consideration of climate vulnerabilities?**

14 A. The Con Edison Climate Change Vulnerability Study probably represents the
15 current state of the art in demonstrating how an electric utility should integrate the
16 likely impacts of climate change in its long-term planning process. The extent to
17 which utilities should be expected to integrate the risks associated with climate
18 change in their long-term planning should depend on the circumstances unique to
19 each utility. In that regard, the Company faces an enhanced obligation to integrate
20 climate change into its long-term planning, given the extent to which the financial
21 community has identified the Company as one of the electric utilities in the country
22 with the greatest exposure to climate change impacts. Thus, the Company's failure

1 to integrate such impacts into its analysis affects not only the level of operating
2 costs it incurs over time, but also the capital costs borne by its customers to the
3 extent that the financial community perceives that the Company is doing a poor job
4 of managing those risks, and accordingly demands a higher cost of capital for the
5 costs of financing the Company's investments.

6 **Q. Are you aware of any processes underway in North Carolina that would enable**
7 **the Company to use existing climate science and climate analytics to inform its**
8 **decision making?**

9 A. Yes. As noted above, there is a current proceeding at the North Carolina
10 Department of Environmental Quality—Phase 2 of the climate risk and resilience
11 group—that is relevant to the type of analysis that should be required of the
12 Company going forward. NCICS has performed a high-value granular analysis of
13 likely climate conditions in North Carolina through the remainder of the century
14 (publication pending). Through funding from the US Department of Energy, the
15 North Carolina State Clean Energy Technology Center is hosting a collaborative
16 process that is going to look precisely at this issue.

1 **Q. Would it be reasonable for the Company to use the data and expertise gathered**
2 **from these various working groups to inform its own system planning process**
3 **with the best available climate science and scenario analysis techniques?**

4 A. Yes. In fact, it would be unreasonable, and inconsistent with prudent utility
5 practice, for the Company to fail to incorporate these resources to help prioritize
6 strategies and investments to improve the resilience of the Company’s network in
7 the face of increasing risks from climate change.

8 **Q. Did the Company perform any forward-looking analysis of climate-related**
9 **data to inform its recommended GIP investments?**

10 A. No. As described in the preceding section, the Company failed to take into account
11 what we currently know about possible scenarios regarding temperature, humidity,
12 precipitation, and sea level increases over time. It is irresponsible, and contrary to
13 prudent utility practice, to base long-term planning on historical trends that simply
14 do not reflect the new reality of the impacts of climate change going forward. And
15 the consequence of this failure would be to impose unnecessary costs on the
16 Company’s customers, which would be disallowed in the typical ratemaking
17 process. The better outcome than relying on the end-loaded disallowance, of course,
18 is to require the Company to engage in a rigorous planning process that integrates
19 the impact of climate change.

1 **Q. Does this mean the Company's GIP fails to carry the burden of proof at this**
2 **time?**

3 A. There is insufficient data available to determine if the Company made the most
4 prudent prioritization and investments in light of its actual, projected climate risk.
5 However, the failure to even attempt to quantify and identify its climate
6 vulnerabilities, in our view, dramatically increases the risk that these investments
7 could prove more costly to ratepayers over time than investments made under a
8 strategy that diligently considered and mitigates future climate vulnerabilities.

9 **Q. If you are not recommending a current disallowance based on the Company's**
10 **failure to consider climate risk, why should the Commission consider climate**
11 **risk as a necessary consideration to justify the prudence of these types of**
12 **climate-vulnerable infrastructure investments going forward?**

13 A. The risks are intensifying and the impacts are growing. The need to mitigate to be
14 cost-effective is growing. The visibility and confidence level of future climate data
15 are growing. Based on the standard of doing what a reasonable manager would do
16 based on what they know or *should know*, willful blindness to the reality of climate
17 change going forward cannot be a defense. The Company simply must do better if
18 it is to fulfill its fundamental obligation to engage in practices that result in the
19 lowest costs to its customers over time.

1 **D. Incentive Mechanisms to Encourage Integration of Climate-Related**
2 **Risks**

3 **Q. How can the Company be encouraged to integrate climate-related risks into**
4 **its long-term system planning?**

5 A. As noted above, the Commission has considerable discretion in deciding whether
6 or not to authorize deferred accounting treatment for the Company's GIP. The
7 Commission previously rejected deferred accounting treatment for the Company's
8 proposed Power Forward program, which in many ways is replicated by the
9 Company's proposal in this case with respect to the GIP. Notwithstanding the
10 similarities, the Commission has the authority to address any perceived deficiencies
11 through a properly structured incentive mechanism. We recommend consideration
12 of a performance-based incentive mechanism that would properly penalize or
13 reward the Company for integrating climate change-related risks into its long-term
14 system planning.

15 **Q. What are the elements of this performance-based incentive mechanism?**

16 A. As noted earlier in this testimony, the Company is seeking to defer the investment
17 and costs related to its GIP, and to earn a return equal to its weighted average cost
18 of capital ("WACC") on the unamortized balance. The Commission has the
19 discretion to determine whether or not to grant the Company's deferral request and,
20 correspondingly, has the authority to impose conditions on granting that request.
21 We recommend that the Company's ability to earn its WACC on the unamortized
22 balance of GIP investments be subject to a performance-based incentive

1 mechanism. In other words, the extent to which the Company is allowed to earn its
2 WACC should be a function of its success in integrating climate change-related
3 risks into its GIP. We propose that the portion of the WACC be weighted according
4 to the Company's success in achieving certain prescribed metrics that reflect the
5 integration of climate change-related risks into long-term system planning.

6 **Q. How would such an incentive mechanism operate?**

7 A. If the Company does a good job of meeting such metrics, it would be allowed to
8 earn its WACC on the unamortized balance. If the Company falls short, the return
9 it is allowed to earn on the unamortized balance would be less than its WACC. To
10 make the incentive mechanism symmetrical, the Company should have an
11 opportunity to earn a return greater than its WACC. In other words, the Company
12 should be rewarded to the extent that it does an exemplary job of integrating climate
13 change-related risks, and could earn a return in excess of its WACC upon exceeding
14 the prescribed metrics.

15 **Q. Is there precedent for such a performance-based mechanism?**

16 A. Yes. Under the Future Energy Jobs Act passed by the Illinois legislature in
17 December 2016, electric utilities in that state have the option of capitalizing the
18 investment they make in energy efficiency measures, and to amortize such
19 investment over the measures' useful lives. The return they earn on the unamortized
20 balance of such investments is subject to performance-based metrics that capture
21 the utilities' respective performance in achieving energy efficiency savings. The
22 performance-based incentives under the Future Energy Jobs Act operate to reward

1 utilities for exceeding their energy efficiency savings targets and to impose
2 penalties if they fall short.¹⁹⁶ Another example is the use of earnings adjustment
3 mechanisms by the New York Public Service Commission as part of its Reforming
4 the Energy Vision (“REV”) programs. Under the “Track Two” Order in the REV
5 proceeding, a utility can be provided with incentives up to the dollar equivalent of
6 100 basis points of its return on equity based on its ability to implement various
7 measures that are consistent with REV objectives, such as facilitating
8 interconnection of DERs, increasing electric usage intensity (i.e. reducing peak and
9 improving load factor), encouraging customer engagement, and implementing
10 beneficial electrification programs (e.g., heat pumps) geared toward greenhouse gas
11 reductions.¹⁹⁷

12 **Q. What sort of metrics could be included in such a mechanism to capture the**
13 **Company’s integration of climate change-related risks?**

14 A. There are several measures that would reflect the improvement in the resilience of
15 the Company’s network in the face of climate change risks, such as
16 (1) improvements in reliability-related statistics (e.g., SAIDI, SAIFI, or MAIFI),
17 (2) hosting capacity for DERs (measured in kW), (3) voltage reductions (measured
18 as average annual voltage by circuit), (4) demand response from time-varying rates
19 (measured in kW), (5) participation in time-varying rates (as a percentage of

¹⁹⁶ The Future Energy Jobs Bill (SB 2814) was enacted into law on December 7, 2016, as Public Act 99-0906, with an effective date of June 1, 2017.

¹⁹⁷ Case 14-M-0101, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Order Adopting a Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy Framework (May 19, 2016), pp. 53-93.

1 customers), or (6) operational savings, measured in dollars or dollars per average
2 bill. These metrics would capture the sort of benefits that one should expect from
3 large investments in the Company's grid. These performance targets should be
4 quantifiable, not subjective; should include achievement dates; and be based on
5 outcomes, not processes.

6 **Q. How would this mechanism and these metrics be established?**

7 A. The details regarding the design of such a mechanism are beyond the scope of this
8 proceeding, and should be considered in a subsequent proceeding on
9 comprehensive and integrated grid planning. The record in this case would simply
10 not support a thorough evaluation consideration of these issues, which would
11 benefit from a full examination by all the interested stakeholders.

1

7. CLIMATE RISK AND CUSTOMERS

2 **Q. How do customers figure into the discussion of utilities and climate risk?**

3 A. Customers are directly affected by the impacts of climate-related physical risks,
4 with respect to both the quality/reliability of their service and the costs of that
5 service. Upon the occurrence of an extreme weather event, customers' electric
6 service is subject to interruption for extended periods. Actions by the utility to
7 improve the resilience of the grid thus should reduce the adverse impacts on service
8 arising from extreme weather events. Similarly, integration of climate change-
9 related risks in the utility's long-term system planning should result in lower costs
10 for customers over time, as the utility will avoid or minimize investments in
11 facilities that are vulnerable to extreme weather events, thereby minimizing the
12 storm damage costs that ultimately are recovered in utility rates. The extent to
13 which utilities engage in resilience-related investments to reduce their climate-
14 related risks thus redound to the benefit of customers.

15 **Q. Are there particular groups that are expected to be more vulnerable to the**
16 **electric service-related impacts of climate change?**

17 A. Climate adaptation and vulnerability studies show that the most socially vulnerable
18 households today often bear the most exposure to climate-related risks.¹⁹⁸ These

¹⁹⁸ Lynn, K., MacKendrick, K., & Donoghue, E., (2011, August). Social Vulnerability and Climate Change: Synthesis of Literature. *US Forest Service*. Retrieved at: https://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr838.pdf;
U.S. Global Change Research Program (2016). The Impacts of Climate Change on Human Health in the United States: A Scientific Assessment. *Populations of Concern*. Retrieved at: <https://health2016.globalchange.gov/populations-concern>.

1 households often lack access to resources necessary to cope with climate-related
2 shocks and stresses. Specifically, low-income households and communities of
3 color¹⁹⁹—commonly referred to as “environmental justice communities”—and
4 those at home who are medically dependent on electricity²⁰⁰ are especially likely to
5 be vulnerable to climate-related risks. Thus, the consequences of a utility’s failure
6 to integrate climate change-related risks into its long-term system planning will fall
7 disproportionately on segments of the population least capable of coping with the
8 impacts.

9 **Q. Are there potential customer programs that the Company could pursue**
10 **through ISOP, or otherwise, that could address the needs of their most**
11 **vulnerable customers and communities?**

12 A. Yes. As discussed above, DERs have unique resilience benefits in that they can
13 generate energy closest to where it is needed. With the right kind of forward-
14 looking planning, DERs could be deployed through ISOP or other resource
15 planning proceedings to equip these communities with the assets and resources to
16 withstand climate-related risks. Some examples of potential programs could be
17 storage “resilience hubs” in vulnerable neighborhoods, or behind-the-meter solar
18 plus storage programs for medically vulnerable ratepayers.

¹⁹⁹ Coffee, J. (2018, February). Climate Disasters Hurt the Poor the Most. Here’s What We Can Do About it. *Governing*. Retrieved at: <https://www.governing.com/commentary/col-disasters-disadvantaged-climate-justice.html>.

²⁰⁰ Dominianni, C., Ahmed, M., Johnson, S., Blum, M., Ito, K., Lane, K., (2018, July). Power Outage Preparedness and Concern among Vulnerable New York City Residents. *Journal of Urban Health*. Retrieved at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6181821/>.

1 **Q. What are your recommendations to protect customers, and in particular low-**
2 **income customers, from the rate impacts associated with climate change-**
3 **related risk and grid resiliency strategies going forward?**

4 A. Ultimately, prudent management of climate-related risks by the utility should
5 produce the desired effect of minimizing rate impacts of climate-related risks and,
6 to the extent such risks are not managed prudently, regulators have a responsibility
7 to ensure that imprudent costs are not passed on to customers, whether low-income
8 or not. The Commission is uniquely situated to exercise its full range of options to
9 minimize rate impacts through, among other things, the period over which grid
10 resilience investments are amortized or how such costs are allocated to customer
11 classes.

12 Targeted climate resilience investments could also provide relief for low-
13 income customers. Solar plus storage investments, for example, could decrease
14 bills while ensuring resilience against climate impacts. Equitable access to such
15 measures, of course, is a challenge, and the Commission may wish to focus
16 particular attention to developing programs that facilitate access to such
17 investments by environmental justice communities.

1

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2

Q. Based on your review of the Company’s filing and emerging electric utility trends, what conclusions do you reach in this testimony?

3

4

A. We reach the following conclusions:

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- Climate-related risks, emerging in many vectors, have a material and substantial bearing on the Company’s operations today and will continue to affect operations in the future. Collaborative processes in North Carolina are currently underway to assess these risks and their implications for the electric grid.

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- The Company faces demonstrable physical risks from climate change and increasing scrutiny on climate risk management from relevant financial institutions.

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- As a potential foundational investment for the 21st century grid, any grid modernization plan should consider best climate resilience practices alongside grid modernization best practices. This includes the fair assessment of DERs as climate resilience and grid modernization solutions.

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- The Grid Improvement Plan, as filed, does not assess or respond to climate-related risks, nor does it adhere to grid modernization best practices. As a result, the Company’s proposal does not provide enough information to indicate that the Plan is a prudent investment.

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Q. Based on your review of the Company’s filing and emerging electric utility trends, what recommendations do you make in this testimony?

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22

A. We respectfully ask that the Commission:

- 1 • Direct the Company to assess and manage climate-related risks across its
2 operations and assets, in accordance with prudent utility practice.
- 3 • Make clear that it will hold the Company accountable for implementing this
4 standard when it evaluates the prudence of proposed GIP investments by the
5 Company.
- 6 • Direct the Company to participate in ongoing Department of Environmental
7 Quality stakeholder processes around grid modernization and integrate data,
8 findings, and recommendations, into its grid modernization investments. The
9 Commission should further require that the Company file a report by December
10 31, 2020 identifying any gaps in knowledge that need to be filled through
11 further collaboration.
- 12 • Require the Company to develop large distribution investments such as the GIP
13 through an integrated distribution planning (“IDP”) or integrated systems &
14 operations planning (“ISOP”) process moving forward.
- 15 • To the extent that GIP projects are permitted deferred recovery, impose
16 performance-based conditions on the recovery of such deferred amounts in
17 rates, such as through adjustments to the weighted average cost of capital
18 applied to the unamortized balance of deferred amounts.

19

1 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

2 **A. Yes.**