1	PLACE: Dobbs Building
2	Raleigh, North Carolina
3	DATE: Thursday, May 23, 2018
4	DOCKET NO.: E-2, Sub 1159
5	E-7, Sub 1156
6	TIME IN SESSION: 10:00 a.m 12:43 p.m.
7	BEFORE: Commissioner ToNola D. Brown-Bland, Presiding
8	Commissioner Jerry C. Dockham
9	Commissioner Lyons Gray
LO	Commissioner Daniel G. Clodfelter
L1	Commissioner Charlotte A. Mitchell
L2	
L3	IN THE MATTER OF:
L 4	TECHNICAL CONFERENCE
L 5	Joint Petition of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
L 6	and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, for Approval of
L 7	Competitive Procurement of Renewable Energy Program
L 8	
L 9	Volume 1
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COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Good morning.

We'll come to order now and go on the record. I am

Commissioner ToNola D. Brown-Bland, and with me this

morning are Commissioners Jerry C. Dockham, James G.

Patterson, Lyons Gray, Daniel G. Clodfelter and

Charlotte A. Mitchell.

The Commission now calls for Technical Conference, the Matter of the Joint Petition of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, which may sometimes be referred to as DEC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, sometimes referred to as DEP, and collectively they will be referenced as Duke, for Approval of Competitive Procurement of Renewable Energy Program, hereafter CPRE Program.

Specifically pending before the Commission is the requested approval of the CPRE Program plan which was filed with the Commission in Docket E-100, Sub 157 on September 5, 2018, as a part of Duke's 2018 Biennial Integrated Resource Planning Reports. Duke's proposed CPRE Program plan contemplates the opening of the Tranche 2 CPRE RFP solicitation in July 2019.

On December 17, 2018, the Commission issued an Order allowing Duke to implement the proposed CPRE Program plan on an interim basis requiring Duke to

file interim reports regarding the status of the Tranche 1 CPRE RFP solicitation and establishing a schedule for the filing of comments by the parties to this proceeding. That Order authorized Duke to implement the CPRE Program plan without prejudice as to the right of any party to file comments with the Commission regarding the CPRE Program plans or the Commission to order changes in the CPRE Program plans.

Since the Commission issued that Order, the Commission has received the required interim reports from the Independent Administrator, hereafter IA, of the CPRE Program, and comments from the following parties: Duke; the Public Staff; First Solar, Inc., hereafter First Solar; and the North Carolina Clean Energy Business Alliance, NCC -- NCCEBA.

On May 1, 2019, after having taken under advisement the comments filed by the parties, the Commission issued an Order scheduling this matter for Technical Conference at this time and in this place for the purpose of receiving more detailed arguments from the parties regarding the following four issues: First, the need for more detailed locational guidance and when that guidance should be published to market participants; second, the reasonableness of the energy

storage protocol that is a part of the CPRE pro forma Power Purchase Agreement, hereafter PPA; third, the reasonableness of the dispatchable PPA proposed by First Solar for purposes of the CPRE Program; and, fourth, how to structure a bid refresh procedure and what amendments should or need to be made to Commission Rule R8-71(f)(3) to authorize that procedure. As to the bid refresh procedure, the Commission allowed for the filing of proposed amendments to the rule -- to Rule R8-71(f)(3) and comments related to the same. Duke, the IA, the Public Staff, and NCCEBA filed proposed amendments and comments.

On May 21, 2019, as directed by the Commission, the Commission Staff hosted a prehearing conference call to address logistical and procedural matters prior to the convening of this technical conference, including a tentative order of discussion for today's technical conference.

In compliance with the State Ethics Act, I now remind the Commissioners of our duty to avoid conflicts of interest, and I inquire at this time as to whether any Commissioner has a known conflict of interest with respect to the matter coming before us

this morning?

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(No response)

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were identified.

Petitioner.

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I will now call upon counsel for the parties to announce their appearances and to introduce as necessary any other persons that you anticipate might be involved in today's discussion on the part of the party you represent, and I'll start with the

Let the record reflect that no conflicts

MR. JIRAK: Thank you, Chairman. On behalf of Duke Energy, Jack Jirak and Brett Breitschwerdt. We have a number of Duke personnel that will be providing some information to the Commission. If it's okay with you we'll have them introduce themselves and then come up at the appropriate portions of the presentation.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: That will be And I'll say at the outset, Mr. Jirak reminds fine. me, but there are a number of people who we anticipate will be speaking today, and our court reporter is not familiar with you, so you will help her out greatly if each time you come to the mic you identify who you are and who you're with. Thank you, Mr. Jirak.

Continue.

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MS. KEMERAIT: Good morning, Commissioners. I'm Karen Kemerait with the Law Firm of Fox Rothschild in Raleigh, and I'm here on behalf of the North Carolina Clean Energy Business Alliance. And with me are several of the members of NCCEBA who are market participants in Tranche 1 and who are planning to be market participants in Tranche 2, and I'll ask that they stand, Brian O'Hara with Strata Solar, Steve Levitas with Cypress Creek, and Tyler Norris also with Cypress Creek. Mike Wallace with EcoPlexus had a flight and was planning to come today but he is very ill and was not able to make it but he was intending to be here. Also, Andy White with First Solar is a member of NCCEBA who is also here today. Thank you. COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Thank you all.

Thank you.

MR. HIGGINS: Commissioner Brown-Bland and Commissioners, Dan Higgins with Burns, Day and Presnell appearing for First Solar, Inc. With me are these gentlemen with First Solar, Roger Bredder, Andy White who stood a moment ago, and Hubert Lee.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Good morning.

24 Thank you.

MR. SMITH: Ben Smith, Regulatory Counsel for NCSEA. I'm here more for observation and potentially questions if any come up.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Well, we hope you will learn a lot today.

MR. DODGE: Good morning, Commissioners.

I'm Tim Dodge with the Public Staff. Also joining me is Layla Cummings with the Public Staff. We also anticipate calling on Jeff Thomas from our Electric Division and Dustin Metz from our Electric Division to answer some questions today.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Thank you. And we have our Independent Administrator.

MR. JUDD: Thank you, Commissioner

Brown-Bland, and thank you, Commissioners, for letting us appear. I will introduce myself but as a matter of protocol is it all right if we remain seated when we address you?

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Yes.

MR. JUDD: Thank you. My name is Harry

Judd. I'm with the group -- the Accion Group. We are
serving as the Independent Administrator. With me
today is Phil Layfield, our transmission expert, and

Dave Wall, also with the Accion Group who went through

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Tranche 1 with us and will have insights to share.
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    Thank you.
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               COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Thank you.
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    this morning, as I'll be mentioning later, our
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    Commission Staff is participating so, just for the
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    record, I'll have them to identify themselves.
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               MR. BUFFKIN: Thank you, Madam Chairman.
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    Patrick Buffkin, Staff Attorney with the Commission
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    Staff.
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              MR. McDOWELL: Hi, I'm Steve McDowell with
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    the Operations, Commission Staff.
              MS. JONES: Kim Jones also on Commission
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    Staff.
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              MS. DUFFLEY: Kim Duffley, Commission Staff.
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               COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: All right. So I
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    think we have -- we've gotten everybody on the record.
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               I have some comments to make about
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    today's -- the procedure and the reasons we're here,
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    but before I do that is there -- does anyone have any
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    preliminary matters to bring to the Commission's
    attention before that?
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                (Counsel shakes their heads no)
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               COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: The Commission
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    appreciates the parties and the IA's efforts to date
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to attempt to reach consensus on the issues raised in the CPRE Program implementation as the Tranche 2 solicitation approaches.

The purpose of today's technical conference is to facilitate discussion so that the Commission can resolve outstanding issues to assist with the forward progress of implementation of the CPRE Program.

To that end, we are having this technical conference transcribed by our court reporter. So while we want this conference to be somewhat relaxed and informal, we do still need each of you who has something to say to speak one at a time and not speak over one another. Wait for whoever is speaking to finish before you start. And as I mentioned earlier, also identify for the court reporter who you are and who's speaking.

Please feel free to respond to questions from the Commission and from our -- and from the Commission Staff at your seats using the microphones or, if you wish, you could come around to the witness stand podium or the podium that's been placed there. Again, it's relaxed, you don't need to ask permission if that's what you want to do, please go ahead and do that. But as I said, we're trying to keep it

informative and informal.

Generally, this conference will be much less formal than usual. And if you have questions of other parties for greater clarity or for understanding, I may allow that but I need you to first ask so that we can just keep order in the record. And I want to remind you that the questions should not be for the purpose of argumentation or arguing and should not be considered to be cross examination. There will be no formal testimony or cross examination and we're not swearing anybody in. The comments made today will though be part of the record in this proceeding just as the written comments that were already filed were -- are a part of the proceeding.

The other thing I want to emphasize, and I believe you were told this in the pre-conference call, but the purpose of today is not to make long extensive arguments. You can assume that we've already read the comments that have been filed so we're not looking for a repeat or long presentations in that regard. We want to keep it moving as best we can. And we really wanted to get some questions answered that we the Commission have and those have been developed along with our staff. So staff -- I mean, the questions you

get are not to be ascribed to any one particular person, they're coming from the body as a whole in general. And we'll proceed -- we'll let the staff begin, they will, after a statement by the IA of course, but the staff will generally start this ball rolling with their questions and we'll go through in a basic order starting with the Petitioner and we will hear from -- well, from time to time the IA first, and then the Petitioner, and then the Intervenor parties, back to the Petitioner I think, and then the same thing will happen with the Commissioners. So we don't do these often; they're rare, so bear with us as we kind of figure our way out to what's gonna make the most sense for purposes of the record.

Any questions or preliminary issues after that statement?

(No response)

We're ready to begin. So we'll now start with Mr. Judd of Accion Group as the Independent Administrator of the CPRE Program for an overview of the results of Tranche 1 and a forecast of potential success in Tranche 2.

MR. JUDD: Thank you, Commissioner.

Tracy, may we have the next slide please.

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

First off, let me say that we are not going to be introducing any confidential information including if we have questions that would delve into areas that we understand are confidential. We'll provide that in an appropriate manner to the Commission at a later date.

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We do believe that Tranche 1 was a success. It started the CPRE Program. We view it and always did view it as a beta test for how we were going to go through a number of different Tranches. acknowledge that we did not reach the goal that we had set of 600 megawatts. There are reasons for that. think that, first off, that number was arbitrary. have over 2000 megawatts to procure. We wanted to see how it would work. Our MO when starting a new program is you walk before you run. But the program was launched in a timely manner. It did confirm that the marketplace is prepared to bring forward bids that are at or below avoided cost. In fact, we had 2700 megawatts bid in initially; that shows certainly an interest.

As we go through our initial presentation and as there are later discussions, we do have ways that we think it could be improved so that Tranche 2

will be even more successful. I do want to say that the proposals that are now in the final phases of -for which PPAs will be issued are going to be coming online using the excess capacity on transmission of the system, which was the goal here to see if we can bring in renewable resources without a significant increase in cost.

I also want to note that the process we used as guided by the staff in using a web-based procurement platform has created an audit trail for you. We have all exchanges with the marketers recorded; we have their proposals recorded; we have all of their materials recorded; and we are able to provide to the Commission a complete record of every bid that was considered and how we moved forward.

Tracy, may I have the next slide, please.

When we were here in November we prepared a flow chart of how the CPRE Program would be conducted, how things would be administered. We're here to tell you that we used the process that we had presented then. There were no changes to it and it was successful.

Next slide, please.

What we're providing here -- and again I'm

not going to read all of these slides, we've provided it to you both electronically and a hard copy -- but to show you that we used the progression. We're continuing to believe that is the right way to proceed in Tranche 2. It will produce the results that are required in CPRE.

Next slide, please.

Again, this is just showing the progression that we used and how we got to the results.

(Discussion among the panel)

We're trying to be efficient here for you. I understand your time is valuable. We went through a process as we had laid out ahead of time that we received the proposals. We confirmed the intent of the bidders, and I will use bidder/MP interchangeably if you don't mind, and we were able to go through the process also of bringing in proposals from the DEP/DEC team for acquisition. A separate data record that we have for the Commission are proposals for projects to be acquired by Duke. We were -- that data also is collected for you and, as an aside, we have created an audit of that process as we were instructed to do and we will be providing that report to you of how the

selections were made for the projects to be acquired by Duke and how those were presented into CPRE and how they progressed. You can see from the charts -- I'm sorry, next slide please -- that we progressed in time including that we did bring in proposals from the DEP/DEC team that were included and evaluated using the same standards as used for all other proposals.

MR. BALL: One more.

MR. JUDD: Next slide, please.

We also went through the process that was unique to Tranche 1 of recognizing what we termed "late-stage projects". Those were ones that were well into the process of completing the determination of what the cost would be for their system upgrades and that the market participants had agreed to assume that cost so that they were not subject to the process of the stage two determination of system impact cost and then having that cost imputed into their proposal to determine the true cost to the Duke system and ultimately to ratepayers, and we treated them separately but we did recognize their existence.

MR. LAYFIELD: Me?

MR. JUDD: Yes, sir.

MR. LAYFIELD: On page 8, we're talking

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

about formation of the base case. I'm sorry. I'm Phil Layfield with Accion.

The base case is the starting point for the analysis as we add CPRE projects, and it's critical that it be an accurate depictation of the electric system. What we had in the base case as you see is a little over 12,000 megawatts in DEC and a little over 12,000 megawatts in DEP that needed to be entered as having existing and being built. That's 25,000 megawatts in a system that peaks at 37,000 megawatts and you already have generation in place to meet that peak.

My point is there is a bit of a disconnect here, folks. And I realize that we're not here to solve the queue reform issue today, but I do want to point out that we have a bloated base case. And hopefully as we get into the guidance, which is the second issue you've asked us to talk about, we can talk a little bit more about how we can manage the base case.

One proposal that -- just a consideration is that we only enter into the base case those projects that have a completed facility study. That would reduce the base case down to about 7000 megawatts --

we're on the last line now -- reducing, eliminating if you will, from the base case 18,000 megawatts that could be freed for later CPRE tranches. I don't want to tell you that this is without risk because we still have the queue so we have to manage this, but it is an opportunity. It's an opportunity to continue to add generation on the existing transmission system that I am hopeful we'll be able to pursue.

Next slide.

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Thank you, Phil. Thank you, MR. BALL: Commissioners. I'm Dave Ball with Accion Group. going to cover the next few slides that describes the process of the step one evaluation. And on slide number 9, we talk about the bid cures and clarifications. Just as a point of reference, we received a -- all of the bids and there is a tremendous amount of information that's required for each market participant to bid, and we reviewed all of We had technical teams split up to go over it. different subject areas. Also, we summarized the important pricing and other technical factors in their bids and sent it back to each market participant in a document to allow them to confirm that what we were seeing in our files matched what they intended to

propose. And in that process we identified a few items as charted out in that table of different factors that were needed to be clarified. So our whole process was intended to find the important information, confirm that it was what they intended to provide, and allow them to cure them in those instances when it wasn't what they intended. The purpose is to keep everybody in and to get the best offers.

Now, on slide 10 we're pointing out that only two bids actually were dropped out. The Independent Administer did not kick anybody out. The two that were dropped out were, as itemized in the slide, inadvertent or unintended double submissions of the same project. In DEC, there was one that was submitted as both late stage and non-late stage, and in DEP there was one that had storage and without storage, and they clarified that they only intended that one of each of those to go through.

On slide 11, this shows our initial ranking of the pricing factors. The average net benefit, that's the average net benefit below avoided costs.

The -- I'd just like to point out the final line there is the median net benefit. So, if you prefer an

average or a median in the statistics, you have both of those information points. And just to remind you, the net benefit is the net energy benefit from the production of solar energy plus the net capacity benefit that you get from the solar production minus the T&D system upgrade costs. And, again, that's an 8760 hourly load production profile across 20 years of production and that's matched to the 20 years of 8760 avoided energy and avoided capacity costs for the Duke systems, each DEP and DEC are separate.

Now, on slide 12, this is the asset acquisition proposals that were sponsored by Duke. There were five of them; two in DEC and two in DEP. And I'd just like to point out that the Duke self-build team submitted other proposals in addition to these, just so you understand there are more than just the five. These are just the five from the asset acquisition silo.

And then the -- on slide 13, as the result of the step one process, we evaluated the economic benefits of every proposal and we ranked them in descending order of net benefit, and we classified them in terms of whether they were in the competitive tier or the reserve list or they were released. And

the competitive tier, as Accion has used in another jurisdiction, is generally three times the requested megawatts, and it was split into the competitive tier in this instance which was required to post proposal security, and then the reserve list was held in reserve so they might be brought in and then others were allowed to be released if they chose to be released, and some chose to be released and some asked to stay in.

Thank you. I'm going to turn it over to Phil.

MR. LAYFIELD: Okay. We're on slide 14 and this gets into step two which is the analysis process for determining the system upgrade cost associated with each bid. We had a process in place, was tested, the teams worked through it, and we evaluated each bid starting at the most attractive bid in terms of improvement from avoided cost.

In DEC, we had 57 bids and as you see 26 of them were in the red zone. None of those bids prevailed. We had a number drop out because of security not being provided but we moved forward and ended up only slightly shy of the 600 megawatt target. We ran out of bids. There were no more bids available

to be evaluated. In DEP, we had 20 bids; eight were in the red zone, and that was more straight forward. We ended up analyzing three. We did not have conflict among the winning bids.

MR. BALL: Next slide, please.

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MR. LAYFIELD: Excuse me. Sorry. not have multiple bids that relied upon the same transmission access path. We had anticipated that we might have a cluster issue. We've had such issues in other jurisdictions and I suspect that we'll see it here in the future, but we did not have to allocate any costs between bids. We were fortunate that we found areas of the transmission system that were available and afforded relatively easy connection with relatively low costs, and that's what we see on page 15 -- 16, excuse me. We have 682 megawatts. total cost of the system upgrades for those 14 projects, and remember this transmission upgrade cost is socialized, was only \$5 million; a very low number for connecting that much.

COMMISSIONER GRAY: Can you speak a little more directly in the mic.

MR. LAYFIELD: I'm sorry, sir. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER GRAY: Some of us are getting a

little older.

2 MR. LAYFIELD: I understand.

So we had a good opportunity, a nice fit.

The bids that won put themselves in the right position on the transmission system, and you can see the 12 bids, the size of them in DEC, and the two bids, the two on the left in DEP were taken, and the process worked the way we intended. And the teams did a very beautiful job of working through all of the bids and coming up with the cost and we're quite pleased with the outcomes.

Dave.

MR. JUDD: (Inaudible)

MR. LAYFIELD: Thank you, Harry. What I was asked to say here is that the one bid in DEP, that's the small one on the left, is the only bid that prevailed that was in the red zone. As you see it's quite small. It also was a late-stage project that we already knew the cost for. Thank you.

MR. JUDD: So we provided to Duke our list of finalists and are moving forward to complete the PPAs. As you all know, we have a pro forma PPA, it's non-negotiable. We are, if you will, plugging in the necessary data about project specifics. And we have a

situation where the bidders were advised they had 60 days from when they were notified. In reviewing the Commission's prior orders, we determined that, in fact, the Commission had said we could take up to 90 days. We have advised the -- we being the IA has advised the bidders to let us know which way they wish to go. We do have the proposal security in place for all of those projects that are moving into the PPA phase that will be replaced by project security. Shortly after signing the PPA, the project -- the proposal security, forgive me, stays in place until that time and, if they choose not to sign the PPA that's been proffered, they will forfeit the proposal security.

I just want to take a moment on that point.

It's a process we have used in other jurisdictions to great success of determining that only projects that are shovel ready, those that the developers are prepared to move forward actually get full analysis and are presented with a PPA. We have had the unfortunate situation elsewhere where at the 11th hour someone pulls out and that leaves us short, leaves us scrambling to try to meet program goals. We don't have that situation here. If anyone departs now they

will forfeit and will deal with any short-come in the next round.

It is our thinking that having come in slightly under our arbitrary goal for Tranche 1 that we do have additional tranches coming and we will roll that, those megawatts into future solicitations.

At this point I'd like to stop. We do have some information that we'd like to present concerning a later topic that is outlined by the staff, but this concludes our overview of Tranche 1.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: And did you want to move forward and address Tranche 2 at this time, the process, or do you consider that done?

MR. JUDD: Let me address that. Thank you, ma'am.

The recommendations that you'll hear from
Phil about how we managed step two in Tranche 2 we
think are very important in making that even a more
robust program and bringing forward even more
successful bids. Because we're coming down to when we
have to assign the cost, and I understand it's on the
table of whether the developer pays it directly or
whether it's socialized, regardless, it is a cost that
in large part is because of the process we have to use

because of, and I'll use Phil's term "the bloated queue" that we have.

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We also have some thoughts about Tranche 2 and starting with we'd like permission to start the document review process now so that we can have that in place so that when we get final authorization on the avoided cost to be applied so we can launch the bid process without further delay. We are mindful of the fact that the marketplace wants to move forward. They want to capture the tax advantage that we have in place for them. And we believe that if we can move through the comment period on the draft documents, being both the PPA and the RFP, have those set to go so that when you tell us to release the bid process every one will be aware of what to expect and we won't have additional delay. We think that by doing the review process now the marketplace will be fully aware of what the confines will be of the RFP and they can prepare their proposals, fine tuning them if you will. When we have a decision on the issue of how many different buckets we call them on avoided cost, the granularity that we're permitted to use. believe that we should have more granularity than we The three buckets that were in Tranche 1, again, do.

it was a beta we got started. We needed something to work with. But we believe that providing bidders the opportunity to use their projected production profile to the max and having that identified as separate avoided cost buckets will produce more benefit to the system and will also encourage more participation.

Did I miss any --

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MR. BALL: No.

MR. JUDD: So that, in summary, is how we'd like to proceed. We'd like to get started. We'd like to move so that we can work with the market participants and other stakeholders in finalizing the RFP framework and the parameters. Obviously, Duke is a critical participant in that. And we need your guidance on what the -- any changes to the PPA. Specifically, there have been some questions, of course, about storage which is the sticking point. The rest of the terms did not get much attention in terms of being in dispute. The vast majority of that document is commercially acceptable and very similar to what we use elsewhere.

I'll stop there and be delighted to take questions, ma'am.

> COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Thank you for

getting us started this morning. So every one has heard what the IA had to say. I will go around to see if there are any comments. This section is really not intended to be long but if you have reactions or something you want to respond to what you've just heard. We'll start with the Petitioner.

MR. JIRAK: Thank you, Commissioner. We -just very briefly a minute here to say there's
obviously nothing much that Duke can add. Because the
IA was solely responsible for step one and understands
the mechanics of that we don't -- we defer to their
expert judgment on how to run that and what lessons
learned to carry over in Tranche 2.

The only thing I would add is obviously the IA has characterized that Tranche 1 was a success and we agree. As we think about this procurement from a 30,000 foot level, it's important to remember where we've been and where we're going in this process. And obviously in HB589 CPRE signaled a fundamental shift towards a competitive solicitation process for new renewable resources. And the big idea as we all know is that paying long-term avoided cost for solar resources, which has historically resulted in all customers being put in an overpayment risk to the tune

is that those same resources could be obtained through a competitive process at prices below forecast and avoided costs, and on top of that there'd be the operational benefit of having resources that could be operated in the same manner as the utility's So it's a big shift no doubt and it would be unreasonable to think that instituting a first of its kind RFP in North Carolina is going to be without any hiccups whatsoever. But we think obviously from our perspective that with the Commission's close oversight and strong direction, and the IA's leadership and experience, and the strong engagement of Public Staff and the many stakeholders in this room, we ended up with a well thought out first RFP. We're going to use lessons learned obviously in Tranche 2 to improve. And it's no surprise that there continues to be differences of opinion on some issues in this RFP; there likely always will be. But again, big picture, less than two years after HB589, we're at the tail end of the first RFP and that RFP has delivered a portfolio of solar

of billions of dollars. The idea for CPRE obviously

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resources and solar plus storage resources that under

the IA's analysis shows close to \$400 million of

savings for customers, and we think that's a success, no doubt. I think that definitively meets the statutory direction to achieve resources that reliably and cost effectively serve customers. And, again, we think this is a good first step. We think there's things we can learn as we move in Tranche 2 and we'll be looking to the IA's leadership as we think about those next steps.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Thank you. NCCEBA, any reaction to the IA's comments?

MS. KEMERAIT: Yes. Thank you,

Commissioners, I will be brief as well. With me are
representatives of Cypress Creek and Strata who have a
couple of comments as well, but we will -- we will be
brief.

As I mentioned when I made the introductions, North Carolina Clean Energy Business Alliance, the group that is participating in this docket is a group of solar developers that are market -- that were market participants in Tranche 1 and are planning to be market participants in Tranche 2. And my understanding is that this group of solar developers is the vast majority of the market participants for Tranche 1 and that, again, that are

anticipating being involved with Tranche 2. So the positions and the concerns that we will be talking about today are the collective and consensus opinions and concerns of the market participants. And those market participants, just so the Commission is aware that we have been involved with Tranche -- with this docket, are Cypress Creek Renewables, Strata Solar, Ecoplexus, First Solar, Carolina Solar, Southern Current, O2 Energy and Birdseye. So these opinions are those that are represented, are the collective opinions.

So, again, we appreciate the Commission ordering this technical conference because we believe that this is a great opportunity to discuss in depth some of the important issues and considerations for Tranche 2. And there have been a number of issues that we view as being particularly problematic for Tranche 1. That -- as Mr. Judd mentioned, there is an opportunity for Tranche 2 to be improving those aspects and that the Independent Administrator is going to be working toward having a more robust program for Tranche 2. And I wanted to mention -- respond to Mr. Judd's recommendation to the Commission that the document review process for Tranche 2 begin

now or immediately. We are in full support of that recommendation. We think it's prudent to begin consideration of the revisions of the Tranche 2 documents now so that there can be time to review them and provide comments about the Tranche 2 PPA, especially about the energy storage protocol.

Beginning in May of 2018, we expressed concerns about the energy storage protocol. And we, beginning in May of 2018, we asked for justification from Duke about why those restrictions were necessary, and we have not received any detailed information about that or any specific revisions for the energy storage protocol. So we think it's really important that there be an opportunity to consider and provide comments about the energy storage revisions and that the Commission review it carefully and then approve those revisions for Tranche 2.

And for the issues for Tranche 1 that we would like to have in particular be addressed for Tranche 2, the first and I think most important issue is the energy storage protocol which is in Exhibit 10 of the Tranche 1 PPA, and we believe that those -- that the energy storage protocol is overly restrictive. That is what we said when we filed a

motion back in May of 2018. And the results of
Tranche 1 I think demonstrate that those restrictions
are overly restrictive because only four out of 78
proposals that were bid into Tranche 1 of CPRE
included energy storage. Most of the market
participants elected not to submit energy plus storage
for Tranche 1 based upon the restrictions in the PPA.

And then the second issue that we'll be talking about that we think is particularly important is the curtailment provisions, and the PPA.

And then the third, which is not on the agenda for today but we did raise in our comments that we filed on March 22nd, are the exorbitant liquidated damage penalties for failure to build facilities. So we would ask that the Commission carefully consider that issue.

And then finally and briefly, we'd like to have some concerns about lack of transparency be improved for Tranche 2, and Brian O'Hara and Tyler Norris will briefly describe what -- from a practical aspect what occurred for Tranche 1.

MR. O'HARA: My name is Brian O'Hara. I'm with Strata Solar, also, the Chairman of the Board of NCCEBA. I just want to give maybe three kind of

anecdotes that highlight some of the points that Karen just made.

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So first off from Strata's perspective, and this is related to the PPA documents, Strata did not participate in Tranche 1 of CPRE other than to bid asset acquisition proposals because we evaluated the PPA and other contract documents and found them to be not commercially reasonable. Life is too short to bid on documents like that from our perspective. So we were not participants other than asset acquisition proposals. We hope that changes for Tranche 2. we've provided comments via NCCEBA about some of the changes that we would like to see made there. I'll say, too, that we're a company that, while we're based here in North Carolina we operate across the country. And I'm not sure, Mr. Judd I think mentioned -- I think -- Harry, you were talking about the PPA when you said that the only issue that was sort of contested was the storage protocols and the rest of it was commercially reasonable. Was that the PPA you were referring to?

MR. JUDD: Brian, what I said was that it was -- yes, the storage was the focal point of concern. The rest of the terms, there were some

thoughts given to it, but they appeared to be commercially reasonable as we've seen in other jurisdictions.

MR. O'HARA: Thank you for the clarification. And as our company would take exception with that, we did not find those documents to be commercially reasonable.

The second kind of anecdote I'll share related to the need for transparency as we only bid asset acquisition proposals. It actually wasn't until the meeting with the Independent Administrator after the Tranche 1 awards were announced that we actually understood how the asset acquisition proposals were even going to be evaluated. That would have been really helpful to know ahead of time. Perhaps that was an oversight on our part, but if it was an oversight on our part the rest of the market participants in that room were also learning about that process for the first time in that meeting, so we all — it was an oversight for all of us if it was an oversight. So I think that's one example there.

And then third, we'll say more about the storage protocols later in the meeting, but I'll just say again from Strata's perspective, we would not bid

on a project that had the restrictions in place that we saw here related to storage. That's also part of the reason that we supported the position that NCCEBA took that if we don't -- we would prefer to see the storage protocols and the ability to bid storage removed all together rather than set the precedent of having bad protocols around something as important as storage. We really see storage as the future of the industry and it's really critical that we get those rules right around storage. Thank you.

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MR. NORRIS: Thanks, Brian. Thanks for having us here. We really appreciate this opportunity. I'm Tyler Norris with Cypress Creek and with NCCEBA. I just wanted to expand on one aspect related to transparency that we thought would be valuable to note just as we reflect on Tranche 1, and that is with respect to what occurs during the cluster study process and thereafter. And just to recall for all our sake, what normally occurs in the course of the System Impact Study, according to the State Interconnection Procedures, is that an interconnection customer executes a System Impact Study Agreement, a variety of studies are performed as part of that, and then they are delivered a final System Impact Study

that they can then agree upon and then proceed to a Facility Study Agreement, if they choose to. occurring now with this cluster study process is that a site say that is just submitted in an interconnection request, even a week prior to say to the bid deadline, can bid that project into say Tranche 2, and then they'll proceed into a cluster study if they do post a bid bond, but it's unclear what exactly occurs during that cluster study process and whether that actually represents a full System Impact Study, and it's unclear if they actually have to execute a System Impact Study Agreement prior to entering that process. And I think in general, from our perspective, too, as a market participant we didn't quite understand sequentially how the cluster study was proceeding. This impacted us directly because we had multiple projects that were still under consideration but then we were being invited to post bid bond while that cluster study was underway, and they were running into network upgrades. But that was not a predetermined schedule, it was ad hoc, and it created challenges for being able to make a decision about whether to post a bid bond upon invitation because we only had a few days to do so.

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So the general point is just that I think there's an opportunity to provide some more transparency information about what exactly is occurring during the cluster study process and what that represents with respect to the System Impact Study. And then after the cluster study is complete and awards are made, having more information available about when a System Impact Study, a final System Impact Study will be, in fact, delivered to the interconnection customer. To our knowledge, that information was not provided upfront despite some appeals to make more information available. And my understanding is that awardees did not get information about when they would get that System Impact Study until very recently. And that has a lot of implications, of course, for an interconnection customer making a decision about whether to proceed with ex-communal PPA. And it has implications for the in-service timeline for their own project and their business planning about when they're going to need to make substantial capital expenditures to get those projects in service.

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So we think this is an opportunity that will help all market participants including the utility in

Tranche 2 on that front. Thank you.

MR. LEVITAS: Good morning. Steve Levitas with Cypress Creek. First, I just want to add one issue, a small, obscure issue relating to transparency but an important one. But before I do that, I just want to be sure that from this side of the room that we commend the IA for doing really an excellent job on a very difficult and challenging assignment. We didn't agree with everything along the way but on balance they certainly should be commended.

The issue that I want to bring to your attention concerns your Rule R8-71(1)(4), which is your CPRE implementing rule, and the very last sentence of that section, it's actually the last sentence of the whole rule. If you'll let me try to with my poor eyesight read it to you, it says the following, "If the electric public utility's initial proposal includes assumptions about pricing after the initial term, such information shall be made available to the Independent Administrator and all participants". So what this is getting at is all bidders into a process like this or, for that matter, PURPA QFs who agree to enter into contracts or you'll see the same thing with your GSA Program, you have a

time limited initial term, and then after that you're making a bet about what's going to happen thereafter in terms of potential revenues, and the price that you bid or the price that you're willing to accept in that initial term is heavily dependent on that assumption. And we requested and negotiated, and you approved that requirement in that Rule for a very specific reason, which is Duke coming into this program as a market participant has vastly more resources and vastly more information about market conditions than other participants do and, therefore, you required them to share that information with the IA and other participants. To my knowledge, I'm not aware that that information ever was provided and I hope that that will be corrected in Tranche 2. If I may, one quick question for the IA.

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The slide presentation included information about base line assumptions. I believe that's what you called it, the 24 --

MR. JUDD: The base case, yes.

MR. LEVITAS: The base case. And I don't recall having seen that information during the process. And my question is did you make the assumption that all of those projects would be built

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and would trigger system upgrades and, therefore, pay for the upgrades that they triggered? What assumption was made about the impact to the transmission system of those projects being in queue?

MR. LAYFIELD: The assumption was that the projects did exist prior to CPRE, they were in the queue, and they were entered into the base case.

MR. LEVITAS: And so, if I may follow up, is it possible then that there's an assumption that network upgrades or system upgrades were being -- would be built as a result of those projects coming on, that if -- should those projects not be built, would then become the responsibility of projects that may have received awards?

MR. LAYFIELD: That's not exactly how the base case works. It's a snapshot of the system as it exists for study purposes and load flow analysis so that we can understand what an incremental project impact would be on the system.

MR. LEVITAS: Okay. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: First Solar, any

response to the IA?

MR. HIGGINS: No, thank you.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Public Staff?

MS. CUMMINGS: Yes, thank you. Layla
Cummings with the Public Staff. We do have a few
comments about overview from Tranche 1 and some
additional comments about Tranche 2 going forward.

We overall think -- agree with the IA and with Duke and the Intervenors, too, it sounds like that Tranche 1 was generally a success. We were happy to see the total savings versus the avoided cost over 20 years was \$290 million in DEC and calculated to be \$85 million, rounded up a bit there, in DEP. We think these savings in general show a good outcome for ratepayers and that the CPRE in that regard has been successful.

We do have a few concerns; however, we are concerned to see how many projects failed to post performance security and how many of those projects then backed out of Tranche 1. We understood from the IA that that was -- the 20 projects that backed out were an abnormal amount to back out of the RFP. We believe this delayed the process and maybe did not give the most accurate depiction of the base case. We hope to hear more from the market participants. I think we just heard from Tyler Norris about some of the reasons for -- for maybe some transparency

measures could be put in place to help with that. But we would like to -- we hope going forward in Tranche 2 that we would see less projects backing out.

We also acknowledge that there was some uncertainty for the market participants surrounding GSA implementation and also the finalization of the grouping study in the interconnection docket.

So looking forward to Tranche 2, and consistent with our March 22nd comments, we continue to support a delay of the Tranche 2 solicitation until the Sub 158 rates are in effect. We believe that current rates are most reflective of the avoided cost are the best to provide the cost cap.

We also have a few issues up for consideration, new issues in the avoided cost docket, that we think are appropriate to consider in the CPRE and that includes our partial settlements on rate design and the solar integration services charge. In general, we believe that more granular rates will allow for more pricing buckets and will send better price signals. We also believe it is appropriate to consider whether a charge or some other similar calculation of additional ancillary services costs

should be applied to CPRE Tranche 2 projects or any other future tranches. We believe that this is consistent with the language of House Bill 589 that requires the utility to consider the potential for increased delivery cost to a public utility's customers as a result of siting additional renewable energy facilities.

We also, in terms of a delay, believe that

we -- we're still in the contracting phase for Tranche

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before the finalizing of the winning bids. And so

we've heard today some from NCCEBA about the PPA. We,

along with the IA, support putting those documents out

and learning more but that may be a process.

We acknowledge, too, that the delay may cause some hardships, that there may be other factors such as further reductions in the tax credits and increased carrying costs for projects, that the Commission may want to take into consideration before considering such a delay. That's all of our comments.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: I'll ask if the Commission has any response or questions just based on the preliminary comments here. Commissioner Clodfelter.

that we wouldn't actually solicit the bids until we had established the new methodology in the avoided cost docket, but we wanted to get the bids in and received before the end of the year, if we were to say that that's our goal is to try to get the bids in before the end of the year, how late can -- what's the latest date by which we have to establish the new methodology and Duke establish the new rates? We've got our evidentiary hearings on July 15th. I'm not suggesting that we're going to sit on it; I'm not suggesting that at all. I just want to know what's our window before we get into trouble.

MR. JUDD: Well, I can definitely tell you if it's Christmas Eve that we'll be --

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Well sure, okay, but I'm saying reasonably. You've got a lot of work to be done on these documents. We've already heard that.

MR. JUDD: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: There's going to be a lot of work done on these documents. We heard you loud and clear. You want to get that started right now. That's good. But it sounds like there are

going to be a lot of issues on the documents and people are going to want to talk about that so that's going to chew up some time, too. So taking all of that into consideration, you're going to need the methodology because then Duke has to sort of give you the rates under that new methodology. So that's going to take a little time for them to sort of -- they may have already done it but --

MR. JUDD: That's a great question and let me respond this way.

MR. JUDD: The parties in interest have been working together. As you know, we did have formal stakeholder meetings with them. We thrashed through some issues, got them on the table, and we continue to talk to try to work together to make this a successful program. In Tranche 1 we accepted bids in October.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Okay.

MR. JUDD: Given lessons learned in Tranche

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will move more quickly in Tranche 2.

The issue of the -- finalizing the PPAs was mentioned that we're still in the process. I want to

say again I think the Commission was wise in saying we're going to have a pro forma PPA. And the reason for that, and that has eliminated by the way a protracted discussion period, because all we're doing now is confirming the information, confirming the willingness of the counter party to go forward. If we had done otherwise and permitted that the PPAs be negotiated after the selection process, I can -- I can say without a moments hesitation the people would have gained the system. They would have said I'll give you a low number to get to the table and now I'm going to negotiate. I'm going to trade some horses and I'm going to claw back value. Even if I don't change my price I'll shift risk and to my benefit and that takes time. I think you were spot on in saying we're not going to go that way. So the fact that whether it's 60 days or 90 days it's plenty of time to complete that contracting.

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I think that the team that Duke put up into a T&D evaluation team that is isolated from the rest of the company that worked with Phil have made great progress in eliminating the challenges that we faced in Tranche 1. Again, this is one of those lessons learned situations, Commissioner, where going through

the evaluation there were issues identified that have been corrected and will not be repeated in Tranche 2 that will save us time.

The issue of posting the bid security, I understand that there is a concern about why so many pulled back. We haven't done a survey and, frankly and candidly, I really don't care to learn the -- and nor would they tell us the individual business model that these folks are using of why they had so many bids that they put in, and given the opportunity to move forward, chose not to. I will tell you that the proposal security process works well. We've used it many other places including in Georgia, by the way which was somewhat of a model for this program, and it does avoid the situation of folks getting to the 11th hour and then trying to extract value and change the PPA under the guise that you're stuck with us, you've got to go forward.

Lots of reasons to have it there: It works; it means that the projects that are prepared to go forward are the ones that we're looking at; and folks can decide to bid, not bid, withdraw, and I think it's an appropriate way. Frankly, I think it's an exit ramp to let people decide whether they are serious and

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whether within their business model a particular
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    project is appropriate to move forward; whether it's
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    changed --
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              COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: So, Mr. Judd, I
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    hear you saying for various reasons parts of this
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    process should be faster than it was before just
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    because --
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              MR. JUDD: And they will be, ma'am.
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              COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: -- you have been
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    through it and you worked it out.
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              MR. JUDD: Yes. I expect in Tranche 2 they
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    will.
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              COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Can you get
    closer to an answer to Commissioner Clodfelter's
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    question?
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              MR. JUDD: I'm sorry. I wasn't as
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    explicit -- if we can have --
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              COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Let me come at it
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    this way. Suppose -- and I'm picking this out of the
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    air, but suppose we've got Duke and you, a decision on
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    the avoided cost docket around about the Labor Day
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    time period. Does that give you enough time to --
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              MR. JUDD: Absolutely. Absolutely. And, in
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    fact --
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COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: When did it begin to get into trouble?

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MR. JUDD: Yeah. Let me give you a little more color.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Okay

MR. JUDD: If we can have it so the bids are presented in October, we're fine.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Okay.

MR. JUDD: And, also, if we can go through this process of having the RFP document and the PPA documents completed then what would happen? want to give a little flavor here, that on the electronic online bid form it lays out all of the different tranches -- strike that, I'm sorry, wrong word -- the different buckets for the avoided cost. If you give us how much granularity we have, whether it's 7, 8, 9, whatever, that would be presented on the form so that the bidder can literally use that as a scratch pad to see what the impact would be for the different periods. And what I recommend is that we have the information early enough so that the market participants have at least a month to go through that They'll know all of the other scratch pad process. terms because of the RFP. We can even put up a model

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bid form so they'll know all of the information they need to collect. And the only page left will be to figure out how they will break on the individual buckets.
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Was that a more precise answer? I hope it was.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yes. Thank you.

MR. JUDD: Thank you.

As you can see we get into the weeds too much so thank you for guiding me back.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Commissioner Mitchell.

MS. MITCHELL: Just two questions. Will you -- I want to make sure I'm entirely clear. Will you define for me "red zone"?

MR. JUDD: Thank you. It's our shorthand for the areas that are serious constrained areas for transmission access. Duke worked with Phil on our team and produced maps that we published on the website and it shows the areas of constraint. And we colored them red to say you really should take a serious look at whether you want to go forward because we're telling you you will incur costs if you bring us a proposal on those terms. I apologize for the

confusion.

COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: Oh, that's okay.

So -- so that information was made available to the entire marketplace; is that correct?

MR. JUDD: Yes. It was published on the website in a map form so that it was visually available to them.

COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: How many of the proposals that advanced to this stage or step two review were late-stage proposals?

MR. JUDD: Do you recall?

MR. LAYFIELD: I don't recall that off the top of my head.

MR. JUDD: To avoid delay we don't have the precise number in front of us. We'll get it for you today.

COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: Okay. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Commissioner

Clodfelter.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yeah, since it's not really connected to any of the other things we're going to be talking about later in the day, would you respond to the point Mr. Levitas raised? Did Duke provide you any information about post initial term

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pricing or renewal terms? Did you -- were you provided any of that by Duke?

MR. JUDD: I'm not sure I understand the question, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: The question -- the question was you are required to be provided information under the rule about what pricing structures might look like in a renewal term for any of the winning proposals. Were you provided any of that information? It sounds like you weren't. If you're not, not even following the question, you
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MR. JUDD: As was said before we have subject matter expert teams in our group --

probably weren't provided the information.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Okay.

MR. JUDD: -- so give me just a moment -
COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: You can provide
that in a follow-up later if you want, that's fine,
unless you've got it right now.

MR. JUDD: Let me do that. I know a lot of information was provided.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Okay.

MR. JUDD: I don't want to give a mistaken answer to you.

1 COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Okay.

MR. BALL: Excuse me. Just to clarify, the question is what is the pricing after the 20-year PPA term?

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yes.

MR. JUDD: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: So now we'll move on with the items that we had listed in our May 1 Order. And we'll start with -- oh, do you want to ask -- okay. I'm sorry. I'm leaving out my staff.

MR. McDOWELL: That's all right. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Steve McDowell.

MR. McDOWELL: Steve McDowell with the Commission Staff. I want to ask a couple of questions. One playing off of Commissioner Mitchell's questions there.

In Tranche 1, how many winning project proposals had network upgrade costs yet were not located on the list of constrained circuits and substations that you can provide it as locational guidance? And partly I'm playing off of a couple of things in your presentation. On page 14 you indicated that there was one winning bid in the red zone. And then on page 15 said every winning bid required

minimum basic system upgrade requirements. So my question is related to Commissioner Mitchell's but probing that in a little different way.

MR. LAYFIELD: There was one winner -excuse me, there was a winner in the red zone in DEP.

It did have minimum costs as did every bid that won.

We felt was a low-cost project and that's frankly one
of the reasons that they won. They bid into a

location that was relatively easy and inexpensive to
connect. Did that help?

MR. McDOWELL: Yes. So partly what I wanted to -- what we're interested in is, and we're going to probe this a little bit later in the locational guidance but more directly, but I was interested in any evidence out of the Tranche 1 that the locational guidance hit the mark so to speak. And so the question was how many winning project proposals had network upgrade costs but yet were not located on the list of constrained circuits and substations that have been provided in that locational guidance? Does that make sense?

MR. LAYFIELD: It makes sense but I don't have that data in front of me, sir.

MR. JUDD: But we'll get it.

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              MR. LAYFIELD: Yes.
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              MR. McDOWELL: Can you provide that later
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    then?
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              MR. LAYFIELD: Yes, sir.
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              MR. JUDD:
                         Absolutely.
              MR. McDOWELL: Let me change gears real
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              I want to -- I'm interested in the proposals
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    with storage, the four proposals and, in fact, there
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    were some that won. I read with interest the Public
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    Staff's comments and I'll quote, "the IA has indicated
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    that bids with storage operated the storage devices to
12
    maximize revenue - that is, energy storage was
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    discharged during the on-peak hours and charged during
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    the off-peak hours, both derived from the E-100,
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    Sub 148 Option B rate tariffs used in the RFP". And
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    that's from page 11 of the Public Staff comments.
17
    Based on the production profiles provided by the
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    projects that included storage, would this have
19
    included battery discharges in the hours of 6:00 to
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    7:00 a.m., in the winter?
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              MR. JUDD: Let me start by giving a little
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    background so you understand our point of reference.
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              MR. McDOWELL: Okay. Thank you.
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              MR. JUDD:
                         Any proposal that included
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storage was required to provide a production profile in 8760 with and without storage, and we did that for a couple of reasons. One was to stress test whether they knew how to use storage; whether they were realistic in what they were proposing. That's based on experience elsewhere that we drew upon.
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MR. McDOWELL: So those profiles look different with and without storage --

MR. JUDD: Most --

MR. McDOWELL: -- as a simple test?

MR. JUDD: Yes.

MR. McDOWELL: Okay.

MR. JUDD: Yes. I'm sorry. I'm now going to pass to someone who actually had to pull apart the production profiles.

MR. McDOWELL: Thank you.

MR. BALL: Thank you. We did look at the hourly battery storage, the charging as well as the battery discharging and there were hours of discharge in the winter peak hours. Is that -- I think that's the question.

MR. McDOWELL: Yes. And more specifically, I understand peak hours, and in the Sub 148 and what's proposed in 158 those peak hours are pretty broad.

Specifically, the question was related to say a peak hour of 6:00 to 7:00 a.m., in the winter?

MR. BALL: Can we get back with you? I don't recall exactly in -- when those discharges occurred in that peak period but they were in the -- whatever the peak periods were they did take advantage of and responded to those pricing signals.

MR. McDOWELL: Okay.

MR. JUDD: If I could, I'm going to request some guidance from you gentlemen as to what of this information we're provided should be considered confidential. If you say none then that's fine, you'll have it all; I just will want the guidance. Patrick admonished us on that on our call the other morning and I wanted to make certain that you're aware we will test that with you before we make it public. Thank you.

MR. McDOWELL: So kind of a follow up to that, the System Impact Grouping Study approach that the Commission approved in October 2018, that was the approach used to evaluate system impacts; is that correct, the grouping study?

MR. LAYFIELD: CPRE bids were looked at as a group, yes.

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               MR. McDOWELL:
                             Okay. Consistent with that
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    quidance?
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              MR. LAYFIELD:
                             Yes.
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              MR. McDOWELL: So in those production
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    profiles that were provided for storage and how they
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    impacted that, and I know you're going to follow up
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    with some more specific information about how those
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    profiles looked with storage, that would have been
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    included in the grouping study, the System Impact
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    Study?
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              MR. LAYFIELD:
                              The answer is yes.
                                                  The
12
    storage is behind the inverter and does not impact the
    amount of megawatts provided to the grid.
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14
              MR. McDOWELL: Just in a different location;
    a timeframe?
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16
              MR. LAYFIELD: A different timeframe.
                                                      But.
17
    the magnitude would not -- the maximum magnitude would
18
    not change and we look at the maximum input when doing
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    analysis.
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              MR. McDOWELL: So it was studied with
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    storage and without storage because that was with the
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    profiles that were provided by the projects that bid?
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MR. LAYFIELD: The costs were for the

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megawatt hours.

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MR. McDOWELL:
                             How about in terms of the
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    System Impact Study?
                             There is no difference in
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              MR. LAYFIELD:
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    cost, whether the project has storage or not, in terms
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    of its system upgrade costs.
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              MR. McDOWELL: Okay. So did the results
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    there provide any unique issues with storage, without
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    storage?
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              MR. LAYFIELD:
                              No.
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              MR. McDOWELL: For instance, did the
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    stability studies, for example, reflect any
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    significant impact from storage being a part of the
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    formula?
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              MR. LAYFIELD:
                              The answer is no, because we
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    took the maximum input to the system and that's what
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    all of the studies were based upon.
17
               MR. McDOWELL:
                             The maximum megawatt hour?
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               MR. LAYFIELD: Yes. Maximum megawatts, yes.
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              MR. McDOWELL: One final question then, from
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    Tranche 1 how many winning bids will be
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    interconnecting to the transmission system as opposed
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    to the distribution system?
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               MR. LAYFIELD: There was one bid that will
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    connect to distribution. The other 13 winning bids
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connect to transmission.
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              MR. McDOWELL: Thank you. That's all I
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    have.
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              MR. BUFFKIN: I have one question for
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    Mr. Layfield.
               You describe the total grid upgrade cost to
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    $5 million as being a very low number. I think that's
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    what you said.
              MR. LAYFIELD: Yes, I did.
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              MR. BUFFKIN: You must have made a
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    comparison to something. What did you compare that
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    to?
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              MR. LAYFIELD: Other jurisdictions in which
    we've worked. It's not unusual to have over
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    $5 million for a single project.
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              MR. BUFFKIN: Then I think this question is
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    for Mr. O'Hara, if I may.
               You told us that the process just wouldn't
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    work for you and that's why you didn't bid, but it
    worked for a lot of other market participants, so
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    what's unique about your situation at Strata?
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              MR. O'HARA: Well, I would actually say that
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    if you look at the number of projects that did not
    post the bid -- the security, that may be telling that
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it actually didn't work for a lot of other market
participants as well. It's not unusual for us to see
in these competitive processees that if there aren't
controls in place to ensure, like the Independent
Administrator said, that bids that go in are
legitimate and shovel ready that you will see often
times bidders sort of go on a fishing expedition, put
in a lower number, get short listed and look to either
sell that project or see if the economics change in
time for them to post the bid security. I think the
fact that we saw so few bids - I think it was 10 out
of the total that were short listed I think in DEC -
actually post the bid security tells me that other
folks were looking at these, potentially looking at
these agreements and saying that there's too much risk
there.
         MR. JUDD:
                   Madam Commissioner, may I follow
up on Patrick's earlier question to Phil?
         MR. LEVITAS: Harry, do you mind if I just
elaborate on Brian's --
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MR. JUDD: Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't see you.

MR. LEVITAS: -- just for a second.

okay.

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Just following up on a point that was made

earlier about the transparency of the process. whole asset -- the language gets a little confusing, asset acquisition and asset transfer. Basically, the Statute and Rules contemplate several ways that, other than a PPA, that third parties can participate but that would ultimately involve the transfer -- the ultimate ownership of the asset by Duke. Mr. O'Hara observed earlier but he didn't go into much detail, we had very little understanding of how that bid process was going to work. And, specifically -and I'm still not sure I fully understand how it did work and it's intended to work in the future. essentially as I think I understand it, what happened was that there was an initial bid that came in from a third party in the nature of a transfer or an EPC project, a project that would ultimately be owned by Duke. And there was then a secondary stage in which Duke made a decision whether to quote, sponsor that project, which required negotiation with the bidder and both with respect to Mr. Judd's point earlier about how price and other contracted terms relate to each other. I think there was an opportunity for negotiation regarding price and contract terms that ultimately led to Duke formulating a new bid price

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that it submitted in -- that competed with the other -- the PPA projects. And I'm not sure any market participant understood that's how it was going to work. We certainly didn't and had we understood that we might well have chosen to bid projects on that pathway. So I think there's a need for a lot more transparency and clarity about how that's going to work in the future.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Mr. Judd, you wanted to follow up on Mr. Buffkin --

MR. JUDD: I did. I wanted to give a little more flavor, if you will, color to your question about why is \$5 million not a significant number in this context. I expect it's probably more than you keep in a checking account. But we ran some numbers of what it would take -- it would have taken for system upgrade costs for other projects, and they're well in excess of \$200 million. Had the other projects been brought on line with a maximum in DEP of \$89 million for projects, \$235 million of system upgrades in DEC, for all of the 57 projects that were bid there. So when Phil says what we've come down to, and a \$5 million upgrade it met, we believe, the goal of CPRE which was to find the least cost way of using the

existing transmission system and bringing projects online as opposed to wholesalely going out and building a -- putting a lot more infrastructure costs on the rate base.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Mr. Jirak, I see that you were inching up to the mic but we're in the Commission Staff's questions. Do you want to respond to something that they've said or can you hold yours til we come back?

MR. JIRAK: I can hold mine to not defer the Commission Staff.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: All right.

MR. BUFFKIN: I have one more. So the bids that were eliminated had some significant -- I guess what we could call significant upgrade costs?

MR. JUDD: Yes, sir.

MR. LAYFIELD: Yes, sir.

MR. BUFFKIN: Then is it reasonable to expect those are the same bids that are going to be submitted into Tranche 2 and we would face much greater upgrade costs as a result of selection of bids in Tranche 2?

MR. JUDD: Whether the market participants will choose to bid the same projects -- again, we do

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get to a point at which the definition of insanity.
But as I mentioned before, if we don't make changes in
the way we establish the base case, it's our view that
the available capacity for new projects is going to be
smaller; it's going to constrict. And, therefore,
there will be system upgrade costs that will
necessarily be assigned to the bids that come in that
are in the constrained area, the red zone if you will,
ma'am, that we defined. We will be producing new maps
that will give guidance once it's determined whether
we are permitted to address the base case, the size of
the base case. If we have to go forward as we did in
Tranche 1, and those projects now become part of the
base case, in fact, there will be less excess capacity
available. Have I responded to be your question?
                        I understand.
          MR. BUFFKIN:
                                       Thank you.
          MR. JUDD:
                     Thank you.
          COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND:
                                     Kim Jones.
          MS. JONES: One quick one for the gentleman
at the end of the table here, and I apologize I can't
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remember your name.

You mentioned concern that you didn't receive System Impact Study results in time to know that information before putting in a security bond.

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Am I getting it right?
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MR. NORRIS: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: That's Tyler Norris for the record.

MR. NORRIS: Yes, sorry, Tyler Norris. That is correct. The bid bond was required to be posted prior to the cluster study being completed.

MS. JONES: So help me out because for

Tranche 1 the costs learned from the cluster study of
the network upgrades weren't going to be the
developers problem in any case. So they were going to
be put into Duke's base rates, so why was knowing that
number important at that stage?

MR. NORRIS: Yeah, well in this scenario where those costs are socialized or rate-based it is less of a concern. So I think that's really important to emphasize for the Commission as well, because if rate-basing is eliminated it only elevates that concern going forward. But for the case of Tranche 1, so part -- so one issue to address there is, in terms of the timing of in-service completion, if you are allocated in a network upgrade you're going to have a much longer period to actually -- a complete COD and that has substantial implications for the economics of

a project because the year that it goes into service, of course, has implications for what module costs, et cetera, and also for capital planning purposes.

MS. JONES: Okay. So for Tranche 1 what was really important was knowing what your in-service date was going to be based on when your transmission would be available.

MR. NORRIS: Yeah. And that, also, would have implications for whether or not the project would meet the in-service deadline that was enforced as part of the -- or should have been enforced as part of the evaluation --

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Mr. Jirak.

MR. JUDD: If I could follow up on your question, ma'am, that -- just to remind everyone, in Tranche 1 as part of the effort to get shovel-ready projects to move forward, there was an established in-service date, the COD, and market participants who bid committed that they could make that date, the January 1, 2021. And if they felt that they were not far enough along in their development, they didn't have the necessary information, whatever their concerns were, then maybe CPRE Tranche 1 wasn't for them. And, again, we gave them the guidance and that

was part of the RFP that there was to be a firm in-service date that they were expected to meet. And again, the goal here was to find the shovel-ready projects so we could take advantage of existing transmission capacity and move forward in getting projects into service.

MR. NORRIS: May I comment on that issue just for a second?

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Briefly please.

MR. NORRIS: Thank you. This issue of build timelines matters a lot for even whether the Tranche 1 projects can, in fact, meet the in-service timeline.

None of them were likely to meet the January 1st timeline. There was an extension provided in the Tranche 1 RFP that, if necessary, that could be expended -- extended to July 1st of 2021.

The fact is is that the utility's own build timelines for even projects without any upgrades is a minimum of two years, or at least in the case of DEC, so 24 months. They're very unlikely to meet that timeline unless those timelines are accelerated. And this is an issue we probably should address collectively because I think there was some questions about whether there could be preferential treatment to

certain projects in their build timelines for those that have been awarded. And -- but regardless it's almost certainly the case that those established timelines are going to need to be accelerated to even meet those. So it's probably just something at a minimum we need to address and have more clarity around for Tranche 2.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Mr. Jirak.

MR. JIRAK: Yes. Thank you, Commissioner, I'll be very brief here.

Obviously a lot of different issues have been raised so I'm just going to pinpoint a couple of them. A lot of the storage related discussions you're going to have -- hear a lot more on so I won't go into that.

Three quick issues to address. First, the reasonableness of the PPA document. We just, from Duke's perspective obviously, we firmly disagree with the characterization that the PPA is not being a commercially reasonable document. And we disagree for the following reasons: As a reminder, the PPA form that's used in CPRE started with the -- as a QF negotiated PPA form that has been used to finance and construct 800 megawatts worth of projects. And I have

a slight background in project development finance and I know it's very difficult to get a project built with a completely unreasonable PPA because you won't get financing for it. So I think the fact the -- so where the PPA started was a document that already served as a commercially unreasonable document to support 800 megawatts of solar development, I think undercuts the assertion.

Moving beyond that form we then took two rounds of comments, we worked with the IA, we responded to every comment we received, we made improvements to the document and, from my perspective, moved it more towards what market participants are asking. So the assertion that the PPA itself is, as a general matter, just a commercially unreasonable document we just simply disagree with.

We recognize there's a disagreement about the storage proposal on the storage protocols. We also recognize there's a disagreement on the size of the pre-COD commercial performance assurance. But aside from those two issues, we think the evidence fully supports the fact that the overall terms and conditions of this PPA were reasonable and wouldn't -- should not have served as a barrier to participation

in CPRE. So that's the PPA.

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Two more quick issues. Transparency; certainly we want to improve the RFP. We want to put all the information on the table that market participants need to know and we want to work with the Commission, the Public Staff, and stakeholders to do that. But I want the Commission to be clear that the process as it existed for Tranche 1 allowed for an incredible amount of transparency. All of the documents were subject to comments. There was a 60-day comment period as mandated by the Commission In addition, at any point during -- so during that 60 days any market participant could have asked or raised any questions about the structure of the RFP, how asset acquisitions have worked, how the documents were -- why the documents were structured the way they were. In addition, throughout the entire RFP process, both before and after the RFP was issued, the IA message board was open for confidential questions to the IA. So, again, it's not to say we can't improve in the clarity of certain aspects of the RFP, but I want the Commission to be very aware of the fact that there was a complete opportunity given for market participants to get answers to questions where

they had them. And so that's just an important fact as you think about transparency issues in general.

Then the last just very minor point is this issue that was raised about the assumptions about post-term revenue for Duke projects. That issue was litigated expressly during the program -- the review of the program planning guidelines, and the Commission's February Order specifically addressed that issue and came to a conclusion. So at this point we don't see the need to rehash that issue. We think the Commission's conclusion was reasonable in February and it's just as reasonable today.

So that's the three points I'd like to hit.

And obviously we'll give some more feedback on the

grid locational issues and storage later today.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: And Commissioner Mitchell is going to have the last word in this session -- in this section and she's standing between you and a 10-minute break.

COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: This is a very quick one.

Do you all -- this is directed to the IA.

Do you all anticipate that the in-service deadline for

Tranche 2 will be moved beyond that mid-year 2021?

MR. JUDD: Yes, ma'am.

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COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: And can you tell us when you think it will be?

MR. JUDD: We have not established that working with Duke. If I could add just a little color The issue is -- it's not an arbitrary date. to this. Part of the issue is how much can the Duke system absorb in a particular timeframe, and that's where the 600 megawatts in Tranche 1 came from. We didn't want to set an unrealistic goal. We didn't want to set up MPs for failure. So what we will be doing is going back with Duke, look at -- you have now taken out a certain amount of capacity because of the Tranche 1 experience and setting a new date. I would expect it would be at least a year later. But part of that is also dealing with the market participants and their goals to have an opportunity to maximize their use of the investment tax credits.

COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: Right. That's where obviously I have some questions. I mean, because the two seem -- there seem to be some tension there.

MR. JUDD: Yeah. They -- well, I'm agreeing with you. And what we have done in some places is have a maximum date, an outer limit if you will, but

permit developers to come online sooner in order to meet the goals. And, yes, it is different for wind than it is for solar and how much has to be completed. I'm not expecting we will see any wind bids just like we only got solar bids here. So we're looking at strictly what would a solar developer need to accomplish in order to maximize capturing the ITCs, which it's not -- frankly, it's not only for their benefit it's for the ratepayers benefit because they should be able to give us better pricing if they know they're getting the benefit of the federal tax credits. So we're very mindful of that. And, again, my expectation is we'll -- we'll work not only with Duke as to when they can bring it on, but what the needs and the expectations are of the market participants as well.

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COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: And just one quick follow up. I assume that the limiting factor for Duke would be construction labor but is there something else that would limit Duke's ability to bring projects online?

MR. JUDD: As long as the -- I would say no as long as we can continue to focus on the available excess capacity. When they have to bring in major

investments, you know, running additional crews to bring in new lines, that's what we're trying to avoid here. We're trying to absorb the existing capacity so that they don't have to have delays in bringing projects online.

COMMISSIONER MITCHELL: Okay. Thank you.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: All right.

You've brought forth a lot of complexities in your discussion and this is helpful to us in our understanding.

Right now we're going to take a break and let's see, I said 10 minutes. Let's be back at 11:50.

(A recess was taken at 11:40 a.m.,

until 11:50 a.m.)

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Now, we're back to order and back on the record and we will turn our attention to how to structure a bid refresh procedure and what amendments need to be made to Commission Rule R8-71(f)(3) to authorize that procedure. And from this point on staff will take the lead and some of the questions may be for everyone, some of the questions they may direct to specific parties. So who's starting? Kim Duffley.

MS. DUFFLEY: Can you hear me? Thank you.

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My first set of questions will be for the Independent Administrator. And when I say grid upgrade costs in the questions, for purposes of the CPRE Program, I mean transmission and distribution upgrades.
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MR. JUDD: Thank you.

MS. DUFFLEY: So you state within your comments that the Independent Administrator has conducted over 100 RFPs in the past 12 years. In any of those RFPs that you've conducted, have transmission and distribution upgrades of non-utility winning bidders been placed into rate -- base rates of the utility company versus being incurred by the market participant?

MR. JUDD: Absolutely and certainly.

Let's -- I'll just address so there's no confusion.

In California with the CAISO it's separate, but that is an expense that is borne as a wire's charge so ultimately it goes to the consumer though it's not directly assigned by the utility; so that's one, otherwise, the answer is yes.

MS. DUFFLEY: So --

MR. JUDD: Do you want examples or how would you like to proceed?

MS. DUFFLEY: Right. I mean, so you

mentioned California, what other states have they socialized these network or distribution upgrades?

MR. JUDD: One moment. We're going through a checklist here. Certainly Colorado, and Oregon -- well not the renewables in Georgia, right. I'm sorry. You know that we do the RFPs in Georgia --

MS. DUFFLEY: Correct.

MR. JUDD: We're the IA for that Commission, and there for the third-party providers those expenses go back, after a threshold amount, go back to the developer; correct?

MR. LAYFIELD: Yes.

MR. JUDD: And the threshold amount was -do you recall? Sorry. We can get you that number if
you'd like. There is a threshold that is rate based
by Georgia power and after that it's assigned to the
developer.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. You mentioned the Georgia model so I'm going to --

MR. JUDD: There's also -- I was going to say some of the RFPs that we have done in Arizona, the cost has been borne by the utility.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. I'm going to skip ahead for a minute because you mentioned the Georgia

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So on pages 5 and 6 of your March 15, 2019,
report regarding the Tranche 2 stakeholder process,
you outline that the stakeholders indicated four ways
to employ a bid refresh. Were any of those four ways
similar to the Georgia RFP process?
         MR. JUDD: Point of reference if I could,
you're speaking of our most recent filing concerning
refresh?
         MS. DUFFLEY:
                        The March 15th filing.
         MR. JUDD:
                    No.
                         The answer is no.
         MS. DUFFLEY:
                       Okay.
                              So we've talked about
the $5 million in grid upgrade costs, how are those
grid upgrade costs distributed amongst the winning
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bidders?

MR. LAYFIELD: Thirteen of the 14 --

COMMISSIONER GRAY: Please pull the mic up.

MR. LAYFIELD: Thirteen of the 14 winning bidders had upgrade costs associated with them, one did not. We have that data for each bid in terms of the upgrade costs if you would like us to supply it to you.

MS. DUFFLEY: That would be helpful. So we've heard today that, even though there was this \$5 million in grid upgrade costs, that DEC is

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estimated to have saved $290 million; is that correct?
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              MR. LAYFIELD: That's not my number.
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              MS. DUFFLEY: Okay. What's the number?
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              MR. LAYFIELD: I don't know. That's Harry's
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    number.
                           (Laughter)
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              MR. JUDD:
                         Correct.
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                           (Laughter)
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              MS. DUFFLEY:
                             Thank you. These questions
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    are for all of you. And then on page 1 of your
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    report, you stated that it looks like that savings
    were estimated versus a full avoided cost contract
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    over a full 20-year term; is that correct?
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              MR. JUDD: Yes, ma'am.
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              MS. DUFFLEY: And based on your review of
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    the bids from Tranche 1, can you estimate or provide
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    an estimate of what grid upgrade cost could be part of
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    winning bids in Tranche 2?
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              MR. JUDD: I was told years ago if you don't
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    say anything it doesn't end up in the transcript;
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    that's with my pause. The difficulty I'm having in
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    answering your question is I don't know who's going to
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          I don't know what's going to be bid. And I'm
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    not trying to dodge your question. In every one of
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as the opportunities to consider. I fully expect projects that are already in the queue will be bid.

I'm afraid I'm reluctant to guess which ones. But, Phil, do you have some views?

MR. LAYFIELD: Clearly, we can't know who's going to bid or where they're going to do their point
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going to bid or where they're going to do their point of interconnection. But based upon Tranche 1 and, if you extrapolate that, all of the winning bids had the basic connection costs, extension of the bus, a breaker, relays, the communication required, were the basic components that were assigned to each winning bid. Does that help?

MS. DUFFLEY: It helps some. Let me go at it a different way. So on page 5 of your report dated April 9, 2019, I'll let you get to it.

MR. JUDD: Thank you. I'm sorry the page reference again?

MS. DUFFLEY: Page 5. You indicate that 15 proposals which would represent 794 megawatts were eliminated because of T&D, which is transmission and distribution system upgrade costs, and that that resulted in a proposal above avoided cost?

MR. JUDD: That's correct.

MS. DUFFLEY: And then on page 9 of the report you state that system improvements required to accommodate the proposals that were evaluated but not selected would cost approximately \$230 million; correct?

MR. JUDD: Yes.

MS. DUFFLEY: And when you say "system improvement" do you mean network upgrades or both network and distribution upgrades?

MR. LAYFIELD: Network upgrades.

MS. DUFFLEY: Network only. So how was the \$230 million in network upgrades distributed upon -- among those 15 projects?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ LAYFIELD: Off the top of my head I don't know.

MR. JUDD: The answer is we can give you a break down for that if you would like but we don't have the data right in front of us.

MS. DUFFLEY: Okay.

MR. JUDD: We'll be happy to provide it.

MS. DUFFLEY: Wonderful. I just kind of want to have a general sense is it one or two projects or would it be evenly dispersed among all 15

24 | proposals?

MR. JUDD: One moment please.

MR. LAYFIELD: Memory is all I've got here. I believe that the most expensive system upgrade cost for any winning bid was about \$855,000. There were a number of bids at the \$450,000. There were some at the two twenty-five. And the difference is -- is -- a voltage difference is a 44 kV doesn't cost as much as 100 kV, the equipment, and these are all standard costs and they were applied to all of the bids and tabulated, and that's the range of cost that we have.

MS. DUFFLEY: Sure. And do you know if any of those 15 proposals were interdependent with each other?

MR. LAYFIELD: They were not.

MS. DUFFLEY: So I'm going to give a hypothetical. The last time that we had a technical conference we heard from Duke that with respect to an 80-megawatt facility, if you had an 80-megawatt facility and you had a decrement of \$8.00 that you could have per project about \$13 million in system upgrades and still come below avoided cost so that's what we've heard. And what I'm trying to get at or find out with this \$230 million in system upgrades divided by 15 proposals - tell me if my math -- I'm an

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attorney so tell me if my math is correct - that you could have roughly around $15 million per proposal.

And under this type of hypothetical let's assume that the decrement is lower and this would come under avoided cost. Is that a possibility in Tranches 2 and 3?
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MR. LAYFIELD: The \$235 million is not for the 15 winning projects. That's for what we added up to be the cost of the projects that were not selected.

MS. DUFFLEY: I understand that but this is a hypothetical. These same --

MR. LAYFIELD: I'm sorry.

MS. DUFFLEY: These same projects come in in Tranche 2 or Tranche 3, they've determined a bid where they can come in at a certain level and each of these projects have about \$15 million in upgrades. Is that a possibility in Tranche 2 and 3?

MR. LAYFIELD: The \$15 million per project seems excessive.

MS. DUFFLEY: And then asked a different way, and you may have to -- it sounds like you're going on memory here so if you could follow up with the Commission on this. In your opinion is there any way that the bidders who were not selected, those 15

projects that were above avoided cost, could restructure their bids in Tranche 2 and come in under avoided cost?

MR. LAYFIELD: There were some bids that were very close to avoided cost and those bids could certainly be repriced slightly and come in under avoided cost. We had about four bids if I recall that were very close to and just over avoided cost.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. So am I correct in assuming that when the cost of grid upgrades increases -- so let's assume that the \$230 million in upgrades that were pushed out in Tranche 1 is dispersed between these 15 projects and they fall below avoided cost, just assume that hypothetical, that under that scenario, you know we had \$290 million in savings in Tranche 1, that that type of savings would go away due to the grid upgrade costs pushing the decrement to right below avoided cost? Is that a possibility?

MR. LAYFIELD: If we're staying with the hypothetical 15 projects then that follows.

MS. DUFFLEY: Okay. And how likely is this scenario?

MR. LAYFIELD: Not at all.

MS. DUFFLEY: Not at all. Would you explain why not at all?

MR. LAYFIELD: Well, because there will be other bids that are competitive and we wouldn't be looking at just the higher cost bids.

MS. DUFFLEY: So -- but in Tranche 1 -- and I thought I heard earlier today that the red zone area, that more and more of the bids are actually going to have to bid in these constrained areas, that we might be not having the bids that do not have these grid upgrade costs. Did I mishear that testimony?

MR. LAYFIELD: That's certainly a possible but we're still working on how we can restructure the base case and that's a topic of conversation here.

And if we're successful -- and there's several avenues to follow to do that, we're not just looking at the one facility study criteria there. If we're able to restructure the base case then we might well have more transmission capacity available for Tranche 2 than we did Tranche 1.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you.

MR. BALL: Thank you. Just in terms of a hypothetical for Tranche 2 or Tranche 3, I want to point out that we'll be updating using Duke's updated

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avoided costs. So making an extrapolation of the net benefits from avoided cost savings for Tranche 1 to Tranche 2 is something to keep -- to be careful with because it will -- my understanding is avoided costs might be coming down and so that will put pressure on the net benefits whether the system upgrade costs change at all.
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MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. So on page 6, and I'm assuming this is the April 9th document, you indicated that market participants -- so this is -- let me -- it's the March 15, 2019 report, page 6.

MR. JUDD: I'm sorry, March 15th?

MS. DUFFLEY: I think it's the March 15th report, yes, regarding the Tranche 2 stakeholder process.

MR. JUDD: Thank you. Continue please.

MS. DUFFLEY: So you indicate that the market participant should not be restricted to submitting proposals in non-constrained areas as it would deny market participants who are willing to bear some or all of the grid upgrade costs. This statement seems to conflict with other statements with the document that market participants will not bid if the market participant is responsible for grid upgrade

costs. And so I just -- could you explain this discrepancy or conflict for me?

MR. JUDD: Sure. Thank you for pointing it out. We tried to avoid confusion but it's not always a success.

What we're trying to capture there was that we recommend -- we don't prohibit a market participant from pursuing and bidding in a project at a site that they've already procured. We require site control. We require that they have a plan for the site. We look at how much they have proceeded with local permitting, et cetera.

If someone is along the route of developing a project, and you could even put it in the context of it's a late-stage though we're not, I understand, using that concept in Tranche 2, we urge that we not prohibit them from bidding into Tranche 2 simply because of the geographics of their location. They may choose to absorb some of the costs of the system upgrades because it's within their business model. That's what we are trying to capture.

MS. DUFFLEY: Okay. Thank you. So as you may know, the Commission has some concern about the socialization of grid upgrade costs in this model.

Specifically, there's a potential that if the grid upgrade estimate is inaccurately low, the final cost of the project may be over the avoided cost cap. At the last technical conference I believe we heard Gary Freeman state that it can be typical to have cost estimate swings up to 20, maybe 30 percent.

MR. JUDD: Yeah, and he retired from the Company, just so you know. That was his swan song.

MS. DUFFLEY: I do. I do. His last day and we kept him from his party.

So what specific steps are you as an Independent Administrator taking to ensure compliance with the avoided cost cap for the winning bidders?

So, for example, are you rejecting a bid where a potential 20 percent increase in grid upgrade costs would place the proposal above that cap?

MR. JUDD: We did not in Tranche 1. We are -- but we are exploring banding, if you will, upgrade costs if the market participant is to -- particularly if a market participant is expected to be responsible for those costs. But let me start at the beginning, if I might, of your question and that is will Duke be able to provide a firm cost estimate. And I believe not unless they include a risk factor

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for changes and their costs between the beginning and the ending of a project. They're estimating today for work that will be completed two years from now. There will be a difference and we can ask them to be high and include a -- some percentage risk for cost increase, a contingency component if you will. We've done that in some construction projects saying we want your hard number, now give us a contingency number as well so we'll understand your view. We have not explored that with Duke specifically but we do believe from experience that whatever the number is that we're able to come up with in step two, it will not be the final number. And --
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MS. DUFFLEY: Right.

MR. JUDD: -- is that --

MS. DUFFLEY: So what specific steps are you taking to ensure that we don't have a result -- well, the Commission's concern is that we don't want to create a program where ratepayers are paying higher than avoided costs.

MR. JUDD: Understood. And part of the --

MS. DUFFLEY: And what steps are you taking

23 to ensure that compliance?

MR. JUDD: Let me answer your question this

way and I hope it's -- you review it as responsive. For Tranche 2, we're talking about now, if the -regardless of who's going to pay for it, we want to explore with Duke and with the stakeholders a process that identifies a call to contingency, a call to risk factor, whatever you wish, I believe and I will share that if the cost is to be borne by the developer they will have to include a risk premium of their own. we can address that many ways. They can do their own planning and their own cost of capital and their own knowledge to come up with that but they will include it. And the challenge there is if their risk premium -- if they're still able to stay under avoided cost with their risk premium and that ends up being -they have overstated the cost of system upgrade in their planning but that is the basis for their rates, then we'll be overpaying them. Similarly, if Duke is way off in their estimates for the dollars to be added to rate base that, too, would be included in rates. It's not perfect but I'm sharing we've run into both scenarios of who puts on the risk premium and how do we define it. And I will say that it would be easier to control that risk premium on the utility than in third-party independent bidders simply because we're

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not going to get into their business model and their cost of capital and in their planning in the same way that you have insight into the regulated utility.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. So in Tranche 1 did you reject any bids that lacked the headroom to accommodate network upgrades? And I think we did hear it's those 15 projects, correct? Okay.

So moving to the specific proposals for bid refresh. Now that you've read the other proposals, what is your opinion of the Public Staff and NCCEBA's option of creating a system upgrade cost formula? And that's the one, an adder to the market participants' decrement, that the Independent Administrator would update the bid price taking into account only the grip upgrade cost assigned to the bid and with only one bid refresh.

MR. JUDD: I'm glad you asked that question. I did anticipate it.

Tracy, if you would move to the next slide please. Oh, I'm sorry. Yes.

We were unaware of the Public Staff's proposal until we read it, and so that's not a slight on anyone. It's simply to tell you why we did not include it in our earlier comments.

Let me preface by saying we'll do whatever you folks tell us to do. We can model it. evaluate it. We've made our views known on and pros and cons of the refresh. We are -- we understand we're not revisiting that. So if we are taking up the Public Staff's proposal, we would -- if you would move to slide 20, please -- we propose what we think -- in implementing that what we think would be a simple approach which is that at the time of bidding the market participant provides a \$1.00 per megawatt-hour adjustment for every million dollars of upgrade from system upgrades. We would run the step two, we would plug in their number, and obviously if it's half a million dollars we -- somebody in our team has a calculator and they can figure out what half of their number is, and we would apply it and then run it back through the model to determine whether it is still in the competitive tier. This way we believe that we could take up a formula approach consistent with what the staff had recommended. It -- the beauty of it is it's the bidder's number. They know their business. They know what their tolerance would be. It would also avoid the gaming of someone. After the bids are submitted, find out that their costs have changed

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elsewhere, and they want to adjust. Likewise, we note that at least one of the filings suggested that it should not be a one and done; that the adjustment should be iterative, along with the iterative process. If we use this approach, frankly, we could apply it every time.

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And the point being there, a hypo -- I'll give a hypothetical back to you, if you don't mind. Let's say we're in a situation where we have five bids that are in a cluster study and we run through this process and some are taken out of because they're We would priced out. They're above avoided cost. then move bids up from the reserve list. I'11 continue the hypothetical and say that three took themselves out. There are only two remaining at the cluster, but the new bids do not hit at the cluster; therefore, instead of 20 percent of a price being assigned to a bid they get 50 percent. We think if you're going to do this then let us run it a second time with their number rather than a one and done.

So I hope this information will be responsive. But we did lay it out ahead of time in our PowerPoint for you to consider.

MS. DUFFLEY: And do you think that a bid

refresh process potentially causes more risk in not meeting the RFP target and the goals of CPRE?

MS. DUFFLEY: Could you explain why?

MR. JUDD: No.

MR. JUDD: Going in all participants will know the rules and they'll all have to use the same rules. If you use the approach we've laid out there -- here rather in front of you, the risk of gaming would be dramatically reduced to not having someone -- the game that, I'm sorry, I'm alluding to is someone gives us a very attractive price in order to get in the competitive tier to find out what their

system upgrade costs would be and they keep on

for their project and pricing.

churning trying to figure out what the sweet spot is

That is also -- Commissioners, I'll come back to the fact of using a pro forma PPA prevents that sort of gaming, too, of getting to the negotiating table and then trying to get a better deal. So it wouldn't necessarily produce fewer bids at all. I do strongly urge though, if you're going to have a refresh, that you put some parameters around. As I noted in our earlier filing, where we've done refreshes before it's been for specific reasons. Back

when we were adding conventional generation and price volatility was a serious issue, we would permit a refresh on pricing. When just in '17, when we had the volatility because of the uncertainty of the federal tax code, we did a refresh in a major RFP saying now that you know -- you know, January, you now know what they did to us in December, do you want to reprice? Has that dramatically changed your businesses model? It was a known change that we thought was fair to let people take that into account and not be held to a number that was produced six months before. This approach as outlined by the staff and as we could see a way to implement it, should do -- should not prevent folks from being competitive in their bidding.

MS. DUFFLEY: And under this type of bid refresh process, who would bear the risk of cost overruns, grid upgrade cost overruns?

MR. JUDD: As I understand this approach so let me define it, this would be in the situation where the cost is to be borne by the developer. In that case they would bear the risk.

MS. DUFFLEY: So a quick question for NCCEBA, what is your response to this risk shift?

MS. KEMERAIT: I wanted to point out that we

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are in agreement with the Public Staff's recommendation and also with what Mr. Judd has presented in his PowerPoint presentation. That is the objective formula of basically an adder is what we had recommended in our, I believe it is our March 22nd comments, and then we also recommended it in our May 16th comments. We had a slight difference in our May 16th comments from the Public Staff's recommendation but we were in full agreement. It's a slight difference and we're in full agreement with the Public Staff's recommendation. And we think that it is a fair and objective formula that will prevent gaming of the system.

And the other option would be more of a subjective refresh and which would lead to, we believe, gaming of the system, where a bidder could come in and provide, as Mr. Judd stated, a artificially low price for its bids so that it could get into the competitive tier knowing it would have an opportunity to come in and then provide a more realistic bid, and then perhaps take advantage of market opportunities or market changes that other market participants would not be able to do. So we don't -- we're not concerned about risk shifting

because we think it's an objective and fair way to do a refresh.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. And what is Duke's position?

MR. JIRAK: Is the question --

MS. DUFFLEY: On this bid refresh procedure.

MR. JIRAK: So if the Commission chooses to go the bid refresh, we don't have a strong opinion and we defer to the IA's judgment on that. A formula, methodology seems like an appropriate path to go down if the decision is made to shift those costs and to be directly borne by the developer.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. And then one last question for the Independent Administrator. Between the two, this bid refresh option that we just discussed and the method in Tranche 1, do you have a preference one way or the other?

MR. JUDD: With respect that we don't do policy for the Commission and we respect your judgment, including the cost of the upgrade in rate base is a more straight-forward approach and we know that the market participants from the stakeholder meetings we ran, they prefer it as well. It is less likely to produce significant challenges and

disagreements between a bidder and the company. I will not bore you with war stories but we have been through that process where the Company produces cost estimates and then we go through a protracted process of pulling it apart and putting it back together to try to explain every component.

In this instance we avoided that in the interconnection cost component because the evaluation T&D team and Phil put together a list of expected costs for different components that are already the responsibility of the developer that is the interconnection, but from the point of interconnection on are the system upgrade costs, those are not possible I believe - and Phil will kick me if I'm wrong - but those cannot be preestablished because you don't know what will be needed until we have the bids in hand.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. So now I'm moving

to --

MS. KEMERAIT: Ms. Duffley, I realized, and I apologize, but I realized I did not fully respond to your question about risk shifting.

MS. DUFFLEY: Okay.

MS. KEMERAIT: And I think Mr. O'Hara would

like to respond to that because there is an issue about risk for the developers based upon the formula approach.

MR. O'HARA: I think what I heard you ask was, and let me just make sure I got it right, was I heard Mr. Judd say that the risk of cost overruns in network upgrades who would that be borne by, and I believe he said market participants. And you were asking about our reaction to that; is that right?

MS. DUFFLEY: Correct.

MR. O'HARA: So obviously we think it's critically important that those estimates be as accurate as possible. If the -- if the method by which that risk is applied to the market participants is through that formula, it essentially adjusts the bid price accordingly. And to the extent that -- this probably comes as no surprise but to the extent that those network upgrades are part of the rate base that doesn't necessarily impact the economics for a developer or it may knock them out of the competitive tier.

MS. DUFFLEY: Well, but under this bid refresh process, it would not go into base rates; it would be borne by the market participant?

MR. O'HARA: Right. So my understanding under the bid refresh process is the scenario we're solving for is you have a bid in where we don't know network upgrade costs. And so we're bidding on a project assuming there are no network upgrade costs and then if network upgrade costs are applied, the evaluation of our bid is adjusted so the value of our bid is adjusted; correct?

MS. DUFFLEY: Correct. And that the market participant would be solely responsible for those network upgrades.

MS. KEMERAIT: Correct. And I think that the -- I think the question is, is about cost overruns for the network upgrades because what we heard, and I'm going to let Mr. Norris speak to this, but we heard from Duke and from Mr. Judd is -- or from Mr. Judd is that there can be significant swings upward about what the estimates are and then what the actual network upgrade costs are from 20 to 30 percent swing upward --

MS. DUFFLEY: Correct.

MS. KEMERAIT: -- and if we are providing an objective formula and we don't have accurate information about what those network upgrades cost,

that can be very problematic. And I think Mr. Norris would like to speak to that.

MR. NORRIS: Yeah. I'll just add if there is truly a formula then it would apply in the instance of a cost overrun. So the only way you can account for that risk is if the bid price would increase in proportion to any cost overrun that may occur. And without that formula holding that's going to present potentially prohibitive risks to the many market participants and we're likely to see more market participants back out either -- well, in this case they would have already posted bid bond but we may see more not actually end up executing their PPAs, and we may see substantial delays in the overall state's procurement targets here. So as long as the formula holds you can see that --

MS. DUFFLEY: When you -- when you say formula holds can you explain that further?

MR. NORRIS: As in let's say in the cluster study a certain network upgrade cost is identified and a PPA price is agreed upon and a PPA is executed. And then after the network upgrade actually occurs, it turns out that there was a cost overrun of say 20 percent, we would have to have a mechanism to

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modify the PPA to make sure that that, again, the formula holds such that that overrun would be accounted for in the PPA price, if that makes sense.
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MS. DUFFLEY: It does.

MR. JUDD: If I could, what we -- I'm sorry, Commissioner, I didn't mean to interrupt you.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: But if I understand what you just proposed correctly that means we could end up with a PPA price that exceeds avoided cost. How can we do that? The Statute doesn't allow us to do that.

MR. NORRIS: In the scenario where the utility has determined that there is a risk of a cost overrun such that the final PPA price would exceed avoided cost, then presumably the IA would have to eliminate that bid.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: But we may not know what that risk is or be able to quantify it before the PPA complies with final ranking and the bids are selected and go to PPA negotiation. We may not know that risk. So I think Ms. Duffley's question is are you willing to carry that risk knowing that you can't adjust it in the PPA?

MR. NORRIS: Well, I -- what -- this may

raise a question around is how are costs being determined for network upgrades and who is taking on the liability for the actual construction of those network upgrades. And it may be worth considering a separate competitive process by which the construction company that commits to billing those upgrades has to commit to such costs. In fact, we are as independent developers committing to the construction cost of our own projects subject to a price cap which is our own PPA bid. So why should there not be similar controls for the cost of network upgrades. So I submit to you that and it's --

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: I jumped in on Ms. Duffley's questions and I apologize.

MS. DUFFLEY: No. I thank you for that.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Can I stay with this for a minute because this is really what the heart of the bid refresh is all about. It's not about the bid refresh procedure. I mean, you guys can solve the bid refresh procedure. You've given us a very elegant illation to it. It's really about what happens if we shift the risk of the upgrade costs from the ratepayer back to the developer. That's what this is all about. So let's talk about that for a minute

if I can stay with it.

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So now take a deep breath because I want to ask you guys a question. Take a real deep breath. Okay. If the Commission were to decide that it did want to follow the existing policy it uses with QF contracts and require that the upgrade costs be borne by the developer. But suppose the Commission did this, suppose the Commission said they're going to get an estimate. All they're going to have is an estimate. That's all they're going to have. It's got inherent uncertainty in it. And we're going to require them to manage that uncertainty through the refresh process up to the estimate, up to the amount of the estimate. If it turns out in an actual fact that the costs are greater -- you're in control of those costs, you have better control of the costs than anybody -- if those costs are greater by some trigger amount, you've got a prudency issue. What would you say? You've got a prudency issue. We'll let you socialize some of the overrun, but if you overrun by 40 percent, 50 percent, you've got a prudency problem. What would you say?

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in mind as you mentioned the fact that the System

MR. JIRAK:

Two major points, one is keeping

Impact Study point in time at which these estimates could be delivered, their estimates, and certainly field engineering has not been done. There's a lot of stuff. I don't know all of, it, but there's a lot of things that have to be done to firm up that estimate. But secondarily, I think just generally that would incent Duke to sort of build in some contingency into its estimates to account for that risk in the same way that other entities making capital investments as they look for in the future and make contingency assumptions, depending on the certainty of the information they have underlying their then best guess about the cost of it. So I don't necessarily think that's the right way to go but we could solve for that and figure out a way to how to allocate the risk in the most appropriate way given the information we have at the time we're making that estimate.

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And again, it's not who -- it's not whether retail customers pay the cost of the upgrades. They will pay the cost of the upgrades either through CPRE PPA price recovery if the developers bear the cost directly, or they will pay for it through rate base recovery if it's rate base. But there's no scenario where retail customers don't pay the cost. It's just

which is the most efficient way from a process perspective to do it and what's the most efficient way to avoid an unnecessary risk premium being added and paid for if the costs do, in fact, end up coming in where you estimated them. And it seems to me that if you shift the risk of developers they necessarily have to put a risk premium in, any rational investor would do that, and that risk premium may or may not turn out to be necessary depending on where the actual costs come in. So those are the big picture issues that we think about.

MR. O'HARA: Commissioner Clodfelter -- go ahead.

MS. CUMMINGS: I was just going to ask if the Public Staff could comment on that?

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Yes.

MS. CUMMINGS: We've had a lot of internal conversations about this and we generally still support our March 22nd comments that the grid upgrade costs for winning bids are in base rates and that is just a general discussion about how that risk will be allocated. We believe if the risk premium is developed by the developers that the ratepayers will pay it regardless and even if those construction costs

come under. So we agree generally that Duke is in the best position to determine what those costs are.

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I would like to say about the ratepayers will pay it regardless, the ratepayers will only pay reasonable and prudent costs incurred. And our general theory on this is if you guys decide to stay with the Tranche 1 procedure, which is just no refresh and to socialize those costs, one option or one safeguard available is to put a sort of cost cap on any overruns, and you could determine a certain percentage. There's, you know, a normal construction contingency of 10 percent. We recognize there's a lot of uncertainty here. We've seen in other states, and this is interconnection costs not a RFP, but we've seen 25 percent in Massachusetts and California. they do is they create a rebuttable presumption so you presume that costs over a certain envelope are imprudently and unreasonably incurred and not recoverable, and the utility is given a chance to demonstrate that those costs were reasonable and prudent so it shifts that burden. And we think that would be an appropriate approach in this case.

COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: My question to you was what she said.

MR. JIRAK: As an initial matter, first of all, we wholeheartedly agree with Ms. Cummings' clarification that certainly we would not be entitled to recover any prudently incurred costs, so I agree with that presumption.

We haven't had a chance to discuss whether the business team could support a cost cap but I certainly understand the perspective on that and it's something we will be willing to consider and think about how that informs the group and the process itself and the development of estimates, but I understand where that idea comes from.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Mr. O'Hara.

MR. O'HARA: Yes, ma'am, thank you.

First, I just wanted to say we're in complete agreement with Duke that having Duke socialize -- or socializing the costs of those network upgrades is probably the most efficient way to do this. Our bids will -- if we -- as market participants we have to cover the cost of bid upgrades. That will be reflected in our price. So assuming everyone's cost of capital is about the same you're probably at a wash.

I think that's a more efficient process.

But I do want to be very clear about the question that was asked about overages because I think we were kind of beating around the bush on the answer to that one. As market participants we need to have certainty as to what the cap on those network upgrades are. If we bid based on a number X and the network upgrades come in at 1.3X or, God forbid, 4X which we've seen in some distribution cases, that is not an overrun that in anywhere in that range a market participant could bear. We're bidding at the minimum acceptable margin we can because we know this is a hyper-competitive process and so we have to have some certainty around what those costs are.

MS. KEMERAIT: So, and we would support the Public Staff's position of what Ms. Cummings just mentioned as well.

MS. DUFFLEY: So, Ms. Cummings, what I think that I just heard you say is that you've weighed the costs and benefits of both models that we've discussed today and determined that the socialization model is the best -- in the best interest of ratepayers?

MS. CUMMINGS: Yes. That's the internal conclusion we've come to. And it's not just the risks that would be added to the developer's bid, it's also

the potential delay. So we're aware that we are asking for a significant delay with the Sub 158 docket. And we've heard from the IA that if they have a bid refresh, even a limited bid refresh according to the formula, you could have four or more iterations of that bid refresh in a cluster study and that could take up to six months, and we would rather avoid that delay on the back end.

MS. DUFFLEY: So I have two more concerns. I just want to make sure that it was part of your process. Do you have any concerns about treating CPRE RFP winners differently than non-CPRE participants in that the interconnection customer awarded a PPA under the CPRE RFP is not responsible for paying their distribution and network upgrades, while all other interconnection customers under the jurisdiction of the North Carolina Interconnection Standards are responsible for paying for their distribution and network upgrades?

MS. CUMMINGS: Generally, I think that's a policy call and, you know, we've supported it as it's been proposed in Tranche 1 and we found -- we think it's working well. I think, in general, it's not a bad policy call and it's one that can be supported by

the Public Staff to incentivize people to participate in CPRE through this socialization of costs.

MS. DUFFLEY: But are there any discrimination issues?

MR. DODGE: This is Tim Dodge with the Public Staff. And, again, when the Commission originally approved the CPRE Program plan and agreed that the system -- socializing those system upgrade costs was appropriate, I think that there was some discussion at that time but, as Ms. Cummings was just indicating to the extent it's part of implementing the CPRE Program. On the front end, in terms of the queue position for projects as they come in, they're being treated in a non-discriminatory fashion. Those costs are being assigned. They shouldn't be while the -- again the costs -- ultimately how they're recovered may be different, they would be bearing the same amount of costs associated with those upgrades.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. And then one more concern is under the socialization model, who or what entity will be responsible for cost containment of grid upgrade costs? So, for example, under the traditional PPA, the interconnection customers are monitoring the cost of these upgrades because they

want to maximize profit, so you have a natural regulator through this arms length transaction. But under the socialization model, these incentives for the interconnection customer to monitor the upgrades has disappeared. So who will take on this burden?

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MS. CUMMINGS: So we think that the developer paying those costs does create a way of containing those costs. They'll argue about certain costs. And we've worried in general that you're giving us sort of -- you know, on the -- we can always review -- the Public Staff can always review in a rate case those costs that come in. It may be difficult when something was built three years prior, and those costs were incurred a long time ago, and we may not be able to evaluate every single project in the same manner. We think though that using the rebuttable presumption that I mentioned before will serve as a sort of check on this that if they do go over a certain cost cap that they would have to present their reasons for doing that. And we support that either on an individual project basis, 20 percent of what was originally estimated for that project, say hypothetically, or portfolio-wide. So hypothetically, if you had \$5 million in upgrades, if there were

six -- over \$6 million portfolio-wide, that they would then have to look at those costs and the presumption would shift to them.

MS. DUFFLEY: So what I heard you say is that the Public Staff would step into that role of being the monitor and you have the expertise close to an interconnection customer and would review those -- those upgrades, correct?

MR. DODGE: Those upgrade costs would be reviewed in a rate case. So we would be looking at those like other T&D upgrades in the next rate case.

MS. DUFFLEY: Thank you. That's all I have.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Well, this is a good breaking point. I think everybody was instructed that we would complete this today and be here no later than 5:30, so bear that in mind as you answer questions. Try to answer them as tightly as you can and hold off on making prefacing statements and that kind of thing. Just hone right in on a question to the extent you can. With that said, we're going to break now and please be back by 1:50.

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

(The hearing was adjourned at 12:43 p.m., and set to reconvene at 1:50 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, KIM T. MITCHELL, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the Proceedings in the above-captioned matter were taken before me, that I did report in stenographic shorthand the Proceedings set forth herein, and the foregoing pages are a true and correct transcription to the best of my ability.

Kim T. Mitchell

Kim T. Mitchell
Court Reporter

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION