

**STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
UTILITIES COMMISSION
RALEIGH**

DOCKET NO. E-2, SUB 1340
DOCKET NO. E-7, SUB 1310

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

In the Matter of	)	ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION,
Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and	)	ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES, AND
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,	)	PERMITTING USE OF RESOURCE
2024 Solar Procurement Pursuant	)	SOLICITATION CLUSTER AND
to Initial Carbon Plan	)	ELIMINATION OF RED ZONE
	)	EXPANSION PLAN COST ADDER

BY THE COMMISSION: On December 30, 2022, the Commission issued an Order Adopting Initial Carbon Plan and Providing Direction for Future Planning (Initial Carbon Plan) in Commission Docket No. E-100, Sub 179 that in pertinent part directed Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP), and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC; together with DEP, Duke or Companies), to target the procurement of 2,350 MW of new solar generation resources during the 2023-2024 period. The Initial Carbon Plan requires Duke to hold stakeholder discussions regarding a competitive, least cost 2024 Solar Procurement and file, by no later than February 15, 2024, a proposal to procure new solar generation resources to be placed in service by 2028, subject to a volume adjustment mechanism, including a targeted procurement of Solar Plus Storage in alignment with the 2024 Definitive Interconnection System Impact Study (DISIS).

On February 5, 2024, Duke filed a motion requesting that the Commission (1) open new dockets for the purpose of reviewing Duke's 2024 Solar Procurement Program proposal, including its proposed 2024 solar and Solar Plus Storage procurement request for proposal (2024 RFP) and pro forma power purchase agreements and to receive stakeholder comments on the same; (2) allow Duke to use the Resource Solicitation Cluster (RSC) option under the approved generator interconnection procedures for the 2024 RFP; and (3) grant Duke an extension of time to file the 2024 Solar Procurement Program proposal from February 15, 2024, to April 12, 2024 (Motion).

Further, the Motion references that on January 30, 2024, Duke held its first 2024 RFP stakeholder engagement session to discuss a number of topics with Market Participants (MPs) including but not limited to Duke's "plan to not utilize a red zone expansion plan (RZEP) shadow cost allocation for the 2024 RFP[.]"

In regard to RZEP project costs, the Initial Carbon Plan states in pertinent part

. . . it is important that the 2023 Solar Procurement RFP ensure that bids for solar projects that depend on the RZEP projects are assigned an appropriate percentage of RZEP project costs since those solar projects have caused the need, in part, for the RZEP projects but will not have to pay for it . . . [B]ids for solar projects that depend on the RZEP projects should be evaluated in solar procurements' RFPs based upon the projects' costs, including the Network Upgrades. The Commission points out that the necessity of evaluating bids for solar projects considering the projects' total costs is not confined to the RZEP projects; instead, any projects triggering Network Upgrades that the [North Carolina Transmission Planning Collaborative] has approved, and that Duke has included in the "baseline" should be evaluated based upon the projects' total costs. Accordingly, the Commission directs Duke to prepare a mechanism for the 2023 Solar Procurement that evaluates bids for solar projects that depend on the RZEP that includes an appropriate cost for the RZEP projects.

Initial Carbon Plan, 118-19. In accordance with this directive, the 2023 Solar Procurement involved the development of a method for determining which of the proposals utilized the RZEP projects and by how much, and then used this method to calculate a "shadow cost" or RZEP cost adder mechanism associated with these projects to be imputed to these RZEP-dependent proposals in the evaluation and ranking of proposals. 2023 RFP Document, *Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 2023 Solar Procurement Pursuant to Initial Carbon Plan*, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1317 and E-7, Sub 1290 (June 30, 2023), Attachment 1, Page 29 of 36. More particularly, in the 2023 RFP, the RZEP cost adder was calculated as the cost of the RZEP upgrade multiplied by the ratio of the generator's impact on the RZEP upgrade to the capacity increase caused by the RZEP upgrade and was used to evaluate and rank the bids of projects that utilized an RZEP upgrade. Those projects utilizing an RZEP upgrade, however, were not actually responsible for paying those upgrade costs.

Since the issuance of the Initial Carbon Plan with the directive that Duke procure new solar generation and Solar Plus Storage in the 2023 Solar Procurement RFP, Duke stated

After further discussions with stakeholders, however, the Companies believe that allocating an RZEP "shadow cost" has the potential to increase procurement cost for customers and could result in non-Carbon Plan selected resources taking advantage of these investments in a way that provides less benefits for retail customers. Recognizing that the RZEP projects are now approved by the North Carolina Transmission Planning Collaborative and classified as "contingent facilities" for the 2023 DISIS, these facilities will not be assigned as incremental Network Upgrades to Interconnection Customers coming out of the 2022 DISIS or 2023 DISIS ahead of the planned 2023 RFP RSC. This could result in non-Carbon

Plan-selected Interconnection Customers obtaining the benefit of the new transmission capacity created by RZEP ahead of the 2023 RFP proposals. The Companies plan to use this shadow cost mechanism for the 2023 RFP and further evaluate the impacts of this approach for future procurements; however, preliminary consensus amongst stakeholders is that the RZEP cost allocation methodology should not be used for subsequent procurements.

2023 Solar Resource Procurement Request for Proposals for Solar and Solar Paired with Storage Resources, *Duke Energy Progress, LLC, and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 2023 Solar Procurement Pursuant to Initial Carbon Plan*, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1317 and E-7, Sub 1290, Attachment 1 (Apr. 6, 2023).

Based upon the forgoing, on February 8, 2024, the Chair issued an Order Initiating Proceeding and Expedited Comments (Order) initiating this proceeding and requesting expedited comments on Duke's intent to eliminate the imputation of a shadow cost to RZEP-dependent proposals for purposes of evaluation and ranking, Duke's proposal to use an RSC for the 2024 RFP, and Duke's requested extension of time to file its 2024 Solar Procurement. In particular, the Order directed that responsive comments should "explain (1) whether and how imputing a 'shadow cost' in the 2024 Solar Procurement RFP could increase procurement costs for customers and result in non-IRP selected resources' taking advantage of the RZEP in a way that provides fewer benefits for retail/native load customers; and (2) whether and how imputing a 'shadow cost' to RZEP-dependent proposals could result in non-CPIRP-selected Interconnection Customers obtaining the benefit of the RZEP transmission capacity ahead of the 2024 Solar Procurement proposals." Finally, the Order suspended Duke's February 15, 2024 deadline to file its 2024 Solar Procurement Program proposal and noted that a new filing deadline for the 2024 Solar Procurement Program proposal would be established by future order subsequent to review and consideration of the requested comments.

Through various orders, the Commission permitted the intervention of the following parties: the Carolina Industrial Group for Fair Utility Rates II and the Carolina Industrial Group for Fair Utility Rates III (together, CIGFUR); the Carolinas Clean Energy Business Association (CCEBA); the Carolina Utility Customers Association, Inc. (CUCA); the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association (NCSEA); the North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation (NCEMC); and appearing jointly the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE), the Sierra Club, and the Natural Resources Defense Counsel (together, SACE et al.). The intervention of the Public Staff – North Carolina Utilities Commission (Public Staff) is recognized pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 62-15(d) and Commission Rule R1-19(e).

Consistent with the Order, CCEBA, SACE et al., NCEMC, and the Public Staff filed initial comments on February 15, 2024. Also on February 15, 2024, NCSEA filed a letter in lieu of comments. Neither CIGFUR nor CUCA submitted comments for the Commission's consideration. Finally, on February 20, 2024, Duke filed reply comments.

No other party hereto submitted any additional materials for the Commission's consideration on the three issues for consideration.

SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' COMMENTS

Request to Eliminate the RZEP Cost Adder

CCEBA

CCEBA states that it supports Duke's proposal to eliminate the RZEP cost adder mechanism in the evaluation and scoring of bids in the 2024 Solar Procurement and asserts that the RZEP cost adder is contrary to both Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rulings and the successful implementation of the Carbon Plan process.

CCEBA notes that the first round of RZEP projects have been reviewed and approved by the Carolinas Transmission Planning Collaborative (CTPC) and are now classified as "contingent facilities" included in the system baseline from and after the 2023 DISIS. CCEBA contends that requiring individual generators to bear the cost of transmission upgrades needed for the system as a whole is counter to sound transmission planning policy and contrary to FERC rulings that system upgrade costs should not be assigned to a particular customer when those upgrades were part of a "comprehensive transmission system plan."

CCEBA explains that while the RZEP cost adder mechanism used in the 2023 Solar Procurement did not impose actual costs on the winning bids, "[i]n the context of a competitive procurement, the effect on potential generators is the same. They are placed at a competitive disadvantage and their bids are deemed 'more expensive' because of costs they should not otherwise be required to bear alone." CCEBA Comments, 5. Finally, CCEBA asserts that discouraging RZEP-reliant bidders has the potential to result in "underutilized network improvements." *Id.* at 6.

SACE et al.

SACE et al. assert that Duke is right to propose to exclude the RZEP cost adder mechanism from its 2024 Solar Procurement proposal. SACE et al. explain that the primary reason driving the use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism in the 2023 Solar Procurement — the Commission's reluctance to alter bidding criteria mid-procurement — is no longer applicable. "Because Duke has already made clear that it would exclude an RZEP shadow price, before the 2024 solar procurement RFP opens, this concern does not apply." SACE et al. Comments, 2.

SACE et al.'s comments distinguish between a distributed generation project that "causes the transmission expenditure," and a distributed generation project that relies upon transmission upgrades that "will be developed — and associated costs incurred — regardless of the particular generation project that ultimately interconnects to

them.” SACE et al. therefore assert that it would be improper to impute transmission upgrade costs to the later category of distributed generation projects. *Id.* at 3.

SACE et al. note that the Commission approved DEP and DEC’s Multiyear Rate Plans which were inclusive of RZEP transmission upgrades in their most recent general rate cases, Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1300 and E-7, Sub 1276. SACE et al. assert that “[i]mportantly, the process by which Duke identified the RZEP projects already attempted to identify the least-cost mix of both generation and transmission resources that would serve Duke’s projected load.” *Id.* at 4.

Accordingly, the RZEP transmission costs are already part of the least-cost resource mix, and it is not necessary to evaluate them again as part of an analysis of the least-cost mix of new solar resources; that would be determined by only the cost of the solar resource and any additional transmission costs above and beyond the RZEP projects.

Id. Accordingly, SACE et al. explain that Duke ratepayers stand to receive the most value from RZEP transmission upgrade investments if the completed infrastructure is used “to the greatest extent possible.” *Id.* SACE et al. assert that the RZEP cost adder mechanism is likely to have the opposite of the desired effect by potentially discouraging the development and selection of projects sited in the red zone. Finally, SACE et al. caution that the RZEP cost adder mechanism could potentially distort bids and exacerbate “the significant attrition seen among solar bids in the recent procurements, ultimately putting compliance with the carbon-reduction requirements . . . at greater risk.” *Id.* at 5.

NCEMC

NCEMC states that solar projects procured by Duke pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 62-110.9 should be evaluated “based on the solar project’s total costs, including all network upgrades attributable to that project.” NCEMC Comments, 5. “To the extent the RZEP shadow price used in the solar procurements helps to provide a more accurate reflection of the total costs of the proposal, NCEMC supports the continued use of that mechanism in the evaluation of proposals.” *Id.* at 6.

NCSEA

NCSEA states that it agrees with Duke’s recommendation to eliminate the RZEP cost adder mechanism for the 2024 Solar Procurement. Noting that this position is consistent with NCSEA’s position in the 2023 Solar Procurement proceeding, NCSEA opines that “[i]n the case of the 2024 RFP, including an RZEP shadow cost would create the perverse result of prioritizing projects that do not maximize the use of infrastructure upgrades the Commission has already determined to be in the public interest.” NCSEA Letter in Lieu of Comments, 2. NCSEA further contends that the RZEP cost adder

mechanism puts projects that rely on RZEP upgrades at a competitive disadvantage. NCSEA further explains

While [use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism] may have been appropriate previously (considering the uncertainty around planning for and paying for the RZEP upgrades), now that these upgrades have been approved both for planning purposes and for rate-base treatment such justification no longer applies.

Id. Finally, NCSEA argues that the RZEP cost adder mechanism could drive up bids “by increasing uncertainty and injecting unneeded complexity into the bidding process[.]” and “would do nothing to help with the issue of attrition” “where bidders are asked to submit bids years in advance of actual development[.]” *Id.* at 3.

Public Staff

The Public Staff explains that during the 2022 Solar Procurement, in Commission Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 1297 and E-7, Sub 1268, RZEP projects were not included in the study baseline, but upgrade costs triggered by projects located in the red zone were assigned to those projects during the bid process evaluation process. Further the Public Staff notes that the Commission’s Order Adopting Initial Carbon Plan and Providing Direction for Future Planning determined that 14 RZEP projects would allow the interconnection of approximately 3,759 MW, that those RZEP projects were necessary to achieve the mandates of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-110.9 in a least cost manner, and that the risk of those upgrades being underutilized was low. The Public Staff also explained that the Commission deemed it important that the 2023 Solar Procurement impute RZEP project costs to solar projects that would have triggered an upgrade for bid evaluation purposes. Since then, the Public Staff notes that the RZEP upgrades were classified as “contingent facilities” by the CTPC and accordingly associated upgrade costs will not be assigned to interconnection customers in the ongoing DISIS clusters. Therefore, the Public Staff recommends that RZEP project costs should not be imputed to 2024 Solar Procurement projects as was done in the 2023 Solar Procurement.

Opining that “all-in cost of both an individual resource and its impact on the transmission system is an important holistic aspect of competitive bid evaluation and helps guide procurement to the most optimal selection of generation resources,” the Public Staff explains that for the 2023 Solar Procurement it supported the use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism as “a reasonable approach for determining the ‘best’ utilization of new transmission resources (from a cost perspective) in a given cluster study, by factoring in both the proposed bid of the project and the all-in costs when considering transmission.” Public Staff Comments, 3.

When an RZEP project is designated as a contingent project, if a shadow price is not assigned, it creates a signal to developers that projects interconnecting to this line or designated area will see lower average interconnection costs and are more likely to be selected. If the selected

portfolio of projects is highly concentrated around these RZEP projects, it may have the effect of quickly consuming the RZEP capacity while creating an uneven distribution of generation projects. This uneven distribution may, as loads increase and other electric generation facilities are added to the system, result in the triggering of more substantial upgrades than would be required if the distribution of generation facilities was more even, while a larger distribution of projects would potentially provide other non-quantifiable benefits of a larger, more distributed area that would minimize the impacts of localized storms (e.g., rapid shadowing), as well as line outages that could cut off significant resource capacity in a concentrated area.

Id. at 3-4. For this reason, the Public Staff reiterates that the use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism “was reasonable and served its intended purpose” in the 2023 Solar Procurement. *Id.* at 4.

Nonetheless, the Public Staff states that the benefits of continued use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism, “which attempt[s] to account for long-term planning uncertainty and other non-quantifiable benefits, are now outweighed by the cost of each procurement portfolio due to the increasing procurement targets and load projections.” *Id.* Further, the Public Staff explains that use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism “risks distorting the economic ranking of projects in future RFPs.” *Id.* The Public Staff also notes that were the Commission to continue to require use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism despite the RZEP projects being designated as “contingent facilities” by the CTPC, it would be a departure from practice in other states.

The Public Staff concludes that “unless there is evidence that the lack of RZEP cost allocation is leading to a disorderly utilization of the transmission system,” it is no longer “appropriate to penalize projects attempting to utilize that interconnection capacity[.]” *Id.* at 7. Notwithstanding the forgoing, the Public Staff observes its recommended course of action is not without risks:

There are confounding factors as one considers multiple annual RFP cycles and system changes in the interim; for example, a project rejected today may be able to bid in future RFPs at a lower overall price while potentially avoiding significant impacts to the transmission system within a given cluster study.

Id. However, the Public Staff also acknowledges the concerns voiced by CCEBA, SACE et al., and NCSEA, that “continuation of the imputation of a shadow cost may result in higher procurement costs that are not offset by lower transmission upgrade costs.” *Id.* In conclusion, the Public Staff advises the Commission that if a “disorderly utilization of the transmission system” becomes an issue in the future, the Commission may consider transmission upgrade cost adder mechanisms in response as a function of its competitive procurement development oversight.

Duke

In reply comments, Duke states that continued use of the of the RZEP cost adder mechanism is unnecessary to protect the interests of DEC's and DEP's customers and should not be imposed in the 2024 RFP bid evaluation process. In support of its recommendation to eliminate the RZEP cost adder mechanism, Duke cites to "the risk of increased costs to customers" and "the potential for perceived 'unfairness' between RZEP-dependent DISIS and RFP interconnection customers" as downsides to the mechanism. Duke Reply Comments, 6-7.

In response to the position of NCEMC, that was the sole party to file comments in support of continuing the RZEP cost adder mechanism, Duke argues that "treating CTPC Local Transmission Plan-approved RZEP projects in a manner consistent with all other transmission investments included in the Local Transmission Plan is the most reasonable and non-discriminatory approach for RFP bidders, generator interconnection customers, and the Companies' retail and wholesale customers." *Id.* at 7. Duke explains that "[t]he RZEP upgrades are not caused by or designed to specifically benefit any one proposed solar project or interconnection customer[.]" and that third-party generators interconnecting to Duke's transmission grid (both those bidding into the 2024 Solar Procurement and those who do not), transmission, wholesale, and retail customers will all receive the benefits of the RZEP transmission upgrades. *Id.* Duke opines that the RZEP transmission upgrades "will enable the more efficient and reliable interconnection of new solar and other generation in previously constrained areas of the DEP and DEC transmission systems and will provide additional system benefits such as increased reliability, added resilience, and improved transfer capability between DEC and DEP, thereby benefitting all customers." *Id.* at 7-8.

Finally, Duke echoes the positions of CCEBA, SACE et al., NCSEA, and the Public Staff, advising that employing the RZEP cost adder mechanism in the 2024 Solar Procurement "risks increasing the costs of projects selected in the RFP and could result in increased costs to customers and bias towards selection of sub-optimal RFP projects" *Id.* at 8.

Request to Use an RSC

CCEBA

CCEBA states that it does not oppose "the consideration of an RSC in the 2024 Procurement." CCEBA Comments at 7. Nonetheless, CCEBA asserts that it "reserves the right to address the details of that RSC in stakeholder negotiations with Duke and in future filings. As in the 2023 Solar Procurement, CCEBA will seek to have that RSC provide flexibility and optionality to bidders and will address those issues as the RSC is designed for the 2024 Procurement." *Id.*

SACE et al.

SACE et al. states that they take no position on Duke's proposal to use a "Resource Solicitation Cluster" for the 2024 RFP.

Public Staff

The Public Staff states that it supports the use of an RSC for the 2024 Solar Procurement RFP noting that the use of an RSC to facilitate the 2023 Solar Procurement was "beneficial . . . in that the use of an RSC appears to have led to less volatility in the 2023 DISIS cluster." Public Staff Comments, 7-8. The Public Staff further explains

[w]hile it is still early to declare the 2023 RFP a success, early signs are promising, and the Public Staff believes it would be premature to require the 2024 RFP to participate in the 2024 DISIS cluster. In addition, it may not be possible to finalize the 2024 RFP and receive Commission approval of the RFP and associated documents prior to the closing of the 2024 DISIS enrollment period. If this were to occur, 2024 RFP projects would not be able to begin the interconnection study process until mid-2025.

Id. at 8.

Duke

Duke explains that its request to implement the 2024 Solar Procurement via an RSC is driven by the successful utilization of the RSC thus far for the 2023 RFP study process. Agreeing with the Public Staff's statement that using an RSC for the 2023 Solar Procurement led to a less volatile 2023 DISIS, Duke states that "utilization of the RSC option in the 2023 RFP has so far reduced the probability of a Phase 3 study in both the 2023 RSC and 2023 DISIS, creating more stable cluster studies." *Id.* at 3. Duke further anticipates that implementing the 2024 Solar Procurement through an RSC "will mitigate the risk of withdrawals later in the 2024 RFP study process and reduce the potential that a Phase 3 restudy will be required, thereby leading to a more efficient and successful generator interconnection study process and resource procurement." *Id.*

Request for an Extension of Time

CCEBA

CCEBA states that it does not oppose Duke's request to extend the time to file its proposed RFP and other procurement documents to April 12, 2024.

SACE et al.

SACE et al. states that they take no position on Duke's request for an extension of time to file its 2024 Solar Procurement proposal.

Public Staff

The Public Staff states that it agrees with Duke that more time is needed to develop the 2024 RFP as there are still matters that must be addressed through the ongoing stakeholder process. As an example of an issue that could benefit from an extended stakeholder process, the Public Staff explains

[f]or example, given the extraordinary volumes of solar likely to be sought in the 2024 and 2025 RFPs, stakeholders have been discussing methods to reduce the likelihood of projects withdrawing after executing a contract (PPA or asset acquisition), as was seen in the Competitive Procurement of Renewable Energy (CPRE) program. Addressing this issue may require further detailed discussions on how to reduce the time between contract execution and commercial operation, or potential indices that might be used to adjust bid prices up or down should material changes in the market emerge after contract execution.

Public Staff Comments, 8. Nonetheless, the Public Staff advises that “it is imperative that Duke, stakeholders, and the Public Staff reach agreement on the parameters of the 2024 RFP as soon as possible” as any “significant delay to the orderly procurement of solar and solar plus storage resources puts compliance [with the State’s carbon reduction mandates pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 62-110.9] at risk.” *Id.* at 9.

Duke

Duke notes that the Public Staff supports and no party opposes its request for additional time to develop the 2024 RFP. Duke explains that if the Commission extends its time to file its 2024 Solar Procurement Program proposal, including its pro forma power purchase agreements, until April 12, 2024, it will have the opportunity to continue engaging with Market Participants, including an open stakeholder engagement session in March, 2024. Duke further states that “[a]dditional stakeholder engagement is in the public interest and will enhance market participants’ understanding enhance their understanding of and provide input into the 2024 RFP, ultimately leading to a more successful procurement.” Duke Reply, 8.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Based upon the foregoing, the Commission finds good cause to grant the pending requests in Duke’s Motion to (1) permit Duke to use the RSC option under the approved generator interconnection procedures to facilitate the 2024 Solar Procurement, and (2) allow Duke an extension of time to file the 2024 Solar Procurement Program proposal until April 12, 2024. In granting Duke’s Motion, the Commission is persuaded by the Public Staff’s expressed support for these requests and the lack of objections from any other party to this proceeding. It is the Commission’s expectation that Duke will use this time to conduct fruitful pre-filing stakeholder engagement with Market Participants.

The Commission further finds good cause to permit Duke to discontinue use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism for the purposes of evaluating bids in the 2024 Solar Procurement. In arriving at this determination, the Commission finds particularly persuasive the Public Staff's comments that (1) the benefits of continued use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism are outweighed by the potential for economic distortion and higher priced bids, and (2) to the Public Staff's knowledge, no other state includes a similar transmission upgrade cost adder mechanism for transmission upgrades that are part of an approved transmission plan. The Commission also finds persuasive Duke's comment that continuation of the RZEP cost adder in the 2024 Solar Procurement could risk increased cost to customers. The Commission further finds credible the commentary provided by groups representing solar developers – CCEBA, NCSEA, and SACE et al. – that imputing RZEP costs to bids may drive higher bid prices. The Commission notes that its decision to discontinue use of the RZEP cost adder mechanism for the 2024 Solar Procurement does not preclude it from reintroducing transmission upgrade cost adder mechanisms to future competitive procurements should the need arise.

Finally, the Commission finds good cause to establish the following procedures for the purpose of reviewing Duke's 2024 Solar Procurement Program proposal, including its proposed 2024 RFP and pro forma power purchase agreements and to receive stakeholder comments on the same.


IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. That any person having an interest in the 2024 Solar Procurement may file a petition to intervene in these dockets stating such interest on or before Friday, May 3, 2024;
2. That the Public Staff and intervenors may file comments on Duke's 2024 Solar Procurement proposal on or before Friday, May 3, 2024; and
3. That Duke may file reply comments by Friday, May 17, 2024.

ISSUED BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.

This the 22nd day of March, 2024.

NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "A. Shonta Dunston". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

A. Shonta Dunston, Chief Clerk