

Carolina Water Service, Inc. of North Carolina  
Docket No. W-354, Sub 344

BEFORE THE  
NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

DIRECT TESTIMONY  
OF  
PAULINE M. AHERN, CRRA  
PARTNER  
SUSSEX ECONOMIC ADVISORS, LLC

ON BEHALF OF  
CAROLINA WATER SERVICE, INC. OF NORTH CAROLINA

AUGUST 21, 2015

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page No.</u>
Introduction.....	1
Purpose.....	3
Summary.....	4
General Principles .....	7
Business Risk.....	8
Financial Risk.....	21
Proxy Group .....	22
Capital Structure Ratios and Long-Term Debt Cost Rate .....	24
Common Equity Cost Rate Models.....	26
Discounted Cash Flow Model (“DCF”).....	27
The Risk Premium Model (“RPM”).....	30
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”).....	45
Common Equity Cost Rates for the Proxy Group of Domestic, Non-Price Regulated Companies Based Upon the DCF, RPM and CAPM .....	49
Conclusion of Common Equity Cost Rate .....	54
Business Risk Adjustment.....	56

Attachment A – Resume of Pauline M. Ahern, CRRA

1    **Introduction**

2    **Q.    PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION AND**  
3       **BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

4    A.    My name is Pauline M. Ahern. I am a Partner with Sussex  
5       Economic Advisors, LLC. My business address is 161  
6       Worcester Road, Suite 503, Framingham, MA 01701. My  
7       mailing address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount  
8       Laurel, NJ 08054.

9    **Q.    PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PROFESSIONAL**  
10       **EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.**

11   A.    I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned  
12       utilities before twenty-nine state regulatory commissions in  
13       the United States as well as one provincial regulatory  
14       commission in Canada on rate of return issues, including but  
15       not limited to common equity cost rate, fair rate of return,  
16       capital structure issues, relative investment risk and credit  
17       quality issues. I am a graduate of Clark University,  
18       Worcester, MA, where I received a Bachelor of Arts degree  
19       with honors in Economics. I have also received a Master of  
20       Business Administration with high honors and a  
21       concentration in finance from Rutgers University.

22               On behalf of the American Gas Association ("A.G.A."),  
23       I calculate the A.G.A. Gas Index, which serves as the

1 benchmark against which the performance of the American  
2 Gas Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured monthly. The A.G.A.  
3 Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted  
4 index and mutual fund, respectively, comprised of the  
5 common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members of  
6 the A.G.A.

7 I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory  
8 Financial Analysts ("SURFA") where I serve on its Board of  
9 Directors, having served two terms as President, from  
10 2006 – 2008 and 2008 – 2010. Previously, I held the  
11 position of Secretary/Treasurer from 2004 – 2006. In 1992, I  
12 was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of  
13 Return Analyst" ("CRR") by SURFA, which is based upon  
14 education, experience and the successful completion of a  
15 comprehensive written examination.

16 I am also an associate member of the National  
17 Association of Water Companies, serving on its  
18 Finance/Accounting/Taxation and Rates and Regulation  
19 Committees; a member of the American Finance and  
20 Financial Management Associations; a member of Edison  
21 Electric Institute's Cost of Capital Working Group; and, a  
22 member of A.G.A.'s State Affairs Committee.

23

1 **Purpose**

2 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT**  
3 **TESTIMONY?**

4 A. The purpose of my direct testimony is to provide testimony  
5 on behalf of Carolina Water Service Inc., of North Carolina  
6 ("CWSNC" or "the Company") relative to the appropriate  
7 overall rate of return, including capital structure ratios, long-  
8 term debt cost rate and the investor-required common equity  
9 cost rate which CWSNC should be afforded the opportunity  
10 to earn on its sewer jurisdictional rate base.

11 **Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED EXHIBITS WHICH SUPPORT**  
12 **YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?**

13 A. Yes. They have been marked for identification as Ahern  
14 Direct Exhibits 1 through 10.

15 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED OVERALL RATE OF**  
16 **RETURN?**

17 A. I recommend that the North Carolina Utilities Commission  
18 ("the NCUC" or "the Commission") authorize the Company  
19 the opportunity to earn an overall rate of return of 8.54%  
20 based upon the consolidated capital structure of Utilities, Inc.  
21 ("UI" or "the Parent") at December 31, 2014, which consisted  
22 of 48.99% long-term debt and 51.01% common equity, at a  
23 long-term debt cost rate of 6.60% and my recommended

1 common equity cost rate of 10.40%. A common equity cost  
2 rate of 10.40% results in an overall rate of return of 8.54%  
3 when applied to the common equity ratio of 51.01% as will  
4 be discussed below and as summarized on page 1 of Ahern  
5 Direct Exhibit 1.

6 **Summary**

7 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON**  
8 **EQUITY COST RATE.**

9 A. My recommended common equity cost rate of 10.40% is  
10 summarized on page 3 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 1. Because  
11 CWSNC's common stock is not publicly traded, a market-  
12 based common equity cost rate cannot be directly observed  
13 for the Company. Consequently, I have assessed the  
14 market-based common equity cost rates of companies of  
15 relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk, i.e., a  
16 proxy group, for insight into a recommended common equity  
17 cost rate applicable to CWSNC. Using companies of  
18 relatively similar risk as proxies is consistent with the  
19 principle of fair rate of return established in the *Hope*<sup>1</sup> and  
20 *Bluefield*<sup>2</sup> cases, adding reliability to the informed expert  
21 judgment necessary to arrive at a recommended common

---

<sup>1</sup> *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

<sup>2</sup> *Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n*, 262 U.S. 679 (1922).

1 equity cost rate. However, no proxy group can be selected  
2 to be identical in risk to CWSNC. Therefore, the proxy  
3 group's results must be adjusted, if necessary, to reflect the  
4 unique relative investment (financial and / or business) risk  
5 of the Company.

6 My recommendation results from the application of  
7 market-based cost of common equity models, the  
8 Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") approach, the Risk Premium  
9 Model ("RPM") and the Capital Asset Pricing Model  
10 ("CAPM"), to the market data of the proxy group of eight  
11 water companies whose selection will be discussed below.  
12 In addition, I also applied the DCF, RPM and CAPM to the  
13 market data of domestic, non-price regulated companies  
14 comparable in total risk to the eight water companies.

15 The results derived from each are as follows:

1	Discounted Cash Flow Model	8.52%
2	Risk Premium Model	10.74
3	Capital Asset Pricing Model	9.41
4		
5	Cost of Equity Models Applied to	
6		
7	Comparable Risk, Non-Price	
8	Regulated Companies	<u>10.63%</u>
9		
10	Indicated Common Equity	
11	Cost Rate	10.02%
12		
13	Business Risk Adjustment	<u>0.40%</u>
14		
15	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate	10.42%
16		
17	Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	<u>10.40%</u>

18           After reviewing the cost rates based upon these  
19 models, I conclude that a common equity cost rate of  
20 10.02% is indicated before any adjustment for CWSNC's  
21 greater business risk relative to the proxy group of eight  
22 water companies as I discuss in more detail below. Thus,  
23 the indicated common equity cost rate based upon the eight  
24 water companies needs to be adjusted upward by 0.40% to  
25 reflect CWSNC's greater business risk. After adjustment,  
26 the common equity cost rate is 10.42%, which when rounded  
27 to 10.40%, is my recommended common equity cost rate. A  
28 common equity cost rate of 10.40% is, in my opinion,  
29 reasonable, if not conservative, for CWSNC



1    **General Principles**

2    **Q.    WHAT GENERAL PRINCIPLES HAVE YOU CONSIDERED**  
3           **IN ARRIVING AT YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON**  
4           **EQUITY COST RATE OF 10.40%?**

5    A.    In unregulated industries, the competition of the marketplace  
6           is the principal determinant of the price of products or  
7           services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act  
8           as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that  
9           the utility can fulfill its obligations to the public while  
10          providing safe and reliable service at all times requires a  
11          level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of  
12          presently invested capital as well as permitting the attraction  
13          of needed new capital at a reasonable cost in competition  
14          with other firms of comparable risk. This is consistent with  
15          the fair rate of return standards established by the  
16          U.S. Supreme Court in the *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases.  
17          Consequently, marketplace data must be relied upon in  
18          assessing a common equity cost rate appropriate for  
19          ratemaking purposes. Therefore, my recommended  
20          common equity cost rate is based upon marketplace data for  
21          a proxy group of utilities as similar in risk as possible to  
22          CWSNC, based upon selection criteria that will be discussed  
23          subsequently. The use of the market data for a proxy group

1 adds reliability to the informed expert judgment used in  
2 arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate. Also,  
3 the use of multiple common equity cost rate models adds  
4 reliability when arriving at a recommended common equity  
5 cost rate.

6 **Business Risk**

7 **Q. PLEASE DEFINE BUSINESS RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT**  
8 **IS IMPORTANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF A FAIR**  
9 **RATE OF RETURN.**

10 A. Business risk is important to the determination of a fair rate  
11 of return because the greater the level of risk, the greater the  
12 rate of return investors demand, consistent with the basic  
13 financial principle of risk and return. Business risk is the  
14 riskiness of a company's common stock without the use of  
15 debt and/or preferred capital. Examples of the general  
16 business risks faced by all utilities, i.e., electric, natural gas  
17 distribution and water utilities, include, but are not limited to,  
18 the quality of management, the regulatory environment,  
19 customer mix and concentration of customers, service  
20 territory economic growth, capital intensity and size, all of  
21 which have a direct bearing on earnings. An individual utility  
22 may face different levels of one or more particular risks.

23 **Q. WHAT BUSINESS RISKS DOES THE WATER UTILITY**

1           **INDUSTRY IN GENERAL FACE TODAY?**

2       A.     Water is essential to life and unlike electricity or natural gas,  
3             water is the only utility product which is intended for  
4             customers to ingest. Consequently, water quality is of  
5             paramount importance to the health and well-being of  
6             customers and is therefore subject to additional and  
7             increasingly strict health and safety regulations. Beyond  
8             health and safety concerns, water utility customers also have  
9             significant aesthetic concerns regarding the water delivered  
10            to them and regulators pay close attention to these concerns  
11            because of the strong feelings they arouse in consumers.  
12            Also, unlike many electric and natural gas utilities, water  
13            utilities serve a production function in addition to the delivery  
14            functions served by electric and gas utilities.

15            Water utilities obtain supply from wells, aquifers,  
16            surface water reservoirs or streams and rivers. Throughout  
17            the years, well supplies and aquifers have been  
18            environmentally threatened, with historically minor  
19            purification treatment giving way to major well rehabilitation,  
20            extensive treatment or replacement. Simultaneously, safe  
21            drinking water quality standards have tightened  
22            considerably, requiring multiple treatments prior to water  
23            delivery. Supply availability is also limited by drought, water

1 source overuse, runoff, threatened species and habitat  
2 protection, and other operational, political and environmental  
3 factors. In addition, the United States Environmental  
4 Protection Agency (“EPA”), as well as individual state and  
5 local environmental agencies, is continually monitoring  
6 potential contaminants in the water supply and promulgating  
7 or expanding regulations when necessary. Increasingly  
8 stringent environmental standards necessitate additional  
9 capital investment in the distribution and treatment of water,  
10 exacerbating the pressure on water utilities’ free cash flows  
11 through increased capital expenditures for infrastructure,  
12 repair and replacement. In the course of procuring water  
13 supplies and treating water so that it complies with Safe  
14 Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) standards, water utilities have  
15 an ever-increasing responsibility to be stewards of the  
16 environment from which supplies are drawn, in order to  
17 preserve and protect essential natural resources of the  
18 United States.

19 Water utilities are typically vertically engaged in the  
20 entire process of acquisition, supply, production, treatment  
21 and distribution of water. In contrast, electric and natural  
22 gas companies, where transmission and distribution is often  
23 separate from generation, do not always produce the

1 electricity or natural gas which they transmit and distribute.  
2 Hence, water utilities require significant capital investment  
3 not only in distribution and transmission systems but also in  
4 sources of supply (wells), production (treatment facilities),  
5 and storage. Significant capital investment is necessary  
6 both to serve additional customers and to replace aging  
7 systems, creating a major risk facing the water utility  
8 industry.

9 *Value Line Investment Survey* (“*Value Line*”)<sup>3</sup>  
10 observes the following about the water utility industry:

11 The industry continues to face the same  
12 problems that have existed for years. Chronic  
13 under-investment in the infrastructure of water  
14 utilities in the past has resulted in most  
15 domestic investor owned and municipal  
16 systems being antiquated and in great need of  
17 repair.

18  
19 To bring these water systems up to par,  
20 companies are increasing their capital budgets.  
21 Since these expenditures can’t be financed  
22 entirely with internal funds, the difference must  
23 be made up by issuing new debt and equity.

24  
25 \* \* \* \*

26  
27 No stock in the industry is ranked to outperform  
28 the market in the year ahead. Moreover, the  
29 recent strength in the price of most of these  
30 stocks has significantly reduced their long-term  
31 appeal.

32  
33 \* \* \* \*

34  

---

<sup>3</sup> *Value Line Investment Survey*, January 16, 2015 p 1779.

1 Almost no utilities generate a sufficient amount  
2 of funds internally to cover the rising capital  
3 budgets. Therefore, there should be a fair  
4 amount of new debt and equity issued in the  
5 years ahead. Since no regulated utility  
6 currently has subpar finances, as of now, we  
7 don't foresee a major deterioration in the  
8 group's balance sheet. However, most will  
9 likely be in worse shape by the end of the  
10 decade.

11 \* \* \*

12  
13 Most state commissions realize that huge  
14 sums are required to mostly replace aging  
15 pipelines networks. Therefore, they have been  
16 relatively reasonable when it comes to allowing  
17 the companies to increase their customers [sic]  
18 bills to recoup their investment.

19  
20 \* \* \*

21  
22 Investors should understand that a harsh  
23 regulatory environment is one of the major  
24 risks that any kind of utility faces.

25  
26  
27 As we mentioned earlier, these stocks have  
28 been on a remarkable run the past few months.  
29 The sharp increases in the price of the equities  
30 has removed much of the previous appeal that  
31 this group offered. Indeed, almost every water  
32 stock seems to be fully valued for both the long  
33 and short term.

34  
35 In addition, because the water utility industry is more  
36 capital-intensive than the electric, combination electric and  
37 gas or natural gas utilities, the investment required to  
38 produce a dollar of revenue is greater. For example, as  
39 shown on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 2, it took \$3.91 of  
40 net utility plant on average to produce \$1.00 in operating

1 revenues in 2013 for the water utility industry as a whole.  
2 For CWSNC specifically, it took a much greater \$5.39 of net  
3 utility plant to produce \$1.00 in operating revenues in 2013.  
4 In contrast, for the electric, combination electric and gas and  
5 natural gas utility industries, on average it took only \$2.67,  
6 \$2.18 and \$1.30, respectively, to produce \$1.00 in operating  
7 revenues in 2013. As financing needs have increased and  
8 will continue to increase, the competition for capital from  
9 traditional sources has increased and will also continue to  
10 increase, making the need to maintain financial integrity and  
11 the ability to attract needed new capital increasingly  
12 important.

13 **Q. WHY IS THERE AN INCREASED NEED FOR**  
14 **FINANCING?**

15 A. There are a number of challenges facing the water utility  
16 industry. The National Association of Regulatory  
17 Commissioners ("NARUC") has highlighted the challenges  
18 facing the water utility industry stemming from its capital  
19 intensity. NARUC's Board of Directors adopted the following  
20 resolution in July 2013.<sup>4</sup>

21 **WHEREAS**, There is both a constitutional  
22 basis and judicial precedent allowing investor  
23 owned public water and wastewater utilities

---

<sup>4</sup> "Resolution Supporting Consideration of Regulatory Policies Deemed as 'Best Practices'", Sponsored by the Committee on Water. Adopted by the NARUC Board of Directors, July 2013.

1 the opportunity to earn a rate of return that is  
2 reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in  
3 the financial soundness of the utility and its  
4 ability to provide quality service; *and*

5  
6 **WHEREAS**, Through the *Resolution*  
7 *Supporting Consideration of Regulatory*  
8 *Policies Deemed as "Best Practices"* (2005),  
9 the National Association of Regulatory Utility  
10 Commissioners (NARUC) has previously  
11 recognized the role of innovative regulatory  
12 policies and mechanisms in the ability for  
13 public water and wastewater utilities to  
14 address significant infrastructure investment  
15 challenges facing water and wastewater  
16 system operators; *and*

17  
18 \* \* \*

19  
20 **WHEREAS**, Recent analysis shows that as  
21 compared to other regulated utility sectors,  
22 significant and widespread discrepancies  
23 continue to be observed between commission  
24 authorized returns on equity and observed  
25 actual returns on equity among regulated  
26 water and wastewater utilities; *and*

27  
28 **WHEREAS**, The extent of such discrepancies  
29 suggests the existence of challenges unique  
30 to the regulation of water and wastewater  
31 utilities; *and*

32  
33 \* \* \*

34  
35 **WHEREAS**, Deficient returns present a clear  
36 challenge to the ability of the water and  
37 wastewater industry to attract the capital  
38 necessary to address future infrastructure  
39 investment requirements necessary to provide  
40 safe and reliable service, which could exceed  
41 one trillion dollars over a 20-year period; *and*

42  
43 **WHEREAS**, The NARUC Committee on Water  
44 recognizes the critical role of the  
45 implementation and the effective use of sound  
46 regulatory practice [sic] and the innovative



1 regulatory policies identified in the *Resolution*  
2 *Supporting Consideration of Regulatory*  
3 *Policies Deemed as “Best Practices”*, and  
4

5 \* \* \*

6  
7 **RESOLVED**, That the Board of Directors of  
8 the National Association of Regulatory Utility  
9 Commissioners, convened at its 2013  
10 Summer Meeting in Denver, Colorado,  
11 identifies the implementation and effective use  
12 of sound regulatory practice [sic] and the  
13 innovative regulatory policies identified in the  
14 *Resolution Supporting Consideration of*  
15 *Regulatory Policies Deemed as “Best*  
16 *Practices”* (2005) as a critical component of a  
17 water and/or wastewater utility’s reasonable  
18 ability to earn its authorized return; and *be it*  
19 *further*  
20

21 **RESOLVED**, That NARUC recommends that  
22 economic regulators carefully consider and  
23 implement appropriate ratemaking measures  
24 as needed so that water and wastewater  
25 utilities have a reasonable opportunity to earn  
26 their authorized returns within their  
27 jurisdictions...  
28

29 **Q. PLEASE CONTINUE YOUR DISCUSSION OF BUSINESS**  
30 **RISKS.**

31 A. Coupled with its capital-intensive nature, the water utility  
32 industry also experiences lower relative depreciation rates  
33 as well. Given that depreciation is one of the principal  
34 sources of internal cash flows for all utilities, lower  
35 depreciation rates mean that water utility depreciation as a  
36 source of internally-generated cash is far less than for  
37 electric, combination electric and gas or natural gas. Water

1 utility assets have longer lives and, hence, longer capital  
2 recovery periods. As such, water utilities face greater risk  
3 due to inflation which results in a higher replacement cost  
4 per dollar of net plant than for other types of utilities. As  
5 shown on page 2 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 2, water utilities  
6 experienced an average depreciation rate of 3.0% for 2013,  
7 with CWSNC experiencing a lower rate of 2.5%. In contrast,  
8 in 2013, the electric, combination electric and gas and  
9 natural gas utilities experienced average depreciation rates  
10 of 3.4%, 3.4% and 4.0%, respectively. Low depreciation  
11 rates signify that the pressure on cash flows remains  
12 significantly greater for water utilities than for other types of  
13 utilities.

14 Not only is the water utility industry historically capital  
15 intensive, it is expected to incur significant capital  
16 expenditure needs over the next 20 years.

17 In 2011, the EPA stated the following:<sup>5</sup>

18 The survey estimated a total national  
19 infrastructure need of \$384.2 billion for the 20-  
20 year period from January 2011 through  
21 December 2030.

22 \* \* \*

23  
24  
25  
26 The large magnitude of the national need

---

<sup>5</sup> "Fact Sheet: "EPA's 2011 Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey and Assessment," United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, April 2013.

1 reflects the challenges confronting water  
2 systems as they deal with an infrastructure  
3 network that has aged considerably since  
4 these systems were constructed, in many  
5 cases, 50 to 100 years ago.

6  
7 \* \* \*

8  
9 With \$247.5 billion in needs over the next 20  
10 years, transmission and distribution projects  
11 represent the largest category of need. This  
12 result is consistent with the fact that  
13 transmission and distribution mains account for  
14 most of the nation's water infrastructure. The  
15 other categories, in descending order of need  
16 are: treatment, storage, source and a  
17 miscellaneous category of needs called "other".  
18

19 **Q. FROM WHERE WILL THE NECESSARY CAPITAL TO**  
20 **FUND THIS LEVEL OF INFRASTRUCTURE**  
21 **REPLACEMENT BE RAISED?**

22 A. The question of the source of this necessary capital  
23 highlights the importance of capital attraction. Water utility  
24 capital expenditures as large as those projected by the EPA  
25 will require significant financing. The three sources typically  
26 used for financing are debt, equity (common and preferred)  
27 and cash flow. All three are intricately linked to the  
28 opportunity to earn a sufficient rate of return as well as the  
29 ability to achieve that return. Consistent with *Hope* and  
30 *Bluefield*, the return must be sufficient enough to maintain  
31 credit quality as well as enable the attraction of necessary  
32 new capital, be it debt or equity capital. If unable to raise

1 debt or equity capital, the utility must turn to either retained  
2 earnings or free cash flow [operating cash flow (funds from  
3 operations) minus capital expenditures], both of which are  
4 directly linked to earning a sufficient rate of return. The level  
5 of free cash flows represents the financial flexibility of a  
6 company or a company's ability to meet the needs of its debt  
7 and equity holders. As noted above, even *Value Line*<sup>6</sup>  
8 notes as much when it states: "Almost no utilities generate a  
9 sufficient amount of funds internally to cover the rising  
10 capital budgets. Therefore, there should be a fair amount of  
11 new debt and equity issued in the years ahead." If either  
12 retained earnings or free cash flows are inadequate, it will be  
13 nearly impossible for the utility to attract the necessary new  
14 capital, on reasonable terms, to invest in needed new  
15 infrastructure. It is thus clear that an insufficient rate of  
16 return can be financially devastating for utilities and for their  
17 customers.

18 In view of the foregoing, the water utility industry's  
19 high degree of capital intensity and low depreciation rates,  
20 coupled with the need for substantial infrastructure capital  
21 spending, makes the need to maintain financial integrity and  
22 the ability to attract needed new capital increasingly  
23 important in order for water utilities to be able to successfully

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<sup>6</sup> *Value Line* 1779

1 meet the challenges they face.

2 **Q. DOES A COMPANY'S SIZE HAVE A BEARING ON**  
3 **BUSINESS RISK?**

4 A. Yes. Lack of sufficient company size is a significant element  
5 of business risk for which investors expect to be  
6 compensated through higher returns on their investment.  
7 Smaller companies are simply less able to cope with  
8 significant events that affect sales, revenues and earnings.  
9 For example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to  
10 business cycles and economic conditions, both nationally  
11 and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues from a few  
12 larger customers would have a greater effect on a small  
13 company than on a much bigger company with a larger,  
14 more diverse, customer base.

15 Further evidence of the risk effects of size includes  
16 the fact that investors demand higher returns to compensate  
17 for the lack of marketability and liquidity of the securities of  
18 smaller firms. Moreover, it is a basic financial principle that it  
19 is the use of funds invested and not the source of those  
20 funds that gives rise to the risk of any investment.<sup>7</sup>  
21 Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return  
22 discussed above, such increased risk due to small size must

---

<sup>7</sup> Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance  
(McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996) 204-205, 229.

1 be taken into account in the allowed rate of return on  
2 common equity.

3 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS HOW CWSNC'S SIZE INCREASES ITS**  
4 **BUSINESS RISK RELATIVE TO THE PROXY GROUP.**

5 A. CWSNC is smaller than the average company in the proxy  
6 group of eight water companies based upon estimated  
7 market capitalization, providing water and wastewater  
8 service to 20,094 (water) and 12,343 (wastewater)  
9 customers in 31 counties throughout North Carolina. I will  
10 discuss this in greater detail below. For now, as shown on  
11 Ahern Direct Exhibit 10, page 1, CWSNC's estimated market  
12 capitalization of \$127.613 million is lower than the average  
13 market capitalization of the proxy water group, \$2.356 billion  
14 at February 27, 2015. Consequently, CWSNC has greater  
15 relative business risk because, all else being equal, size has  
16 a bearing on risk.

17 Since investors demand an increased return in  
18 compensation for assuming greater risk, CWSNC's greater  
19 relative business risk must be reflected in the cost of  
20 common equity derived from the market data of the less  
21 business risky proxy companies in the proxy group.

22

23

1    **Financial Risk**

2    **Q.     PLEASE DEFINE FINANCIAL RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY**  
3           **IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE DETERMINATION OF A FAIR**  
4           **RATE OF RETURN.**

5    A.     Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction  
6           of senior capital, i.e., debt and preferred stock, into the  
7           capital structure. The higher the proportion of senior capital  
8           in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk which  
9           must be factored into the common equity cost rate,  
10          consistent with the previously mentioned basic financial  
11          principle of risk and return, i.e., investors demand a higher  
12          common equity return as compensation for bearing higher  
13          investment risk.

14   **Q.     CAN THE COMBINED BUSINESS RISKS, I.E.,**  
15           **INVESTMENT RISK OF AN ENTERPRISE, BE PROXIED**  
16           **BY BOND AND CREDIT RATINGS?**

17   A.     Yes. Similar bond/issuer credit (bond/credit) ratings reflect  
18           and are representative of similar combined business and  
19           financial risks, i.e., total risk faced by bond investors.  
20           Although specific business or financial risks may differ  
21           between companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates  
22           that the combined risks are similar, albeit not necessarily  
23           equal, as the purpose of the bond/credit rating process is to

1 assess credit quality or credit risk and not common equity  
2 risk. Risk distinctions within Standard & Poor's ("S&P")  
3 bond/issuer rating categories are recognized by a plus or  
4 minus, i.e., within the A category, an S&P rating can be at +,  
5 A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinctions for Moody's ratings are  
6 distinguished by numerical rating gradations, i.e., within the  
7 A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3. As  
8 shown on Ahern Direct Exhibit 6, page 4, the average S&P  
9 long-term issuer rating of the eight water companies is A and  
10 the average Moody's long-term issuer rating is A2/A3.

11 **Proxy Group**

12 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CHOSE THE PROXY**  
13 **GROUP OF EIGHT WATER COMPANIES.**

14 A. I chose the proxy group by selecting those companies which  
15 meet the following criteria: 1) they are included in the *Value*  
16 *Line's* standard edition (January 16, 2015; 2) they have 70%  
17 or greater of 2013 total operating income derived from and  
18 70% or greater of 2013 total assets devoted to regulated  
19 water operations; 3) at the time of the preparation of this  
20 testimony, they had not publicly announced that they were  
21 involved in any major merger or acquisition activity, i.e., one  
22 publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring another;  
23 4) they have not cut or omitted their common dividends



1 during the five years ending 2014 or through the time of the  
2 preparation of this testimony; 5) they have a *Value Line*  
3 adjusted beta; and 6) they have *Value Line*, Reuters, Zacks  
4 or Yahoo! Finance, consensus five-year earnings per share  
5 (“EPS”) growth rate projections. The following eight  
6 companies met these criteria: American States Water Co.,  
7 American Water Works Co., Inc., Aqua America, Inc.,  
8 California Water Service Corp., Connecticut Water Service,  
9 Inc., Middlesex Water Co., SJW Corp. and York Water Co.<sup>8</sup>

10 **Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED FINANCIAL DATA FOR THE**  
11 **PROXY GROUP?**

12 A. Yes. Page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 3 contains comparative  
13 capitalization and financial statistics for the eight proxy group  
14 water companies for the years 2009-2013.

15 As shown on page 1, during the five-year period  
16 ending 2013, the historically achieved average earnings rate  
17 on book common equity for the group averaged 9.09%. The  
18 average common equity ratio based upon permanent capital  
19 (excluding short-term debt) was 50.28%, and the average  
20 dividend payout ratio was 61.54%.

21 Total debt outstanding as a percent of EBITDA for the  
22 years 2009-2013 ranged between 3.65 and 5.40 times,

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<sup>8</sup> I no longer include Artesian Resources, Inc. in my water proxy group because of a continued lack of forecasted data and Artesian Resources, Inc. is not included in *Value Line's* Standard Edition

1 averaging 4.43 times, while funds from operations relative to  
2 total debt range between 16.76% to 22.91%, averaging  
3 19.50%.

4 **Capital Structure Ratios and Long-Term Debt Cost Rate**

5 **Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS AND LONG-TERM**  
6 **DEBT COST RATE DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR USE IN**  
7 **DETERMINING THE OVERALL COST OF CAPITAL FOR**  
8 **CWSNC AND WHY?**

9 A. I recommend that the actual consolidated capital structure  
10 ratios and embedded long-term debt cost rate of UI at  
11 December 31, 2014 be use to establish an allowed overall  
12 rate of return for CWSNC. These ratios, as well as  
13 corresponding cost rates, are shown on page 1 of Ahern  
14 Direct Exhibit 1. They consist of 48.99% long-term debt, at  
15 an embedded cost rate of 6.60%, and 51.01% common  
16 equity at my recommended common equity cost rate of  
17 10.40%.

18 **Q. ARE THE CONSOLIDATED PARENT CAPITAL**  
19 **STRUCTURE RATIOS AT DECEMBER 31, 2014**  
20 **APPROPRIATE FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES?**

21 A. Yes. The Company's current capital structure contains  
22 100% common equity, which is not appropriate for  
23 ratemaking purposes. Because there is no income tax

1 shield resulting from interest expense deduction for tax  
2 purposes, a common equity ratio of 100% would result in an  
3 unreasonably high revenue cost of capital, and  
4 consequently, higher than necessary rates for customers.

5 UI's capital structure ratios at December 31, 2014 are  
6 reasonable to use for ratemaking purposes for CWSNC  
7 because they are consistent if not conservative, compared  
8 with the capital structure ratios maintained, on average, by  
9 the proxy group of eight water companies upon whose  
10 market data I relied in deriving my recommended common  
11 equity cost rate of 10.40%.

12 **Q. HOW DOES UI'S LONG-TERM DEBT RATIO OF 48.99%**  
13 **AT DECEMBER 31, 2014 COMPARE WITH THE LONG-**  
14 **TERM DEBT RATIO MAINTAINED, ON AVERAGE, BY**  
15 **THE PROXY GROUP?**

16 **A.** UI's long-term debt ratio of 48.99% at December 31, 2014 is  
17 similar to the long-term debt ratio based upon permanent  
18 (excluding short-term debt) capital of 49.52% for the five  
19 years ending 2013 and 46.24% for 2013 as shown on page  
20 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 3 and detailed by the individual  
21 proxy group companies on page 2. However, as this case  
22 progresses, I recommend that the Commission set rates for  
23 CWSNC based upon the most recently available actual

1 capital structure of UI.

2 **Common Equity Cost Rate Models**

3 **Q. ARE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS YOU**  
4 **USE MARKET-BASED MODELS?**

5 A. Yes. It is important to use market-based models because  
6 the cost of common equity is a function of investors'  
7 perception of risk, which is embodied in the market prices  
8 they pay. The DCF model is market-based in that market  
9 prices are utilized in developing the dividend yield  
10 component of the model. The RPM is market-based in that  
11 the bond/issuer ratings and expected bond yields used in the  
12 application of the RPM reflect the market's assessment of  
13 bond/credit risk. Also, market prices are used in the  
14 development of the returns and equity risk premiums used in  
15 the Predictive Risk Premium Model ("PRPM"). In addition,  
16 the use of betas to determine the equity risk premium also  
17 reflects the market's assessment of market/systematic risk  
18 as betas are derived from regression analyses of market  
19 prices. The CAPM is market-based for many of the same  
20 reasons that the RPM is market-based i.e., the use of  
21 expected bond (U.S. Treasury bond) yields and betas.

1     **Discounted Cash Flow Model (“DCF”)**

2     **Q.     WHAT IS THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE DCF**  
3     **MODEL?**

4     A.     The theoretical basis of the DCF model is that the present  
5            value of an expected future stream of net cash flows during  
6            the investment holding period can be determined by  
7            discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the  
8            investors’ capitalization rate. DCF theory indicates that an  
9            investor buys a stock for an expected total return rate, which  
10           is derived from cash flows received in the form of dividends  
11           plus appreciation in market price (the expected growth rate).  
12           Mathematically, the dividend yield on market price plus a  
13           growth rate equals the capitalization rate, i.e., the total  
14           common equity return rate expected by investors.

15    **Q.     WHICH VERSION OF THE DCF MODEL DO YOU USE?**

16    A.     I utilize the single-stage constant growth DCF model  
17            because, in my experience, it is the most widely utilized  
18            version of the DCF in public utility rate regulation. In my  
19            opinion, it is widely utilized because utilities are generally in  
20            the mature stage of their lifecycles and not transitioning from  
21            one growth stage to another.

22    **Q.     PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DIVIDEND YIELD YOU USED IN**  
23    **YOUR APPLICATION OF THE DCF MODEL.**

1 A. The unadjusted dividend yields are based upon a recent  
2 (February 27, 2015) indicated dividend divided by the  
3 average of closing market prices for the 60 days ending  
4 February 27, 2015 as shown in Column [1] on page 1 of  
5 Ahern Direct Exhibit 4.

6 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTED DIVIDEND YIELD**  
7 **SHOWN ON PAGE 1 OF AHERN DIRECT EXHIBIT 4,**  
8 **COLUMN [7].**

9 A. Because dividends are paid periodically (quarterly), as  
10 opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be  
11 made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the  
12 discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

13 DCF theory calls for the use of the full growth rate, or  
14  $D_1$ , in calculating the dividend yield component of the model.  
15 However, since the various companies in the proxy group  
16 increase their quarterly dividend at various times during the  
17 year, a reasonable assumption is to reflect one-half the  
18 annual dividend growth rate in the dividend yield component,  
19 or  $D_{1/2}$ . This is a conservative approach, which does not  
20 overstate the dividend yield that should be representative of  
21 the next twelve-month period. Therefore, the actual average  
22 dividend yields in Column [1] on page 1 of Ahern Direct  
23 Exhibit 4 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the

1 average projected growth rate shown in Column [6].

2 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE GROWTH RATES**  
3 **OF THE PROXY GROUP THAT YOU USE IN YOUR**  
4 **APPLICATION OF THE DCF MODEL.**

5 A. Ahern Direct Exhibit 5 shows that on average approximately  
6 48% of the common shares of the eight water companies are  
7 held by individuals as opposed to institutional investors.  
8 Institutional investors tend to have more extensive  
9 informational resources than most individual investors.  
10 Individual investors, with more limited resources, are  
11 therefore likely to place great significance on the opinions  
12 expressed by financial information services, such as *Value*  
13 *Line*, Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo! Finance, which are easily  
14 accessible and/or available on the Internet and through  
15 public libraries. Investors realize that analysts have  
16 significant insight into the dynamics of the industries and  
17 individual companies they analyze, as well as an entity's  
18 historical and future abilities to effectively manage the effects  
19 of changing laws and regulations and ever changing  
20 economic and market conditions.

21 Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more  
22 significant, but not sole, influence on market prices than  
23 dividend expectations and market price appreciation or the

1 “growth” experienced by investors.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, over the long  
2 run, there can be no growth in dividends per share without  
3 growth in EPS. Thus, the use of earnings growth rates in a  
4 DCF analysis provides a better matching between investors’  
5 market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate  
6 component of the DCF.

7 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR DCF MODEL RESULTS.**

8 A. As shown on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 4, the average  
9 result of the application of the single-stage DCF model is  
10 8.84% while the median result is 8.52%. In arriving at a  
11 conclusion of a DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for  
12 the proxy group, I have relied upon the median result of the  
13 DCF, due to the wide range of DCF results as well as  
14 continuing volatile capital market conditions in light of the  
15 continued slow recovery of the economy, and to not give  
16 undue weight to outliers on either the high or the low side. In  
17 my opinion, the median is a more accurate and reliable  
18 measure of central tendency, and provides recognition of all  
19 the DCF results.

20 **The Risk Premium Model (“RPM”)**

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<sup>9</sup> Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance (Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006) 298-303.



1    **Q.    PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE**  
2           **RPM.**

3    A.    The RPM is based upon the basic financial principle of risk  
4           and return, namely, that investors require greater returns for  
5           bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common  
6           equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital,  
7           as common equity shareholders are last in line in any claim  
8           on an entity's assets and earnings, with debt holders being  
9           first in line. Therefore, investors require higher returns from  
10          investment in common stocks than from investment in bonds  
11          to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

12           While the investor required common equity return  
13          cannot be directly determined or observed, it is possible to  
14          directly observe bond returns and yields. According to RPM  
15          theory, one can assess a common equity risk premium over  
16          bonds, either historically or prospectively, and then use that  
17          premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. In  
18          summary, according to RPM theory, the cost of common  
19          equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt  
20          capital plus a risk premium over that cost rate to compensate  
21          common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured  
22          and last-in-line for any claim on a corporation's assets and  
23          earnings.

1 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DERIVED YOUR  
2 INDICATED COST OF COMMON EQUITY BASED UPON  
3 THE RPM.

4 A. I relied upon the results of the application of two risk  
5 premium methods. The first method is the Predictive Risk  
6 Premium Model (PRPM), while the second method is a risk  
7 premium model using an adjusted total market approach.

8 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PRPM.

9 A. The PRPM, published in the Journal of Regulatory  
10 Economics (JRE)<sup>10</sup> and The Electricity Journal (TEJ),<sup>11</sup> was  
11 developed from the work of Robert F. Engle who shared the  
12 Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003 “for methods of analyzing  
13 economic time series with time-varying volatility (“ARCH”)”<sup>12</sup>  
14 with “ARCH” standing for autoregressive conditional  
15 heteroskedasticity. In other words, the volatility of stock  
16 returns and equity risk premiums changes over time and is  
17 related from one period to the next. Engle discovered that  
18 the volatility in market prices, returns, and equity risk

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<sup>10</sup> “A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278.

<sup>11</sup> “Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model™, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model”, Pauline M. Ahern, Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Dylan W. D’Ascendis, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal (May, 2013).

<sup>12</sup> [www.nobelprize.org](http://www.nobelprize.org)

1 premiums also clusters over time, making them highly  
2 predictable and available to predict future levels of risk and  
3 risk premiums. In other words, the predicted equity risk  
4 premium is generated by the prediction of volatility (risk).  
5 The PRPM estimates the risk / return relationship directly by  
6 analyzing the actual results of investor behavior rather than  
7 using subjective judgment as to the inputs required for the  
8 application of other cost of common equity models. Thus,  
9 the PRPM is not based upon an estimate of investor  
10 behavior, but rather upon the evaluation of the actual results  
11 of that behavior, i.e., the variance of historical equity risk  
12 premiums.

13 The inputs to the model are the historical returns on  
14 the common shares of each utility in the proxy group minus  
15 the historical monthly yield on long-term U.S. Treasury  
16 securities through February 2015. Using a generalized form  
17 of ARCH, known as GARCH, each water utility's projected  
18 equity risk premium was determined using Eviews®  
19 statistical software. The forecasted 30-year U.S. Treasury  
20 Bond (Note) yield of 3.61% is based upon the consensus  
21 forecast for the six quarters ending with the second quarter  
22 2016, derived from the March 1, 2015 Blue Chip Financial  
23 Forecasts (Blue Chip), was averaged with the long-range

1 forecasts for 2016-2020 and 2021-2025 from the December  
2 1, 2014 *Blue Chip* (shown on pages 9 and 10 of Ahern Direct  
3 Exhibit 6) as discussed below. The risk-free rate of 3.61%  
4 was then added to each company's PRPM-derived equity  
5 risk premium to arrive at a PRPM-derived cost of common  
6 equity as shown on page 2 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6 which  
7 presents the average and median results for each proxy  
8 company. As shown on page 2, the average PRPM  
9 indicated common equity cost rate is 12.31% and the  
10 median is 11.81% for the eight water companies. Consistent  
11 with my use of the median DCF results, I rely upon the  
12 median PRPM results of 11.81%.

13 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET**  
14 **APPROACH RPM.**

15 A. The adjusted total market approach RPM adds a prospective  
16 public utility bond yield to an equity risk premium which is  
17 derived from a beta-adjusted total market equity risk  
18 premium and an equity risk premium based upon the S&P  
19 Utilities Index.

20 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE ADJUSTED**  
21 **PROSPECTIVE BOND YIELD OF 4.88% APPLICABLE TO**  
22 **THE EIGHT WATER COMPANIES SHOWN ON PAGE 3**  
23 **OF AHERN DIRECT EXHIBIT 6.**

1     A.     The first step in the adjusted total market approach RPM  
2             analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because  
3             both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including common  
4             equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective  
5             yield on long-term debt similarly rated to the proxy group is  
6             essential. Hence, I rely on a consensus forecast of about 50  
7             economists of the expected yield on Aaa rated corporate  
8             bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the second  
9             calendar quarter of 2016 as derived from the March 1, 2015  
10            *Blue Chip* averaged with the long-range forecasts for 2016-  
11            2020 and 2021-2025 from the December 1, 2014 *Blue Chip*  
12            (shown on pages 9 and 10 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6). As  
13            shown on Line No. 1 of page 3, the average expected yield  
14            on Moody's Aaa rated corporate bonds is 4.65%. An  
15            adjustment of 0.10% is necessary to adjust that average Aaa  
16            corporate bond yield to be equivalent to a Moody's A rated  
17            public utility bond, as shown on Line No. 2 and explained in  
18            Note 2 resulting in an expected bond yield applicable to a  
19            Moody's A rated public utility bond of 4.75% as shown on  
20            Line No. 3.

21                 Since the eight water companies' average Moody's  
22                 issuer rating is A2/A3, an adjustment of 0.13% is necessary  
23                 to make the prospective bond yield applicable to the proxy

1 group's average A2/A3 long-term issuer rating, as detailed in  
2 Note 3 on page 3 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6. Therefore, the  
3 adjusted prospective bond yield is 4.88% for the eight water  
4 companies as shown on Line No. 5.

5 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE METHOD OF ESTIMATING THE**  
6 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM IN THE ADJUSTED TOTAL**  
7 **MARKET APPROACH.**

8 A. I evaluated the results of market equity risk premium studies  
9 based upon Ibbotson Associates' data and *Value Line's*  
10 forecasted total annual market return in excess of the  
11 prospective yield on Moody's Aaa corporate bonds, as well  
12 as two different studies of the equity risk premium for public  
13 utilities with Moody's A rated bonds as detailed on pages 8  
14 and 11 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6. As shown on Line No. 3,  
15 page 7 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6, the average equity risk  
16 premium is 4.79% applicable to the eight water companies.  
17 This estimate is the result of an average of a beta-derived  
18 equity risk premium as well as the average public utility  
19 equity risk premium relative to bonds rated A by Moody's  
20 based upon holding period returns.

21 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE BETA-DERIVED**  
22 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.**

23 A. The basis of the beta-derived equity risk premium applicable

1 to the proxy group is shown on page 8 of Ahern Direct  
2 Exhibit 6. The beta-determined equity risk premium is  
3 relevant because betas are derived from the market prices of  
4 common stocks over a recent five-year period. Beta is a  
5 measure of relative risk to the market as a whole and a  
6 logical means by which to allocate an entity's/proxy group's  
7 share of the total market's equity risk premium relative to  
8 corporate bond yields.

9 The total market equity risk premium utilized is 6.55%,  
10 based upon an average of the long-term arithmetic mean  
11 historical market equity risk premium; a predicted market  
12 equity risk premium based upon the PRPM; a forecasted  
13 market equity risk premium based upon *Value Line's*  
14 projected market appreciation and dividend yield; and, a  
15 forecasted market equity risk based upon the S&P 500's  
16 projected market appreciation and dividend yield as detailed  
17 below and in Notes 1 through 4 on page 7 of Ahern Direct  
18 Exhibit 6.

19 **Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE LONG-TERM HISTORICAL**  
20 **MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM?**

21 A. To derive the historical (expectational) market equity risk  
22 premium, I used the most recent Morningstar data on  
23 holding period returns for the large company common stocks

1 from the Ibbotson® SBBI® 2014 Valuation Yearbook – Market  
2 Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bill and Inflation (“SBBI –  
3 2014”)<sup>13</sup> and the average historical yield on Moody’s Aaa  
4 and Aa rated corporate bonds for the period 1926-2013.  
5 Moreover, the use of holding period returns over a very long  
6 period of time is useful because it is consistent with the long-  
7 term investment horizon presumed by the DCF model.

8 Consequently, as explained in Note 1 on page 8 of  
9 Ahern Direct Exhibit 6, the long-term arithmetic mean  
10 monthly total return rate on large company common stocks  
11 of 12.05% and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield  
12 on Moody’s Aaa and Aa rated corporate bonds of 6.20%  
13 were used. As shown on Line No. 1, the resultant long-term  
14 historical equity risk premium on the market as a whole is  
15 5.85%.

16 I used arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for  
17 the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for  
18 Moody’s Aaa/Aa corporate bonds, because they are  
19 appropriate for cost of capital purposes as noted in the  
20 SBBI – 2014. Arithmetic mean return rates and yields are  
21 appropriate because ex-post (historical) total returns and  
22 equity risk premiums differ in size and direction over time,

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<sup>13</sup> Ibbotson® SBBI® Valuation Yearbook – Market Results for Stocks,  
Bonds, Bills and Inflation, Morningstar, Inc., 2014.



1 providing insight into the variance and standard deviation of  
2 returns. Because the arithmetic mean captures the  
3 prospect for variance in returns and equity risk premiums, it  
4 provides the valuable insight needed by investors in  
5 estimating future risk when making a current investment.  
6 Absent such valuable insight into the potential variance of  
7 returns, investors cannot meaningfully evaluate prospective  
8 risk. If investors alternatively relied upon the geometric  
9 mean of ex-post equity risk premiums, they would have no  
10 insight into the potential variance of future returns because  
11 the geometric mean relates the change over many periods of  
12 time to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the  
13 period-to-period fluctuations, or variance, *critical to risk*  
14 *analysis*.

15 Only the arithmetic mean takes into account all of the  
16 returns / premiums, hence, providing meaningful insight into  
17 the variance and standard deviation of those returns /  
18 premiums.

19 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF PRPM MARKET**  
20 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.**

21 A. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on  
22 large company common stocks from SBBI – 2014 minus the  
23 monthly yields on Aaa and Aa corporate bonds during the

1 period from January 1926 through January 2015 (the latest  
2 available at the time of the preparation of this testimony),  
3 consistent with the rationale for using of the long-term  
4 historical arithmetic market equity risk premium discussed  
5 above. Using the previously discussed generalized form of  
6 ARCH, known as GARCH, the market's projected equity risk  
7 premium was determined using Eviews® statistical software.  
8 The resulting predicted market equity risk premium based  
9 upon the PRPM of 6.18% is shown on Line No. 2 on page 8  
10 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6.

11 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF A MARKET**  
12 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED UPON *VALUE LINE'S***  
13 **3-5 YEAR ESTIMATED MEDIAN TOTAL ANNUAL**  
14 **MARKET RETURN MINUS THE PROSPECTIVE YIELD ON**  
15 **AAA RATED CORPORATE BONDS IN YOUR**  
16 **DEVELOPMENT OF A MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM**  
17 **FOR YOUR RPM ANALYSIS.**

18 **A.** Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including  
19 the cost rate of common equity, are prospective, a  
20 prospective market equity risk premium is essential.  
21 The derivation of the *Value Line* based forecasted or  
22 prospective market equity risk premium of 4.76% can be  
23 found in Note 3 on page 8 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6.

1 Consistent with the development of the dividend yield  
2 component of my DCF analysis, it is derived from an  
3 average of the most recent thirteen weeks ending February  
4 27, 2015 3-5 year estimated median market price  
5 appreciation potential by *Value Line* plus an average of the  
6 median estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of  
7 the approximately 1,700 firms covered in *Value Line's*  
8 Standard Edition as explained in detail in Note 1 on page 2  
9 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 7.

10 The average median expected price appreciation is  
11 3%, which translates to a 7.39% annual appreciation and,  
12 when added to the average (similarly calculated) median  
13 dividend yield of 2.02% equates to a forecasted annual total  
14 return rate on the market as a whole of 9.41%. The  
15 forecasted total market equity risk premium of 4.76%, shown  
16 on Line No. 3, page 8 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6, is derived by  
17 deducting the 4.65% prospective yield on Moody's Aaa rated  
18 corporate bonds discussed previously from the *Value Line*-  
19 derived projected market return of 9.41% ( $4.76\% = 9.41\% -$   
20  $4.65\%$ ).

21 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE MARKET**  
22 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED UPON THE S&P 500.**

23 A. Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service, an

1 expected total return for the S&P 500 can be derived by  
2 adding the expected dividend yield for the S&P 500 to long-  
3 term growth in earnings per share as a proxy for capital  
4 appreciation. The expected total return for the S&P 500 is  
5 14.05%. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa  
6 rated corporate bonds of 4.65% results in a 9.40% projected  
7 market equity risk premium.

8 In arriving at my conclusion of market equity risk  
9 premium of 6.55% on Line No. 4 on page 8, I averaged the  
10 historical market equity risk premium of 5.85%; the PRPM  
11 based market equity risk premium of 6.18%; the *Value Line*-  
12 based forecasted market equity risk premium of 4.76%; and  
13 the S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium of 9.40%  
14 shown on Line Nos. 1 through 4.  $(6.55\% = ((5.85\% + 6.18\%$   
15  $+ 4.76\% + 9.40\%) / 4)$ .

16 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF A BETA-DERIVED**  
17 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR USE IN YOUR RPM**  
18 **ANALYSIS?**

19 A. As shown on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 7, the most  
20 current average and median *Value Line* betas for the eight  
21 water companies is 0.74. Applying a median beta of 0.74 to  
22 the market equity risk premium of 6.55%, on Line No. 4 of  
23 page 8 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6, results in a beta adjusted

1 equity risk premium of 4.85% for the eight water companies.

2 **Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE 4.73% EQUITY RISK**  
3 **PREMIUM BASED UPON THE S&P UTILITY INDEX AND**  
4 **MOODY'S A RATED PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS?**

5 A. First, I derived the long-term monthly arithmetic mean equity  
6 risk premium between the S&P Utility Index total returns of  
7 10.69% and monthly A rated public utility bond yields of  
8 6.48% from 1928-2014 to arrive at an equity risk premium of  
9 4.21% as shown on Line No. 3 on page 11 of Ahern Direct  
10 Exhibit 6. I then performed the PRPM using historical  
11 monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 through  
12 February 2015 to arrive at the PRPM derived equity risk  
13 premium of 4.18% for the S&P Utility Index shown on Line  
14 No. 4, on page 11. Finally, I derived the projected total  
15 return on the S&P Utilities Index using data from Bloomberg  
16 Professional Service of 10.55%, identically to the projected  
17 total return on the S&P 500 discussed above, and  
18 subtracting the prospective Moody's A rated public utility  
19 bond yield of 4.75% from Line No. 3 on page 3 of Ahern  
20 Direct Exhibit 6. The resulting equity risk premium is 5.80%

21 I rely upon the average of the historical (4.21%); the  
22 PRPM (4.18%) and S&P Utilities Index (5.80%) derived  
23 equity risk premiums, which is 4.73%.  $(4.73\% = ((4.21\% +$

1           4.18% + 5.80%) / 3).

2       **Q.   WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF AN EQUITY RISK**  
3       **PREMIUM FOR USE IN YOUR ADJUSTED TOTAL**  
4       **MARKET APPROACH RPM ANALYSIS?**

5       A.   The equity risk premium applicable to the proxy group of  
6           eight water companies is the average of the beta-derived  
7           premium, 4.85%, and that based upon the holding period  
8           returns of public utilities with Moody's A rated bonds, 4.73%,  
9           as summarized on Line No. 3 on Ahern Direct Exhibit 6,  
10          page 7, i.e.,  $(4.79\% = (4.85\% + 4.73\%) / 2)$ .

11      **Q.   WHAT IS THE INDICATED RPM COMMON EQUITY COST**  
12      **RATE BASED UPON THE ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET**  
13      **APPROACH?**

14      A.   It is 9.67% for the eight water companies as shown on Line  
15          No. 7 on Ahern Direct Exhibit 6 page 3.

16      **Q.   WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF**  
17      **THE PRPM AND THE ADJUSTED TOTAL MARKET**  
18      **APPROACH RPM?**

19      A.   As shown on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 6, the indicated  
20          RPM-derived common equity cost rate is 10.74%, derived by  
21          averaging the PRPM results with those based upon the  
22          adjusted total market approach.  $(10.74\% = ((11.81\% +$   
23           $9.67\%) / 2)$ .

## **The Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”)**

**Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE CAPM.**

A. CAPM theory defines risk as the covariability of a security's returns with the market's returns as measured by beta ( $\beta$ ). A beta less than 1.0 indicates lower variability while a beta greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all other risk, i.e., all non-market or unsystematic risk, can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market or systematic risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that investors require compensation only for these systematic risks that are the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market as measured by beta. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

$$R_s = R_f + \beta(R_m - R_f)$$

21	Where:	$R_s$	=	Return rate on common stock
22		$R_f$	=	Risk-free rate of return
23		$R_m$	=	Return rate on the entire market
24		B	=	Adjusted beta

26 Numerous tests of the CAPM have measured the

1 extent to which security returns and betas are related as  
2 predicted by the CAPM confirming its validity. The empirical  
3 CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that while the results of  
4 these tests support the notion that beta is related to security  
5 returns, the empirical Security Market Line ("SML")  
6 described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as  
7 the predicted SML.<sup>14</sup>

8 In view of theory and practical research, I have  
9 applied both the traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the  
10 companies in the proxy group and averaged the results.

11 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF THE BETA**  
12 **COEFFICIENT FOR YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?**

13 A. I relied upon an average of the adjusted betas published by  
14 the *Value Line* and provided by Bloomberg Professional  
15 Service.

16 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE**  
17 **RATE OF RETURN FOR YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS.**

18 A. As shown in column [3] on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 7,  
19 the risk-free rate adopted for both applications of the CAPM  
20 is 3.61%. The risk-free rate for my CAPM analysis is based  
21 upon the average of the consensus forecast of the second  
22 calendar quarter of 2016 from the March 1, 2015 *Blue Chip*

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<sup>14</sup> Morin 175.



1 averaged with the long-range forecasts for 2016-2020 and  
2 2021-2025 from the December 1, 2014 *Blue Chip*, as shown  
3 in Note 2, page 2 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 7.

4 **Q. WHY IS THE YIELD ON LONG-TERM U.S. TREASURY**  
5 **BONDS APPROPRIATE FOR USE AS THE RISK-FREE**  
6 **RATE?**

7 A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury T-Bonds is almost risk-  
8 free and its term is consistent with the long-term cost of  
9 capital to public utilities measured by the yields on A rated  
10 public utility bonds, the long-term investment horizon  
11 inherent in utilities' common stocks, the long-term  
12 investment horizon presumed in the standard DCF model  
13 employed in regulatory ratemaking, and the long-term life of  
14 the jurisdictional rate base to which the allowed fair rate of  
15 return (i.e., cost of capital) will be applied. In contrast, short-  
16 term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile and largely a  
17 function of Federal Reserve monetary policy.

18 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED**  
19 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR THE MARKET.**

20 A. The basis of the market equity risk premium is explained in  
21 detail in Note 1 on page 2 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 7. It is  
22 derived from *Value Line's* 3-5 year median total market price  
23 appreciation projections averaged over the most recent

1 thirteen weeks ending February 27, 2015; the arithmetic  
2 mean monthly equity risk premiums of large company  
3 common stocks relative to long-term U.S. Treasury bond  
4 income yields from SBBI-2014 from 1926-2013; the PRPM  
5 predicted market equity risk premium using monthly equity  
6 risk premiums for large company common stocks relative to  
7 long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926  
8 through January 2015 (the latest available at the time of the  
9 preparation of this testimony); and the projected total return  
10 on the S&P 500 less the projected risk free rate as detailed  
11 below and in Note 1 on of Ahern Direct Exhibit 7.

12 The *Value Line*-derived forecasted total market equity  
13 risk premium is derived by deducting the 3.61% risk-free rate  
14 discussed above from the *Value Line* projected total annual  
15 market return of 9.41%, also discussed above, resulting in a  
16 forecasted total market equity risk premium of 5.80%.

17 The long-term income return on U.S. Government  
18 Securities of 5.26% was deducted from the SBBI-2014  
19 monthly historical total market return of 12.05% resulting in  
20 an historical market equity risk premium of 6.79%.

21 The PRPM market equity risk premium is 6.98%,  
22 derived using the PRPM, discussed above, relative to the  
23 yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January

1 1926 through January 2015 (the latest available at the time  
2 of the preparation of this testimony).

3 The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium of  
4 10.44% is derived by subtracting the 3.61% projected risk-  
5 free rate, discussed above, from the projected total return of  
6 14.05%, also discussed above.

7 These four market equity risk premiums result in an  
8 average total market equity risk premium of 7.50%.  $(7.50\%$   
9  $= ((5.80\% + 6.79\% + 6.98\% + 10.44\%) / 4)$

10 **Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF**  
11 **THE TRADITIONAL AND EMPIRICAL CAPM TO THE**  
12 **PROXY GROUP?**

13 A. As shown on Ahern Direct Exhibit 7, page 1, the average  
14 traditional CAPM cost rate is 9.10% while the median is  
15 9.16% for the eight water companies. The average ECAPM  
16 cost rate is 9.61%, while the median is 9.65%. Consistent  
17 with my reliance upon the median results of the DCF  
18 discussed above, I rely upon the median results of the  
19 traditional CAPM and ECAPM for the proxy group, 9.16%  
20 and 9.65%, respectively, or 9.41% as shown on column [6]  
21 on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 7.  $(9.41\% = ((9.16\% +$   
22  $9.65\%) / 2)$

23 **Common Equity Cost Rates for the Proxy Group of Domestic,**

1 **Non-Price Regulated Companies Based Upon the DCF, RPM**  
2 **and CAPM**

3 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE BASIS OF APPLYING COST OF**  
4 **COMMON EQUITY MODELS TO COMPARABLE RISK,**  
5 **NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES.**

6 A. Applying cost of common equity models to non-price  
7 regulated companies, comparable in total risk, is derived  
8 from the “*corresponding risk*” standard of the landmark  
9 cases of the U.S. Supreme Court, i.e., Hope and Bluefield,  
10 previously discussed. Therefore, it is consistent with the  
11 Hope doctrine that the return to the equity investor should be  
12 commensurate with returns on investments in other firms  
13 having corresponding risks based upon the fundamental  
14 economic concept of opportunity cost which maintains that  
15 the true cost of an investment is equal to the cost of the best  
16 available alternative use of the funds to be invested. The  
17 opportunity cost principle is also consistent with one of the  
18 fundamental principles upon which regulation rests: that  
19 regulation is intended to act as a surrogate for competition  
20 and to provide a fair rate of return to investors.

21 The first step in determining such an opportunity cost  
22 of common equity based upon a group of non-price  
23 regulated companies comparable in total risk to the eight

1 water companies is to choose an appropriate broad-based  
2 proxy group of non-price regulated firms comparable in total  
3 risk to the proxy group of eight water companies which  
4 excludes utilities to avoid circularity.

5 The selection criteria for the non-price regulated firms  
6 of comparable risk are based upon statistics derived from  
7 the market prices paid by investors. *Value Line* betas were  
8 used as a measure of systematic risk. The standard error of  
9 the regression was used as a measure of each firm's  
10 unsystematic or specific risk with the standard error of the  
11 regression reflecting the extent to which events specific to a  
12 company's operations affect its stock price. In essence,  
13 companies which have similar betas and standard errors of  
14 the regression, have similar total investment risk. Using a  
15 *Value Line* proprietary database dated December 15, 2015,  
16 the application of these criteria based upon the eight water  
17 companies results in a proxy group of non-price regulated  
18 firms comparable in total risk to the average water company  
19 in the proxy group of eight water companies as explained on  
20 page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 8. Pages 3 provides the  
21 identities of the companies in the proxy group of non-price  
22 regulated companies.

23 **Q. DID YOU CALCULATE COMMON EQUITY COST RATES**

1           **USING THE DCF, RPM AND CAPM FOR THE PROXY**  
2           **GROUP OF DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED**  
3           **COMPANIES THAT ARE COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK**  
4           **TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

5       A.    Yes. Because the DCF, RPM and CAPM have been applied  
6           in an identical manner as described above relative to the  
7           market data of the eight water companies, I will not repeat the  
8           details of the rationale and application of each model shown  
9           on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 9. An exception is that, in  
10          the application of the RPM, I did not use public utility-specific  
11          equity risk premiums nor apply the PRPM to the individual  
12          companies.

13               Page 2 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 9 contains the  
14               derivation of the DCF cost rates. As shown, the average and  
15               median DCF cost rates for the proxy group of twenty-eight  
16               non-price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the  
17               eight water companies, is 10.63%.

18               Pages 3 through 5 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 9 contain  
19               information relating to the 11.01% RPM cost rate for the proxy  
20               group of twenty-eight non-price regulated companies  
21               summarized on page 3. As shown on Line No. 1 of page 3,  
22               the consensus prospective yield on Moody's Baa rated  
23               corporate bonds of 5.51% is based upon the forecasted yields

1 for the six quarters ending with the second quarter of 2016  
2 averaged with the long-range forecasted yields for 2016-2020  
3 and 2021-2025 from the March 1, 2015 and December 1,  
4 2014 *Blue Chip*, respectively. Since the twenty-eight non-  
5 price regulated companies comparable in total risk to the  
6 eight water companies have an average Moody's long-term  
7 issuer rating of Baa2 as shown on page 4 of Ahern Direct  
8 Exhibit 9, no adjustment is necessary to make the prospective  
9 bond yield applicable to the Baa corporate bond yield. Thus,  
10 the expected specific bond yield is 5.51% for the twenty-eight  
11 non-price regulated companies as shown on Line No. 1 on  
12 page 3 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 9. When the beta-adjusted risk  
13 premium of 5.50% relative to the proxy group of non-price  
14 regulated companies, as derived on page 5, is added to the  
15 prospective Baa rated corporate bond yields of 5.51%, the  
16 indicated RPM cost rate is 11.10%.

17 Page 6 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 9 contains the details of  
18 the application of the traditional CAPM and ECAPM to the  
19 proxy group of twenty-eight non-price regulated companies  
20 comparable in total risk to the eight water companies. As  
21 shown, the median traditional CAPM and ECAPM results are  
22 10.17% and 10.21%, respectively, for the twenty-eight non-  
23 price regulated companies which, when averaged, result in an

1 indicated CAPM cost rate of 10.19%.

2 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF THE COST RATE OF**  
3 **COMMON EQUITY BASED UPON THE PROXY GROUP**  
4 **OF NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES**  
5 **COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE EIGHT WATER**  
6 **COMPANIES?**

7 A. As shown on page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 9, the results of  
8 the DCF, RPM and CAPM applied to the non-price regulated  
9 group comparable in total risk to the eight water companies  
10 are 10.63%, 11.01% and 10.06%, respectively. Based upon  
11 these results, I will rely upon the median of the DCF, RPM  
12 and CAPM results of 10.63% for the proxy group of non-  
13 price regulated companies as summarized on page 1 of  
14 Ahern Direct Exhibit 9.

15 **Conclusion of Common Equity Cost Rate**

16 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY**  
17 **COST RATE?**

18 A. It is 10.40% based upon the indicated common equity cost  
19 rate resulting from the application of multiple cost of common  
20 equity models to the eight water companies adjusted for  
21 CWSNC's business risks.

22 As discussed above, I employ multiple cost of  
23 common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my



1 recommended common equity cost rate because: 1) no  
2 single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied  
3 upon solely to the exclusion of other theoretically sound  
4 models; 2) all of the models are market-based; 3) the use of  
5 multiple models adds reliability to the estimation of the  
6 common equity cost rate; and 4) the prudence of using  
7 multiple cost of common equity models is supported in both  
8 the financial literature and regulatory precedent. Therefore,  
9 no single model should be relied upon exclusively to  
10 estimate the investor required rate of return on common  
11 equity.

12 The results of the cost of common equity models  
13 applied to the eight water companies are shown on page 2  
14 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 1, and summarized below:

1		
2	Discounted Cash Flow Model	8.52%
3	Risk Premium Model	10.74
4	Capital Asset Pricing Model	9.41
5		
6	Cost of Equity Models Applied to	
7	Comparable Risk, Non-Price	
8	Regulated Companies	<u>10.63%</u>
9		
10	Indicated Common Equity	
11	Cost Rate	10.02%
12		
13	Business Risk Adjustment	<u>0.40%</u>
14		
15	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate	10.42%
16		
17	Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	<u>10.40%</u>

18 **Business Risk Adjustment**

19 **Q. IS THERE A WAY TO QUANTIFY A BUSINESS RISK**  
20 **ADJUSTMENT DUE TO CWSNC'S SMALL SIZE**  
21 **RELATIVE TO THE PROXY GROUP?**

22 A. Yes. As discussed above, increased risk due to small size  
23 must be taken into account in the cost of common equity  
24 consistent with the financial principle of risk and return.  
25 Since the Company is smaller in size relative to the proxy  
26 group, measured by the estimated market capitalization of  
27 common equity for CWSNC, whose common stock is not  
28 traded, it has greater business risk than the average  
29 company in the proxy group.

30

1			
2		Market	Times
3		Cap. (1)	Greater than
4		<u>(\$ Millions)</u>	<u>CWSNC</u>
5			
6	CWSNC	\$127.613	
7			
8	Proxy Group of		
9	Eight Water Cos.	2,355.800	18.5x
10			
11	(1)	From page 1 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 10.	
12			

13 As derived on page 2 of Ahern Direct Exhibit 10, CWSNC's  
 14 estimated market capitalization based upon the proxy  
 15 group's February 27, 2015 market-to-book ratio was  
 16 \$127.613 million. In contrast, the market capitalization of the  
 17 average water company was \$2.336 billion on February 27,  
 18 2015, or 18.5 times the size of CWSNC's market  
 19 capitalization.

20 Therefore, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the  
 21 indicated common equity cost rate of 10.02% based upon  
 22 the eight water companies to reflect CWSNC's greater risk  
 23 due to its smaller relative size. The determination is based  
 24 upon the size premiums for decile portfolios of New York  
 25 Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX)  
 26 and NASDAQ listed companies for the 1926-2013 period  
 27 and related data from Duff & Phelps 2015 Valuation  
 28 Handbook (Preview Edition). The size premium for the 6<sup>th</sup>  
 29 decile (1.74%) in which the eight water companies fall has

1        been compared with the size premium for the 10<sup>th</sup> decile  
2        (5.78%) in which the estimated market capitalization of  
3        CWSNC falls. As shown on page 1, the size premium  
4        spread between the 10<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> deciles is 4.04%. In view of  
5        the foregoing, I am recommending a business risk  
6        adjustment to reflect CWSNC's greater relative business risk  
7        due to CWSNC's smaller size relative to the proxy group of  
8        0.40%, which, in my opinion, is both reasonable and  
9        conservative.

10       Adding a business risk adjustment of 0.40% to the  
11       10.02% indicated common equity cost rate based upon the  
12       eight water companies before adjustment, results in a  
13       business risk-adjusted common equity cost rate of 10.42%<sup>15</sup>  
14       which when rounded to 10.40% is my recommended  
15       common equity cost rate.

16       In my opinion, a common equity cost rate of 10.40%,  
17       which results in an overall rate of return of 8.54%, is both  
18       reasonable and conservative.

19       A common equity cost rate of 10.40% is consistent  
20       with the *Hope* and *Bluefield* standards of a fair and  
21       reasonable return which ensures the integrity of presently  
22       invested capital and enables the attraction of needed new

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<sup>15</sup>       10.42% = 10.02% + 0.40%.

1 capital on reasonable terms. It also ensures the continued  
2 reliability and quality of service to the benefit of ratepayers.  
3 Thus, it balances the interests of both ratepayers and the  
4 Company.

5 **Q. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

6 A. Yes.

ATTACHMENT A

RESUME OF

PAULINE M. AHERN, CRRA  
PARTNER

SUSSEX ECONOMIC ADVISORS, LLC

**Pauline M. Ahern, CRRA**  
**Partner**  
**Sussex Economic Advisors, LLC**

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Ms. Ahern has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for 27 years. As a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA), she has extensive experience in rate of return analyses, including the development of ratemaking capital structure ratios, senior capital cost rates, and the cost rate of common equity for regulated public utilities. She has testified as an expert witness before 29 regulatory commissions and one Canadian province.

She also maintains the benchmark index against which the American Gas Association's (AGA) Mutual

Fund performance is measured. Ms. Ahern has also served as President of the Society of Utility Regulatory and Financial Analysts (SURFA) from 2006-2010 and now sits on its Board of Directors. SURFA is a non-profit organization founded to promote the education and understanding of rate of return analysis which represents utility financial analysts in government, the financial community, industry and academia. She also serves on the Finance/Accounting/Taxation Committees of the National Association of Water Companies. Ms. Ahern is also a member of the Advisory Council, Financial Research Institute, University of Missouri - Robert J. Trulaske, Sr. School of Business. She is also a member of Edison Electric Institute's Cost of Capital Working Group.

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**PROFESSIONAL HISTORY**

**Sussex Economic Advisors, LLC (2015 – Present)**

Partner

**AUS Consultants (1988 – 2015)**

Principal

- Offered testimony as an expert witness on the subjects of fair rate of return, cost of capital and related issues before state public utility commissions.
- Provided assistance and support to clients throughout the entire ratemaking litigation process; supervision of the financial analyst and administrative staff in the preparation of fair rate of return and cost of capital testimonies and exhibits which are filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies as well as the preparation of interrogatory responses, as well as rebuttal exhibits.
- Responsible for the production, publishing, and distribution of the AUS Utility Reports (formerly C. A. Turner Utility Reports), which has provided financial data and related ratios for about 80 public utilities (*i.e.*, electric, combination gas and electric, natural gas distribution, natural gas transmission, telephone, and water utilities, on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis) since 1930. Subscribers include utilities, many state regulatory commissions, federal agencies, individuals, brokerage firms, attorneys, as well as public and academic libraries.
- Responsible for maintaining and calculating the performance of the AGA

Index, a market capitalization weighted index of the common stocks of the approximately 70 corporate members of the AGA, which serves as the benchmark for the AGA Gas Utility Index Fund.

Assistant Vice President

- Prepared fair rate of return and cost of capital exhibits which were filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies; supporting exhibits include the determination of an appropriate ratemaking capital structure and the development of embedded cost rates of senior capital and also support the determination of a recommended return on common equity through the use of various market models, such as, but not limited to, Discounted Cash Flow analysis, Capital Asset Pricing Model and Risk Premium Methodology, as well as an assessment of the risk characteristics of the client utility.
- Assisted in the preparation of responses to any interrogatories received regarding such testimonies filed on behalf of client utilities. Following the filing of fair rate of return testimonies, assisted in the evaluation of opposition testimony in order to prepare interrogatory questions, areas of cross-examination, and rebuttal testimony and evaluated and assisted in the preparation of briefs and exceptions following the hearing process.
- Submitted testimony before state public utility commissions regarding appropriate capital structure ratios and fixed capital cost rates.

Senior Financial Analyst

- Supervised two analysts and assisted in the preparation of fair rate of return and cost of capital exhibits which are filed along with expert testimony before various state and federal public utility regulatory bodies; the team also assisted in the preparation of interrogatory responses.
- Evaluated the final orders and decisions of various commissions to determine whether further actions were warranted and to gain insight which assisted in the preparation of future rate of return studies.
- Assisted in the preparation of an article authored by Frank J. Hanley and A. Gerald Harris entitled "Does Diversification Increase the Cost of Equity Capital?" published in the July 15, 1991 issue of Public Utilities Fortnightly.

Administrator of Financial Analysis for AUS Utility Reports

- Oversaw the preparation of this monthly publication, as well as the accompanying annual publication, Financial Statistics - Public Utilities.

Financial Analyst

- Assisted in the preparation of fair rate of return studies including capital structure determination, development of senior capital cost rates, determination of an appropriate rate of return on equity, preparation of interrogatory responses, interrogatory questions of the opposition, areas of cross-examination and rebuttal testimony, as well as preparation of the annual publication C. A. Turner Utility Reports - Financial Statistics - Public Utilities.

**Research Dept. of the Regional Economics Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (1973 – 1975)**

Research Assistant

- Involved in the development and maintenance of econometric models to



simulate regional economic conditions in New England in order to study the effects of, among other things, the energy crisis of the early 1970's and property tax revaluations on the economy of New England. I was also involved in the statistical analysis and preparation of articles for the New England Economic Review. Also, I was Assistant Editor of New England Business Indicators.

**Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department, Washington, D.C. (1972)**

Research Assistant

- Developed and maintained econometric models which simulated the economy of the United States in order to study the results of various alternate foreign trade policies so that national trade policy could be formulated and recommended.

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**Education**

M.B.A., Rutgers University, High Honors, 1991

B.A., Clark University, Honors, 1973

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**Designations and Professional Affiliations**

**Advisory Council**

Financial Research Institute

University of Missouri's Trulaske School of Business

**Edison Electric Institute**

Cost of Capital Working Group

**National Association of Water Companies**

Member of the Finance/Accounting/Taxation and Rates and Regulation Committees

**Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts**

Member, Board of Directors – 2010-2014 President – 2006-2008 and 2008-2010

Secretary/Treasurer – 2004-2006

**American Finance Association**

**Financial Management Association**

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**SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS**

"Leadership in the Financial Services Sector", Guest Professor – Cost of Capital, Business Leader Development Program, Rutgers University School of Business,

February 20, 2015, Camden, NJ.

“ROE: Trends & Analysis”, American Gas Association, AGA Mini-Forum for the Financial Analysts Community & Finance Committee Meeting, September 11, 2014, The Princeton Club, New York, NY.

Guest Professor, “Measuring Risk”, Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council of the Peoples’ Republic of China, Rutgers School of Business, July 21, 2014, New Brunswick, NJ.

Instructor, “Cost of Capital 101”, EPCOR Water America, Inc., Regulatory Management Team, June 9, 2014, Phoenix, AZ.

Moderator: Society of Utility Financial Analysts: 46th Financial Forum – “The Rating Agencies’ Perspectives: Regulatory Mechanisms and the Regulatory Compact”, April 22-25, 2014, Indianapolis, IN.

“The Return on Equity Debate: Its Impact on Budgeting and Investment and Wall Street’s View of Risk”, National Association of Water Companies – 2014 Indiana Chapter Water Summit, March 13, 2014, Indianapolis, IN.

“Regulatory Training in Financing, Planning, Strategies and Accounting Issues for Publicly- and Privately-Owned Water and Wastewater Utilities”, New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities, October 13-18, 2013, Instructor (Cost of Capital).

“Regulated Utilities – Access to Capital”, (panelist) - Innovation: Changing the Future of Energy, 2013 Deloitte Energy Conference, Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, May 22, 2013, Washington, DC.

“Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity”, (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) – Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 32<sup>nd</sup> Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 17, 2013, Rutgers University, Shawnee on the Delaware, PA.

“Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks”, before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN.

“Issues Surrounding the Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return”, before the Staff Subcommittee on Electricity of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Winter 2013 Committee Meetings, February 3, 2013, Washington, DC.

“Leadership in the Financial Services Sector”, Guest Professor – Cost of Capital, Business Leader Development Program, Rutgers University School of Business, February 1, 2013, Camden, NJ.

“Analyst Training in the Power and Gas Sectors”, SNL Center for Financial Education, Downtown Conference Center at Pace University, New York City, December 12, 2012, Instructor (Financial Statement Analysis).

“Regulatory Training in Financing Planning, Strategies and Accounting Issues for Publicly and Privately Owned Water and Wastewater Utilities”, New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities, October 14-19, 2012, Instructor (Cost of Financial Capital).

“Application of a New Risk Premium Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity”, Co-Presenter with Dylan W. D’Ascendis, CRRA, AUS Consultants, Edison Electric Institute Cost of Capital Working Group, October 3, 2012, Webinar.

“Application of a New Risk Premium Model for Estimating the Cost of Common Equity”, Co-Presenter with Dylan W. D’Ascendis, CRRA, AUS Consultants, Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners, September 10, 2012, St. Paul, MN.

“Analyst Training in the Power and Gas Sectors”, SNL Center for Financial Education, Downtown Conference Center at Pace University, New York City, August 7, 2012, Instructor (Financial Statement Analysis).

“Advanced Regulatory Training in Financing Planning, Strategies and Accounting Issues for Publicly and Privately Owned Water and Wastewater Utilities”, New Mexico State University Center for Public Utilities, May 13-17, 2012, Instructor (Cost of Financial Capital).

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Applied to Public Utilities”, before the Finance and Regulatory Committees of the National Association of Water Companies, March 29, 2012, Telephonic Conference.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Applied to Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Frank J. Hanley, Principal and Director, AUS Consultants) before the Water Committee of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners’ Winter Committee Meetings, February 7, 2012, Washington, DC.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium Applied to Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Frank J. Hanley, Principal and Director, AUS Consultants) before the Wall Street Utility Group, December 19, 2011, New York City, NY.

“Advanced Cost and Finance Issues for Water”, (co-presenter with Gary D. Shambaugh, Principal & Director, AUS Consultants), 2011 Advanced Regulatory Studies Program – Ratemaking, Accounting and Economics, September 29, 2011, Kellogg Center at Michigan State University – Institute for Public Utilities, East Lansing, MI.

“Public Utility Betas and the Cost of Capital”, (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) – Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 30th Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 20, 2011, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA.

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 43rd Financial Forum – “Impact of Cost Recovery Mechanisms on the Perception of Public Utility Risk”, April 14-15, 2011, Washington, DC.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Richard

A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) – Hot Topic Hotline Webinar, December 3, 2010, Financial Research Institute of the University of Missouri.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Richard

A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) before the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission Cost of Capital Task Force, September 28, 2010, Indianapolis, IN.

Tomorrow’s Cost of Capital: Cost of Capital Issues 2010, Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions, 2010 Deloitte Energy Conference, “Changing the Great Game: Climate, Customers and Capital”, June 7-8, 2010, Washington, DC.

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, (co-presenter with Richard

A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) – Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 29th

Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 20, 2010, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA.

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 42nd Financial Forum – “The Changing Economic and Capital Market Environment and the Utility Industry”, April 29-30, 2010, Washington, DC.

“A New Model for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities” (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) – Spring 2010 Meeting of the Staff Subcommittee on Accounting and Finance of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, March 17, 2010,

Charleston, SC.

“New Approach to Estimating the Cost of Common Equity Capital for Public Utilities” (co-presenter with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University) - Advanced Workshop in Regulation and Competition, 28th Annual Eastern Conference of the Center for Research in Regulated Industries (CRRI), May 14, 2009, Rutgers University, Skytop, PA.

Moderator: Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 41st Financial Forum – “Estimating the Cost of Capital in Today’s Economic and Capital Market Environment”,

April 16-17, 2009, Washington, DC.

“Water Utility Financing: Where Does All That Cash Come From?”, AWWA Pre-Conference Workshop: Water Utility Ratemaking, March 25, 2008, Atlantic City, NJ.

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**PAPERS**

“Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model™, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model”, co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Dylan W. D’Ascendis, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal, May, 2013 (forthcoming).

“A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities”, co-authored with Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278.

“Comparable Earnings: New Life for Old Precept” co-authored with Frank J. Hanley, Financial Quarterly Review, (American Gas Association), Summer 1994.

Clients Served

I have offered expert testimony before the following commissions:

Alaska	Maine
Arkansas	Maryland
Arizona	Michigan
British Columbia	Missouri
California	Nevada
Connecticut	New Hampshire
Delaware	New Jersey
Florida	New York
Hawaii	North Carolina
Idaho	Ohio
Illinois	Pennsylvania
Indiana	Rhode Island
Iowa	South Carolina
Kentucky	Virginia
Louisiana	Washington

I have sponsored testimony on fair rate of return and related issues for:

Alpena Power Company	Aqua Illinois, Inc.
Apple Canyon Utility Company	Aqua New Jersey, Inc.
Applied Wastewater Management, Inc.	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.
Aquarion Water Company	Aqua Ohio, Inc.
Aquarion Water Co. of New Hampshire, Inc.	Aqua Virginia, Inc.
Arizona Water Company	The Columbia Water Company
Artesian Water Company	The Connecticut Water Company
The Atlantic City Sewerage Company	Consumers Illinois Water Company
Audubon Water Company	Consumers Maine Water Company
Bermuda Water Company	Consumers New Jersey Water Company
Carolina Pines Utilities, Inc.	Corix Utilities
Carolina Water Service, Inc. of NC	City of DuBois, Pennsylvania
Carolina Water Service, Inc. of SC	Elizabethtown Water Company
Chaparral City Water Company	Emporium Water Company
	EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.

Fairbanks Natural Gas LLC  
Greenridge Utilities, Inc.  
The Borough of Hanover, PA  
GTE Hawaiian Telephone Inc.  
Illinois American Water  
Company  
Indiana American Water  
Company  
Iowa American Water  
Company  
Jersey Central Power & Light  
Co.  
Lake Wildwood Utilities Corp.  
Land'Or Utility Company  
Long Island American Water  
Company  
Long Neck Water Company  
Louisiana Water Service, Inc.  
Maine Water Company  
Massanutten Public Service  
Company  
Middlesex Water Company  
Missouri Gas Energy  
Missouri-American Water  
Company  
Mt. Holly Water Company  
Nero Utility Services, Inc.  
New Jersey Utilities  
Association  
The Newtown Artesian Water  
Company  
NRG Energy Center  
Harrisburg LLC  
NRG Energy Center  
Pittsburgh LLC  
Ohio-American Water  
Company  
Penn Estates Utilities  
Pinelands Waste Water  
Company  
Pinelands Water Company  
Pioneer Water LLC  
Pittsburgh Thermal  
San Gabriel Valley Water  
Company  
San Jose Water Company  
Southland Utilities, Inc.  
Spring Creek Utilities, Inc.

Sussex Shores Water  
Company  
Tega Cay Water Services,  
Inc.  
Thames Water Americas  
Tidewater Utilities, Inc.  
Total Environmental Services,  
Inc. –  
Treasure Lake Water &  
Sewer Divisions  
Transylvania Utilities, Inc.  
Trigen – Philadelphia Energy  
Corporation  
Twin Lakes Utilities, Inc.  
United Utility Companies  
United Water Arkansas, Inc.  
United Water Arlington Hills  
Sewerage, Inc.  
United Water Connecticut,  
Inc.  
United Water Delaware, Inc.  
United Water Great Gorge  
Inc./United Water  
Vernon Transmission, Inc.  
United Water Idaho, Inc.  
United Water Indiana, Inc.  
United Water New Jersey,  
Inc.  
United Water New Rochelle,  
Inc.  
United Water New York, Inc.  
United Water Owego/Nichols,  
Inc.  
United Water Pennsylvania,  
Inc.  
United Water Rhode Island,  
Inc.  
United Water South County,  
Inc.  
United Water Toms River, Inc.  
United Water Vernon Sewage  
Inc.  
United Water Virginia, Inc.  
United Water West Lafayette,  
Inc.  
United Water West Milford,  
Inc.  
United Water Westchester,

Inc.	Utilities Services of South
Utilities, Inc.	Carolina
Utilities Inc. of Central Nevada	Utility Center, Inc.
Utilities, Inc. of Florida	Valley Energy, Inc.
Utilities, Inc. of Louisiana	Water Services Corp. of
Utilities, Inc. of Nevada	Kentucky
Utilities, Inc. of Pennsylvania	Wellsboro Electric Company
Utilities, Inc. - Westgate	Western Utilities, Inc.

I have sponsored testimony on generic/uniform methodologies for determining the return on common equity for:

Aquarion Water Company	United Water Conn., Inc.
The Connecticut Water Company	Utilities, Inc.
Corix Multi-Utility Services, Inc.	

I have sponsored testimony on the rate of return and capital structure effects of merger and acquisition issues for:

California-American Water Co.	NJ American Water Co.
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I have sponsored testimony on capital structure and senior capital cost rates for the following clients:

Alpena Power Company	PG Energy Inc.
Arkansas-Western Gas	United Water Delaware, Inc.
Company	Washington Natural Gas
Associated Natural Gas	Company
Company	

I have sponsored testimony on Distribution System Improvement Charges (DSIC):

Arizona Water Company

I have assisted in the preparation of rate of return studies on behalf of the following clients:



Algonquin Gas Transmission  
Company  
Anadarko Petroleum  
Corporation  
Arizona Water Company  
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas  
Company  
Arkansas Western Gas  
Company  
Artesian Water Company  
Associated Natural Gas  
Company  
Atlantic City Electric Company  
Bridgeport-Hydraulic  
Company  
Cambridge Electric Light  
Company  
Carolina Power & Light  
Company  
Citizens Gas and Coke Utility  
City of Vernon, CA  
Columbia Gas/Gulf  
Transmission Cos.  
Commonwealth Electric  
Company  
Commonwealth Telephone  
Company  
Conestoga Telephone &  
Telegraph Co.  
Connecticut Natural Gas  
Corporation  
Consolidated Gas  
Transmission Company  
Consumers Power Company  
CWS Systems, Inc.  
Delmarva Power & Light  
Company  
East Honolulu Community  
Services, Inc.  
Equitable Gas Company  
Equitrans, Inc.  
Fairbanks Natural Gas, LLC  
Florida Power & Light  
Company  
Gary Hobart Water Company  
Gasco, Inc.  
Great Lakes Gas  
Transmission L.P.

GTE Arkansas, Inc.  
GTE California, Inc.  
GTE Florida, Inc.  
GTE Hawaiian Telephone  
GTE North, Inc.  
GTE Northwest, Inc.  
GTE Southwest, Inc.  
Hawaiian Electric Company  
Hawaiian Electric Light  
Company  
IES Utilities Inc.  
Illinois Power Company  
Interstate Power Company  
Interstate Power & Light Co.  
Iowa Electric Light and Power  
Company  
Iowa Southern Utilities  
Company  
Kentucky-West Virginia Gas  
Company  
Lockhart Power Company  
Middlesex Water Company  
Milwaukee Metropolitan  
Sewer District  
Mountaineer Gas Company  
National Fuel Gas Distribution  
Corp.  
National Fuel Gas Supply  
Corp.  
Newco Waste Systems of NJ,  
Inc.  
New Jersey Natural Gas  
Company  
New Jersey-American Water  
Company  
New York-American Water  
Company  
North Carolina Natural Gas  
Corp.  
Northumbrian Water  
Company  
Ohio-American Water  
Company  
Oklahoma Natural Gas  
Company  
Orange and Rockland Utilities  
Paiute Pipeline Company  
PECO Energy Company

Penn Estates Utilities, Inc.  
Penn-York Energy  
Corporation  
Pennsylvania-American Water  
Co.  
PG Energy Inc.  
Philadelphia Electric  
Company  
Providence Gas Company  
South Carolina Pipeline  
Company  
Southwest Gas Corporation  
Stamford Water Company  
Tesoro Alaska Petroleum  
Company  
Tesoro Refining & Marketing  
Co.  
United Telephone of New  
Jersey  
United Utility Companies  
United Water Arkansas, Inc.  
United Water Delaware, Inc.  
United Water Idaho, Inc.  
United Water Indiana, Inc.  
United Water New Jersey,  
Inc.

United Water New York, Inc.  
United Water Pennsylvania,  
Inc.  
United Water Virginia, Inc.  
United Water West Lafayette,  
Inc.  
Utilities, Inc. of Pennsylvania  
Utilities, Inc. - Westgate  
Vista-United  
Telecommunications Corp.  
Washington Gas Light  
Company  
Washington Natural Gas  
Company  
Washington Water Power  
Corporation  
Waste Management of New  
Jersey –  
Transfer Station A  
Wellsboro Electric Company  
Western Reserve Telephone  
Company  
Western Utilities, Inc.  
Wisconsin Power and Light  
Company