

LEWIS & ROBERTS

PROFESSIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

3700 Glenwood Avenue, Suite 410
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612
Mailing Address
Post Office Box 17529
Raleigh, NC 27619-7529

Telephone (919) 981-0191
Facsimile (919) 981-0199

John H. Ruocchio
Paul C. McCoy**
Mallory E. Lidaka
Matthew D. Quinn
Melissa P. Woodard
Ashton L. Harrell, II

Richard M. Lewis **
James A. Roberts, III **
Winston L. Page, Jr.
Timothy S. Riordan
John D. Elvers **
Brian D. Lake

** NCDRC Certified Mediator

Matthew D. Quinn
Direct Dial: (919) 719-8538
Email: mdq@lewis-roberts.com

May 28, 2024

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING

Ms. Shonta Dunston, Chief Clerk
North Carolina Utilities Commission
4325 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-4300

Re: Duke Energy Progress, LLC and Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC's Biennial
Consolidated Carbon Plan and Integrated Resource Plan
Docket No. E-100, Sub 190

Dear Ms. Dunston:

On behalf of The Environmental Working Group and NC WARN and pursuant to the North Carolina Utilities Commission's January 17, 2024 *Order Scheduling Public Hearings, Establishing Interventions and Testimony Due Dates and Discovery Guidelines, Requiring Public Notice, and Providing Direction Regarding Duke's Supplemental Modeling* and February 21, 2024 *Order Establishing Additional Procedures for Expert Witness Hearing* issued in the above-captioned proceeding, enclosed for filing please find the direct testimony of Grant Smith.

By copy of this letter, I am forwarding a copy to all parties of record by electronic delivery. Pursuant to the Commission rules, we will also be submitting for delivery by May 29, 2024, twelve three-hole punched paper copies of the testimony (including one single-sided copy).

Should you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Matthew D. Quinn

Enclosure(s)

cc: Parties of Record

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MAY 28 2024

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
UTILITIES COMMISSION
RALEIGH

DOCKET NO. E-100, SUB 190

In the Matter of Biennial)	
Consolidated Carbon Plan and)	
Integrated Resource Plans of Duke)	DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke)	GRANT SMITH ON BEHALF OF
Energy Progress, LLC, Pursuant to)	THE ENVIRONMENTAL
N.C.G.S. § 62-110.9 and § 62-110.1(c))	WORKING GROUP AND
		NC WARN¹

¹ NC WARN is presently a party to this docket. Contemporaneous with the filing of this direct testimony, petitions to intervene are being filed by the Environmental Working Group, Charlotte Mecklenburg NAACP, Down East Coal Ash Environmental and Social Justice Coalition, and Seeds of HOPE. To the extent that these organizations are permitted intervention, the present testimony is offered on their behalf.

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1 **Q: PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS, AND CURRENT**
2 **EMPLOYMENT POSITION.**

3 My name is Grant Smith. My business address is 1250 I Street NW, Suite 1000,
4 Washington, DC 20005. I am currently the Senior Energy Policy Advisor at the
5 Environmental Working Group.

6 **Q: WHAT ARE YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITIES AS SENIOR**
7 **ENERGY POLICY ADVISOR FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING**
8 **GROUP?**

9 **A:** My responsibilities include: (1) co-authoring reports concerning Duke Energy and
10 other utilities across the country, jobs in the renewables and energy efficiency
11 sectors, hydrogen technology, energy and water; (2) highlighting trends and
12 technological developments in the energy sector; and (3) authoring articles on
13 energy policy and regulatory developments on topics such as utility rate structures,
14 energy subsidies, renewable power, nuclear and coal-fired power, alternative utility
15 models, and natural gas-fired power.

16 **Q: PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL AND**
17 **PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND.**

18 **A:** I hold a Master of Arts in Teaching German in 1985 and a Bachelor of Arts in
19 history and German in 1980 from Indiana University. I also attended the University
20 of Hamburg, West Germany from 1978 to 1981. In 1982, I was a Max Kade Fellow
21 at Indiana University. For nearly 40 years, I've been an energy, consumer, and
22 environmental advocate. I have drafted reports, articles, and blogs on an array of

1 energy policy issues. I also have 20 years' lobbying experience at the Indiana
2 General Assembly on energy-related issues. Since 2017, I have worked at the
3 Environmental Working Group. I've co-authored reports concerning Duke Energy
4 and other utilities across the country, jobs in the renewables and energy efficiency
5 sectors, hydrogen technology, energy and water. I've authored articles on energy
6 technology trends, policy, and regulatory developments on topics such as utility
7 rate structures, energy subsidies, renewable power, nuclear and coal-fired power,
8 alternative utility models, and natural gas-fired power. Two of my articles were
9 published in the energy sector trade periodical *Utility Dive*.

10 Prior to my role at EWG, from June 2011 – August 2017, I was Senior Energy
11 Policy Advisor for the Civil Society Institute based in Newton, MA. For the Civil
12 Society Institute, I conducted research and drafted white papers and topic briefs on
13 various issues, including energy policy and the energy transition (including in
14 Germany), the utility-sector assault on customer-owned solar, uranium mining,
15 nuclear power, water policy (with respect to energy and agricultural impacts), frack
16 sand mining, and energy market trends. I also worked with local organizations on
17 the power sector and water related issues. From 1986 – 2011, I was employed at
18 Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, as a lobbyist, organizer, researcher and writer,
19 and fundraiser. I became Executive Director in 2004. I worked on industrial
20 toxics/industrial pollution prevention policy, alternative agriculture,
21 telecommunications, and energy issues.

1 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE NORTH**
2 **CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION?**

3 **A:** No.

4 **Q: HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TESTIMONY OR COMMENT AS**
5 **AN EXPERT BEFORE ANY OTHER REGULATORY BODIES OR**
6 **FORUMS?**

7 **A:** Yes. I submitted comments in North Carolina Utilities Commission's (the
8 Commission's) proceeding regarding Duke Energy's net metering program in
9 March 2022 and in the Commission's proceeding regarding Duke Energy's carbon
10 plan in July 2022.

11 **Q: ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

12 **A:** I am testifying on behalf of the Environmental Working Group ("EWG").

13 **Q: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS**
14 **PROCEEDING?**

15 **A:** The purpose of this testimony is to explain how Duke Energy Progress LLC and
16 Duke Energy Carolinas LLC's (collectively, "Duke Energy") Carbon Plan and
17 Integrated Resource Plan ("CPIRP") is flawed. This testimony will show (1) why
18 electric system resiliency, properly vetted, should be the central concept around
19 which to design Duke Energy's CPRIP and any future carbon plan, (2) the
20 continuing and increasing impacts of climate change on North Carolina's power
21 system leads to the conclusion that a much greater balance must be struck between
22 utility-scale and distributed energy resource investments, (3) planned outages of

1 central power plants will be increasingly difficult to schedule as every season
2 currently harbors system disruptions from severe weather, and (4) without
3 significant regulatory changes distributed energy resources (“DERs”) will continue
4 to be marginalized and risks and costs to electric system operations from climate
5 change will escalate.

6 **Q: HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

7 **A:** The remainder of my testimony is divided into the designated Issues for 2023-2024
8 CPIRP. First, I will discuss *Issue 1: Planning Objectives in a Changing Energy*
9 *Landscape*. Second, I will discuss *Issue 9: Near-Term Actions: Supply-Side*
10 *Development and Procurement*. Third, I will discuss *Issue 13: Ensuring Reliability*
11 *and Operational Resilience*. Fourth, I will discuss *Issue 11: Advancing Grid Edge*
12 *and Customer Programs*. Finally, I will offer my conclusions and
13 recommendations.

14 **1. ISSUE 1 - PLANNING OBJECTIVES IN A CHANGING ENERGY**

15 **LANDSCAPE**

16 **Q: PLEASE SHARE YOUR PERSPECTIVE ON DUKE ENERGY’S CPIRP?**

17 **A:** Duke Energy has adhered to an unchanged business plan for over a decade,
18 emphasizing the need for increased natural gas capacity and reliance on existing
19 nuclear plants. Despite acknowledging the impacts of climate change and the
20 benefits of DERs, Duke Energy has opted for utility-scale investments, dismissing
21 cheaper and more reliable alternatives such as virtual power plants (VPPs). This
22 approach poses reliability and adequacy risks to the power system, compromises

1 affordability and energy equity, and prioritizes profit over customer interests. Duke
2 Energy's plan overlooks the integrated nature of reliability and resiliency, favoring
3 utility-scale investments over distributed resources. This strategy violates statutes
4 and fails to capture the benefits of VPPs and DERs, as recognized by state reports.
5 To fully realize the benefits of DERs and VPPs, state mandates are necessary to
6 ensure their incorporation into utility plans, using broader cost-effectiveness
7 parameters.

8 **Q: HOW HAS DUKE ENERGY'S BUSINESS PLAN HAS CHANGED OVER**
9 **THE PAST DECADE?**

10 **A:** Duke Energy's business plan has not changed for the better part of a decade,
11 including its practice of shifting its business risk to customers and failure to account
12 for the severe impacts of climate change. As shown in Table SPA 3-2 of the
13 *Supplemental Planning Analysis*, Duke Energy's current CIPRP proposal relies
14 heavily on additional natural gas capacity and existing nuclear capacity. This
15 comports with Duke Energy's business plan for more than a decade in its IRPs, and
16 new, non-existent nuclear capacity.² Duke Energy has emphasized natural gas-fired
17 capacity additions and continued reliance on its aging, existing nuclear plants for

² Duke Energy, Supplemental Planning Analysis, NCUC Docket No. E-100, Sub 190 (Jan. 31, 2024), p. 39. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=bf12788-90ea-4352-97d6-3f3a7134b5ad>

1 more than decade.³ The company has been touting its need for new “advanced”
2 nuclear capacity since its 2019 annual report.⁴

3 Duke Energy does not address new technology, including VVPs or microgrids in
4 its plan. Duke Energy’s supplemental filings only add offshore wind as a potential
5 energy source, but nuclear remains a dominant resource throughout the planning
6 period and natural gas generation remains dominant until after 2038 – with the aim
7 of burning only hydrogen in hydrogen-ready turbines by 2050.⁵ The distributed
8 energy programs remain the same from the initial filing, comprising a very small
9 percentage of capacity and with no consideration of using customer-sited storage
10 or EVs to supply power to the grid.⁶

11 Indeed, Duke Energy’s alternative portfolios are essentially the same portfolio,
12 except for the pace of implementation. As Duke Energy states, “[i]mportantly, all
13 three Energy Transition Pathways employ similar base assumptions, but require a

³ See, e.g., Smith, Grant, Walker, Bill, *Public Energy Enemy No. 1*. EWG (April 16, 2019).
<https://www.ewg.org/research/public-energy-enemy-no-1> and *Duke Energy’s Epic Fails: \$11.6 Billion in Scrapped Projects Since 2013*. EWG (Aug. 31, 2020).
<https://www.ewg.org/research/duke-energys-epic-fails-116-billion-scrapped-projects-2013>

⁴ Duke Energy Corporation, 2019 Annual Report and Form 10-K, p. 5.
https://s201.q4cdn.com/583395453/files/doc_financials/2019/ar/2019-duke-energy-annual-report.pdf

⁵ Planning Analysis, *supra* note 149.

⁶ Compare Duke Energy, *supra* note 148, pp. 39,40 and Duke Energy, Duke Energy Carbon Plan Chapter 3 (Aug. 17, 2023), Table 3-2, p. 6 and Table 3-3, p. 7.
<https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=0ae7fa49-ce8f-4df2-954d-0637b35e2f7b>

1 different pace, scope and scale of resource additions to achieve the Interim
2 Target.”⁷

3 **2. ISSUE 9 - NEAR-TERM ACTIONS: SUPPLY-SIDE**

4 **DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT**

5 **Q: WHAT IS DUKE ENERGY’S STRATEGY FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY**
6 **RESOURCES?**

7 **A:** Duke Energy has a history of marginalizing DERs. EWG has published three
8 reports that tracks Duke Energy’s planning regimen and legislative initiatives from
9 the early 2010s through 2020. In terms of preferred generation resources and what
10 it considered threats to its bottom line, the monopoly utility abandoned an offshore
11 wind pilot and has no onshore wind; instead, embarking on a massive buildout of
12 natural gas plants. Duke Energy also continually presses legislatures and regulators
13 to shift its business risk to customers, with respect to undermining or eliminating
14 energy efficiency programs, seeking extremely high fixed charges, pushing
15 construction work in progress for construction of a coal gasification plant and
16 nuclear units and weakening customer-owned solar programs.⁸

⁷ *Verified Amended Petition for Approval of 2023-2024 Carbon Plan and Integrated Resource Plans of Duke Energy Carolinas LLC and Duke Energy Progress LLC*, NCUC Docket No. E-100, Sub 190 (Jan. 31, 2024), pp. 14,15. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=6ca06ddb-b10a-4620-b69f-a718ccf9c9c1>

⁸ EWG, *supra* note 149 and Smith, Grant, Walker, Bill, *Tone Deaf: The Facts Behind Duke Energy’s Low-Income Programs*. EWG (June 3, 2020). <https://www.ewg.org/energy/tone-deaf-the-facts-behind-duke-energys-low-income-programs>

1 **Q: WHAT IS YOUR COST AND RISK ASSESSMENT OF DUKE ENERGY'S**
2 **CPIRP?**

3 **A:** Duke Energy's proposal is neither least cost nor low risk. Duke Energy's emphasis
4 on utility-scale resources and small modular reactors ("SMRs") with no operational
5 experience or definitive cost data makes Duke Energy's chosen portfolio neither a
6 "lower cost" plan nor a plan with "lower execution risk,"⁹ as Duke Energy claims.
7 It may be the purported lowest cost among Duke Energy's chosen alternatives, but
8 not an actual low-cost proposal. It may be low financial risk for Duke Energy, but
9 not for ratepayers.

10 As shown, VPPs can provide the same services as utility-scale resources at a
11 fraction of the price. Therefore, Duke Energy's proposal, heavily laden with utility-
12 scale additions and minimal DER investment and with no portfolio option including
13 VPPs or microgrids, cannot be the least costly.

14 Likewise, the plan is low risk for Duke Energy, as its shareholders are held harmless
15 from any upfront initial development and R&D costs. Duke Energy recovers
16 margin from the costs, and Duke Energy gets to keep those ratepayer dollars and
17 their recovered margin even if the resources, such as SMR units, are not deployed.¹⁰

18 In fact, Duke Energy seeks nearly \$596 million upfront in this proceeding – on top

⁹ Verified Amended Petition, supra note 154, p. 15.

¹⁰ Verified Amended Petition, supra note 154, p. 22.

1 of the \$75 million for SMR R&D from the previous carbon plan proceeding.¹¹ Once
2 again, Duke Energy has been successful in shifting its business risk to ratepayers.
3 Another weakness in Duke Energy's proposal is the utility's test to gauge the cost-
4 effectiveness of energy efficiency programs. A recommendation in the NC DEQ's
5 2019 report is for utilities to expand the indices analyzed in arriving at cost
6 effectiveness.¹² What the DEQ proposed was essentially the Societal Test that could
7 consider, among other things, resilience, economic development, and public health.
8 Importantly, there would be no argument for shifting costs among residential
9 customers. Despite the state report's recommendation, nothing has been done to
10 expand the cost-effectiveness test used by Duke Energy. The cost-effectiveness test
11 expansion proposed by the DEQ would make VPPs look much better in terms of
12 cost risk.

13 **Q: HOW DOES DUKE ENERGY JUSTIFY ITS UTILITY-SCALE BIAS IN ITS**
14 **CPIRP?**

15 **A:** Duke Energy's justification of its continued over-investment in utility-scale
16 resources boils down to this statement: "Although the electricity generation from
17 wind and solar resources provides fuel-free electricity for the Companies'
18 customers, this electricity is variable and not a replacement for baseload
19 capacity."¹³ Importantly, complete replacement of conventional power is not

¹¹ *Id.*, pp. 31, 32.

¹² NC Clean Energy Plan, *supra* note 124.

¹³ Appendix J, *supra* note 209, p. 2.

1 currently technologically feasible. However, a renewables portfolio, which would
2 include utility-scale wind, solar, and storage and coordinated DERs, can
3 dramatically reduce conventional power generation and displace a good amount of
4 existing conventional capacity.

5 Germany is proof of how renewables plus storage can systematically reduce
6 reliance on conventional generation. Comparing Germany's energy mix in 1990¹⁴
7 with 2023¹⁵ is a clear demonstration. By 2023, natural gas generation rose by about
8 10 percent of total generation,¹⁶ but has remained relatively flat since 2019.¹⁷

9 However, all renewable generation exceeds the combined generation of coal,
10 nuclear and natural gas power plants – with, in 2023, 39 percent of variable solar
11 and wind (on- and off-shore) and 43 percent of conventional resource generation.¹⁸

12 Germany has also launched a comprehensive green hydrogen program to
13 decarbonize industry.¹⁹

14

¹⁴ German Federal Environment Agency. Electricity Generation According to Energy Technology. Retrieved April 30, 2024, from https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/384/bilder/dateien/3_abb_bruttostromerzeugung-et_2023-11-24.pdf

¹⁵ The Energy Supply Annual Report. German Association of Energy and Water Industries (Dec. 18, 2023), pp. 30-31. https://www.bdew.de/media/documents/Jahresbericht_2023_Foliensatz_final_18Dez2023_V2.pdf

¹⁶ Compare *supra* notes 230 and 231.

¹⁷ Energy Supply Annual Report, *supra* note 211.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ Germany's National Hydrogen Strategy. Clean Energy Wire (July 26, 2023). <https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-national-hydrogen-strategy>

1 Balkan Green Energy News.²² Moreover, about 70 percent of solar buildings also
2 include battery storage.²³

3 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HAS DUKE HAS COMMITTED TO OFFSHORE**
4 **WIND?**

5 **A:** No. Duke Energy is unsure about offshore wind investment, though offshore wind
6 turbines have operational experience and hurricane-resistant offshore turbines are
7 in development. Not only does Duke Energy ignore off-the-shelf VPP technology
8 in its plan and rely heavily on the questionable future of SMR technology, but Duke
9 Energy also seems to hedge on offshore wind technology, for which there is
10 operating experience. Additionally, a turbine design is being developed by NREL,
11 partnering with the University of Virginia, the University of Texas at Dallas, the
12 Colorado School of Mines, to withstand hurricane-force winds.²⁴ The two-bladed,
13 downwind turbine has been tested on land, with a smaller turbine, and modeled up
14 to 25 megawatts, but not yet tested at scale.²⁵ Gulf Wind Technologies and Shell

²² Spasic', Vladamir, "Germany adds record 14 GW of solar in 2023 – half is on households." Balkan Green Energy News (Jan. 9, 2024). [https://balkangreenenergynews.com/germany-adds-record-14-gw-of-solar-in-2023-half-is-on-households/#:~:text=The%20Federal%20Network%20Agency%2C%20the,in%202022%20\(7.5%20GW\)](https://balkangreenenergynews.com/germany-adds-record-14-gw-of-solar-in-2023-half-is-on-households/#:~:text=The%20Federal%20Network%20Agency%2C%20the,in%202022%20(7.5%20GW))

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ "Scientists develop wind turbines resistant to hurricanes." EcoWatch (June 23, 2022). <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/06/scientists-develop-wind-turbines-resistant-to-hurricanes/>

²⁵ Simpkins, Kelsey, "Inspired by palm trees, scientists develop hurricane-resistant wind turbines." University of Colorado Boulder (June 15, 2022). <https://www.colorado.edu/today/2022/06/15/inspired-palm-trees-scientists-develop-hurricane-resilient-wind-turbines>

1 New Energies may demonstrate a hurricane-resistant turbine in the Gulf of Mexico
2 this year.²⁶

3 Duke Energy appears serious about offshore wind, but also indicates, in its
4 Supplemental Planning Analysis, only the *possibility* of offshore wind
5 development. Duke Energy plans to request information from vendors about
6 pricing and acquiring the technology that Duke Energy says, “will shape and define
7 a future *potential acquisition of an offshore wind generating facility...*”²⁷
8 (Emphasis added). The company has also asked for \$1.4 million to develop and
9 administer this wind development proposal²⁸ that Duke Energy can keep even if it
10 doesn’t invest in offshore wind.

11 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HOW DOES DUKE ENERGY’S CPIRP IMPACT**
12 **NATURAL GAS PLANT CAPACITY?**

13 **A:** Duke Energy is planning for more climate-change vulnerable natural gas plant
14 capacity. In terms of the vulnerability of natural gas plants, the Commission noted
15 in its investigation of the outages during Winter Storm Elliott that “the Public Staff
16 explained that even minor inadequacies in winterization efforts could have major
17 consequences and gave the example of an inch-wide gap in insulation, difficult to

²⁶ “Gulf Wind Technology and Shell to Collaborate on Offshore Wind Technology and Workforce Development for the Gulf of Mexico.” Gulf Wind Technology (March 13, 2023). <https://gulfwindtechnology.com/news/gulf-wind-technology-and-shell-to-collaborate-on-offshore-wind-technology/>

²⁷ Planning Analysis, supra note 149, p. 53.

²⁸ Verified Amended Petition, supra note 154, p. 23.

1 see because the gap was beneath a control box, that contributed to a plant derate.”²⁹

2 The margin of error in weatherizing natural gas plants against extreme cold is 1
3 inch. This does not assure resiliency of these power plants, as combined-cycle plant
4 operation could be disrupted, or power output curtailed from extreme heat, drought,
5 or flooding.

6 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN DUKE’S SUPPORT FOR SMR TECHNOLOGY.**

7 **A:** Despite unknown costs and poor chances for wide deployment, Duke Energy
8 continues to support SMR technology. Duke Energy is absolutely committed to
9 SMRs – apparently initially raised in its 2020 Climate report³⁰ – asserting, in its
10 January verified amended petition for approval: “For the avoidance of doubt,
11 however, all Pathways and Portfolios rely on adding breakthrough advanced
12 nuclear SMRs as fundamental to the Companies’ execution of the energy transition
13 in the mid-2030s and to ultimately achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.”³¹ The
14 amended CPIRP is fundamentally the same as the initial CPIRP n from August
15 2023, except, that a portion of proposed capacity additions is shifted from nuclear
16 capacity to offshore wind. Interestingly, Duke Energy appears certain that SMRs

²⁹ Order Making Findings and Directing Actions Related to Winter Storm Elliott, NCUC Docket No. M-100, Sub 163 (Dec. 22, 2023), p.18. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=59ef1ffc-74d7-4b83-b24a-ffc775304203>

³⁰ Duke Energy Climate Report. (2021), p. 5. <https://www.duke-energy.com/-/media/pdfs/our-company/climate-report-2020.pdf?rev=49bbf0609086481fb190e75d9c09a29a>

³¹ Verified Amended Petition, supra note 154, p. 21.

1 will become available but appears to be hedging on offshore wind, for which there
2 is, at least, operational experience.

3 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH SMR TECHNOLOGIES IS DUKE LIKELY**
4 **WAITING ON?**

5 **A:** Duke Energy expects the first 300-megawatt unit to be deployed by early 2034.³²
6 There are two reactor designs: the GE-Hitachi BWRX-300 unit and the TerraPower
7 sodium fast-reactor, or Natrium Reactor. The Department of Energy (“DOE”) has
8 committed \$2 billion in taxpayer funds towards the Natrium project, with a
9 preliminary price tag of \$4 billion.³³

10 **Q: WHAT ARE YOUR RISK CONCERNS OF THE TERRAPOWER**
11 **REACTOR DESIGN?**

12 **A:** The TerraPower project harbors many risks, mainly for taxpayers, and could very
13 end up ultimately terminated like NuScale’s attempt to license its SMR unit.
14 Nuclear power developers have the option of using the current combined
15 construction and operating license process or the original process³⁴ that allows the

³² Supplemental Direct Testimony of Glenn Snider, Michael Quinto, Thomas Beatty, and Ben Passty on Behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, NCUC Docket No. E-100, Sub 190 (Jan. 31, 2024) p. 31. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=35832f96-86b1-488c-a4f2-b6730812031d>

³³ Gardner, Timothy, “US says Gates-backed reactor company’s planned application needs work.” Reuters (March 22, 2024). <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-says-gates-backed-reactor-companys-planned-application-needs-work-2024-03-22/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Department%20of%20Energy,environmental%20issues%20for%20the%20reactor.>

³⁴ 10 CFR 50. <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/full-text.html>

1 developer to begin construction, prior to submitting more detailed safety data. The
2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC's") approval of the safety data allows
3 the developer to obtain an operating permit.

4 TerraPower chose the two-step process,³⁵ which requires a far less detailed
5 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. TerraPower will hone the design and the
6 analysis of potential accidents during construction. An applicant that chooses this
7 approach only does so because the design has insignificant deficiencies and
8 incomplete technical justification.

9 As the NRC describes the process:

10 Final design information and plans for operation are developed
11 during the construction of the nuclear plant. The applicant then
12 submits an application to the NRC for an operating license. The
13 application contains a final safety analysis report and an updated
14 environmental report. The safety analysis report describes the
15 plant's final design, safety evaluation, operational limits, anticipated
16 response of the plant to postulated accidents, and plans for coping
17 with emergencies.³⁶

18
19 As such, many aspects of the TerraPower project will be undefined at the
20 construction permit phase. The problem with the two-step process is that it is a
21 "design-as-you-build" approach. The NRC explains:

22 An advantage of the 10 CFR Part 50 process is that it supports
23 beginning the licensing process and, if the applicant wishes, starting
24 construction earlier in the design process (at the preliminary design
25 stage) than would be required by 10 CFR Part 52. While offering

³⁵ *Submittal of the Construction Permit Application for the Sodium Reactor Plant, Kemmerer Power Station Unit 1*. TerraPower (March 28, 2024), p 1. <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2408/ML24088A060.pdf>

³⁶ *Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process*. NRC (July 2004), p. 4. <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0421/ML042120007.pdf>

1 some advantages, the ‘design-as-you-build’ approach introduces
2 some project risks in the regulatory arena if the NRC imposes
3 additional requirements as a condition of receiving an OL. This
4 approach also provides less finality before making a significant
5 financial investment in plant construction.³⁷
6

7 Indeed, this licensing regulation stipulates, to obtain an operating permit, “safety
8 features or components, if any, which require research and development have been
9 described by the applicant and the applicant has identified, and there will be
10 conducted, a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve
11 any questions associated with such feature or components.”³⁸ This results in R&D
12 on unresolved safety issues conducted during construction. Additionally, the
13 construction permit regulations do not require the applicant to describe the
14 operational and emergency response programs of the plant. Those issues are
15 included in the operating license application.³⁹

16 A critically important issue that remains unresolved is the extent of the corrosive
17 nature of sodium coolant on plant components. In 2021, the Oak Ridge National
18 Lab issued a report on this issue for the NRC, stating:

19 Compatibility of structural materials with liquid sodium is one of
20 the most important aspects of the safety and lifetime of sodium fast
21 nuclear reactors (SFRs). This report reviews relevant and publicly
22 available knowledge on the interaction between sodium chemistry
23 and thermodynamics with structural materials... In general, there is
24 a clear need for better predictive capabilities for sodium
25 compatibility and long-term performance, which would avoid

³⁷ *A Regulatory Review Roadmap For Non-Light Water Reactors*. NRC (ML17312B567) (December 2017), p. 16. <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1731/ML17312B567.pdf>

³⁸ 10 CFR 50.35. <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0035.html>

³⁹ NRC, *supra* note 180.

1 extended experimental campaigns for new materials; design
2 changes; and transient, off normal, or accident conditions.⁴⁰

3
4 Notably, incessant redesign of the SMR unit, which led to surging costs and safety
5 concerns, ultimately sunk the NuScale project.⁴¹

6 In terms of the licensing process, TerraPower submitted a report in August 2023
7 that proposed a methodology to determine the source term (understanding the
8 amount of radiation that can be released from the reactor during each accident
9 scenario) prior to submitting a construction license. In November, NRC staff found
10 deficiencies in the report. TerraPower resubmitted an updated report in January.
11 NRC plans to finish its analysis of the report by November 2024.⁴² At the end of
12 March, TerraPower submitted an application for construction.⁴³

13 **Q: WHAT ARE YOUR RISK CONCERNS OF THE GE-HITACHI REACTOR**
14 **DESIGN?**

⁴⁰ Romedenne, Marie, Pint, Bruce, *Corrosion in Sodium Fast Reactors*. Oak Ridge National Lab (TLR-RES/DE/CIB-CMB-2021-07) (May 2021), p. 45. <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2111/ML21116A231.pdf>

⁴¹ Smith, Grant, Lacy, Anthony, “Small size, big problems: Nuscale’s troublesome small modular reactor plan.” EWG (July 11, 2023.) <https://www.ewg.org/news-insights/news/2023/07/small-size-big-problems-nuscales-troublesome-small-modular-nuclear#:~:text=NuScale%20has%20increased%20by%2050,catastrophic%20breakdown%20and%20radiation%20leak>.

⁴² Brusselmans, Roel, “Radiological Source Term Metho., Revision 1 (L-2023-TOP-0046).”

Received by George Wilson, March 7, 2024. <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2406/ML24067A069.pdf>

⁴³ TerraPower, *supra* note 179.

1 **A:** The GE-Hitachi began the NRC licensing process for its BWRX-300 SMR unit in
2 late 2019⁴⁴ and is in a licensing process in Canada. Nuclear expert M.V. Ramana,
3 Simons Chair in Disarmament, Global and Human Security at the School of Public
4 Policy and Global Affairs, University of British Columbia, is skeptical of the
5 success of GE-Hitachi’s design. He wrote in 2022, referencing the BWRX-300, that
6 even if GE-Hitachi does not make changes in its SMR design during the Canadian
7 licensing process “there will be the inevitable delays (and cost escalations) during
8 construction.”⁴⁵ EWG also investigated the licensing process for the BWRX-300
9 unit. The Canadian and US licensing processes for the GE-Hitachi SMR are on
10 parallel courses. Ontario Power Generation claims that it will have a unit online by
11 2029.⁴⁶ Tennessee Valley Authority is also planning to build a BWRX-300 reactor
12 at the Clinch River site, which is projected to begin operation in 2032.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ “GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Begins NRC Licensing Process for BRWX-300 Small Modular Reactor.” GE (Press Release) (Jan. 30, 2020). <https://www.ge.com/news/press-releases/ge-hitachi-nuclear-energy-begins-nrc-licensing-process-for-bwrx-300-small-modular>

⁴⁵ M.V. Ramana, “Slow deployment, safety hazards make SMRs a poor climate solution.” NB Media Co-op. (Aug. 2, 2022). <https://nbmediacoop.org/2022/08/02/slow-deployment-safety-hazards-make-smrs-a-poor-climate-solution/>

⁴⁶ Ontario Power Generation, OPG’s Darlington Small Modular Reactor project passes significant milestone. Retrieved May 1, 2024, from <https://www.opg.com/stories/opg-darlington-small-modular-reactor-project-passes-significant-milestones/#:~:text=OPG%20has%20commenced%20site%20preparation,commercial%20Operation%20starting%20in%202029>

⁴⁷ Patel, Sonal, “TVA Unveils Major New Nuclear Program, First SMR at Clinch River Site.” Power Magazine (Feb. 10, 202). <https://www.powermag.com/tva-unveils-major-new-nuclear-program-first-smr-at-clinch-river-site/>

1 Canada and the US signed an MOU “that allows the companies to coordinate efforts
2 on the design, licensing, construction, and operation of SMRs. CNSC and USNRC
3 are currently engaged in licensing and pre-application activities with OPG and
4 TVA, respectively,” and have signed several cooperative agreements.⁴⁸ The
5 multinational design evaluation program was initiated in 2008 as an attempt to
6 harmonize the licensing process between countries and to “improve the efficiency
7 and the effectiveness of the design review process, aiming at increased convergence
8 of regulatory practices.”⁴⁹ Although each country relies on its own standards, the
9 agreement is intended to prevent significant deviation of the design from country
10 to country and to reduce duplication of technical reviews. This is important to US
11 nuclear proponents and policymakers, who see the Darlington project as the first-
12 of-a-kind BWRX deployment.

13 In 2019, GE initiated pre-application activities with the NRC around the BWRX-
14 300 design. These activities involve meetings and submission of licensing topical
15 reports (“LTRs”). Unlike safety topical reports, which focus on specific technical
16 and safety approvals, the LTR seek approval of the licensing approach for the
17 BWRX-300. NRC approval means the applicant has known methods, analysis, and

⁴⁸ *Joint Report on GEH BWRX-300 Safety Strategy White Paper: A Collaborative Review by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.* NRC (ML23135A151) (July 2023), p 1. <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2313/ML23135A151.pdf>

⁴⁹ *Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 2008 Annual Report.* Nuclear Energy Agency (June 2009), p. 2. <https://www.oecd-nea.org/mdep/annual-reports/MDEP-Annual-Report-2008.pdf>

1 tests to demonstrate compliance with the appropriate safety regulations for
2 licensing. These topical reports do not provide generic resolution of safety issues.
3 The NRC has approved several topical reports, but there are many remaining.⁵⁰
4 In the US, GE-Hitachi is also expected to use the original licensing process,⁵¹
5 applying for a construction license separately from the operating license. However,
6 GE-Hitachi is still early in the NRC licensing process compared to Canada, where
7 GE has submitted a construction authorization.⁵² In 2023, GE requested a readiness
8 assessment of a LTR to cover safety strategy.⁵³ It does not appear that GE has
9 submitted the LTR for this topic. Given the progress in the Canadian licensing
10 process and the hope of avoiding design changes at the NRC, it is my opinion the
11 US government is content to wait for the design to be tested in Canada before
12 attempting deployment in the US. Given the wait-and-see-approach and the typical

⁵⁰ U.S. NRC, Pre-Application review of Topical Reports associated with the BRWX-300 water cooled, natural circulation small modular reactor (SMR) with passive safety features. Retrieved May 1, 2024, from <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/smr/licensing-activities/pre-application-activities/bwr-x-300.html>

⁵¹ U.S. NRC, *supra* note 179, p. 6.

⁵² *Written Submission from Ontario Power Generation Inc. In the Matter of the Ontario Power Generation Inc: Applicability of the Darlington New Nuclear Project Environmental Assessment and Plant Parameter Envelope to Selected Reactor Technology*. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CMD 24-H2.1) (Sept 18, 2023), p. 3. <https://api.cnsccs.gc.ca/dms/digital-medias/CMD24-H2-1.pdf/object?subscription-key=3ff0910c6c54489abc34bc5b7d773be0>

⁵³ Jardenah, Mahmoud, "Pre-Submittal Readiness Assessment Engagement Plan for Draft Safety Strategy LTR (NEDC-33934P)." Received by George Watkins (GE Vernova), Jesus Diaz-Quiroz (GE Vernova), June 15, 2023. <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2316/ML23166A876.pdf>

1 delays in the licensing process and construction, the 2032 date projected by TVA
2 for bringing its first BWRX-300 unit online seems extremely unlikely.

3 What this means for Duke Energy is if construction of the SMR in Canada, if
4 constructed at all, is pushed into the mid-2030s that will also postpone Duke
5 Energy's construction schedule. Provided, however, that Duke Energy adheres to
6 the "pledge" it made in the 2022 carbon plan proceeding to be a "second mover" of
7 SMR technology.⁵⁴

8 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, SHOULD SMRS BE EXPECTED TO ADDRESS**
9 **CLIMATE CHANGE AND BE COST-EFFECTIVE ADDITIONS TO**
10 **DUKE'S SYSTEM?**

11 **A:** No. SMRs fail the main argument for new nuclear units. Given the long lead-times,
12 nuclear experts have found that SMRs will do nothing to address climate change,
13 as the technology is too little, too late.⁵⁵ We find that, for SMRs generally, EWG's
14 expert witness 2022 testimony for the previous carbon plan is still relevant:

15 Based on a variety of factors, no reliance should be placed on SMRs
16 and non-light-water advanced nuclear energy technologies to
17 achieve the decarbonization goals of HB 951. They are costly; their
18 schedules are likely to be delayed relative to the dates in Duke

⁵⁴ *Order Adopting Initial Carbon Plan and Providing Direction for Future Planning*, NCUC Docket No. E100, Sub 179 (Dec. 30, 2022), p. 95 <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=7b947adf-b340-4c20-9368-9780dd88107a>

⁵⁵ Makhijani, Arjun, M.R. Ramana, "Can small modular reactors mitigate against climate change?" *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (July 21, 2021). <https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-07/can-small-modular-reactors-help-mitigate-climate-change/>

1 Energy's portfolios; and the risks and uncertainties involved are far
2 too large to even put reliable upper limits on costs and delays.⁵⁶

3
4 In addition, a 2015 analysis of the learning curves of various generation
5 technologies found that nuclear power was the only technology where costs
6 continually increased from generation to generation.⁵⁷ As for the expected costs of
7 SMRs, an October 2023 analysis of SMR technology, including the BRWX-300,
8 concluded:

9 Based on a large-scale Monte Carlo analysis of potential net present
10 values (NPVs) and levelized costs of electricity (LCOE), we find
11 that SMR concepts do not seem to be an economic alternative to
12 existing low-carbon technologies during our design lifetime
13 simulation using the most favorable parameter values based on the
14 literature. Even when using the *overly optimistic manufacturer-*
15 *advertised construction costs* in the simulation, the majority of
16 examined SMR concepts cannot deliver a positive NPV. The
17 variance in the simulations can be in the largest part explained by
18 the variance of the investment costs and the WACC, whereas the
19 load factor and the electricity price play a minor role.⁵⁸

20
21 (Emphasis added).

22
23 In 2023, Wood McKenzie estimated the first of a kind SMR to be anywhere from
24 \$6,000,000 to \$8,000,000 per megawatt – adding, “[w]e believe that FOAK costs

⁵⁶ Direct Testimony of Arjun Makhijani, PhD, on Behalf of Environmental Working Group, NCUC Docket No. E-100, Sub 179 (Sept. 2, 2022), p. 30. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=7d950a20-80ec-4d51-982d-11d5a881e9e9>

⁵⁷ Rubin, Edward, Azevedo, Ines, Jaramillo, Paulina, Yeh, Sonia, *A review of learning rates for electricity technologies*. Energy (2015). <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421515002293>

⁵⁸ Steigerwald, Bjoern, Weibezahn, Jens, Slowik, Martin, von Hirschhausen, Christian, *Uncertainties in estimating the future costs of nuclear technologies: A model-based analysis of small modular reactors*. Energy (Oct. 15, 2023), pp. 9, 10. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544223015980>

1 will be at the high end of this range, and could be even higher, as developers build
2 out early-stage projects.”⁵⁹ At this projected generic high end – and experience tells
3 us that it costs will be much higher – Duke Energy’s 300 megawatt BRWX-300 or
4 the TerraPower unit, not counting the proposed molten salt storage system, would
5 cost more than \$2 billion plus profit margin – with no positive learning curve in
6 sight. Duke Energy seeks a total of 3,600 megawatts of SMRs by 2043,⁶⁰ essentially
7 tight 9-year buildout plan, costing billions more - equivalent to 3 large nuclear units
8 that would take more than a decade or two to construct and bring online.

9 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS HOW SMRS ARE VULNERABLE TO CLIMATE**
10 **CHANGE IMPACTS?**

11 **A:** SMRs are vulnerable to flooding,⁶¹ They also use water to create steam to generate
12 electricity,⁶² so are vulnerable to periods of extreme heat and drought.

13 The Union of Concerned Scientists recently updated its SMR perspective, stating:

14 *[T]he so-called passive safety features that SMR proponents like to*
15 *cite may not always work, especially during extreme events such as*
16 *large earthquakes, major flooding, or wildfires that can degrade the*
17 *environmental conditions under which they are designed to operate.*

⁵⁹ *The Nuclear Option: Making nuclear power viable in the energy transition.* Wood MacKenzie (May 2023), p. 8. https://storage.pardot.com/131501/1683787920TDeRmpBv/Wood_Mackenzie_Thought_Leadership_Horizons_The_Nuclear_Option.pdf

⁶⁰ Supplemental Director Testimony of Snider et al, *supra* note 75, pp. 30, 31.

⁶¹ Lyman, Ed, *Small Isn't Always Beautiful: Safety, Security, and Cost Concerns about Small Modular Reactors.* UCS (Sept. 2013), p. 10. <https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/small-isnt-always-beautiful.pdf>

⁶² Natrium Cooling Water Availability: a TerraPower & GE-Hitachi technology. (2023). <https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML23345A038> and BRWX-300 small modular reactor. Retrieved April 30, 2024, from <https://www.governova.com/nuclear/carbon-free-power/bwr-300-small-modular-reactor>

1 And in some cases, passive features can actually make accidents
2 worse: for example, the NRC’s review of the NuScale, light-water
3 design revealed that that passive emergency systems could deplete
4 cooling water of boron, which is needed to keep the reactor safely
5 shut down after an accident.⁶³

6
7 (Emphasis added).

8
9 SMRs will use substantial amounts of water if they manage to be deployed and
10 operate on a consistent basis. A nuclear expert addressing SMRs has explained that
11 “[a] single 300 MW reactor operating at 90 percent capacity factor would withdraw
12 160 million to 390 million gallons of water *every day*.”⁶⁴ (Emphasis added).

13 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS HOW DUKE ENERGY’S CPIRP IMPACTS THE**
14 **STATE’S NUCLEAR POWER?**

15 **A:** Duke Energy plans to sink more dollars into its climate-exposed, existing nuclear
16 power plants. Duke Energy’s plans for increasing the capacity of their existing
17 nuclear power plants will also be highly costly to ratepayers. Duke Energy
18 estimates these costs through 2031 to be more than \$1.4 billion.⁶⁵

⁶³ Lyman, Ed, “Five Things The “Nuclear Bros” Don’t Want You To Know About Small Modular Reactors.” UCS (April 30, 2024). Retrieved April 30, 2024, from <https://blog.ucsusa.org/edwin-lyman/five-things-the-nuclear-bros-dont-want-you-to-know-about-small-modular-reactors/>

⁶⁴ Makhijani, Arjun, PhD, M.R. Ramana, PhD, “Why small modular reactors won’t help counter climate change.” EWG (March 25, 2021). <https://www.ewg.org/news-insights/news/why-small-modular-nuclear-reactors-wont-help-counter-climate-crisis>

⁶⁵ Duke Energy, Carbon Plan *Appendix J Nuclear*, p. 8. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=ecc4438a-8a50-4c00-93b6-7331ff5c4c82>

1 system as one of the “key drivers of power sector transformation.”⁶⁶ The other key
2 drivers - digitization, decarbonization, and (economic) “development”- all relate to
3 decentralization.⁶⁷ Decentralization, in turn, is key to greater system resiliency,
4 according to DEQ.⁶⁸

5 Although the DEQ refers to VPPs only a single time in the report, the agency makes
6 observations critical to elevating DERs as at least an equal partner with utility-scale
7 resources that: (1) debunk the utility mantra that customers with solar and storage
8 shift cost to those without, (2) tie DERs to enhance system resilience, and (3) urges
9 expansion of cost-benefit analyses to include resilience, among other important
10 benefits.

11 **Q: COULD YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCY**
12 **HAS EMERGED AS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE NORTH AND**
13 **SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC SYSTEMS?**

14 **A:** Resiliency is the most important concept nationwide around which to design the
15 electric grid. System reliability can no longer be a separate concept from system
16 resiliency, as traditionally treated. To achieve a functional, more weather-resistant
17 and affordable electric system, they must become inextricably intertwined as a
18 matter of unavoidable reality. Climate change is the driving force behind this

⁶⁶ *North Carolina Clean Energy Plan: Transitioning to a 21st Century Electricity System*. State Energy Office, (Oct. 2019), p. 29 https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/clean-energy-plan/NC_Clean_Energy_Plan_OCT_2019_.pdf

⁶⁷ *Id.*, p. 29.

⁶⁸ *Id.*, p. 35.

1 necessity. If Duke Energy's business model continues to prevail in carbon plan
2 proceedings, climate change has and will continue to exact outsized increasing
3 economic impacts on the North and South Carolina economies and attendant rate
4 impacts on ratepayers.

5 Currently, reliability and resiliency are treated as two separate concepts. Reliability
6 is having an electric system stable enough to provide 24/7 service virtually all the
7 time, including enough reserve margin to meet peak demand. Resiliency is the
8 ability of the system to recover quickly after disruptions from, for instance, severe
9 weather. The electric system must be designed to achieve reliability and resilience
10 simultaneously, which requires that DERs be considered commensurate with
11 utility-scale resources. This is important given the fragility of the bulk power
12 system, including conventional, utility-scale power plants, to climate disruptions.

13 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE DESCRIBE DUKE'S APPROACH TO RESILIENCY**
14 **AND RELIABILITY?**

15 **A:** Duke Energy's approach to resiliency is to expand on its reliance on utility-scale
16 resources that are vulnerable to climate change impacts. As noted, the sprawling
17 transmission and interstate gas pipeline system are vulnerable to extreme weather
18 and flooding. Duke Energy intends to add significant natural gas capacity to its
19 system, rely on additional interstate pipelines, maintain its existing nuclear fleet,
20 and wait on yet-to-materialize SMR technology.

21 **Q: HOW HAS CLIMATE CHANGE MADE THESE CONCEPTS SO**
22 **CLOSELY LINKED?**

1 **A:** The impacts of climate change in terms of the costs of outages and threats to public
2 well-being demonstrate that reliability cannot be achieved without a resilient power
3 system. It is next to impossible to believe that the utility sector was unaware of the
4 growing concerns of scientists with respect to the emerging negative impacts of
5 climate change.

6 A much greater balance must be struck between utility-scale and distributed energy
7 resource investments. Climate change has and will continue to impact the NC
8 electric system, and the impacts are expected to worsen. Weather is expected to
9 become less predictable from season to season, and the potential for severe weather
10 becoming practically a year-round phenomenon will make planned outages for
11 power plant maintenance and refueling more difficult to gauge. Specifically, the
12 Brunswick Nuclear Plant poses a significant risk for severe accidents from
13 hurricanes, given its proximity to the coast.

14 **Q: DOES THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA RECOGNIZE CLIMATE**
15 **CHANGE AS A THREAT TO THE OPERATION OF THE ELECTRIC**
16 **SYSTEM?**

17 **A:** Yes. The 2020 NC DEQ report on resiliency includes *Climate Hazards Facing*
18 *North Carolina*,⁶⁹ all of which are or will impair the bulk power system.

19 The findings show that conventional fossil and nuclear plants will continue to be
20 compromised during increasing drought, heavy precipitation, and hurricanes from

⁶⁹ NC DEQ, *supra* note 30, p. 1-3.

1 climate disruptions. Burying transmission lines to protect the system may be
2 difficult due to projected increases in coastal and inland flooding. In our estimation,
3 the Brunswick nuclear plant, due to expected increasing coastal flooding, erosion,
4 storm surges, and saltwater intrusion, should be decommissioned within the next
5 10 years.

6 Specifically, the 2020 report listed the following climate hazards that will increase
7 in severity over time:

8 • “More intense droughts in the future due to climate change are likely...
9 which will lead to [stress] on thermoelectric plant cooling,” which can cause derates
10 or outages.

11 • “Heavy precipitation accompanying hurricanes and other weather systems
12 is likely to increase” which subjects “[e]nergy infrastructure located along inland
13 watersheds and coastal areas... to changes in river discharge and flooding from
14 heavy precipitation events.”

15 • “It is virtually certain that sea level along the North Carolina coast will
16 continue to rise due to expansion of ocean water from warming and melting of ice
17 on land” which “will lead to an increase in storm surge flooding in coastal North
18 Carolina.”

19 • “Intensity of the strongest hurricanes is likely to increase with warming of
20 the oceans and atmosphere, leading to ... flooding and precipitation.”

21 • “Increases in extreme precipitation is likely to increase inland flooding in
22 North Carolina.”

- 1 • “Saltwater [i]ntrusion... due to sea level rise.”
- 2 • “Higher average temperatures and more severe droughts will lead to an
- 3 increased likelihood of conditions conducive to wildfires,”⁷⁰ which could impact
- 4 solar generation as well as the transmission system.

5 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE DISCUSS THE CONTINUED IMPACTS OF**

6 **CLIMATE CHANGE ON POWER SYSTEMS?**

7 **A:** Duke Energy is aware of climate change; however, the company has continually

8 suppressed the distributed energy market, focusing instead on utility-scale options.

9 Climate change has had and will have continued impacts on the bulk power system,

10 and such impacts are “growing in frequency, duration, or intensity...,” according

11 to Climate Central.⁷¹ The Federal Reserve concurs.⁷²

12 Indeed, Spencer Weart, a historian and retired director of the Center for History of

13 Physics at the American Institute of Physics in College Park, Maryland, recently

14 observed, “[s]cientists first began in 1988 to insist that real action should be

15 taken.”⁷³ In response to the growing concern with climate change, the UN created

⁷⁰ *Id.*, p. 1-3 – 1-6.

⁷¹ *Surging Power Outages and Climate Change*, Climate Central, (Sept. 14, 2022), p. 1. <https://assets.ctfassets.net/cxgxcg8r5d/73igUswSfOhdo7DUDVLwK7/bb0a4e95e1d04457e56106355a1f74b9/2022PowerOutages.pdf>

⁷² *Analyzing State Resilience to Weather and Climate Disasters. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.* Retrieved April 29, 2024, from <https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/analyzing-state-resilience-to-climate-change-20230907.html>

⁷³ Pester, Patrick, “When did scientists first warn humanity about climate change?” *Live Science*, (Dec. 12, 2021). <https://www.livescience.com/humans-first-warned-about-climate-change>

1 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC that, at the time,
2 predicted increasingly severe weather.⁷⁴ It has been established that ExxonMobil
3 knew, through its own climate modeling, that global temperatures would increase
4 but misled the public about the existence of climate change.⁷⁵ The predictions of
5 the oil industry and climate scientists were decidedly accurate, with the bulk power
6 system being particularly vulnerable to severe weather.

7 The National Centers on Environmental Information, housed at the National
8 Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA, puts an increasingly hefty price
9 tag on weather-related events over the last 40 years. In its survey of billion-dollar
10 weather events, NOAA shows increasing costs, adjusted according to the consumer
11 price index, from climate change in the US from the 1980s through the 2010s,
12 increasing steadily at \$214.6 billion from 1980 to 1989 to \$972.5 billion from 2010
13 to 2019.⁷⁶ The costs from severe weather in 2023 alone was \$93 billion.⁷⁷ As early
14 as 2012, the Congressional Research Service found that various studies estimated

⁷⁴ “Climate Change History.” History.com, (June 9, 2023).
<https://www.history.com/topics/natural-disasters-and-environment/history-of-climate-change>

⁷⁵ Rannard, Georgina, “Exxon Mobil: Oil giant predicted climate change in the 1970s – Scientists.” BBC, (Jan. 12, 2023). <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-64241994>

⁷⁶ Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters. *National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration*. Retrieved March 29, 2024, from
<https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/summary-stats/US/2000-2024>

⁷⁷ *Id.* <https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/summary-stats/US/2023>

1 the cost to the US economy of power outages was \$20 to \$55 billion annually.⁷⁸
2 The weather-related costs NOAA tracked include flooding, drought, freeze, severe
3 storms, winter storms, hurricanes, and wildfires – all of which negatively impact
4 the bulk power system. The 2022 Climate Central analysis shows a 78 percent
5 increase in “weather-related power outages” in the previous decade compared to
6 2000 to 2010.⁷⁹ Besides hurricanes and drought-driven wildfires, the last decade
7 has seen an escalation in severe winter storms and temperatures impacting the bulk
8 power system, with 5 events in 11 years causing “unplanned cold-weather related
9 outages...,” according to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC.⁸⁰
10 Duke Energy has been referencing climate change at least since 2007 as a potential
11 business risk – either considering it as a potential regulatory cost⁸¹ or hemming and

⁷⁸ Weather-Related Power Outages and Electric System Resiliency. Congressional Research Service, (August 28, 2012), Summary. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42696>

⁷⁹ Climate Central, *supra* note 1, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Inquiry into Bulk-Power System Operations During December 2022 Winter Storm Elliott: FERC, NERC, and Regional Entity Staff Report. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and North American Electric Reliability Corporation, (Oct. 2023), p. 5. <https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-nerc-release-final-report-lessons-winter-storm-elliott>

⁸¹ Duke Energy Corporation, *2007 Form 10-K*, p. 30. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326160/000119312507044568/d10k.htm#tx92233_15

1 hawing over the future impacts.⁸² Notably, not until its 2016 annual report did
2 Duke Energy acknowledge the actual risks to its bulk power system.⁸³

3 **Q: CAN YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT GRID RESOURCES HAVE BEEN**
4 **IMPACTED MOST SEVERELY BY CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS?**

5 **A:** Hurricanes impact the bulk power system primarily with downed transmission and
6 distribution system lines. Extreme winter weather impacts primarily conventional
7 fossil generation.

8 **Q: PLEASE DISCUSS HOW CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTED THE**
9 **CAROLINAS BULK POWER SYSTEMS.**

10 **A:** In a report on resiliency funded by the federal government and published by the
11 North Carolina Department of Environmental Protection, or DEP, the state noted
12 that North Carolina is second in the country for “electric power service
13 interruptions...”⁸⁴ On average, from 2009 to 2019, the report found that North
14 Carolina had 3 hurricanes per year, 55 flooding events per year, 41 winter storms
15 and extreme cold events.⁸⁵

⁸² Duke Energy Corporation, *2013 Annual Report and Form 10-K*, p. 57.
https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/d/NYSE_DUK_2013.pdf

⁸³ Duke Energy Corporation, *2016 Annual Report and Form 10-K*, p. 19
https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/d/NYSE_DUK_2016.pdf

⁸⁴ *Bipartisan Infrastructure Law - SECTION 40101(d): Preventing Outages and Enhancing Resiliency of the Electric Grid (Proposed Program Narrative)*. North Carolina State Energy Office, (March 31, 2023), p. 1.

⁸⁵ *Id.*, p. 2.

1 From 1980 through 2023, North Carolina incurred \$50 to \$100 billion in damages
2 from weather/climate-related severe weather in billion-dollar events, according to
3 NOAA. Fifty percent of those damages occurred from 2010 to 2019 and more than
4 7 percent from 2019 through 2023.⁸⁶ Nearly 84 percent of damages from 2010
5 through 2023 were caused by hurricanes.⁸⁷ The Federal Reserve reports that
6 weather and climate disaster costs accounted for more than 26 percent of
7 cumulative state revenue for the Carolinas, essentially Duke Energy territory, from
8 2012 to 2021 – nearly 15 percent of state revenue for North Carolina and more than
9 11.5 percent of state revenue for South Carolina.⁸⁸

10 Hurricanes, with attendant torrential rain and flooding, have also taken a toll on the
11 bulk power system in the Carolinas. The more severe storms resulted in customers
12 without power for weeks. A few examples of hurricane impact on the Carolinas
13 includes:

- 14 ● Hurricane Florence, 2018
 - 15 ○ Damages: \$24 billion for the Carolinas⁸⁹
 - 16 ○ Customers without power: 1.1 million in North Carolina⁹⁰
- 17 ● Hurricane Michael, 2018

⁸⁶ Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters. *National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration*. Retrieved March 29, 2024, from <https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/summary-stats/NC/2010-2024>

⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁸⁸ NOAA, *supra*, note 6.

⁸⁹ “Report: Hurricane Florence killed 122, caused \$24 billion in damage.” *AP*, (May 3, 2019). <https://apnews.com/weather-general-news-a19e36ba2b2c49949d3e247cf7ea9896#>

⁹⁰ *Id.*

- 1 ○ Damages: \$22 million⁹¹
- 2 ○ Customers without power: 500,000⁹²
- 3 ● Hurricane Matthew, 2016
- 4 ○ Damages: \$4.8 billion⁹³
- 5 ○ Customers without power: 1.2 million in the Carolinas,⁹⁴ nearly
- 6 815,000 in North Carolina⁹⁵
- 7 ● Hurricane Dorian, 2019
- 8 ○ Damages, \$1.2 billion⁹⁶ (majority in North Carolina)
- 9 ○ Customers without power: 200,000 in North Carolina⁹⁷

⁹¹ Davis, Corey, "How Howling Hugo Became the Western Piedmont's Worst Hurricane." *North Carolina State Climate Office*, (Sept 23, 2019). <https://climate.ncsu.edu/blog/2019/09/how-howling-hugo-became-the-western-piedmonts-worst-hurricane/>

⁹² "Hurricane Michael caused 1.7 million electricity outages in the Southeast United States." *Energy Information Administration*, (Oct. 22, 2018). <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37332>

⁹³ *Overview of the Hurricane: Preparation, Response, and Recovery*. North Carolina State Energy Council, (Feb. 20, 2019), p. 21. <https://www.deq.nc.gov/energy-mineral-and-land-resources/energy/energy-policy-council/epc-presentation-2-20-2019/download>

⁹⁴ "Utilities double efforts to restore power to thousands in NC." *WRAL News*, (Oct. 10, 2016.) <https://www.wral.com/story/matthew-s-floods-close-north-south-lifeline-i-95/16102638/>

⁹⁵ Jamieson, Alistair, "500 rescued from North Carolina Floods as Matthew churns on." *CNBC*, (Oct. 9, 2016). <https://www.cNBC.com/2016/10/09/500-rescued-from-north-carolina-floods-as-matthew-churns-on.html>

⁹⁶ *Effects of Hurricane Dorian in the Carolinas*. Wikipedia. Retrieved April 29, 2024, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects_of_Hurricane_Dorian_in_the_Carolinas#:~:text=The%20hurricane%20left%20%241.2%20billion,direct%20deaths%20in%20South%20Carolina

⁹⁷ Nirappil, Fenit, Kaplan, Sahra, Berman, Mark, "Hurricane Dorian crashes into Outer Banks in North Carolina." *Washington Post*, (Sept 6, 2019).

- 1 • Hurricane Ian, 2022
- 2 ○ Damages: We estimate between \$2 to \$4 billion range in the
- 3 Carolinas⁹⁸
- 4 ○ Customers without power: 578,000 in North Carolina; 378,000 in
- 5 South Carolina⁹⁹

6 Indeed, as a recent North Carolina state report on climate risk notes: “Moody’s, one

7 of the big three credit rating agencies worldwide, has acquired a climate data

8 company and recently identified Duke Energy as one of the nation’s top utilities at

9 risk from hurricanes due to climate change.”¹⁰⁰ The North Carolina electric system

10 is also susceptible to winter storms and extreme low temperatures. During Winter

11 Storm Elliott in December 2022, Duke Energy experienced forced outages of nearly

12 1,600 megawatts of its North and South Carolina capacity due to unusually cold

13 temperatures.¹⁰¹

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/hurricane-dorian-crashes-into-outer-banks-in-north-carolina/2019/09/06/75a7936c-d0b3-11e9-87fa-8501a456c003_story.html

⁹⁸ Bucci, Lisa, Alaka, Laura, Hagen Andrew, Delgado, Sandy, Beven, Jack, National Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Ian. National Hurricane Center (AL092022) (April 3, 2023), pp. 13, 14. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092022_Ian.pdf

⁹⁹ *Id.*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁰ *Climate Risk and Resiliency Plan: Impacts, Vulnerability, Risks, and Preliminary Actions; A Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing North Carolina’s Vulnerability to Climate Change*. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality, (June 2020). <https://files.nc.gov/ncdeq/climate-change/resilience-plan/2020-Climate-Risk-Assessment-and-Resilience-Plan.pdf>

¹⁰¹ *Order Making Findings and Directing Action Related to Winter Storm Elliott*, Docket No. M-100, Sub 163 (Dec. 22, 2023), pp. 23-25. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=59ef1f1c-74d7-4b83-b24a-ffc775304203>

1 That does not count the nearly 2,800 megawatts in forced outages not related to the
2 storm and an additional 1,656 megawatts of planned outages, including the 759-
3 megawatt Robinson nuclear plant.¹⁰² In all, this more than 6,000 megawatts of
4 power plant capacity not providing service when sorely needed represented nearly
5 20 percent of Duke Energy's entire power plant capacity in the Carolinas.¹⁰³

6 The Alaska Beacon reports, with respect to Winter Storm Elliott, "[i]n North
7 Carolina, where about 500,000 Duke Energy customers for the first time ever had
8 service cut to save the broader electric grid, company executives told the state's
9 public utility commission... that the company thought it had adequate reserve
10 power to weather the storm."¹⁰⁴

11 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, IS HARDENING THE BULK POWER SYSTEM**
12 **ALONE A SOLUTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS?**

13 **A:** No. The bulk power system infrastructure has proven itself highly vulnerable to
14 hurricane-force winds. With respect to hurricanes in North Carolina, high winds

¹⁰² Id., pp. 20, 21.

¹⁰³ "Duke Energy files updated Carbon Plan to serve the growing energy needs of a thriving North Carolina. Duke Energy," (Aug. 17, 2023). [https://investors.duke-energy.com/news/news-details/2023/Duke-Energy-Energy-files-updated-Carbon-Plan-to-serve-the-growing-energy-needs-of-a-thriving-North-Carolina/default.aspx#:~:text=Duke Energy%20Energy%20Progress%20owns%2012%2C500,North%20Carolina%20and%20South%20Carolina](https://investors.duke-energy.com/news/news-details/2023/Duke-Energy-Energy-files-updated-Carbon-Plan-to-serve-the-growing-energy-needs-of-a-thriving-North-Carolina/default.aspx#:~:text=Duke%20Energy%20Progress%20owns%2012%2C500,North%20Carolina%20and%20South%20Carolina)

¹⁰⁴ Zullo, Robert, "How did renewables fare during Winter Storm Elliott." Alaska Beacon, (Jan., 30, 2023). <https://alaskabeacon.com/2023/01/30/how-did-renewables-fare-during-winter-storm-elliott/>

1 causing trees to damage power lines have been the predominant reason for
2 outages.¹⁰⁵

3 Flooding has also hampered restoring power to customers, as submerged
4 powerlines pose electrocution threats.¹⁰⁶ Hardening the transmission system may
5 prove increasingly ineffective as climate disruptions progress. For instance,
6 Raleigh-based WRAL News reported that, among the transmission lines damaged
7 by Hurricane Matthew, were those “built to sustain the high winds of a
8 hurricane.”¹⁰⁷ Burying power lines may help, but there are issues with that approach
9 as well, as the buried lines are vulnerable to flooding and damaged lines may be
10 more difficult to locate and repair.¹⁰⁸ Greater storm surges, which are expected to

¹⁰⁵ See, e.g., Davis, Corey, “Rapid Reaction: Michael Whips Up Winds and Widespread Damage.” North Carolina State Climate Office, (Oct. 12, 2018). <https://climate.ncsu.edu/blog/2018/10/rapid-reaction-michael-whips-up-winds-and-widespread-damage/> and WRAL News, *supra* note 24, and “Florida and Carolinas count the cost of Hurricane Ian.” *DW*, (Oct. 1, 2022). <https://www.dw.com/en/florida-carolinas-count-the-cost-of-hurricane-ian/a-63308308> and Stewart, Stacy R., Berg Robbie, National Hurricane Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Florence. National Hurricane Center (AL062018) (Sept. 25, 2019), pp. 10-12. https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL062018_Florence.pdf

¹⁰⁶ “Duke Energy reports 96 percent of Hurricane Matthew outages restored; those who can receive power will be restored by Saturday night.” *Duke Energy*. (Press Release) (Oct 14, 2016). <https://news.duke-energy.com/releases/duke-energy-reports-96-percent-of-hurricane-matthew-outages-restored;-those-who-can-receive-power-will-be-restored-by-saturday-night>

¹⁰⁷ WRAL News, *supra* note 24.

¹⁰⁸ Sharpe, John, “Buried lines helping to prevent outages during Carolina hurricanes.” *Carolina Public Press*, (July 26, 2019). <https://carolinapublicpress.org/29165/buried-lines-helping-prevent-outages-during-carolina-hurricanes/>

1 worsen with climate-driven sea level rise,¹⁰⁹ also makes buried lines more
2 vulnerable to corrosion from salt water.¹¹⁰ As Ted Kury, director of energy studies
3 at the University of Florida, told the Washington Post, “If you’re in an area prone
4 to flooding, a policy of putting everything underground doesn’t make sense.”¹¹¹
5 Cost is another issue. After a winter storm in North Carolina in 2002 that knocked
6 a few million customers offline, the state decided to investigate burying power
7 lines. The study found that the cost would be \$41 billion over a 25-year period,
8 doubling electric bills.¹¹² Nuclear power plants near the east coast are particularly
9 vulnerable to storm surge.¹¹³ The NRC requires shutdown of nuclear units prior to
10 hurricanes striking, if the projected wind speeds of the storm require it.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ “Multiple climate change-driven tipping points for coastal systems.” *U.S. Geological Survey*, (July 30, 202). <https://www.usgs.gov/publications/multiple-climate-change-driven-tipping-points-coastal-systems>

¹¹⁰ Brown, Dalvin, “Burying power lines isn’t the only way to waterproof the grid.” *Washington Post*, (Sept. 5, 2021). <https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/09/04/weather-power-lines-climate-change/>

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ Shifflett, Shane, Sheppard, Kate, “How Rising Seas Can Sink Nuclear Plants Along the East Coast.” *HuffPost*, (May 19, 2024). https://www.huffpost.com/entry/maps-rising-seas-storms-threaten-flood-coastal-nuclear-plants_n_5233306

¹¹⁴ “Hurricane Matthew caused millions of customers to go without power on the east coast.” *Energy Information Administration*, (Oct. 17, 2016). <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28372>

1 This applies to Brunswick nuclear power plant.¹¹⁵ Duke Energy shutdown the
2 Brunswick nuclear power plant prior to the landfall of Hurricane Florence.¹¹⁶ North
3 Carolina’s Robinson and Harris nuclear plants both lost grid power during
4 Hurricane Matthew,¹¹⁷ which causes nuclear plants to trip offline and fire up diesel
5 generators to keep the core cool. Harris was offline for refueling, at the time.¹¹⁸ In
6 fact, a recent Government Accountability Office, or GAO, report categorized
7 flooding hazards as “high” for every Duke Energy nuclear plant in the Carolinas.¹¹⁹
8 Other power plants are also vulnerable to flooding. Floodwaters from Hurricane
9 Florence also inundated a 625-megawatt natural gas plant, forcing it offline.¹²⁰
10 Although utility-scale solar can be impacted by flooding and other damage, solar
11 arrays, deenergized directly prior to Hurricane Florence’s landfall were powered
12 up remotely,¹²¹ unlike nuclear power plants that require large staff, the next day.

¹¹⁵ HuffPost, *supra* note 43.

¹¹⁶ Walton, Robert, “Duke Energy shuts down Brunswick nuclear plant ahead of Hurricane Florence.” *Utility Dive*, (Sept. 13, 2018). <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-shuts-down-brunswick-nuclear-plant-ahead-of-hurricane-florence/532297/>

¹¹⁷ EIA, *supra* note 44.

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *Nuclear Power Plants: NRC Should Take Actions to Fully Consider the Potential Effects of Climate Change*. U.S. Government Accountability Office, (GAO-24-106326) (April 2024), pp. 57, 59. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106326.pdf>

¹²⁰ Dennis, Brady, Mufson, Steven, Eilperin, Juliet, “Dam breach sends toxic coal ash flowing into a major North Carolina river.” *Washington Post*, (Sept. 22, 2018). <https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/09/21/dam-breach-reported-former-nc-coal-plant-raising-fears-that-toxic-coal-ash-may-pollute-cape-fear-river/>

¹²¹ Merchant, Emma, “Clean Energy Players Weather Through Florence.” *GreenTech Media*, (Sept 17, 2018). https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/clean-energy-players-weather-hurricane-florence?utm_medium=email&utm_source=Daily&utm_campaign=GTMDaily#gs.WzbSXpA

1 North Carolina's sole wind farm was undamaged.¹²² There was little damage
2 reported with respect to rooftop solar.¹²³ The Brunswick nuclear units were down
3 for about a week, and two crews were at the nuclear plant and had issues initially
4 accessing the site due to flooding.¹²⁴ However, if transmission lines are down and
5 substations damaged, even operating utility-scale wind and solar cannot deliver
6 electricity to homes and businesses.

7 **Q: CAN YOU DISCUSS HOW COLD WEATHER EXTREMES HAVE**
8 **DAMAGED THE BULK POWER SYSTEM GENERALLY AND IN NORTH**
9 **CAROLINA?**

10 **A:** Severe winter storms and temperatures are a threat to the bulk power system. The
11 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") noted in a 2023 report that
12 winter storm Elliot "was the fifth in the past 11 years in which unplanned cold
13 weather- related generation outages jeopardized grid reliability, and the fourth that
14 triggered the need for a firm load shed."¹²⁵ The report continued, "[m]ultiple
15 extreme cold weather event reports, including the 2021 Report issued less than two
16 years ago, have detailed the same three primary causes of the unplanned generating

¹²² Ivanova, Irina, "Hurricane Florence crippled electricity and coal – solar and wind were back the next day. *CBS News*, (Sept. 25, 2018). <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hurricane-florence-crippled-electricity-and-coal-solar-and-wind-were-back-the-next-day/>

¹²³ GreenTech Media, *supra* note 51.

¹²⁴ Freebairn, William, "Duke Energy's two Brunswick units return to service after Hurricane Florence." *S&P Global*, (Sept. 24, 2018). <https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/092418-dukes-two-brunswick-nuclear-units-in-north-carolina-return-to-service-after-hurricane>

¹²⁵ FERC & NERC, *supra* note 10.

1 outages: Freezing Issues; Fuel Issues; and Mechanical/Electrical issues which are
2 correlated with temperature, increasing in number as temperatures fall.”¹²⁶
3 Federal reports on Texas’ winter storm in 2021¹²⁷ and winter storm Elliot¹²⁸ reveal
4 that natural gas-fired and coal-fired power plants are the most vulnerable grid
5 resources to severe winter storms. Outages during the Texas winter storm were
6 attributed to primarily failures at the power plants or failure of the natural gas
7 pipeline system, with 55 percent of natural gas plant capacity and 18 percent of coal
8 plant capacity being knocked offline. Natural gas infrastructure failures caused 27.3
9 percent of all outages, derates and failures to start during the Event.”¹²⁹The storm
10 impacted ERCOT (or the Electric Reliability Council of Texas)), the South/Central
11 US – portions of MISO (or Midcontinent Independent System Operator) - and SPP
12 (or Southwest Power Pool).¹³⁰ Natural gas capacity, at the time of the storm,
13 comprised 52 percent of ERCOT generation, 61 percent of MISO South (the
14 impacted portion of MISO), and nearly 39 percent of SPP generation.¹³¹
15 The FERC report notes:

¹²⁶ *Id.*, p. 15.

¹²⁷ FERC, NERC *Regional Staff Report: The February 2021 Cold Weather Outages in Texas and the South Central United States*. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and North American Energy Reliability Corporation, (November 2021). <https://www.ferc.gov/media/february-2021-cold-weather-outages-texas-and-south-central-united-states-ferc-nerc-and>

¹²⁸ FERC & NERC, *supra* note 55.

¹²⁹ FERC, NERC, *supra* note 57, p. 16.

¹³⁰ *Id.*, p.10.

¹³¹ *Id.*, p. 22, 23.

1 Of those outages, derates, and failures to start, 75 percent were
2 caused by either freezing issues (44.2 percent) or fuel issues (31.4
3 percent) ... Natural gas fuel supply issues caused the majority, 87
4 percent, of the 31.4 percent of outages and derates due to fuel issues,
5 and caused 27.3 percent of all outages, derates and failures to start
6 during the Event.¹³²

7 Solar and nuclear power saw the least outages, at 1 percent and 2 percent of
8 capacity, respectively.¹³³ Twenty-two percent of wind capacity experienced
9 outages.¹³⁴ With respect to the 2023 FERC and NERC report regarding Winter
10 Storm Elliott, gas and coal capacity comprised outages of 63 percent and 23
11 percent, respectively¹³⁵ – nearly 60 percent of fossil units experiencing unplanned
12 outages and derates.¹³⁶ A mere 4 percent of wind and 1 percent of solar capacity
13 experienced outages.¹³⁷ Nuclear outages were also very low, at 1 percent.¹³⁸ The
14 storm also impacted generation resources in a huge area - from the Southeast to the
15 Northeast and from the Midwest to the Plains States. Load had to be shed to
16 maintain grid reliability by utilities in the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Kentucky.¹³⁹
17 In the impacted regions, natural gas comprised more than 41 percent of capacity,

¹³² *Id.*, p. 15, 16.

¹³³ *Id.*, p. 16.

¹³⁴ *Id.*, p. 16.

¹³⁵ FERC, NERC, *supra* note 57, p. 17.

¹³⁶ *Id.*, p. 18.

¹³⁷ *Id.*, p. 17.

¹³⁸ *Id.*, p. 17.

¹³⁹ *Id.*, pp. 7,8.

1 followed by coal at 24 percent, at the time of the storm.¹⁴⁰ For Duke Energy
2 Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress' combined operations in North and South
3 Carolina, natural gas comprised 34 percent of capacity, followed by coal at nearly
4 25 percent and nuclear at 28.5 percent.¹⁴¹ The utilities experienced 810 megawatts
5 of forced outages at combined cycle natural gas plants, due to freezing and low
6 natural gas pipeline pressures, and 768 megawatts of coal plant forced outages due
7 to freezing.¹⁴²

8 Duke Energy says that 1 megawatt for conventional power can power 800 homes.¹⁴³
9 Using Duke Energy's calculations for combined cycle and coal plant derates and
10 home powered per megawatt, the lost power meant that those plants served the
11 equivalent of nearly 1.2 million fewer homes. Although nuclear power plants
12 experienced few outages or derates during winter storm Elliott, as noted, Duke
13 Energy's 759-megawatt Robison nuclear plant was offline for a planned outage,¹⁴⁴
14 meaning the absent power generation was the equivalent of 607,200 fewer homes
15 served. If we consider a home is equivalent to a residential customer,¹⁴⁵ the power
16 available to the above plants with derates or outages could serve about 42 percent

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*, p. 25.

¹⁴¹ *Id.*, pp. 25, 25.

¹⁴² NCUC, *supra* note 31 pp. 21, 22.

¹⁴³ Duke Energy, *supra* note 33.

¹⁴⁴ NCUC, *supra* note 72, p. 21.

¹⁴⁵ 2022 Bundle Retail Sales – Residential. *EIA* (2022).
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table_6.pdf

1 of residential customers in Duke Energy territory in the Carolinas during storm
2 Elliot.

3 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT KIND OF SHIFT IN THINKING AND**
4 **INVESTMENT PATTERN IN THE ELECTRIC SYSTEM DOES CLIMATE**
5 **CHANGE NECESSITATE FOR NORTH CAROLINA?**

6 **A:** Current and expected increasingly severe climate disruptions in North Carolina
7 (and nationwide) indisputably demonstrates that bulk power system infrastructure
8 and utility-scale power generation alone are not up to task to ensure reliability and
9 resiliency for residential and business customers. This calls for rethinking the
10 design of the electric system and points equally indisputably to the distributed grid
11 paradigm, the centerpiece of which is the VVP. Other strategic considerations going
12 forward, such as electrification of the grid grows are resource adequacy and
13 affordability, which VPPs can also help achieve reliability. However, to ensure
14 affordability, financial benefits must flow to ratepayers – not just to the utility.

15 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT A VIRTUAL POWER PLANT IS.**

16 **A:** VPPs are aggregated residential and/or commercial customers that essentially
17 function as utility-scale power plants. VPPs are controlled by web-based signals to
18 thousands of homes equipped with the necessary distributed energy technologies.
19 These DER technologies are well-known and off-the-shelf, such as rooftop or
20 community solar plus storage, EVs or smart thermostats “paired with electric
21 heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems (HVAC) such as heat pumps,

1 electric water heaters, and C&I equipment.”¹⁴⁶ This also includes energy efficiency
2 investments.¹⁴⁷ These are all dispatchable resources or can be aggregated to benefit
3 the electric system and customers. VPPs can reduce stress on the bulk power system
4 or provide power to it. VPPs consist of various configurations. The most well-
5 known and in place for decades is demand response¹⁴⁸ – where utilities control air
6 conditioners or electric water heaters during peak demand to avoid overstressing
7 the grid.

8 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HOW CAN VPPS IMPROVE GRID RELIABILITY?**

9 **A:** As the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) in its *Pathways* report: “[a]s simple as
10 it seems to dial down or turn off electricity-consuming equipment, the critical role
11 that demand response plays in ensuring grid reliability cannot be overstated.”¹⁴⁹ In
12 fact, demand response can play a significant role in maintaining grid stability – if
13 customers are aggregated into a VPP. Brattle Group analysts observe that even
14 “slight, infrequent adjustments to the temperature settings of a smart thermostat...
15 can provide hundreds or even thousands of megawatts of peak demand

¹⁴⁶ *Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Virtual Power Plants*. U.S. Department of Energy, (Sept. 2023), pp. 6,7. https://liftoff.energy.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/20230911-Pathways-to-Commercial-Liftoff-Virtual-Power-Plants_update.pdf

¹⁴⁷ Kevin Brehm, Avery McEvoy, Connor Usry, and Mark Dyson, *Virtual Power Plants, Real Benefits*. RMI, (2023), p. 8. <https://rmi.org/insight/virtual-power-plants-real-benefits/>

¹⁴⁸ Hledik, Ryan, Peters, Kate, *Real Reliability: The Value of Virtual Power*. The Brattle Group, (May 2023), p. 10. https://www.brattle.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Real-Reliability-The-Value-of-Virtual-Power_5.3.2023.pdf

¹⁴⁹ U.S. DOE, *supra* note 78, p. 19.

1 reduction...”¹⁵⁰ California serves as an example of the enormous potential of VPP
2 demand response. California ratepayers voluntarily saved their electric system from
3 collapse when requested by the state’s governor to turn down their air conditioners
4 in the summer of 2022.¹⁵¹

5 Wood McKenzie possesses a database of more than 500 US-based VPPs operating
6 or in development¹⁵² – mainly demand response programs. California, New York,
7 Massachusetts, and Texas are the leading states.¹⁵³ The largest VPP providers have
8 accumulated enough aggregated megawatts to rival the larger independent power
9 producers.¹⁵⁴ Key to the developments in these leading states is that they “offer
10 aggregator-friendly standard offer for... DER resources.”¹⁵⁵ Vehicle-to-grid with
11 EVs remains in the “pilot phase.”¹⁵⁶ However, the emphasis on simply demand
12 response is “rapidly evolving to leverage the expanding mix of DER technologies,”
13 according to the Brattle Group.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁰ Hledik, Ryan, Viswanathon, Kala, Peters, Kate, “Virtual power plants: Resource adequacy without interconnection delays.” *Utility Dive*, (Opinion) (Aug. 17, 2023). <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/virtual-power-plants-vpp-distributed-energy-resource-adequacy-der-distributed-energy/691135/>

¹⁵¹ Martin, Liza, Brehm, Kevin, “Clean Energy 101: Virtual Power Plants.” *RMI*, (Jan. 10, 2023) <https://rmi.org/clean-energy-101-virtual-power-plants/>

¹⁵² “California Dwarfs all other VPP markets in North America.” Wood McKenzie, (Press Release) (March 29, 2023) <https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/california-dwarfs-all-other-vpp-markets-in-north-america/>

¹⁵³ *Id.*

¹⁵⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵⁵ *Id.*

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*

¹⁵⁷ Brattle, *supra* note 80, p. 10.

1 There are examples of VPPs in the US at large commercial scale – or plans for
2 them, including:

- 3 • Puget Sound Energy, or PSE, has partnered with Autogrid to create a 100-
4 megawatt demand response VPP, consisting of nearly half of PSE’s customers.¹⁵⁸
- 5 • New York-based Sustainable Winchester plans to lease batteries, for
6 demand response purposes, to 1 million people in the Hudson Valley, reaching
7 potentially 45 municipalities.¹⁵⁹
- 8 • During the 2020 heatwave in California, OhmConnect used smart devices
9 and appliances to save enough power to take about 600,000 homes off the grid for
10 an hour, “helping to avoid additional blackouts, according to the company.”¹⁶⁰
- 11 • By properly managing EV charging, California estimates that the cost for
12 distribution grid investment to handle electrification could be as low as \$15 billion
13 compared to \$50 billion without managing the flexible demand.¹⁶¹
- 14 • Texas found that demand response programs, utilizing managing demand
15 with “smart meters, heat pumps, EV charging, water heaters, and other DERs could
16 save customers \$150 per year on average by 2030...”¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Hering, Garrett, “‘Call to action’ on virtual power plants resonates across US grid.” *S&P Global*, (Jan. 2, 2024) <https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/call-to-action-on-virtual-power-plants-resonates-across-us-grid-79649945>

¹⁵⁹ Salazar, Christian, “Virtual Power Plants Offer a Climate-Forward Response to Increasingly Hot Summers.” *Next City*, (Aug. 4, 2023). <https://nextcity.org/urbanist-news/virtual-power-plants-offer-a-climate-forward-response-to-extreme-heat>

¹⁶⁰ RMI, *supra* note 83.

¹⁶¹ US DOE, *supra* note 78, p. 10.

¹⁶² *Id.*, p. 10.

1 • New York estimates the costs of managing EV charging demand would
2 reduce costs to customers 95% - \$1.4 billion compared to \$26.8 billion.¹⁶³
3 Experts project that distributed resources will expand significantly by 2030,
4 increasing the buildout potential for VPPs. Specifically, it is projected that by 2030,
5 (1) about 1/3 of US homes are expected to have smart meters, (2) half of all homes
6 are expected to have electric water heaters, (3) distributed battery capacity is
7 expected to increase 14-fold, (4) residential rooftop top solar is expected to increase
8 more than 3-fold, increasing rooftop solar to from about 5 percent to 14 percent of
9 single-family homes¹⁶⁴ - in states with the enabling policies, and (4) 26 million
10 EV's are expected to be on the road – up from 2 million last year.¹⁶⁵
11 The Brattle Group observes: “[a]s decarbonization initiatives ramp up across the
12 U.S., affordability and reliability are in the spotlight as the top priorities of
13 policymakers, regulators, and utilities.”¹⁶⁶ Expansive buildout of VPPs are key to
14 achieving these priorities and others, including playing a prominent role in

¹⁶³ *Id.*, p.10.

¹⁶⁴ The average size of residential solar systems is about 7 KWs. <https://southern-energy.com/what-size-solar-system-do-you-actually-need/> and <https://www.marketwatch.com/guides/solar/power-solar-panels-produce/> and <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1421982/median-size-residential-solar-systems-united-states/> The 56 GW increase in residential capacity equates to about 8 million additional homes with rooftop solar. Given the current approximately 4.2 million solar homes, or about 5% of single-family homes, <https://www.solarinsure.com/how-many-americans-have-solar-panels#:~:text=What%20Percentage%20of%20US%20homes,of%2084.69%20million%20eligible%20homes> by 2030, using Brattle’s estimated expansion of solar capacity, about 14 percent of single-family homes will have installed solar.

¹⁶⁵ Brattle, *supra* note 80, p. 9.

¹⁶⁶ *Id.*, p. 32.

1 hardening the electric system against climate disruptions. A variety of analysts
2 agree on the benefits of VPPs for the ratepayer and electric system and VPP
3 capacity could grow substantially by 2030. Reports by the DOE, the Brattle Group,
4 RMI and Vermont School of Law come to the same conclusions. VPP capacity
5 could be expanded quickly and reduce electric system costs substantially. RMI
6 estimates that VPPs could reach 60,000 megawatts by 2030¹⁶⁷ – equivalent to the
7 power demand of 24 million homes¹⁶⁸ - and reduce costs of the electric system by
8 \$17 billion by avoiding or deferring utility-scale upgrades to the transmission and
9 distribution systems and peaking natural gas power plants or reducing their use.¹⁶⁹
10 In fact, VPPs can provide the same services as utility-scale power plants – such as,
11 ancillary services for reliability¹⁷⁰ – at 40 percent to 60 percent of the cost of utility-
12 scale upgrades.¹⁷¹ The Brattle Group, using RMI’s 60-gigawatt projection,
13 estimates savings of \$15 to \$35 billion over the next decade, excluding societal
14 benefits.¹⁷² DOE agrees with the cost-effectiveness of VPPs.¹⁷³
15 Current VPP providers Voltus and Uplight are examples of the speed at which VPPs
16 can be deployed. Voltus says that it can build out 500 megawatts (the size of a coal
17 power plant unit) of demand response VPPs in 1 year; Uplight signed up 50,000

¹⁶⁷ RMI, *supra* note 83, p. 5.

¹⁶⁸ Next City, *supra* note 91.

¹⁶⁹ RMI, *supra* note 83, p. 5.

¹⁷⁰ US DOE, *supra* note 78, pp. 7,8.

¹⁷¹ Brattle, *supra* note 80, p. 5.

¹⁷² *Id.*, p. 25.

¹⁷³ US DOE, *supra* note 78, p. 3.

1 customers of a utility in 3 months,” in a smart thermostat demand response
2 program.”¹⁷⁴ Speed of capacity deployment is of the essence at this time. Regional
3 transmission organizations keep sounding the alarm about the lack of “resource
4 adequacy” as coal plants are retired. In addition, there is a 5-year backlog¹⁷⁵ of 100s
5 of thousands of megawatts of battery and natural gas power plant capacity due to
6 the lack of transmission to accommodate them.¹⁷⁶

7 VPPs can compensate for this growing concern, as “VPPs not subject to the
8 interconnection queue delays that are limiting deployment of large scale, i.e. utility-
9 scale, resources,” according to analysts at Brattle.¹⁷⁷ Unlike utility-scale resources,
10 VPPs are scalable to need¹⁷⁸ because they are less expensive than grid resources;
11 more quickly deployed; more cheaply and readily reduce transmission congestion;
12 and, more readily utilize grid resources more efficiently – as they can shift peak
13 load.¹⁷⁹ In terms of peak load reduction, the DOE’s 2018 study of Northwest
14 utilities showed that switching to managing heat pump water heaters from
15 “uncontrolled resistance water heaters” could reduce evening peak demand 90

¹⁷⁴ Utility Dive, *supra* note 82.

¹⁷⁵ US DOE, *supra* note 78, p. 12.

¹⁷⁶ Rand, Joseph, Strauss, Rose, Gorman, Will, Steel, Joachim, Mulvaney Kemp, Julie, Jeong, Seonguen, Robson, Dana, Wiser, Ryan, *Queued Up: Characteristics of Power Plant Seeking Transmission interconnection as of the End of 2022*. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, (April 2023), p. 3. https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/default/files/queued_up_2022_04-06-2023.pdf

¹⁷⁷ Utility Dive, *supra* note 82.

¹⁷⁸ “The Emerging Trend of Virtual Power Plants in Electric Utilities.” *Evans*, (Dec. 11, 2023). <https://www.evansonline.com/blog/the-emerging-trend-of-virtual-power-plants-in-electric-utilities>

¹⁷⁹ See generally, US DOE, *supra* note 78 and RMI, *supra* note 83.

1 percent,¹⁸⁰ a growing necessity as the penetration of solar increases and shifts peak
2 demand more into the evening hours.

3 VPPs are also a critical component in enhancing grid resiliency against climate
4 disruptions.¹⁸¹ A significant advantage of VPPs over utility-scale power plants and
5 transmission lines is that they improve resiliency by being local resources, which
6 “integrate multiple small-scale energy resources, improving grid resilience and
7 reducing the impact of a single point of failure.”¹⁸²

8 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW VPPS RELATE TO THE CONCEPTS OF**
9 **RESILIENCY AND RELIABILITY.**

10 **A:** In the context of VPPs, the concepts of resiliency and reliability are presented
11 practically as interchangeable. The DOE presents reliability and resiliency as
12 closely linked concepts. It references the increasing storm damage we’re
13 experiencing in its subsection titled reliability and resilience under “value
14 proposition” of its report. DOE doesn’t mention reliability, only resiliency, stating:

15 Several potential characteristics of VPPs can further increase
16 resilience: a geographically diverse footprint of generation sites, a
17 higher number of storage assets, and the ability to ‘island’ sections

¹⁸⁰ Metzger, Cheryn, Technology Integration: Heat Pump Water Heaters (HPWH). Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, US DOE. <https://www.energy.gov/eere/buildings/articles/technology-integration-heat-pump-water-heaters>

¹⁸¹ Jones, Keven, PhD, Franco, Mary, Mashke, Kim, Pardee, Sarah, *How Virtual Power Plants Can Advance Electrification and Mitigate Infrastructure Needs As We Race to Meet Our Climate Challenges*. San Diego Journal of Climate and Energy Law, (2022), p. 143 <https://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1108&context=jcel>

¹⁸² Evans, *supra* note 110.

1 of the grid into microgrids in response to adverse events such as
2 extreme weather and other threats.¹⁸³

3
4 As noted by the DOE, another advantage of VPPs is that microgrids can be created
5 within VPPs, such as islanding critical infrastructure like hospitals when necessary.

6 DOE also describes the benefits of reliability and resilience in its report as “avoided
7 outages, shortened outages, and reduced number of end users impacted by
8 outages.”¹⁸⁴ RMI links the concepts in a similar way, explaining “VPPs are already
9 helping provide resilience when the grid is down, and offer numerous other unique
10 reliability benefits that traditional power plants do not.”¹⁸⁵ Other benefits of VPPs
11 include the ability to accommodate electrification of the grid and expanding
12 deployment of renewables.¹⁸⁶ VPPs are also a means to achieve energy equity,
13 such as the DOE conditional loan to jumpstart Sunnova’s Project Hestia to provide
14 VPP access to disadvantaged communities.¹⁸⁷

15 What is critical to working towards electric bill affordability is that ratepayers
16 benefit, or should, financially from VPPs. DOE states, “[a]cross VPPs generally,
17 the primary operational costs are participant incentives; in other words, most of the
18 money spent on VPPs flows to electricity consumers (households and

¹⁸³ US DOE, *supra* note 78, p. 11.

¹⁸⁴ *Id.*, p. 53.

¹⁸⁵ RMI, *supra* note 83.

¹⁸⁶ Brattle, *supra* note 80, p. 27.

¹⁸⁷ Kennedy, Ryan, “Virtual power plants roll out across the U.S.” *PV Magazine*, (June 16, 2023). <https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2023/06/16/virtual-power-plants-roll-out-across-the-u-s/>

1 businesses),”¹⁸⁸ which would reverse the national trend over the last decade in
2 legislative and regulatory attempts and actions by utilities to substantially curtail
3 ratepayer financial benefits from their own rooftop solar and energy efficiency
4 investments at the behest of monopoly utility companies – if properly implemented.
5 There are societal benefits as well. The Brattle Group refers to these as reduced
6 emissions and resiliency, estimating that these benefits add an additional \$20 billion
7 in savings to the \$15 to \$35 billion in savings in its report.¹⁸⁹ Resiliency is generally
8 not included in utility cost-effectiveness tests,¹⁹⁰ which greatly undervalue VPP
9 proposals. The Brattle Group refers to VPPs as “real reliability” for good reason,
10 namely, because the bulk power system doesn’t provide it. Indeed, DOE refers to
11 its 2023 report as “an urgent call to action for a diverse range of stakeholders to
12 accelerate VPP liftoff.”¹⁹¹

13 **Q: PLEASE DISCUSS DEQ’S PERSPECTIVE ON SYSTEM RESILIENCE**
14 **AND SAVINGS.**

15 **A:** The DEQ begins early on in its report with the observation that “[i]ntelligently
16 managed DERs could offer a vision of a world where demand may be easily
17 dispatchable as supply – which, as noted, they already do... providing services that

¹⁸⁸ US DOE, supra note 78, p. 24.

¹⁸⁹ Brattle, supra note 80, p. 5.

¹⁹⁰ Sverivastava, Rohini, Garfunkel, Emily, Wood, Amber, *Valuing Resiliency Benefits in Building Retrofit Programs*. American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, (March 2024), p. vi. <https://www.aceee.org/blog-post/2024/03/ignoring-resilience-benefits-limits-growth-energy-efficiency-programs>

¹⁹¹ US DOE, supra note 78, p. 4.

1 benefit both the customer and the utility.”¹⁹² The DEQ recognizes the myriad
2 benefits of DERs, such as enhanced resilience, the ability to provide ancillary
3 services, and reducing costs of the electric system, at various points in its report.

4 Here are examples:

5 In a well-designed system, DERs can provide positive net value to the grid,
6 *such as avoided infrastructure investments, improved resilience, and*
7 *increased integration of clean energy.* Through these capabilities,
8 customers can help mitigate or in certain cases, reduce electricity cost when
9 they offer services to the utility. For example, customers who choose EE
10 measures that shape their load to complement grid resource availability are
11 contributing to *keeping costs down for all customers...*¹⁹³ (Emphasis
12 added).

13 DEQ also states, “[d]istributed energy resources, including EE, demand-side
14 management, solar, and storage have the potential to provide valuable services to
15 the electricity grid and lower costs on the system while providing customers with
16 cleaner power and more control over their energy usage.”¹⁹⁴ Notably, VPPs are
17 mentioned only a single time in the context of energy storage and resiliency,
18 providing improved resilience and reducing “the need for peaker power plants,”¹⁹⁵
19 among other ancillary benefits.

¹⁹² NC DEQ, *supra.*, p. 21.

¹⁹³ *Id.*, p. 37.

¹⁹⁴ *Id.*, p. 83.

¹⁹⁵ *Id.*, p. 33, 34.

1 DEQ acknowledges that energy efficiency and demand response “decrease overall
2 electricity demand from the grid, which in turn, avoids the cost of building new
3 generation and transmission lines, saves customers money, and lowers pollution
4 from electric generation.”¹⁹⁶ However, benefits to customers – that is, working
5 towards affordability – cannot be achieved unless customers benefit financially.
6 This is discussed briefly in the context of utility-scale storage, in that there was “no
7 mechanism (at the time) to pay market participants...”¹⁹⁷ For DER’s, savings are
8 mentioned generally but not payments or bill credits specifically for participating
9 ratepayers. DEQ also notes that DERs, including information technology,
10 represent “economic development opportunities in urban and rural areas of the
11 state.”¹⁹⁸ In addition, DER’s, according to DEQ’s report, can be deployed to
12 disadvantaged areas, creating more energy equity and resilience against severe
13 weather.¹⁹⁹

14 **Q: PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IMPACTS**
15 **DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES.**

16 **A:** Critically important for North Carolina to achieve “real reliability,” is to properly
17 assess the costs and benefits of DERs. DEQ urges expansion of currently used cost-
18 benefit analysis. Here are examples of what DEQ suggested that, if implemented

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*, p. 33.

¹⁹⁷ *Id.*, p. 35.

¹⁹⁸ *Id.* p. 11.

¹⁹⁹ *Id.* p. 78.

1 properly, would make VVPs (and microgrids) equal partners with utility-scale
2 resources:

- 3 • Increased system resilience, reliability, and safety
- 4 • Reduced customer cost, especially for low-income, disadvantaged
5 communities
- 6 • Health impacts
- 7 • Increased customer flexibility and choice
- 8 • Enhanced social equity or environmental justice
- 9 • Environmental benefits, such as avoided GHG emissions
- 10 • Economic development benefits, such as job growth²⁰⁰

11 DEQ also recommended “comprehensive utility planning processes” ... to
12 “[s]trengthen resilience and flexibility of the grid.”²⁰¹

13 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT ARE THE WEAKNESSES IN DEQ’S**
14 **REPORT?**

15 **A:** Notably, the Commission is not involved in the DEQ report. The Commission, with
16 regulatory authority over utilities, should be the lead agency in these analyses. The
17 DEQ discusses Duke Energy’s existing nuclear fleet as a non-carbon emitting
18 technology,²⁰² but does not discuss the nuclear power’s vulnerability to severe
19 drought, flooding, and hurricanes. Similarly, the DEQ discusses the expansion of

²⁰⁰ *Id.* p. 78.

²⁰¹ *Id.* p. 82.

²⁰² *Id.* p. 23.

1 natural gas-fired power and anticipated increasing carbon emissions from the
2 additional capacity²⁰³ but neither their vulnerability to severe weather, nor the
3 vulnerability of the transmission system to severe weather.

4 What is disconcerting is that in its latest report, DEQ seems to marginalize the
5 critical services DERs can provide to all customers. DEQ's follow-on report in
6 2020, "Climate Risk Assessment and Resilience Plan," underscores the 2019
7 report's emphasis on DERs emphasizing "[t]he plan (the Clean Energy Plan report
8 from 2019) calls for requiring utility companies to develop projects focused on
9 distributed energy resources, community solutions, and microgrids... to enhance
10 resilience."²⁰⁴

11 However, in a discussion of administering a grant program to enhance resiliency
12 funded by the federal government, DEQ, after all the proclamations of the benefits
13 of DERs, weakens its tone of necessity. The agency states, "[a]s recommended by
14 the CEP, modernizing the grid *may* include greater deployment of energy storage,
15 use of clean energy, greater use of demand-side resources, and enhanced grid
16 operation for more flexibility and reduced response time."²⁰⁵ (Emphasis added).
17 Given the DEQ's emphasis and discussion of DERs in its 2019 report, one would
18 have expected that grid modernization at least "should", not "may," include greater
19 deployment of the resources listed, particularly DERs.

²⁰³ *Id.*, pp. 24, 25.

²⁰⁴ DEQ, *supra* note 30, p. 5L-3.

²⁰⁵ State Energy Office, *supra* note 14, p. 6.

1 **4. ISSUE 11 - ADVANCING GRID EDGE AND**

2 **CUSTOMER PROGRAMS**

3 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HOW HAVE STATE STATUTES LIMITED**
4 **RESILIENCE AND DERS?**

5 **A:** State statutes marginalize resilience and DERS by eroding the ability of DERS to
6 gain traction in relationship to utility-scale resources.

7 First, the only mention of resiliency or resilience and DERS appear in state statute
8 is in performance-based rates provisions.²⁰⁶ These are concepts that the
9 Commission “may” consider approving utility requests for performance-based
10 rates.²⁰⁷

11 Second, state statute did stipulate that if a utility filed for a certificate of need for a
12 coal or nuclear power plant, it would have to first demonstrate that “energy
13 efficiency measures; demand-side management; renewable energy resource
14 generation; combined heat and power generation; or any combination thereof,
15 would not establish or maintain a more cost-effective and reliable generation
16 system.”²⁰⁸ However, that provision was repealed in Senate Bill 678 in 2023,²⁰⁹
17 seemingly to clear the way for Duke Energy’s bid to construct small nuclear
18 reactors proposed in a previous carbon plan. Since coordinated DERS are cheaper

²⁰⁶ NC Stat. § 62-133.16. (d)(2)(i).

²⁰⁷ *Id.*

²⁰⁸ Senate Bill 678, NC Stat. § 62-110.1(e)
<https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2023/Bills/Senate/PDF/S678v6.pdf>

²⁰⁹ *Id.*

1 than utility-scale investments and more quickly deployed, Duke Energy would have
2 had a tough time justifying construction of a new nuclear design. In addition, in
3 this same provision, state statute stipulates that a proposed power plant is part of a
4 “least cost” approach to achieve state mandated carbon goals and “will maintain or
5 improve the adequacy and reliability of the existing grid.”²¹⁰

6 Notably, “adequacy” is not defined in statute. In Commission rules, adequate or
7 adequacy, although not defined outright, appears to apply mainly to quality of
8 service: the expertise to deliver service, whether the electric power system is
9 maintained and available for operation, enough fuel supply, and enough generation
10 (power capacity) and wires capacity to serve all ratepayers.²¹¹ But, resiliency is not
11 mentioned in Commission rules and DERs are only in the context of planning and
12 constrained by Duke Energy’s cost-effectiveness test and location.²¹² In fact, in its
13 mission statement, the Commission does not mention resiliency; only that it must
14 “promote adequate, reliable, and economical utility service.”²¹³ In essence, state
15 policy excludes resiliency and DERs from an aspect of service utilities must
16 provide – despite the state’s recognition that these resources can provide improved
17 resiliency, lower costs of the overall system, and provide benefits to all ratepayers
18 as well as the necessity of improving system resiliency.

²¹⁰ *Id.*

²¹¹ See generally, Rules and Regulations. North Carolina Utilities Commission.
<https://www.ncuc.gov/ncrules/rulstoc.html>

²¹² NC, Rule R8-60A(d)(iii) <https://www.ncuc.gov/ncrules/Chapter08.pdf>

²¹³ NC Utilities Commission. Retrieved April 29, 2024,
<https://www.ncuc.gov/Aboutncuc.html>

1 **Q: HOW DOES DUKE TREAT DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES IN**
2 **ITS CPIRP?**

3 **A:** Duke Energy continues to marginalize distributed resources. There is no change in
4 its Grid Edge minimal capacity from the initial carbon plan proposal to the
5 supplemental proposal, as well as distributed resources not providing power to the
6 grid.

7 Instead, Duke Energy relegates VPPs to a minimal pilot that could last 10 years,
8 the timing of which happens to coincide with Duke Energy's initially planned SMR
9 unit coming online.²¹⁴ As a comparison, Brattle Group estimates California's VPP
10 potential to be nearly 7,500 megawatts by 2035.²¹⁵ North Carolina should conduct
11 a similar analysis. Experts in VPP potential and technology raise concerns with
12 never-ending pilots and suggest pilots may not be needed at all, with the assumption
13 up front if implemented they will be successful.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Penrod, Emma, "Duke Energy pilot could open door to VPPS at vertically integrated utilities, SELC attorney says. Utility Dive (Jan. 29, 2024). <https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-energy-virtual-power-plant-vpp-PowerPair-selc-battery-solar/705812/>

²¹⁵ Hledik, Ryan, Peters, Kate, Edelman, Sophie, California's Virtual Power Potential: How Five Consumer Technologies Could Improve the State's Energy Affordability. The Brattle Group (April 2024), p. 5. https://www.brattle.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Californias-Virtual-Power-Potential-How-Five-Consumer-Technologies-Could-Improve-the-States-Energy-Affordability.pdf?utm_medium=email&hsenc=p2ANqtz-8wshqIJvstNWYtq2M4ipQfajg8UGoELRB-U3tAami4aAwnxSKIom6Djxdp_B2dOBSmqBAI3e2yCeGmRS6iCaUxO4B-jg&hsmi=302284747&utm_content=302284747&utm_source=hs_email#:~:text=We%20focus%20on%20five%20commercially,commercial%20buildings%20and%20industrial%20facilities.

²¹⁶ Utility Dive, supra note 82.

1 Duke Energy also postponed its vehicle-to-grid pilot for one year – until 2025 -
2 claiming supply chain issues as the reason.²¹⁷ However, Duke Energy’s claim is
3 suspect. For example, Cox Automotive reports record sales of EVs in 2023,
4 reaching 1.2 million and capturing more than 7.5 percent “of the total US vehicle
5 market.”²¹⁸ Similarly, Car Edge reports that Ford’s overall EV sales rose 114
6 percent during March of this year – mainly its Mustang EV²¹⁹ - electric truck sales
7 increased 52 percent in 3 weeks, over the same month.²²⁰

8 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HOW ROBUST ARE DUKE’S ENERGY**
9 **EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS?**

10 **A:** Not very. The most recent American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
11 (“ACEEE”) report on utility efficiency programs shows that Duke Energy’s
12 programs come nowhere near the flagship programs in the country with respect to
13 low-income spending, net savings, spending, peak savings, lifetime savings.²²¹ The

²¹⁷ Order Extending Starting Date of Pilot Program and Modifying Reporting Requirements, NCUC Docket No. E-7, Sub 1275 (Dec. 11, 2023), p. 3. <https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=9e2b7728-f8de-4903-bcb7-0744f6838c57>

²¹⁸ “A Record 1.2 Million EVs Were Sold in the US in 2023, According to Estimates from Kelley Bluebook.” Cox Automotive (Jan. 9, 2024). <https://www.coxautoinc.com/market-insights/q4-2023-ev-sales/>

²¹⁹ “Ford’s EV Sales Are Rising. Tesla Chargers and Price Cuts Fuel Surge.” (2024). <https://caredge.com/guides/ford-ev-sales-2024>

²²⁰ *Id.*

²²¹ Specian, Mike, Berg, Weston, Subramanian, Sagarika, Campbell, Kristin, *2023 Utility Energy Efficiency Scorecard*. ACEEE (Aug. 2023), p. 51-52, 54-55, 58-60, 65-66. <https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/U2304.pdf>

1 Southeast, according to ACEEE, is the worst region in the country for utility energy
 2 efficiency programs.²²²

3 **Table 2. Comparison of Duke Energy EE Programs in the Carolinas to Top**
 4 **Utility Programs 2021**

Category of Savings/Spending	Duke Energy Average in the Carolinas	Range of Top 10 Utilities
Low-income Spending as % of Total EE Spending	4.4%	9.74% to 59.21%
Savings as % of Sales	0.76%	1.74% to 3.00%
Spending as % of Revenue	2.1%	3.25% to 11.99%
Net Lifetime Savings as % of Sales	5.7%	20.54% to 47.02%

5

6 *Source:* EWG, data derived from ACEEE.

7 To further justify its utility-scale laden business plan, Duke Energy uses testimony
 8 of James B. Robb, President and Chief Executive Officer of the North American
 9 Electric Reliability Corporation, before Congress. However, Duke Energy leaves
 10 out important observations by Robb. Duke Energy states the following in
 11 September 2023 testimony in this proceeding – ignoring the IEEE initiative - with
 12 respect to issues with inverter-based technologies:

²²² *Id.*, p. 38-39.

1 Consistent with Mr. Robb’s testimony, *Appendix M* acknowledges
2 that operating experience across the United States underscores the
3 need to purposefully manage the pace of the energy transition to
4 identify and address new challenges before they materialize into
5 broad-based risks to the power system. For example, a key challenge
6 to maintaining grid reliability is ensuring that new resources added
7 to the grid have predictable performance characteristics so as to
8 ensure grid stability. As evidenced by continued major grid
9 disturbances, new IBR-based technologies have the potential to
10 respond to grid events unreliably. *Until improved national*
11 *standards are available to dictate, model, and validate performance*
12 *capabilities, accelerated reliance on these (IBR-based) technologies*
13 *presents System Operators with increasing, unknown risks.*²²³
14

15 (Emphasis added).
16

17 However, Robb also raised the potential for distributed resources to add to
18 resiliency and reliability, emphasizing that resource adequacy isn’t enough in
19 providing power 24/7:

20 [W]e need to better understand the impact on the bulk power system from
21 the dynamic performance associated with inverter based resources (IBRs)
22 and distributed energy resources (DERs). These understandings can then be
23 balanced against the potential for demand side management (both energy
24 efficiency and demand response) to support reliability and resilience. . .
25 Resource adequacy (capacity) does not guarantee energy sufficiency. We
26 must shift focus to 24x7 energy planning, not just capacity plus a reserve
27 margin.²²⁴ *Finally, due to the changing fuel mix, the dynamics associated*
28 *with DERs, and the potential for demand side management to support*
29 *reliability, we must shift the planning focus. Whereas resource planning*
30 *traditionally focused on having enough generation capacity during peak*
31 *demand conditions (“capacity on peak”), the focus must be broadened to*
32 *include the need for sufficient energy at all times (“energy 24x7”).*²²⁵
33

34 (Emphasis added).

²²³ Direct Testimony of Samuel Holeman III and Patrick O’Connor on Behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, NCUC Docket No. E-100, Sub 190 (Sept 1, 2023), p. 19.

²²⁴ *Id.*, p. 9.

²²⁵ *Id.*, p. 3-4.

1 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HOW DOES DUKE ENERGY VIEW UTILITY-**
2 **SCALE INVESTMENT?**

3 **A:** Despite Duke Energy recognizing that “weather extremes, particularly wide-spread
4 and prolonged cold and heat patterns, increase demand and place added load and
5 stress on the electric system”²²⁶ and that summer and fall also “pose reliability and
6 resilience challenges” from extreme heat and hurricanes,²²⁷ Duke Energy lists only
7 its utility-scale generation assets in addressing resilience issues going forward:

- 8 • “Ensuring power-plant resilience by reviewing operating experience during
9 periods of extreme cold weather and high loads, reviewing weatherization
10 enhancements, and re-baselining plant performance as necessary to properly
11 account for generator availability risks in the resource planning and reliability
12 processes.”
- 13 • “Reviewing outage planning strategies to minimize risks from overlapping
14 and/or over- concentrated planned outages on key generating units.”
- 15 • “Resilience and reliability risks are not isolated to periods of cold and winter
16 weather, and the timing of planned outages is an essential component of year-round
17 reliability.”
- 18 • “Continued assessment of fuel security, resilience, and adequacy for the
19 Companies’ supplies of natural gas and coal. A critical need for system resilience

²²⁶ Duke Energy, Carbon Plan Appendix M (Aug 17, 2023), p. 24.
<https://starw1.ncuc.gov/NCUC/ViewFile.aspx?Id=cb70dc63-f81b-42cd-bf4b-ee63e0ae2693>

²²⁷ *Id.*, p. 22.

1 is adequate firm gas transportation and fuel flexibility, including ensuring adequate
2 coal supply through retirement.

3 • “Continued improvements to cross-functional organizational awareness and
4 communication during periods of tighter system conditions and heightened
5 risks.”²²⁸

6 The reality is that that resiliency is now a year-round challenge. Duke Energy does
7 not mention VPPs or microgrids, proven to improve resilience, among other things,
8 in *Appendix M Reliability and Operational Resilience*.

9 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, DOES DUKE ENERGY ADEQUATELY ADDRESS**
10 **RESILIENCE RISKS OF CONVENTIONAL POWER PLANTS?**

11 **A:** Not in any serious manner. Duke Energy begins *Appendix M Reliability and*
12 *Operational Resilience* raising reliability issues with respect to renewables
13 increasing “operational complexity,”²²⁹ using this argument to justify more gas
14 capacity, in the near- to mid-term, and claiming that weather-dependent renewables
15 will exacerbate reliability and resiliency risks to the grid during extreme weather
16 events.

17 Duke Energy goes as far as to focus in on having to repair damaged rooftop solar
18 roofs in the wake of storms²³⁰ - notwithstanding the fact that, if prioritized, it is
19 highly unlikely that tens of thousands (or more) of rooftop solar systems would all

²²⁸ *Id.*, p. 24.

²²⁹ *Id.*, p. 1.

²³⁰ *Id.*, p. 22.

1 be rendered incapacitated while outages of a few large, centralized power plants
2 could potentially cause blackouts.

3 Duke Energy also emphasizes that the smoke from growing wildfire threats due to
4 climate change would likely reduce solar panel output,²³¹ but the recent
5 Government Accountability Report on nuclear plant vulnerabilities noted that all of
6 Duke Energy's nuclear power plants in the Carolinas are vulnerable to wildfires,
7 categorizing that risk as "high/very high."²³² The GAO states: "Wildfires pose
8 several risks to nuclear power plants, including increasing the potential for onsite
9 fires that could damage plant infrastructure, damaging transmission lines that
10 deliver electricity to plants, and causing a loss of power that could require plants to
11 shut down."²³³

12 Noting standards are forthcoming,²³⁴ Duke Energy also raises the disruption caused
13 in Texas by utility-scale solar inverters, as a cautionary note in terms of pace of
14 deployment.²³⁵ However, IEEE developed standards for interconnecting inverters
15 to the grid²³⁶ that garnered overwhelming support of participating stakeholders.

²³¹ *Id.*, p. 22, 23.

²³² GAO, *supra* note 49.

²³³ *Id.*, p. 16.

²³⁴ Duke Energy, *supra* note 149, p. 19.

²³⁵ *Id.*, p. 18

²³⁶ IEEE 2800-2022: Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of IBR Interconnecting with Transmission Systems. ERCOT Inverter-Based Resources Task Force (March 18, 2022). https://www.ercot.com/files/docs/2022/03/21/EPRI_IEEE%202800-2022_Overview_for_ERCOT_IBRTF_2022_03_18.pdf

1 Q: IN YOUR OPINION, DOES DUKE ENERGY DISCUSS THE UTILITY
2 SECTOR SUPPORT FOR NEW STANDARDS TO SMOOTH UTILITY-
3 SCALE IBRS INTEGRATION?

4 A: No. According to IEEE, in April 2022:

5 The IEEE Stands Association... working group that drafted the new
6 standard had more than *175 participants representing stakeholder*
7 *groups including IBR equipment manufacturers, project developers,*
8 *transmission planners, grid operators, researchers, regulators and*
9 *others. The draft standard was later reviewed and balloted by more*
10 *than 450 subject matter experts across the industry. The standard's*
11 *high approval rate of more than 90% at the end of the IEEE SA*
12 *balloting process documented, for the first time in North America*
13 *and beyond, a broad consensus for the technical minimum*
14 *requirements for the interconnection, capability, and performance*
15 *needed for reliable integration of IBRs into the bulk power system.*
16 *Similar consensus requirements have existed in Europe and*
17 *Australia for some years.*²³⁷

18
19 (Emphasis added).

20
21 ERCOT (the Texas RTO) was in the process of adopting standards based on IEEE
22 2800-2022 in 2023, to accommodate solar farm owners' cost objections that
23 replacing existing inverters the IEEE standard would have, in their and ERCOT's
24 view, required.²³⁸ The standard provides for viable inverter capabilities, such as
25 ride-through capability, frequency response, and reactive power voltage control.²³⁹

²³⁷ Addressing Grid Reliability As Renewable Energy Integration Speeds Up. IEEE (April 26, 2022). Retrieved April 30, 2024. <https://standards.ieee.org/beyond-standards/addressing-grid-reliability-as-renewable-energy-integration-speeds-up/>

²³⁸ ERCOT, Inverter-Based (IBR) Ride-Through Requirements. Nodal Operating Guide Revision Request, No. 245, (June 22, 2023).

²³⁹ Hoke, Andy, PhD, PE, *IEEE 2800-2022 Overview and Roadmap to Adoption*. ESIG/NAGF/NERC/EPRI Generation Interconnection Workshop (Aug. 11, 2022).

1 **Q: WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM YOUR RESEARCH?**

2 **A:** Duke Energy's business strategy has remained stagnant for over ten years,
3 emphasizing the expansion of natural gas capacity and the extension of existing
4 nuclear plants' lifetimes. Despite acknowledging climate change's impacts and the
5 potential benefits of DERs, Duke Energy has favored utility-scale investments over
6 distributed technologies, dismissing their cost-effectiveness and reliability
7 advantages. This approach has led Duke Energy to ignore viable alternatives, such
8 VVPs, which could enhance reliability and resiliency while reducing costs.
9 Duke Energy's reluctance to embrace distributed resources is evident in its
10 continued dismissal of VPPs, opting instead for utility-scale investments that
11 compromise both financial and energy security for its customers. By exploiting
12 weaknesses in North Carolina statutes, Duke Energy prioritizes reliability and
13 adequacy over resiliency, disregarding the integrated nature of these concepts in
14 the face of climate disruptions. This narrow focus on reliability serves to bolster
15 Duke Energy's profit margins at the expense of customer affordability and equity,
16 as well as the state's overall economic stability.
17 State reports highlight Duke Energy's vulnerability to climate change and stress the
18 importance of DERs, particularly VPPs, in enhancing system resilience and
19 reducing costs. To fully harness the benefits of DERs and accelerate their
20 deployment, state mandates are necessary to ensure their incorporation into utility

<https://www.esig.energy/download/ieee-2800-2022-overview-and-roadmap-to-adoption-andy-hoke/>

1 plans, using broader cost-effectiveness parameters. By mandating VPPs and
2 microgrids as essential services and incorporating them into the CPIRP, the state
3 can address Duke Energy's narrow focus and better serve the interests of its
4 customers and the broader community.

5 **Q: IN YOUR OPINION, HAS DUKE ENERGY THOROUGHLY PRESENTED**
6 **THE COMMISSION THE POTENTIAL TECHNICAL CHALLENGES**
7 **AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS CPIRP?**

8 **A:** No.

9 **Q: WHAT WOULD YOU RECOMMEND THE COMMISSION DO WITH**
10 **DUKE'S PROPOSED CPIRP?**

11 **A:** The Commission should reject Duke Energy's proposed and supplemental CPIRP.
12 The proposed supplemental CPIRP by Duke Energy fails to meet statutory
13 requirements, as it neglects to prioritize least-cost solutions and overlooks vital
14 elements for maintaining or enhancing grid reliability and adequacy. Notably
15 absent from the plan are virtual power plants (VPPs) and microgrids, which are
16 recognized as highly effective tools for achieving cost-effectiveness and improving
17 system resilience. Given the escalating impacts of climate change and the inherent
18 benefits of VPPs, the Commission should broaden the cost-effectiveness criteria,
19 as recommended by state reports and DEQ, to encompass these crucial factors,
20 along with any other relevant benefits or costs.

21 As climate change impacts will escalate and VPPs possess inherent cost-
22 effectiveness and systemwide benefits, the Commission should expand the too

1 narrow cost-effectiveness test now used by Duke Energy according to parameters
2 recommended by DEQ and any other benefit or cost the Commission deems
3 reasonable.

4 In line with NCWARN's recommendations, the Commission should prioritize the
5 statutory mandate for solar capacity deployment on residential and commercial
6 rooftops and offer direct financial incentives to program participants. Additionally,
7 efficiency measures for existing loads should be progressively increased, with
8 targeted incentives and standards to ensure compliance, particularly focusing on
9 expanding programs for low- and moderate-income households.

10 Given the inevitability of escalating climate risks, particularly along coastal areas,
11 proactive planning should commence for the decommissioning of the New
12 Brunswick nuclear plant within a decade. Furthermore, recognizing the current and
13 future threats of flooding and wildfires to Duke's nuclear fleet, the Commission
14 should initiate a docket for planning the decommissioning of these plants within
15 the next 30 years. Additionally, expedited action is warranted for the VPP pilot
16 program, with a shortened timeline of two years, aiming to achieve full-scale
17 implementation within three to five years. Likewise, initiatives for scaling up
18 vehicle-to-grid (V2G) programs should commence within the next five years to
19 maximize their benefits.

20 **Q: DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

21 **A:** Yes.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing document upon all counsel of record by email transmission.

This the 28th day of May, 2024.

/s/ Matthew D. Quinn

Matthew D. Quinn