Aug 26 2020

BEFORE THE NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. E-2, SUB 1252

In the Matter of Application by Duke Energy Progress, LLC,) for Approval of Demand-Side Management) and Energy Efficiency Cost Recovery Rider) Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.9 and) Commission Rule R8-69)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. HINTON PUBLIC STAFF – NORTH CAROLINA UTILITIES COMMISSION

August 26, 2020

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Testimony of John R. Hinton On Behalf of the Public Staff North Carolina Utilities Commission

August 26, 2020

1Q.PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS, AND2PRESENT POSITION.

A. My name is John R. Hinton. My business address is 430 North
Salisbury Street, Raleigh, North Carolina. I am the Director of the
Economic Research Division of the Public Staff - North Carolina
Utilities Commission. My qualifications are included in Appendix A
to this testimony.

8 Q. WHAT ARE YOUR DUTIES AT THE PUBLIC STAFF?

9 Α. My duties with the Public Staff include conducting financial studies 10 on the investor-required rate of return for water, natural gas, and 11 utilities electric and reviewing issues involving nuclear 12 decommissioning plans, weather normalization of energy sales, 13 electric utility meter sampling plans, the electric utilities' long-range

peak demand and energy forecasts, and the integration aspect of
the electric utilities' integrated resource plans (IRPs). I also review
electric utilities' avoided cost biennial filings, as well as avoided
cost issues for annual rider proceedings involving fuel, renewable
energy, and demand-side management and energy efficiency
(DSM/EE).

7 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS 8 PROCEEDING?

Α. 9 The purpose of my testimony is to discuss the appropriate avoided 10 capacity and energy costs that should be used to evaluate the cost-11 effectiveness of the DSM/EE programs of Duke Energy Progress, 12 LLC (DEP or Company), that are incorporated in the calculation of 13 DEP's portfolio performance incentive (PPI), pursuant to the 14 Company's cost recovery mechanism described in the Agreement 15 and Stipulation of Settlement DEP reached with the Public Staff, 16 the North Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, Environmental 17 Defense Fund, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, the South 18 Carolina Coastal Conservation League, Natural Resources 19 Defense Council, and the Sierra Club, which was filed with the 20 North Carolina Utilities Commission (Commission) on, and 21 approved in the Commission's Order Approving DSM/EE Programs 22 and Stipulation of Settlement issued on June 15, 2009, in Docket 23 No. E-2, Sub 931 (Sub 931 Mechanism). In Docket No. E-2, Sub

1145 (Sub 1145), the Commission approved certain revisions to the
 Mechanism relating to the methodology for determining avoided
 costs for purposes of the PPI calculation and determination of
 program cost-effectiveness in its Order Approving DSM/EE Rider,
 Revising DSM/EE Mechanism, and Requiring Filing of Proposed
 Customer Notice issued on November 27, 2017, (Revised
 Mechanism).

8 Q. IN SUB 1145, WHAT REVISIONS TO THE MECHANISM WERE 9 PROPOSED BY THE PUBLIC STAFF AND THE COMPANY, 10 AND APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION REGARDING 11 AVOIDED CAPACITY COSTS?

12 Α. The Public Staff and DEP proposed and the Commission approved 13 revisions to Paragraphs 18 and 70 of the Sub 1145 Mechanism that 14 clarified the avoided energy and capacity benefits used for cost 15 effectiveness calculations for program approval and the initial 16 estimate of the PPI and any PPI true-up. The revisions also 17 enabled the review of program cost-effectiveness. That review 18 uses avoided capacity costs derived from the most recent 19 Commission-approved Biennial Determination of Avoided Cost 20 Rates; as of December 31 of the year immediately preceding the 21 annual DSM/EE Rider filing date (hereafter, the "PURPA method").

1Q.WHAT IS "THE MOST RECENT COMMISSION-APPROVED2BIENNIAL DETERMINATION OF AVOIDED COSTS FOR3ELECTRIC UTILITY PURCHASES FROM QUALIFYING4FACILITIES" FOR PURPOSES OF THIS DSM/EE RIDER5PROCEEDING?

6 Α. The applicable avoided cost proceeding is Docket No. E-100, 7 Sub 158 (Sub 158), in which the Commission issued its Notice of Decision on October 7, 2019, ruling on issues that are relevant to 8 9 the calculation of avoided capacity rates and avoided energy rates. 10 DEP filed its compliance rates on November 1, 2019, and the 11 Commission issued its Order Establishing Standard Rates and 12 Contract Terms for Qualifying Facilities on April 15, 2020, 13 establishing these rates.

14 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR CONCERN REGARDING THE 15 COMPANY'S APPLICATION OF AVOIDED COST RATES FROM 16 THE SUB 158 PROCEEDING.

A. The Company has updated its underlying avoided cost inputs for
both capacity and energy to be derived from the most recent
avoided cost proceeding, Sub 158. The Public Staff, in this
proceeding, has two concerns with the Company's application of
the newly updated rates to its avoided capacity.

22 The first issue is with the avoided capacity component used for the

1 Company's Residential and Non-Residential energy efficiency 2 programs. The Company applied a 17% reserve margin value 3 adder to all of the megawatt (MW) reductions (demand reduction 4 benefits) associated with the Company's EE programs beginning 5 with vintage year 2021.

6 The second issue is with the seasonal allocation of avoided 7 capacity cost benefits for the Company's portfolio of DSM 8 programs, both Residential and Non-Residential. In Sub 158, the 9 Commission approved a seasonal allocation of 100% winter, 0% 10 summer for avoided capacity costs. However, in this proceeding 11 the Company has proposed to use a different seasonal allocation 12 than approved by the Commission. If the total summer based DSM 13 capacity for Vintage year 2021 exceeds the annual DSM summer 14 capacity as forecasted from the 2018 IRP; then, such capacity will 15 be valued at a 100% winter and a 0% summer capacity weighting. 16 However, the Company's application would use a 100% summer 17 and a 0% winter allocation for any MWs less than what is 18 forecasted by the Company's 2018 IRP.

19 The approved seasonal capacity weighting becomes an issue only 20 with respect to summer-based DSM programs that offer no 21 capacity value during the winter season; such as, with the 22 approximately 411 MWs of load reductions in year 2021 associated with the air conditioning cycling of DEP's EnergyWise Programs for
residential homes and businesses. In addition for 2021, the
EnergyWise program includes approximately 18 MW of load
reductions associated with its water heating load control for the
western service area that receives 100% of the winter-season
capacity value. Shown below is an excerpt of the reduced MW
associated with the Company's DSM programs from its 2018 IRP.

	Summer DSM													
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028				
EnergyWise Home	383	400	411	417	417	418	418	419	419	420				
Demand Response Automation	32	39	46	54	57	57	57	57	57	57				
Large Load Curtailable	287	290	292	295	298	300	300	300	300	300				
EnergyWise Business	9	14	19	24	29	29	29	29	29	29				
DSDR	213	215	215	217	218	221	224	228	231	236				
Total DSM	923	958	984	1,007	1,019	1,024	1,027	1,032	1,035	1,041				
					Winte	r DSM								
	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028				
EnergyWise Home	15	16	18	19	20	21	23	24	25	26				
Demand Response Automation	15	19	23	27	31	31	31	31	31	31				
Large Load Curtailable	246	249	251	254	256	259	259	259	259	259				
EnergyWise Business	1	2	3	4	5	5	5	5	5	5				
DSDR	213	215	215	217	218	221	224	228	231	236				
Total DSM	541	546	550	557										

9 Q. HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY 10 STRUCTURED?

- 11 A. The remainder of my testimony is presented in the following two
- 12 sections:

- 13 I. 17% Reserve Margin Adder
- 14 II. Seasonal Allocation of Capacity

I I. 17 % RESERVE MARGIN ADDER 2 Q. WHY HAS THE COMPANY INCLUDED A 17% RESERVE 3 MARGIN ADDER FOR THE DEMAND REDUCTION BENEFITS 4 ASSOCIATED WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS?

5 Α. In this proceeding, the Company proposed to increase the value of 6 the demand reduction benefits from EE programs by 17%. The 7 Company notes that the demand reduction benefits are accounted 8 as a reduction to its peak load (emphasis added) in its 2018 IRP; 9 as shown in the Company's Load, Capacity, and Reserve (LCR) 10 Tables. Key to the Company's proposal is that the demand 11 reduction benefits from EE programs are not viewed as supply-side 12 resources; rather the EE demand reductions are considered as 13 demand-side resources. The Company's argument rests on the 14 fact that to provide adequate and reliable utility service, the 15 Company increases the amount of supply-side resources by a 17% 16 reserve margin to meet the projected peak load. The Company 17 argues that their proposed reserve margin adjustment is warranted 18 for its demand-side resources associated with EE programs. Prior 19 to the 2012 merger of DEP's parent corporation with Duke Energy 20 Corporation, DEP maintained that its use of the Strategist model 21 included a reserve margin adjustment, However, since the merger, 22 DEP's IRP process has largely followed modeling practices of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC), which until its 2020 DSM/EE
 Rider filing in Docket No. E-7, Sub 1230, had not proposed a
 reserve margin adjustment for demand-side resources.

4 Q. WILL YOU EXPLAIN THE EFFECT OF THE RESERVE MARGIN 5 ADJUSTMENT ON THE IRP?

- 6 Yes. The table below is an excerpt from DEP's 2018 IRP Winter Α. 7 Projections from the LCR Table for years 2019-2025.¹ Lines 23-25 examine the impact of shifting 100 MW of demand-side resources 8 9 to a supply side resource. In 2021, DEP projects generating 10 reserves of 2,405 MW, for an actual reserve margin (RM) of 17.0% 11 (lines 21 and 22). If DEP had 100 MW less EE during 2021, the 12 load forecast would be increased by 100 MW to 14,251. By shifting 13 to a supply side resource, DEP maintains that from a planning 14 standpoint it would effectively increase its 2021 load serving 15 capacity by a 117 MW to 2,522 MW, which leads to a 17.7% 16 reserve margin; as compared to, a 17.0% reserve margin.
- DEP claims that customers benefit from this, and believes its EE programs should have their capacity benefits increased to reflect the fact that its reduced load forecast through this EE program warrants a higher avoided cost valuation. The table below

¹ The 2019 IRP is used here for illustrative purposes.

illustrates DEP's proposal from a cost perspective with respect to
 shifting 100 MW of demand-side MW savings with supply-side
 resources:

Winter Projections of Load, Capacity, and Reserves
for Duke Energy Progress 2018 Annual Plan

	[2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	
Load	Forecast								
1	DEP System Winter Peak	14,036	14,060	14,062	14,168	14,243	14,429	14,553	
2	Firm Sale	150	150	150	150	150	150	0	
3	Cumulative New EE Programs	(26)	(44)	(62)	(79)	(104)	(120)	(138)	
4	Adjusted Duke System Peak	14,161	14,166	14,151	14,239	14,289	14,458	14,415	
18	Cumulative Production Capacity	16,161	16,075	16,045	16,144	16,187	16,381	17,445	
Dema	nd Side Management (DSM)								
19	Cumulative DSM Capacity	490	501	511	521	530	537	541	
20	Cumulative Capacity w/ DSM	16,651	16,576	16,555	16,665	16,718	16,918	17,985	
Reser	ves w/ DSM								
21	Generating Reserves	2,491	2,410	2,405	2,426	2,428	2,460	3,571	
22	% Reserve Margin	17.6%	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	17.0%	24.8%	
23	Adjusted DEP system peak w/100 MW of less demand-side EE resources	14,261	14,266	14,251	14,339	14,389	14,558	14,515	
24	Genera ing Reserves w/117 MW of new demand-side EE resources	2,608	2,527	2,522	2,526	2,528	2,560	3,671	
25	Effective Reserve Margin	18 3%	17 7%	17 7%	17 60/	17 60/	17 60/	25 3%	
	Enective Reserve Margin	10.070	17.770	17.770	17.070	17.0%	17.0%	20.070	

5 Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT DEP'S CUSTOMERS WILL REALIZE

6 THIS CLAIMED VALUE?

4

A. No. The Company agrees that the MW reductions from their EE
program (demand-side resource) are not any greater; however, this
resource is awarded a higher value from a planning perspective.
This enhanced value is not realized from the customer's
perspective in the short-run and it is not entirely clear whether the
customer(s) will realize any value in the long-run. The Company's
proposed reserve margin adder will increase the avoided cost

benefits. In turn, this will increase the program's utility cost test
 result, leading to a higher Portfolio Performance Incentive (PPI)
 and higher earnings.

4 Irrespective of the balance of demand and supply resources at any 5 particular point in time, a key question is what is the appropriate 6 value customers should pay for a MW load reduction, and how is 7 the value calculated? DEP maintains customers should pay (100 8 MW * approved avoided capacity rate per kW-yr. * 1.17); while, 9 historically the value of MW reductions has been calculated (100 10 MW * approved avoided capacity rate per kW-yr). A weakness in 11 DEP's argument is the inequity of asking customers to pay 17% 12 more for the same MW reduction from an EE program, as 13 compared to a MW reduction from a DSM program. From a 14 resource planning perspective, DEP has a theoretical basis as 15 shown in the above table; however, from a ratemaking perspective 16 the logic is deficient.

Q. ARE THERE OTHER REASONS WHY YOU BELIEVE IT IS
 INAPPROPRIATE TO INCLUDE THE 17% RESERVE MARGIN
 ADDER WITH EE PROGRAMS?

A. It is inappropriate to include the 17% reserve margin adder
because it is inconsistent with the way the Mechanism states that
the avoided capacity benefits are to be determined. In Docket No.

- 1 E-2, Sub 1145, the Commission approved certain changes to the
- 2 Mechanism that updated where and how these avoided capacity
- 3 benefits are to be determined. The Mechanism in Paragraph 70A
- 4 states that:

5 "For the PPI for Vintage Years 2019 and afterwards, the program specific per kW avoided capacity benefits 6 7 and per kWh avoided energy benefits...will be derived 8 from the underlying resource plan, production cost model, and cost inputs that generated the avoided 9 10 capacity and avoided energy credits reflected in the 11 most recent Commission-approved Biennial 12 Determination of Avoided Cost Rates for Electric Utility 13 Purchases from Qualifying Facilities as of December 31 of the year immediately preceding the date of the 14 annual DSM/EE rider filing." 15

- 16 This paragraph explicitly states how the rates are to be determined,
- 17 however the Company is now including an additional component to
- 18 the equation that does not exist in the current Biennial
- 19 Determination of Avoided Cost Rates for Electric Utility Purchases
- 20 from Qualifying Facilities.
- Additionally, the Company's proposal effectively increases what customers will pay for the avoided capacity cost benefits of the EE programs by increasing the avoided capacity cost rate above the approved rate. This rate is comprised of an approved annual combustion turbine (CT) carrying cost and other factors including a Performance Adjustment Factor (PAF). The approved² PAF of 5%

² Approved in Docket No. E-100, Sub 158.

is a multiplier that increases the annual CT carrying cost, which
according to DEP should be increased by an additional 17%. From
this perspective, the impact of this adjustment increases the value
of the avoided demand reduction benefits by approximately 23%
(1.228 = 1.05*1.17) over the cost of an avoided CT underlying the
avoided capacity rates.

Q. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE AVOIDED CAPACITY COST BENEFITS WITH AND WITHOUT THE PROPOSED RESERVE MARGIN ADJUSTMENT?

10 The Company's proposal effectively raises the dollar per kW value Α. 11 of the demand reduction benefits by 17% over the approved avoided capacity rates.³ Instead of using the Sub 158 avoided 12 13 capacity cost of [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL] \$ **[END** 14 **CONFIDENTIAL]** per kW-year for 2019 and annually escalating 15 that cost out to 2044, the Company increases that value by 17% to 16 [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL] \$ [END CONFIDENTIAL] per kW-17 year for each kW of demand reduction benefits realized from its EE 18 programs. The proposed cost per kW-yr. for the demand reductions 19 associated with an EE program and with a DSM program is shown 20 in Hinton Exhibit 1.

³ As approved in Docket No E-100, Sub 158.

1 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING DEP'S 2 PROPOSED RESERVE MARGIN ADDER?

3 The Public Staff recommends that the Commission require the Α. 4 Company to remove the reserve margin adder it included for the 5 demand reduction benefits associated with its EE programs. 6 Furthermore, I believe that this is not the appropriate proceeding to 7 evaluate such a significant change to the avoided capacity costs. 8 In Docket No. E-2, Sub 1145, the Public Staff and the Company 9 agreed that the PURPA-based method of calculating avoided costs 10 was preferred over the use of the Company's IRP. In that 11 proceeding, I testified on that,

12 ...the use of PURPA-based avoided costs links the 13 savings and financial incentives afforded the Company 14 for its DSM/EE programs with the rates it pays QFs for 15 avoided energy and avoided capacity. Therefore, I 16 believe that the use of PURPA-based avoided energy 17 and capacity costs will lead to better estimates of the 18 costs avoided by the Company's DSM/EE programs, thereby providing a more accurate view of the value of 19 20 DSM and EE.

- 21Testimony of John R. Hinton, Docket No. E-2, Sub221145 at 7.
- 23 On November 27, 2017, in its Order Approving DSM/EE Rider and
- 24 Requiring Filing of Customer Notice at 25, the Commission
- 25 approved the Agreement and noted that,

26First, the revision to Paragraph 70 removes any27ambiguity regarding the proper avoided costs to be used28for calculating the PPI. The Commission finds that the

1revision to Paragraph 70 better links the savings and2financial incentives for DEP's DSM/EE programs with the3rates it pays QFs for avoided energy and avoided4capacity, and provides for regular updating to prevent5stale or outdated rates.

6 I believe the proposed reserve margin adjustment adds further 7 divergence between the application of the avoided capacity rates 8 in this proceeding and the approved avoided capacity rates in Sub 9 158. Furthermore, I believe that that it is inappropriate to propose 10 such a significant change in the valuation of the avoided energy 11 cost-benefits in this proceeding, as opposed to examining this 12 change within the review of the Mechanism. The current cost 13 recovery mechanism was approved in Docket No. E-2, Sub 1174, 14 where the PPI is based on the present value of the estimated net 15 dollar savings associated with the Company's DSM/EE programs. 16 As such, I believe that any change to the dollar savings of avoided 17 energy costs benefits from DSM/EE programs should be evaluated 18 in concert with consideration of the appropriate incentive rate in a 19 Mechanism review.

II. SEASONAL ALLOCATION OF CAPACITY

Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR CONCERN REGARDING THE COMPANY'S USE OF SEASONAL ALLOCATION FACTORS FOR LEGACY DSM PROGRAMS.

1

My concern stems from the need to ensure that the avoided 5 Α. capacity benefits or values placed on MW reductions associated 6 7 with the legacy DSM programs⁴ remain reasonable. Through data 8 requests and discussions with the Company, DEP maintains that 9 the avoided capacity benefits from the approximate 400 MW of 10 DSM programs should continue to be valued using a 100% 11 summer seasonal allocation weighting. The Company justifies this 12 approach on the basis that these "legacy" measures and 13 participation are modeled in its 2018 IRP. The Company values the 14 "incremental" measures and participation using the seasonal 15 allocation weightings of 100% winter and 0% summer.

DEP maintains it is a winter planning utility, as noted in its IRPs,
filed reserve adequacy studies, and in its previous two Biennial
Avoided Cost Proceedings.

⁴ DEP makes a distinction between "legacy" and "incremental" DSM programs in its evaluation of the portfolio and program cost effectiveness. As understood by the Public Staff and based on the Company's responses to data requests, "Legacy" DSM is the level of DSM activation capability that was originally projected for the year 2021 in the 2018 IRP. "Incremental" means all activation capability that is above the projected MW projected in the 2018 IRP for year 2021.

1Q.HOW DOES THE FACT THAT DEP IS WINTER PLANNING2AFFECT THE SEASONAL ALLOCATION OF THE VALUE OF3AVOIDED CAPACITY WITH ITS DSM/EE PROGRAMS?

4 The Company's recently approved avoided capacity rates were Α. 5 developed using seasonal weighting of 100% for the winter season 6 and 0% for the summer season. These allocations are similar to 7 those approved in Docket No. E-100, Sub 148, where DEP 8 proposed and the Commission approved seasonal allocation 9 factors of 80% for the winter season and 20% for the summer season. For Sub 158, DEP employed Astrapé Consulting to 10 11 perform a Capacity Value of Solar Study that supported QFs 12 receiving 100% of the annual avoided capacity costs during the 13 winter season; while receiving 0% of the avoided capacity cost 14 weighting during the summer season. The Study found a higher 15 loss of load risk during the winter season, which the Commission 16 approved. In addition to addressing this risk, DEC and DEP stated 17 that these seasonal allocations provide improved price signals⁵ for 18 QFs to help the Companies meet their generation needs and 19 appropriately pay QFs for the value they provide.

⁵ Docket No. E-100, Sub 158, T., Vol. 2, page 73, lines 5-13.

1Q.DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S TREATMENT OF2INCREMENTAL AND LEGACY DSM SEASONAL CAPACITY IN3THIS PROCEEDING?

4 No. The Public Staff believes the argument of separating legacy Α. 5 and incremental measures and participation in DSM/EE programs 6 has been seriously weakened by the conclusion of another avoided 7 cost proceeding where DEP's avoided cost rates are based on 8 winter planning. This emphasis on winter planning is supported by 9 the 2016 Resource Adequacy Study, which indicated that DEP's 10 long-range planning should target the winter season, and utilize a 11 17% winter reserve margin. As such, the value of summer DSM is 12 diminished and no longer has the same value for resource planning 13 purposes in terms of a capacity resource at the expected time of 14 peak and the dollar per kW associated with the demand reductions. 15 In Docket No. E-100, Sub 157, the Commission directed DEC and 16 DEP to conduct another reserve margin study for their 2020 IRPs, 17 which is currently being developed. Based on recent discussions 18 among the Company, Astrapé Consulting, and the Public Staff, in 19 preparation for the 2020 IRP filing, it is my understanding that the results of the upcoming study will show that DEP remains winter 20 21 planning.

Lastly, I have a concern about the emphasis that the Companyplaces on the projected number of MWs associated with the DSM

1 in its 2018 IRP in relation to the approved avoided costs from Sub 2 158. The sole use of the generation expansion plan from the 2018 3 IRP in the determination of the avoided energy costs using 4 PROSYM, a production cost model, in Sub 158. Furthermore, the 5 2018 IRP has no role in determining the timing and the level of 6 avoided capacity costs in this proceeding. As noted, the Company 7 has produced reserve margin studies of its shift to winter planning. 8 This shift to winter planning has been noted in prior IRPs and, more 9 importantly, in its previous two Biennial Avoided Cost proceedings. 10 As such, I believe that the approved seasonal allocation of 100% 11 winter and 0% summer weighting should take precedence over the 12 MW reductions that were projected in its 2018 IRP.

13Q.WILL YOUR PROPOSAL PROVIDE ADDED MOTIVATION FOR14THE COMPANY TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE THE WINTER

15 **PEAKS?**

A. Yes, the allocation of seasonal capacity value to all of the DSM
programs would appropriately direct the Company to emphasize
programs that focus on reducing load during the winter season. I
am aware the Company has already begun such an investigation
aimed at reducing winter peak loads, and has filed modifications to
its Residential Load Control Rider, Docket No. E-2, Sub 927, this
week would provide a winter-focused load control program.

1Q.ARE OTHER REASONS WHY YOU DO NOT SUPPORT THE2COMPANY'S USE OF A 100% SUMMER SEASON CAPACITY3ALLOCATION FOR ITS DSM PROGRAMS?

4 Yes. While the Company's Reserve Adequacy Studies provide Α. 5 evidence that DEP is winter planning, the fact that the Company's 6 highest cost of generation typically occurs in the winter season 7 provides additional support for its claim that its capacity needs are 8 greatest in the winter season. With the peak demands for 9 electricity, the marginal costs of fuel, variable O&M, and the 10 occasional start costs of additional generation to serve the 11 customers are four to five times, or more, higher than the average 12 cost approved in rates. As such, it is in the Company's best interest 13 to consider the activation of its DSM programs during those times. 14 Shown below are a history of the last twelve years of DEP's day-15 ahead lambdas, which illustrates the relative dominance of the 16 expected costs of generation during the winter season and the 17 lower and less volatile day-ahead lambdas during the summer 18 seasons relative to the winter seasons.

[BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL]





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[END CONFIDENTIAL]

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While the avoided energy costs for the hour of the peak do not represent the capacity value of a DSM program, it should follow that high energy prices tend to follow constrained conditions.

6 Another reason for the Company's decision to activate is primarily, 7 but not always, a function of available generation, be it an 8 emergency condition or simply low reserves required to meet the 9 expected load. In Hinton Exhibit 2 are exhibits from previous 10 DSM/EE rider filings (2015-2019) on the activations of DEP's 11 EnergyWise and other DSM programs. Exhibit 2 shows that the capacity needs and emergency events that lead to activations most
often occur during the winter season. My intent in discussing DEP's
historical DSM activations is to show the evolving role that these
programs play in providing sufficient capacity. I do not intend to
imply that these programs are not valuable; rather, I am pointing
out that their capacity value has changed relative to the shifting of
the seasonal weighting capacity needs from summer to winter.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING DEP'S PROPOSED SEASONAL ALLOCATION OF CAPACITY VALUE FOR ITS LEGACY DSM PROGRAMS?

11 Α. The Public Staff recommends that the Commission deny DEP's 12 proposal to give its legacy DSM/EE programs a 100% summer 13 weighting under its current IRP winter planning scenario, and 14 require DEP to recalculate cost effectiveness and its PPI using a 15 100% winter and 0% summer allocation of avoided capacity 16 benefits. This would value the demand reduction benefits from 17 DSM on the same basis as any other demand reductions the 18 Company may realize from QFs. To do otherwise would have 19 ratepayers reward the Company with a PPI that is based on over-20 valued kW savings via the use of DEP's proposed 100% summer 21 seasonal capacity allocation despite its need for winter DSM. 22 Whereas, a 100% seasonal capacity allocation for winter and 0% 23 for seasonal capacity allocation for summer strikes a reasonable balance of the value of DSM/EE programs for ratepayers and the
 Company.

3 Furthermore, I note that my recommendation to use the Sub 158 4 seasonal allocation factors will not cause any legacy DSM 5 programs to be no longer cost effective. These programs remain 6 cost effective is, in part, due to the significant role of avoided T&D 7 costs which provide almost the same value as 100% of the avoided 8 capacity cost. My recommendation to use the Sub 158 seasonal 9 weighting of avoided capacity costs reduces the cost-effectiveness 10 of these programs and the overall cost-effectiveness of the portfolio 11 of programs as shown in Public Staff witness Williamson Exhibit 4.

12 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

13 A. Yes, it does.

APPENDIX A PAGE 1 OF 2

QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE

JOHN ROBERT HINTON

I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington in 1980 and a Master of Economics degree from North Carolina State University in 1983. I joined the Public Staff in May of 1985. I filed testimony on the long-range electrical forecast in Docket No. E-100, Sub 50. In 1986, 1989, and 1992, I developed the long-range forecasts of peak demand for electricity in North Carolina. I filed testimony on electricity weather normalization in Docket Nos. E-7, Sub 620, E-2, Sub 833, and E-7, Sub 989. I filed testimony on customer growth and the level of funding for nuclear decommissioning costs in Docket No. E-2, Sub 1023. I filed testimony on the level of funding for nuclear decommissioning costs in Docket Nos. E-7, Subs 1026, and 1146. I have filed testimony on the Integrated Resource Plans (IRPs) in Docket No. E-100, Subs 114 and 125, and I have reviewed numerous peak demand and energy sales forecasts and the resource expansion plans filed in electric utilities' annual IRPs and IRP updates.

I have been the lead analyst for the Public Staff in numerous avoided cost proceedings, filing testimony in Docket No. E-100, Subs 106, 136, 140, 148. I have filed a Statement of Position in the arbitration case involving EPCOR and Progress Energy Carolinas in Docket No. E-2, Sub 966. I filed testimony on avoided costs in DSM/EE rider cases in Docket No.s E-7, Sub 1130, E-2, Sub 1145, E-7, Sub 1230.

APPENDIX A PAGE 2 OF 2

I have filed testimony on the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) in Docket Nos. E-2, Sub 669; SP-132, Sub 0; E-7, Sub 790; E-7, Sub 791; and E-7, Sub 1134.

I have filed testimony on the issue of fair rate of return in Docket Nos. E-22, Sub 333; E-22, Sub 412; P-26, Sub 93; P-12, Sub 89; G-21, Sub 293; P-31, Sub 125; G-5, Sub 327; G-5, Sub 386; G-9, Sub 351; P-100, Sub 133b; P-100, Sub 133d (1997 and 2002); G-21, Sub 442; W-778, Sub 31; and W-218, Sub 319 and E-22, Sub 532; and several smaller water utility rate cases. . I have filed testimony on credit metrics and the risk of a credit downgrade in Docket No. E-7, Sub 1146.

I have filed testimony on the hedging of natural gas prices in Docket No. E-2, Subs 1001 and 1018. I have filed testimony on the expansion of natural gas in Docket No. G-5, Subs 337 and 372. I performed the financial analysis in the two audit reports on Mid-South Water Systems, Inc., Docket No. W-100, Sub 21. I testified in the application to transfer of the CPCN from North Topsail Water and Sewer, Inc. to Utilities, Inc., in Docket No. W-1000, Sub 5. I have filed testimony on weather normalization of water sales in Docket No. W-274, Sub 160.

With regard to the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act, I was a member of the Small Systems Working Group that reported to the National Drinking Water Advisory Council of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. . I have published an article in the National Regulatory Research Institute's Quarterly Bulletin entitled Evaluating Water Utility Financial Capacity.

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit I

CONFIDENTIAL

		Approved Biennial
	Approved Biennial	Avoided Cost Rate
	Avoided Cost Rate	(\$/kW-yr) with 17%
Year	(\$/kW-yr)	Adder
2019		
2020		
2021		
2022		
2023		
2024		
2025		
2026		
2027		
2028		
2029		
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Duke Energy Progress System Event Based Demand Response January 1, 2018 - December 31, 2018 Docket Number E.2, Sub 1206

Evans Exhibit 5

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit 2 Page 1 of 4

Duke Energy Progress System Event Based Demand Response January 1, 2017 - December 31, 2017 Docket Number E-2, Sub 1174

Notes:

-'Customers Notified' is the number of participants notified to participate in the event
 'Switches Dispatched' values represent the monthly active switch counts
 -'MW Reduction' values are based on the average across all hours of the event

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit 2 Page 2 of 4 Duke Energy Progress System Event Based Demand Response January 1, 2016 - December 31, 2016 Docket Number E-2, Sub 1145

MW Reduction	82	180	132	5.3	193	18.6	143	20.9	114.5	1	20.9	201	200	211	141.2	192
Customers Notified /Switches Dispatched	NA	NA	NA	7,358/9,726	NA	18 Customers / 59 Sites	141,195 / 162,713	18 Customers / 59 Sites	105,680 / 121,401	459 / 526	18 Customers / 59 Sites	NA	NA	NA	144,406 / 165,866	NA
Event Trigger	Economic Event	Economic Event	Economic, Low Reserves	Economic, Low Reserves	Economic, Low Reserves	Tariff - Minimum Event	Economic, Low Reserves	Tariff - Minimum Event	Emergency, Regional Control	Emergency, Regional Control	Tariff - Minimum Event	Economic Event	Economic Event	Economic Event	Economic, Low Reserves	Economic, Low Reserves
Program Name	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	DEP EnergyWise Home	DSDR	DEP DRA	DEP EnergyWise Home	DEP DRA	DEP EnergyWise Home	DEP EnergyWise Home	DEP DRA	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	DEP EnergyWise Home	DSDR
State	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC
Date	1/19/2016	1/20/2016	2/8/2016	2/11/2016	2/11/2016	6/23/2016	6/23/2016	7/8/2016	7/24/2016	7/24/2016	7/26/2016	7/26/2016	7/27/2016	7/28/2016	9/8/2016	11/22/2016

Notes:

'Customers Notified' is the number of participants notified to participate in the event
 'Switches Dispatched' values represent the monthly active switch counts
 'MW Reduction' values are based on the average across all hours of the event

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit 2 Page 3 of 4 Duke Energy Progress System Event Based Demand Response January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015 Docket Number E-2, Sub 1108

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MW Reduction	197	123	6	8	172	6	141	192	206	184	192	149	226	173	15	255	240	16	6	1	149	144	150	135	20	Ω	224	207	115	21	241	228	249	127	107	17	185	211	113	
Customers Notified /Switched Dispatched	NA	NA	6,506/8,809	29	NA	6,503/8,808	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	6,528/8,835	NA	75	6,526/8,832	31	4	NA	126,105/161,853	126,254/162,033	NA	53	9	NA	NA	125,212/160,682	53	NA	125,754/161,357	NA	NA	126,261/161,985	54	NA	NA	126,763/162,638	
Event Trigger	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Economic, Low Reserves	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Emergency	Economic, Low Reserves	Economic, Low Reserves	Economic, Low Reserves	Economic, Low Reserves	Rider Minimum Requirement	Rider Minimum Requirement	Economic Event	Economic Event	Economic, Low Reserves	Rider Minimum Requirement	Economic Event	100% Full Shed Test	Economic Event	Economic Event	Economic Event	Rider Minimum Requirement	Economic Event	Economic Event	Economic Event						
Program Name	DSDR	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	DRA-Curtailable	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	DSDR	Large Load Curtailable	EnergyWise Home	DRA-Curtailable	DRA-Emergency Generator	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	EnergyWise Home	DSDR	DRA-Curtailable	DRA-Emergency Generator	DSDR	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	DRA-Curtailable	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	DSDR	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	DRA-Curtailable	DSDR	DSDR	EnergyWise Home	
State	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	NC and SC	
Date	01/07/15	01/08/15	01/08/15	01/08/15	01/09/15	01/09/15	01/28/15	01/29/15	02/03/15	02/06/15	02/13/15	02/15/15	02/16/15	02/19/15	02/19/15	02/20/15	02/20/15	02/20/15	02/20/15	02/20/15	06/15/15	06/15/15	06/16/15	06/16/15	06/16/15	06/16/15	06/18/15	06/22/15	06/23/15	06/23/15	06/24/15	07/10/15	07/20/15	07/21/15	07/21/15	07/21/15	08/04/15	08/05/15	08/05/15	

Notes: - 'Customers Notified' is the number of participants notified to participate in the event - 'Switches Dispatched' values represent the daily active switch counts - 'WW Reduction' values are at the generator based on the average across all hours of the event

Public Staff Hinton Exhibit 2 Page 4 of 4