1	PLACE: Held via Videoconference	
2	DATE: Wednesday, January 13, 2021	
3	TIME: 2:00 p.m 3:12 p.m.	
4	DOCKET NO.: E-2, Sub 1268	
5	E-7, Sub 1245	
6	BEFORE: Chair Charlotte A. Mitchell, Presiding	
7	Commissioner ToNola D. Brown-Bland	
8	Commissioner Lyons Gray	
9	Commissioner Daniel G. Clodfelter	
10	Commissioner Kimberly W. Duffley	
11	Commissioner Jeffrey A. Hughes	
12	Commissioner Floyd B. McKissick, Jr.	
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15	IN THE MATTER OF:	
16	Oral Argument	
17	Protest Related to Informational Filing	
18	by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and	
19	Duke Energy Progress, LLC	
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 CHAIR MITCHELL: Good afternoon. Let's come 3 to order and go on the record, please. I'm Charlotte 4 Mitchell, Chair of the Utilities Commission, and with 5 me today by way of remote connection are the following 6 Commissioners. When I say your name, please announce your presence. Commissioner ToNola Brown-Bland. 7 8 COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: (Inaudible). 9 (Audio feedback) 10 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Gray. 11 COMMISSIONER GRAY: Here. 12 CHAIR MITCHELL: I'm picking up some 13 feedback so make sure you're on mute if you're not 14 speaking. Okay. Commissioner Clodfelter. 15 COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yes. Good 16 afternoon. 17 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Duffley. COMMISSIONER DUFFLEY: Good afternoon. 18 19 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Hughes. 20 COMMISSIONER HUGHES: Good afternoon. 21 Hello. 22 CHAIR MITCHELL: And Commissioner McKissick. 23 COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: Present. 24 CHAIR MITCHELL: The Commission now calls

for Oral Argument, Docket Numbers E-2, Sub 1268 and E-7, Sub 1245, In the Matter of Protest Related to Informational Filing by Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress. I will refer to Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress as the Companies.

On December 11th, 2020, the Companies filed a Joint Informational Filing in their respective company folders regarding their plans for membership and participation in the proposed Southeast Energy Exchange Market noting that the Companies' participation in SEEM will allow improved efficiency in bilateral agreements for the purchase and sale of excess power. The Companies stated their intention to file a Platform Agreement with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or the FERC, on December 28th, 2020.

On December 17th, the Sierra Club, the
Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, and the North
Carolina Sustainable Energy Association, whom I'll
refer to as the Protestants, filed a Joint Protest
contending that the Companies should have filed their
Informational Filing under the advance notice
provision of the Amended Regulatory Conditions that
were approved by the Commission on August 24th, 2018.

Upon filing of the Joint Protest, the Commission transferred the Informational Filing from the Company folders into the above-captioned dockets.

On December 21st, 2020, the Companies filed their Joint Response in opposition to the Protest.

On December 23rd, 2020, the Commission issued an Order that directed the Public Staff to file a response to the Joint Protest by January 6th, 2021; directed the Companies not to file the Platform Agreement with the FERC until further Order of the Commission; and scheduled remote oral argument for this date and time, at which the parties are to address the sole issue of whether the Commission's pre-approval of the Platform Agreement is required pursuant to either Statute or the Regulatory Conditions before the Platform Agreement may be filed at the FERC.

On January 6th, 2021, the Public Staff filed its Response, stating that it concludes the Commission's pre-approval of the Platform Agreement is not required pursuant to 62 -- North Carolina General Statute § 62-153 or the Companies' current Regulatory Conditions prior to the Agreements being filed at the FERC.

On January 6th, the Companies filed a motion requesting admission pro hac vice for Molly Suda to appear on their behalf in the proceeding, which the Commission granted by Order dated January 8th, 2021.

Also on January 8th, 2021, the Protestants filed a motion seeking leave to reply to the Public Staff's Response, which the Commission granted by Order on January 11th, 2021.

In compliance with the requirements of the State Government Ethics Act, I remind all members of the Commission of their responsibility to avoid conflicts of interest, and inquire whether any member of the Commission has a conflict of interest with respect to matters coming before us this afternoon?

The record will reflect that no conflicts have been identified, and we will move forward with the proceeding and I call on counsel now for the parties to announce their appearances, beginning with the Companies.

(No response)

MS. FENTRESS: Good afternoon,

Commissioners. My name is Kendrick Fentress. I'm

appearing on behalf of the Companies. With me -
appearing with me today is Associate General Counsel,

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Molly Suda, and Deputy General Counsel, Danielle
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    Bennett. Thank you.
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              CHAIR MITCHELL: Good afternoon,
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    Ms. Fentress, Ms. Suda and Ms. Bennett.
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               Public Staff.
              MS. CULPEPPER: Good afternoon. This is
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    Elizabeth Culpepper with the Public Staff appearing on
 8
    behalf of the Using and Consuming Public. Appearing
    with me is Robert Josey.
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               CHAIR MITCHELL: Good afternoon,
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    Ms. Culpepper and Mr. Josey.
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               Protestants.
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              MR. LEDFORD: Chair Mitchell, Members of the
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    Commission, Peter Ledford appearing on behalf of
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    NCSEA. With me is Ben Smith.
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              MS. HUTT: Chair Mitchell, Commissioners, my
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    name is Maia Hutt and I'm with the Southern
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    Environmental Law Center. I'm appearing on behalf of
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    the Sierra Club and the Southern Alliance for Clean
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    Energy. And with me is Gudrun Thompson, also from the
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    Southern Environmental Law Center.
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              CHAIR MITCHELL: Good afternoon, Ms. Hutt
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    and Ms. Thompson. Ms. Hutt, you are not on camera so
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you need to make sure that you solve your video issue.

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MS. HUTT: Thank you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Anyone else for the Protestants?

(No response)

We will proceed. Just a few words on the procedure we will employ today. Without objection from any of the parties, we will follow -- we will proceed in the following order: We'll hear first from the Protestants, then from the Public Staff, and then from Duke. I'd ask that you all keep your arguments to under 20 minutes. Please don't simply repeat what you've already written. We've read your comments. We will read them again. Take advantage of this opportunity to clear up any confusion or to provide any additional information or support for your position that will allow us to better understand the issues.

MS. CULPEPPER: Chair Mitchell. Elizabeth Culpepper. We had anticipated going last. We think that Duke can clear up a lot of the questions maybe about the Platform Agreement and different issues that can be better explained by them instead of us, so we would request to go last.

CHAIR MITCHELL: If there are no objections,

then we will hear first from Protestants, then Duke, then the Public Staff.

MS. CULPEPPER: Thank you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: And it is my assumption that we will hear from only one of the Protestants, that you all will be making a joint argument, and if I am incorrect in that assumption please let me know at this point and time.

MR. LEDFORD: Chair Mitchell, the Joint
Protesting Parties have identified a number of issues.

Ms. Hutt is going to address the first two issues and then I will address the second two, the last two issues.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you for that,

Mr. Ledford. I would ask that you all do your best to
keep your total time under 20 minutes. Mr. Ledford or

Ms. Hutt, you all may proceed.

MS. HUTT: Thank you, Chair Mitchell. Good afternoon. The Protesting Parties would like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal.

Before I get started, I'd like to very briefly explain why we filed this Protest and why we believe that it is important for this Commission to exercise its authority on this matter.

To be clear, the Protesting Parties are not opposed to wholesale market coordination, and we are not trying to derail the SEEM. We are here because, along with potential benefits, arrangements like the SEEM create a real risk of undue discrimination and anticompetitive behavior and, in light of this risk, it is critical that the Commission enforce safeguards that were put in place by State Law and by the Regulatory Conditions that ensure transparency and accountability.

We recognize that the Commission has convened this argument to address the sole issue of whether the Commission's pre-approval of the Platform Agreement is required before the Platform Agreement is filed with the FERC. The answer to that question is yes with one qualification. The Commission has the authority and the obligation under the Regulatory Condition to require that the Companies give full notice and obtain explicit approval before filing the executed Platform Agreement with the FERC.

To explain this conclusion we must answer several questions. The first is what is the SEEM Platform Agreement? The second, is it the kind of agreement that this Commission has jurisdiction over?

Third, what does -- what do the Regulatory Conditions require? And, fourth and finally, when in time does the Commission's jurisdiction lie? I will address the first two questions and Mr. Ledford will address the second two.

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The type of jurisdiction that this Commission has depends on the nature of the SEEM The Companies are holding out SEEM as a small entity. tweak to the existing bilateral energy market. fact, it is far more. The SEEM is a power pool. is significant because power pools are subject to additional regulatory oversight due to the potential for undue discrimination and anticompetitive behavior in these kinds of arrangements. It is also significant because the FERC has not claimed exclusive jurisdiction over power pools. FERC Order 888-A defines a "loose power pool" as any multilateral arrangement that explicitly or implicitly contains discounted and/or special transmission arrangements. In an effort to eliminate undue discrimination, the FERC purposely defined pooling arrangements in the broadest terms possible.

And so the SEEM Platform Agreement meets both prongs of this definition set forth by the FERC.

First, the Platform Agreement is inarguably a multilateral agreement. What the Agreement does is it requires members to provide each other access to their transmission system for transactions that make use of the pooled facility.

The facilities are pooled and included in a network map that the SEEM algorithm then uses to allocate available transmission. Essentially, the SEEM algorithm is an automated pool operator. It matches transactions that use the pooled transmission, it makes reservations for the contract path on the pooled transmission, and it tags transactions.

The SEEM Platform Agreement meets the second prong of FERC's definition of a "loose power pool" because it contains discounted and/or special transmission arrangements. The Platform Agreement provides that the transmission rate and rates for ancillary services are provided at a discounted rate of zero dollars per megawatt hour. The Platform Agreement also contains special terms and conditions that apply to the pooled transmission. For example, the transmission will have the lowest curtailment priority, and energy exchanges are the only qualified use of the pooled transmission facility. And for

these reasons, the SEEM Platform Agreement meets both prongs with the FERC definition of a loose power pool and warrants the heightened regulatory oversight on the state and federal level.

And as I mentioned, the fact that the SEEM is a power pool is important because the FERC has not claimed exclusive jurisdiction over power pools or utilities' participation in power pools. And, so contrary to the Companies' assertion in their filing, this Commission is empowered to take action on the SEEM Platform Agreement.

FERC has historically been very careful not to interfere with state regulatory authority or requirements that apply to the -- to utilities' entry into and exit from arrangements like RTOs and power pool. For example, in its update to FERC Order 888, the FERC declined to assert exclusive jurisdiction and impose any particular market structure upon utilities. FERC has also stated that it is committed to federal-state comity on RTO and other issues, and it's open to states imposing reasonable conditions on utilities' participation and arrangements of this nature. As Mr. Ledford will explain, the Regulatory Conditions as they exist today are just that, they

contain reasonable requirements that when enforced do not run afoul of FERC's jurisdiction.

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In this reading of FERC precedent, it's supported by the fact that this Commission and other state commissions have regularly been required to approve utilities' entry and exit from wholesale markets and transmission arrangements. For example, in 2004, Dominion applied to this Commission to get permission to participate in PJM. In 2011, DEC and PEC came to this Commission for approval to file their Joint Dispatch Agreement, which is a pooling agreement, a pooling arrangement with the FERC. other state commissions have been doing the same thing for many years with no objection from the FERC. fact, just a few years back, the FERC actually enforced the condition that the Kentucky Public Utility Commission placed on utilities' entries into an EIM. And so this history demonstrates that state commissions have previously regularly exercised jurisdiction over transmission arrangements like the SEEM Platform Agreement, and this Commission is empowered to do so here.

And finally, I'd like to say a few words about the Orangeburg case. Public Staff asserts that

the D.C. Circuit's decision in Orangeburg prohibits this Commission from exercising jurisdiction over the SEEM Platform Agreement before the Companies file the Executed Agreement with the FERC. This is incorrect for two reasons: First, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Orangeburg simply doesn't apply to this issue at In Orangeburg, the court held that the FERC could not justify disparate wholesale rates for interstate customers by relying on a state commissions' authority. In other words, it was the Commission's authority to regulate wholesale rates for interstate electricity sales that was at issue. is a very different issue from what we're discussing today. Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the FERC on remand addressed this Commission's authority to exercise jurisdiction over utilities' entry into a transmission arrangement such as an RTO or power pool.

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And so given FERC's long history of not interfering with state regulatory authorities or requirements related to entry into such arrangement, and given the reality that state commissions regularly review applications to join RTOs and power pools, we should not lightly presume that the FERC has preempted this Commission's right to have a significant input on

decisions related to the Companies' entry into a power pool. And second, as you know, the Regulatory Conditions were revised post Orangeburg, so the conditions that remain and which our protest relies on, have already been determined by the Public Staff and by this Commission to be compliant with the Orangeburg case.

And I will now turn it over to Mr. Ledford who will discuss the Regulatory Conditions and the issue of where in time the Commission should exercise its jurisdiction. Thank you.

MR. LEDFORD: Thank you. Madam Chair,

Members of the Commission, turning now to the specific

Regulatory Conditions, the protesting parties have

identified four that merit the Commission's attention:

Sections 3.9(b), 3.9(c), 3.9(d), and 4.10.

First, Regulatory Condition 3.9(b) applies because SEEM involves DEC and DEP in joint coordination and operation of transmission. Simply put, it is clear that the Platform Agreement involves DEC and DEP and how -- and impacts how they operate their transmission. As an example, under current practice or under the SEEM, if DEP wishes to sell excess energy to TVA they would have to wheel

electricity across DEC's transmission system.

Currently, in essence, DEP picks up the phone and calls DEC to see if there is transmission capacity available. However, the Platform Agreement changes how DEC operates its transmission system. DEC instead will be complying with the directives of the SEEM rather than responding to a request from DEP regarding capacity for wheeling. The SEEM Platform Agreement clearly creates a coordinated market that automates and changes how the Companies operate their transmission capacity.

Second, Regulatory Condition 3.9(c) has not been satisfied, because DEC and DEP have failed to file their revised Open Access Transmission Tariffs, a pool-wide OATT, or the enabling agreements between SEEM members. Regulatory Condition 3.9(c) requires that DEC, DEP, Duke Energy and other affiliates shall file notice with the North Carolina Commission for informational purposes at least 15 days prior to filing with the FERC in the Agreement, tariff, or other document, or proposed amendment that has the potential to affect DEC or DEP's retail cost of service for its system power supply resources or a transmission system, or be interpreted as involving

DEC or DEP in joint planning, coordination, dispatch, or operation of generation, or transmission, or otherwise have an affect on DEC or DEP's rates or services.

Platform Agreement Section 3.4 states that

Participating Transmission Providers shall amend their

Tariffs to include provision of Non-Firm Energy

Exchange Transmission Service and, if required by Law,

shall also obtain acceptance of such provisions from

the FERC or other such Governmental Entities having

jurisdiction over the Tariff.

In addition, the Companies have not provided this Commission with the Southeast Energy Exchange Market algorithm. The Platform Agreement defines the "algorithm" as the mathematical equations that determine the matching Bids and Offers resulting in Energy Exchanges. However, the FERC has previously required markets to make their algorithms publicly available.

A decision involving the California ISO at 81 FERC 61, 122, the FERC directed the ISO to make publicly available the algorithm that it used to manage congestion saying, quote, market participants need to understand how dispatch decisions are made.

Simply put, this Commission doesn't even have enough information to make a decision regarding the SEEM either -- because the Companies have failed to provide numerous documents required by the Regulatory Conditions.

Third, Regulatory Condition 3.9(d) applies because the SEEM is comparable to an RTO. First of all, as Ms. Hutt noted, the SEEM is a power pool, and you may recall she cited FERC Orders 888 and 888-A. Those FERC orders set out the various wholesale market reforms including both power pools and Regional Transmission Organizations or RTOs. Clearly, a power pool is a comparable entity under Regulatory Condition 3.9(d). And, as Ms. Hutt discussed, the FERC has long recognized that it has concurrent jurisdictions — jurisdiction with state public utilities commissions over utility participation in organized markets such as RTOs and power pools. This Commission's concurrent jurisdiction is reflected in Regulatory Condition 3.9(d).

Fourth and finally, Regulatory Condition
4.10 makes clear that Duke shall take all necessary
actions to prevent the generating facilities owned or
controlled by DEC or DEP from being considered by the

FERC to be part of a power pool. As discussed in detail, SEEM is a power pool under the FERC's definition of that term.

Moreover, looking at transmission, during the Duke Progress merger the Commission was concerned that the Joint Dispatch Agreement would alter DEC and DEP's transmission rights and obligations. This is reflected in Section 5.2(g) of the JDA which says that nothing in this Agreement is intended to alter the parties' contractual or regulatory obligations including, without limitation, the following, DEC and PEC's respective transmission rights and obligations including rights and obligations under any transmission service agreements or transmission tariffs and their respective obligations to provide transmission services.

The Platform Agreement alters the parties' obligations under their transmission tariffs. DEC and DEP admit that they will have to amend their tariffs to add the SEEM service and make the SEEM work. This is not a violation of the Joint Dispatch Agreement, but it is something that the Utilities Commission was concerned about when evaluating the JDA during the merger.

The Platform Agreement changes the Companies' respective obligations to provide transmission services by creating a pooling agreement in which companies no longer control all of the transmission service provided by -- provided on their system determining algorithm, and transmission reservations will be done by the algorithm.

And with regard to generation, under Section 4.1(b) of the JDA, DEC shall act as the Joint Dispatcher and shall have responsibilities for new short-term power purchases to serve the parties native loads. There's an open question as to whether DEC will be the participant in SEEM where Duke Energy Progress sells and purchases through the SEEM Platform. How would the JDA overlay on the SEEM? It could certainly increase opacity in what is already a non-transparent structure. And the question remains whether the JDA will need to be amended so that DEP can make its own sales and purchases through the SEEM.

The final question in the Commission's analysis regards when in time the Commission's jurisdiction lies. Specifically, does this Commission have jurisdiction before Duke files at the FERC or after Duke files at the FERC? The answer to this

question is not a legal one but a factual one. timing of this Commission's jurisdiction hinges on the timing of Duke's execution of the Platform Agreement. The Regulatory Conditions made clear that Duke cannot join SEEM without this Commission's approval. Condition 3.9(b) says absent explicit approval. Condition 3.9(d) says contingent upon state regulatory approval. So the issue of when Duke plans to execute the Platform Agreement impacts this Commission's jurisdiction. If Duke plans to execute the Platform Agreement prior to filing at the FERC, then the Commission's jurisdiction lies prior to the FERC If Duke plans to execute the Platform Agreement after SEEM has been approved by the FERC, then the Commission's jurisdiction lies after the FERC filing.

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answer this factual question. Duke has gone to great lengths to obfuscate when it plans to sign the Platform Agreement. The best insight is the statement in Duke's Joint Response in opposition to protest where they state that nothing in the complaint authorizes the Commission to grant the requested relief of prohibiting the Companies from entering into

the Platform Agreement and filing it at the FERC.

In terms of relief, first we request that the Commission exercise its authority under Regulatory Conditions 3.9(b), (c) and (d) and 4.10 to prevent the Companies from entering into the SEEM Platform Agreement without explicit approval from the Commission; second, we request that the Commission direct the Companies to request and receive permission from this Commission to execute the Platform Agreement; third, if the Companies plan to execute the SEEM Platform Agreement prior to it being filed with FERC, we request that the Commission require the Companies to file the necessary required information: Revised OATTs, a pool-wide OATT, and the enabling agreements between DEC, DEP and other SEEM participants.

Finally, if the Commission concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over whether the Companies may enter into the SEEM Platform Agreement, we ask that the Commission request that the Companies hold off on entering into the Platform Agreement until the Commission has had an opportunity to consider the impact of SEEM on ratepayers. Thank you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Ledford and

Ms. Hutt.

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Ms. Fentress, you all are up.

MS. FENTRESS: Thank you, Chair Mitchell, and good afternoon again. The issue before this Commission today is whether its Regulatory Conditions and General Statute § 62-153 require this Commission to approve the Agreement prior to DEC and DEP filing it at the FERC. The Commission has set forth a procedure that clearly lays out the steps whenever the Companies have to make a filing at FERC, and General Statute § 62-153 sets out the procedure whenever the Companies are involved in an affiliate contract. Whether you agree with the Companies or not that this is an affiliate contract, the Companies have followed the Commission's own procedure under the Regulatory Conditions and have followed the General Assembly's own procedure under General Statute § 62-153, neither of which require or provide this Commission -- I'm sorry -- require this Commission to preapprove the Agreement prior to filing it at the FERC. Because the Protestants have made -- have argued that this is a pooling agreement, I'm going to ask Ms. Suda to address that fundamental error in

their argument. This is not a pooling agreement.

MS. SUDA: Thank you, Kendrick. And good afternoon, Commissioners. I'm Molly Suda, Associate General Counsel, on behalf of Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress. As Kendrick mentioned there is a fundamental error that the Protestants have made an argument that this is not a power pool arrangement. There is a broad definition that FERC has for a power pool arrangement. The key to that is some sort of joint operation, joint dispatch, joint planning; none of which is happening under the SEEM arrangement.

Ms. Hutt mentioned a SEEM entity. There is no SEEM entity. There is no separate legal SEEM entity. This is a multilateral arrangement or multilateral -- multi-party agreement setting up how this group of companies will build, develop and operate a platform that they can trade over. It does not allow for joint dispatch, joint planning, a joint commitment; there is no pooling of any type of generation resources, no pooling of transmission resources. And I believe there was an indication that there is some kind of directive given by SEEM to the transmission providers, that is also incorrect. So I think I would just like to take a step back and give you a more high level overview of how SEEM will

operate.

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So, first of all, the Platform Agreement that is before you, it is a framework document that is addressing how again these parties will build, develop and operate the system. It dictates their roles and responsibilities in how they will make decisions about this platform. It does not -- and in doing so it outlines the platform that they intend to build in the market rules.

Those market rules do explain how the matching process will occur, how the platform will connect buyers and sellers in a more efficient way than happens today in the traditional market, and it also explains how transmission providers, of which Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress are one, will communicate said software platform their available transmission capacity. Upon the software making matches based on available transmission capacity, E-Tags will be generated and those E-Tags are ultimately what transmission providers will use to approve transactions. So no control is transferred in this. No other roles or responsibilities related to Duke Energy Carolinas or Duke Energy Progress' operations are transferred. That is actually a

fundamental component of what the Southeast EEM Market design is based on. The entities in the southeast came together around a principle that they would not be transferring any control of their generation or transmission resources. So this fundamentally undermines the Protestants argument that this is a power pool.

And -- so, with that, I would just like to turn it back with -- to Kendrick for addressing some of the Regulatory Conditions.

MS. FENTRESS: Thank you, Molly. I would like to address a couple of points right off the bat that the Protestants made that are also incorrect.

Orangeburg case and have indicated that the Orangeburg case does not stand for the proposition that the Commission does not have authority to approve this agreement. And I'd like to talk a little bit about Orangeburg. But first I would like to say that it is not the Companies' argument that Orangeburg controls the procedure that the Companies followed, it is the Companies argument that the Commission's own Order, the Order Amending the Regulatory Conditions controls the procedure that the Companies followed.

The Orangeburg decision was a decision that was -- the procedural history is rather complicated but I'll just give a brief summary. Orangeburg was a South Carolina municipality. They wanted to enter into an agreement, a wholesale sales agreement with DEC was required because of advanced notice provisions. And they also came in under a petition for declaratory judgment to give notice to the Commission that DEC did not intend to treat Orangeburg -- or did intend to treat Orangeburg as a native load customer. The North Carolina Commission took that advance notice provision to come to the decision that it disagreed with the treatment that DEC and DEP wanted to give this -- I'm sorry, that DEC wanted to give this wholesale customer, and it did not recognize that native load status. Instead, it indicated to the Company that it would set DEC's rates as if DEC was receiving the higher of incremental cost instead of system average and, therefore, because this was disadvantageous to DEC and to Orangeburg, the agreement did not go forward. To move forward to the merger between Duke

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and Progress, Orangeburg intervened and had objections about the JDA. The objections included the regulatory

regime that is set out in Section 3 of the North
Carolina Regulatory Requirements. And if the
Commission -- I would direct the Commission's
attention to Appendix A which has the redline -compare the old Regulatory Conditions with the new
Regulatory Conditions. We are talking about the old
Regulatory Conditions. Orangeburg had objections
about those Regulatory Conditions and they ultimately
appealed it to the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit,
among other things, indicated that it was troubled by
the FERC's decision to acquiesce to suggest that the
North Carolina Commission had the authority to
regulate in any way interstate wholesale sales which
plainly intrudes upon FERC's authority. The D.C.
Circuit remanded the case back to the FERC.

The FERC then opened up briefing on whether the North Carolina Commission's Regulatory Conditions impermissibly interfered with the Commission's jurisdiction over wholesale ratemaking. The FERC did not enumerate certain conditions or pick and choose which conditions it was going to look at, it just said the Regulatory Conditions. Admittedly, it did look at the Regulatory Conditions specifically dealing with wholesale customers but it appeared to be concerned

with the gatekeeping Regulatory Conditions, and primary among the gatekeeping Regulatory Conditions was this advance notice procedure.

I would also note that unnoted by the Protestants that the FERC at this time also rejected another in this case an affiliate agreement that involved sales between DEC and DEP filed at the FERC, the As-Available Capacity Sales Agreement. In that affiliate agreement DEC and DEP were selling short-term capacity to each other potentially, if the circumstances arose where they could do that, in a way that would benefit ratepayers. The Companies submitted the Agreement. The FERC acknowledged the benefits of the Agreement but then rejected it, because of concerns that the North Carolina Regulatory Conditions, some of which had been included in the body of the agreement impermissibly impinged on their authority.

At that point the Companies and the Public Staff, concerned that the FERC may order a complete preemption of Section 3 of the Regulatory Conditions, came together and worked together to revise the existing Regulatory Conditions to avoid that more pervasive preemption of Commission authority.

And the Commission ultimately approved these Regulatory Conditions in its Order Granting the Motion to Amend Regulatory Conditions. And in that Order it stated unequivocally that the existing Regulatory Conditions as they are now are unlikely to survive continued FERC review and the gatekeeping provisions that require advanced Commission proceedings to approve, reject, modify the Commission's proceedings -- the Commission's filing at the FERC should be eliminated.

The Commission struck a balance between preserving its ability to exercise its authority under General Statute § 62 and avoiding violating federal law. That balance was accepted by the FERC itself. In Paragraph 15 of its Order on Remand, found at 166 FERC 61, 112, the FERC indicated that the Commission's revision of its Regulatory Conditions mooted the concerns of Orangeburg and the FERC, and they dismissed the appeal.

Therefore, I would like to move on to specifically looking at Regulatory Condition 3.1(b).

3.1(b) will show that the Companies completely complied with it. Again, the Companies are not -it's the Companies' position that these Regulatory

Conditions and the affiliate agreement statute don't apply but, in an abundance of transparency and openness, the Companies filed the Platform Agreement under 3.1(b) and filed it under General Statute § 62-153; a point completely ignored in the Protestants' protest.

If you compare the old 3.1(b) and the new 3.1(b), it indicates that the Commission did away with the advance notice procedure that required a lengthy filing of numerous documents; it did away with the ability to intervene; it did away with the Public Staff's requirement to file comments; and it furthermore did away with the filing requirement that this be filed in a new docket. Instead, the Informational Filing gives the Commission the ability to have advance notice of a document that may be filed at FERC to allow them to file or protest or file comments at the FERC when the Agreement is filed at the FERC.

I'd also like to discuss the fact that the Protestants indicated that the Companies had somehow been unclear or less than transparent with respect to when we will sign the Agreement. Nothing is further from the truth. Regulatory Condition 3.1(b) requires

us to file proposed affiliate agreements that we intend to file at FERC 15 days before we file them. The term "proposed" means we file them unsigned at the Commission. Again, I do not necessarily concede that this Regulatory Condition applies, but the practice has been before this Commission that after that time has passed we file the -- the Companies would sign the Agreement and file it at the FERC.

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I'd also like to address the RTO assertion with respect to Regulatory Conditions 4.10 and 3.9(d). As Ms. Suda explained, this is not an RTO. not a pooling agreement. This is not a sales agreement. The Commission has had concerns in the past about the Companies entering into or I suppose withdrawing membership from RTOs. But a review of the Commission's Regulatory Conditions and prior decisions on this point reveals that the salient point that the Commission has been concerned with, with respect to an RTO, is this transfer of ownership or operation or transfer somehow of the Commission's jurisdiction over ownership and operation of generation and transmission. This is not occurring under this agreement.

I would also say that if -- you can look no

further than the Commission's decision in Docket

Number E-7, Sub 795, when it first came up with the

Regulatory Conditions that had to do with joining an

RTO and that was what it indicated its concern was and
that RTO membership concern can be found on Page 23 of
the Commission's Order Approving Merger Subject to

Merger Conditions and Code of Conduct. There the

Commission said it was concerned with RTO membership
and any proposed transfer of control, operational
responsibility or ownership. None of that is
occurring here and, therefore, Regulatory Conditions
3.9(c) and (d), and Regulatory Condition 4.10 do not
apply.

I'd also like to address the Protestants' assertions about this agreement and add to what Ms. Suda had to say. First of all, this is not a wholesale sales agreement. This isn't a sales agreement at all. DEC and DEP do not, contrary to Mr. Ledford's assertion, have an enabling agreement between them. There is no enabling agreement between them to file at the Commission. They cannot transact under this wholesale platform agreement. Instead, this Platform Agreement will allow for the more rapid matching of buyers and sellers under the Agreement and

that will allow them to, pursuant to pre-existing bilateral agreements which are subject to the jurisdiction of FERC, buy and sell unused capacity. Also unmentioned by the Protestants is the fact that this more rapid matching of buyers and sellers of this unused transmission capacity will result in cost savings for North Carolina, for DEC's ratepayers, for DEP's ratepayers, for the ratepayers of NCEMC, for the ratepayers of the munis and for ratepayers across the southeast affecting this more efficient transfer of pre-existing bilateral agreements which allow for the sale of unused transmission capacity. I'm sorry. The button popped up.

Because this is not the pooling agreement that the Protestants claim that it is and because the Companies have followed, as the Public Staff has stated, the process put out by the Commission, the procedure established by the Commission in its Order on amending the Regulatory Conditions in 2018, the Companies believe that this Commission does not — those following those procedures do not provide for the Commission to have to preapprove this agreement prior to filing it at the FERC.

With that, the Companies would respectfully

request that, because they have followed these procedures, again in an effort to be transparent and an effort to be open, that in following these procedures that the Commission recognize that it does not need to approve this agreement before it files at FERC.

There was one more Regulatory Condition that I believe that the Protestants asserted and that is this joint planning, joint coordination and dispatch. Again, that is not occurring here. DEC and DEP with respect to joint planning, coordination and dispatch will be in no different position than they are today with respect to SEEM.

With that, unless Ms. Suda or Ms. Bennett have anything to add, I will conclude my argument.

MS. SUDA: Nothing to add.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Ms. Fentress and Ms. Suda.

Ms. Culpepper, we will hear from you.

MS. CULPEPPER: Yes, ma'am. The Regulatory
Conditions set forth commitments made by Duke Energy
Corporation and its public utility subsidiaries - Duke
Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Progress and Piedmont
Natural Gas - as a precondition of approval of the

Merger Application of Duke Energy and Piedmont.

Section 3 of the Regulatory Conditions is intended to protect the jurisdiction of the Commission as a result of the merger including risks related to agreement and transactions among the Companies and any of their affiliates.

The Public Staff stands on the Response we filed but we are willing to answer any questions.

Thank you.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Ms. Culpepper.

Ms. Hutt, you may proceed with your
response.

MS. HUTT: Thank you. Mr. Ledford and I will split our five minutes. I'd like to start by responding to Ms. Suda's statements about the SEEM not being a power pool. I'd like to point out that

Ms. Suda did not address the fact that FERC Order

888-A very clearly defines what a loose power pool is.

And a loose power pool is an explicit -- well, it's a multilateral arrangement that explicitly or implicitly contains discounted and/or special transmission arrangements. It doesn't matter what the SEEM looks like from far away, because when you get into this on a technical level it does exactly that. And I would

refer the Commission to Appendix B of the Southeast Energy Exchange Market rules, and there it lies out very clearly that this is about the pooling of transmission. And I'm happy to walk through any of that if that would be helpful. But another clarification I would like to make is that we are asserting that this -- that the SEEM would be pooling generation; it's pooling transmission and that's what makes it a power pool.

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Then the second point I'd like to make is that regarding Orangeburg, looking just at the remand back to FERC of the Orangeburg case, it shows that the real concern that the D.C. Circuit had was about what they found to be the Commission's usurping of exclusive FERC jurisdiction over setting wholesale rates, not participation in a transmission pooling arrangement. Nothing of that nature. I'm happy to walk through that. But at Page 3 it makes very clear that this is about FERC's exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale rates. At Page 9 of that same decision, footnote 27, it says this is an issue about disparities in retail not wholesale rates. Again at Page 6, Paragraph 11 of that decision, this is about the Commission's jurisdiction over wholesale

ratemaking. And so the gatekeeping issue that the D.C. Circuit was concerned about in that instance was when state commissions get involved in wholesale ratemaking. And this is -- that couldn't be further from what we're dealing with here. I'll let Mr. Ledford add what he has to say.

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Thank you, Ms. Hutt. MR. LEDFORD: want to point out that we're not arguing about advance notice of the filing but whether the Commission has jurisdiction over the execution of the SEEM. amendments to Regulatory Conditions 3.9(b) and (c) that Ms. Fentress discussed changed the prefiling requirements, period. They did. But they did not change the Commission's jurisdiction over the execution of this type of agreement. So Ms. Fentress is completely correct that there's not clear procedure for how something like this should come before the Commission. But there is clear jurisdiction. Commission has jurisdiction over the issue. FERC has decided over and over again that there is concurrent jurisdiction with State PUCs.

And I'd also point out that on remand the FERC just plain did not address the issues related to the Regulatory Conditions. As Ms. Fentress noted, it

decided that those issues were moot because the Commission had already amended the Regulatory Conditions. So we're not making our argument based on the Regulatory Conditions that existed pre-Orangeburg.

And, finally, with Ms. Suda's assertion that

because there is no SEEM entity the Commission cannot have any sort of jurisdiction, that's entirely incorrect. If you look to Automated Power Exchange, Inc., v FERC, and in the D.C. Circuit, 204 F.3d 1144, the Commission found that an algorithm was sufficient to be an operator in that case of a power exchange, and so that same precedent would apply here.

Thank you, Chair Mitchell and Members of the Commission.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Ledford and Ms. Hutt.

We will now take questions from

Commissioners. I will check in with each of you to

see if you have questions, beginning with Commissioner

Brown-Bland.

COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: (Inaudible).

CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Brown-Bland, we are -- I'm having -- we didn't hear you. You have no questions?

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COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: (Inaudible).
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              CHAIR MITCHELL: We lost audio with
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    Commissioner Brown-Bland.
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              COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: (Indicating).
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              CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Commissioner
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    Brown-Bland has no questions. All right.
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    Commissioner Gray.
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              COMMISSIONER GRAY: No questions.
              CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, sir.
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    Commissioner Clodfelter.
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              COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Yes.
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              Ms. Fentress, I cannot see you on my screen.
13
    Are you there?
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              MS. FENTRESS: I am. I'm sorry. I'm not as
    quick with my fingers as I need to be.
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              COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: You're fine.
                                                       I've
17
    found you now. I wasn't sure exactly what I was
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    hearing from the Protestors on one point so I'll ask
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    you a fairly straight-forward question and then we'll
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    see if we have anything else to explore.
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              Will the SEEM Platform Agreements require
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    any amendments to or modification of procedures under
23
    the Joint Dispatch Agreement between Duke Carolinas
24
    and Duke Progress?
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MS. FENTRESS: Commissioner Clodfelter, I am
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    going to allow or I'm going to ask if Ms. Suda may be
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    allowed to respond to that question.
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               COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: That's fine.
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    Thank you.
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               MS. FENTRESS:
                             Thank you.
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                                 Thanks, Commissioner.
               MS. SUDA:
                          Sure.
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    there are no changes that are required to the JDA in
 9
    order for Duke Energy Carolinas or Duke Energy
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    Progress to participate. But the JDA and the
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    As-Available Capacity Sales Agreement, which this
12
    Commission has previously reviewed and approved, those
13
    will remain in place as is. The SEEM is merely an
    extension of the bilateral market that DEC and DEP
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    participate in today, and the JDA and As-Available
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    Capacity Agreement are components of that SEE Market
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    as well.
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               COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: No amendments to
    the Agreement and no changes in operating protocols
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    under the Agreement, correct?
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               MS. SUDA: Not that we're aware of.
                                                    Right.
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               COMMISSIONER CLODFELTER: Thank you.
                                                     That's
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    all I have.
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               Thank you, Madam Chair.
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CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Duffley. 1 2 COMMISSIONER DUFFLEY: No questions. 3 CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner McKissick. 4 I'm sorry. Commissioner Hughes. Forgive me. 5 COMMISSIONER HUGHES: No questions. CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. And Commissioner 6 7 McKissick. 8 COMMISSIONER McKISSICK: No questions, Madam 9 Chair. 10 CHAIR MITCHELL: All right. I have a few 11 questions for the parties. Bear with me one minute 12 here while I get organized. I am going to -- I will 13 direct these to particular parties. I'm going to 14 start with you, Ms. Culpepper. One question for you. 15 Focusing in here for a minute on this 16 question of whether a contract is an affiliate 17 contract as contemplated by 62-153 and the Regulatory 18 Conditions. Does the Public Staff apply a different 19 standard when it's dealing -- when it's adjudging 20 whether a contract is an affiliate agreement or an 21 affiliate contract when it's looking at 153 or the 22 Regulatory Conditions? 23 MS. CULPEPPER: I'm not sure what you mean 24 by "a different standard".

CHAIR MITCHELL: I mean, is an affiliate agreement or affiliate contract the same whether you're considering the Regulatory Conditions or the Statute? Is there -- go ahead.

MS. CULPEPPER: It would be the same. And there's a definition of affiliate contract in the Regulatory Conditions, but I would say we'd apply it uniformly.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. That's my question.

You apply that -- you apply the definition that's set

forth in the Regulatory Conditions uniformly when

you're dealing with the Statute or the Conditions?

MS. CULPEPPER: Yes.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you. You answered my question more artfully than I asked it, so thank you.

Ms. Fentress, just as sort of a quick clarification for you, will the Companies be treated as a single member under the Platform Agreement or will they be treated as separate members?

MS. FENTRESS: Absolutely not a single member. The operating companies remain two individual members of the SEEM Platform Agreement. It is as if they are -- they are not transacting with each other. There are not enabling agreements between them. They

cannot transact with each other. They each bear their own separate pieces of the operating cost as required, but they are in no way integrated or one single participant.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Thank you,

Ms. Fentress. Another question for you following up
on the comments that you made during the argument. I
just want to make sure I heard you correctly, I
believe I heard you to say that the planning - that
there will be no joint planning and coordination
pursuant to the Companies' entry into this agreement
or participation in this agreement - the planning and
the coordination that goes on subsequent to entry into
the Agreement will be the same as it is now. Did I
hear you correctly?

MS. FENTRESS: That is correct, that nothing is going to change with respect to how we -- how the Companies plan or coordinate or dispatch generation or transmission as to what exists now. And as Ms. Suda indicated, there are no changes to the JDA, no changes to the As-Available Capacity Agreement; no changes.

And I might ask Ms. Bennett, I believe that there was some question about a transmission, about this being a pooling of transmission services. If

relevant to your question, I would ask Ms. Bennett to address that as well.

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CHAIR MITCHELL: Ms. Bennett, I see you now. You have appeared on my screen. Do you have anything further to add or elucidate based on the conversation that Ms. Fentress and I have been having?

MS. BENNETT: Yes Commissioner. There was a comment made that we were pooling transmission and I think that's just a misunderstanding of how service is provided currently, transmission service, under the Open Access Transmission Tariff. Today and in the future, when someone wants to purchase transmission service in order to transfer energy that they are purchasing, they have a service agreement under the OATT, the FERC jurisdictional OATT for DEC and DEP, that's the -- for the Companies that's the Joint OATT. And when you go to purchase you have a service agreement and then you put in reservations when you want to reserve transmission service, and that is reserved using E-Tags. You heard Ms. Suda reference those earlier, that we use E-Tags. That process is all very public. We have our own OASIS page where your available transmission capacity is posted. when someone wants to reserve transmission, if they

have a service agreement in place, if there is available transmission capacity, then a tag is created and the transmission provider can approve that.

That's how it works today and that's the same way that it will work with SEEM.

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So there seems to be this misunderstanding that we are somehow pooling our transmission. Companies, both Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress, are still separate transmission providers. They have separate available transmission capacity available under their OATT. If someone wishes to utilize that transmission they still have to have a service agreement, they still have -- there still has to be available transmission capacity available, and then those tags are approved, if there is available transmission capacity. So that's not changing with SEEM. We are not pooling our transmission for use by others. We will continue to offer FERC jurisdictional transmission service. part of the reason that the Platform Agreement is even being filed with FERC is because this new transmission service is being created that has no cost. And because of that new transmission service there will now be a new service offered under the OATT that

people can apply for. But we're not pooling our transmission service. Everyone remains kind of separate providers and operators.

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I think Mr. Ledford referred to we would pick up the phone and call the other company if we wanted to wheel transmission across the system. That's not the way transmission service works. You have a service agreement for service and you put in a request through OASIS for that service. And that's how it works for affiliates and non-affiliates. doesn't change. There is no pick -- and we're not handing that over to the SEEM Platform so that the Platform can now determine whether you can purchase service. What the Platform will do to expedite matters, the Platform will actually issue the E-Tag. If it goes out to the OASIS of the different transmission providers and checks to make sure there is available transmission capacity available then a tag is issued. So we're not pooling transmission at all.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Ms. Bennett.

MS. FENTRESS: Commissioner Mitchell, may I just follow up very briefly on a question?

CHAIR MITCHELL: Yes.

MS. FENTRESS: You had asked if we were entering -- if we were -- I'm sorry, if we were becoming members of this regional collective as one entity. I would note that our Code of Conduct prohibits us from acting -- our Code of Conduct requires us rather to act independently of each other. And if we were to try to join up as one entity I would be back in front of this Commission with a request to waive the Code of Conduct with respect to that. That's all. Thank you. CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Ms. Fentress and Ms. Bennett. Let's see, I'm looking through my questions for the Protestants. You all have answered some of

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them.

Mr. Ledford, Ms. Hutt, with respect to your reading of one -- 62-153, so North Carolina General Statute § 62-153, in your -- in the Joint Protest that was filed on the 17th, I'm looking at Paragraph 7, you all state that 62-153 requires utilities to obtain the Commission approval of contracts with their affiliates. What is the -- help me understand the basis for that position? And just to expound on our question here, doesn't the fact that 62-153(b)

provides a subset or a category of affiliate contracts for which Commission approval must be obtained necessarily imply that there are other affiliate contracts for which notice must be given but for which Commission approval isn't required? Either one of you all or both of you all can answer that one.

MR. LEDFORD: Chair Mitchell, I'll attempt to address that.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay.

MR. LEDFORD: In our view 62-153, similar to the Public Staff, is essentially implemented in the Regulatory Conditions, almost like a rule-making proceeding. Those are the rules to implement 62-153. So we see some greater detail in the Regulatory Conditions about how to implement 62-153. In particular, when it comes to affiliate contracts it may be in this case that DEC and DEP will never sell anything between each other; however, the fact that there's a third party to a contract that involves DEC and DEP does not render it to no longer be an affiliate contract. They are still signatories to the same document. In terms of whether the Subsection B changes anything, I don't believe that it does.

clear that there's not any payment of fees or anything like that, so I think that it's still appropriate for the Commission to issue -- for the Commission to exercise its general jurisdiction that it has under the Regulatory Conditions regarding these other aspects. Even if it's outside the issue of an affiliate contract, there are still aspects of the Regulatory Conditions involving transmission pooling and the like.

CHAIR MITCHELL: I understand those points that you all have made today and I've heard those. But my question really is, pertains to 153 and specifically -- I mean, I read your protest to say 153 requires Commission approval of affiliate agreements, affiliate contracts, and I just want to make sure I understand your interpretation, your reading of that correctly as 153(b) seems to require approval for only a certain subset of or of the category of affiliate agreements. And so I'm just hoping you could expound on, confirm my reading, or my understanding of your position or your client's position and then expound on that. And if you've already done so just -- you can say that.

MR. LEDFORD: No. I would also just --

CHAIR MITCHELL: And also I directed my follow up to you, Mr. Ledford; Ms. Hutt can also jump in, too, if she would like. I didn't mean to leave her out.

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MR. LEDFORD: I will just make one point and then if Ms. Hutt has anything to add. In 53 -- 153(a) it distinctly says that the Commission may disapprove, after a hearing, any such contract if it's found to be unjust and unreasonable. I think we would welcome the opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing about whether the SEEM contract is just and reasonable but, in light of these current circumstances, we're here for oral arguments. I do think that that would be an appropriate step. And in the event that the Commission disagrees with our interpretation of 62-153, there's a number of other Regulatory Conditions related to pooling of transmission resources and entering into wholesale markets that we believe are also appropriate.

CHAIR MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Ledford.

Just one more follow up for you. So if no party

challenges a contract under (a), 153(a), is it you

all's position that it's incumbent on the Commission

to take the issue up sua sponte?

1	MR. LEDFORD: I think it depends on how
2	these contracts they've presented to the Commission.
3	So the Commission cannot address anything that they
4	don't have notice of. And as was made clear in the
5	cover letter, Duke did not believe that this was an
6	affiliate contract under 62-153. Whether that
7	represents an administrative burden on the Commission
8	I think is for the Commission to decide and recognize.
9	CHAIR MITCHELL: Well, I'm less concerned
10	about administrative burden here and just more
11	concerned about what the Statute says, doesn't say or
12	requires of us.
13	Ms. Hutt, anything to add to Mr. Ledford's
14	response?
15	MS. HUTT: I don't have anything to add.
16	CHAIR MITCHELL: Okay. Any additional
17	questions from Commissioners? Giving y'all one last
18	chance.
19	COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Can you hear me?
20	CHAIR MITCHELL: I can hear you.
21	COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: All right.
22	CHAIR MITCHELL: Commissioner Brown-Bland,
23	you may proceed.
24	COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: Ms. Fentress, I

did have one question. Is it, in fact, the Companies' current position that the fact that the Companies aren't the only parties to the Platform Agreement means that there's not a transaction between or among affiliates?

MS. FENTRESS: That is not at all our position, Commissioner Brown-Bland. Our position is that it is not an affiliate agreement because the two affiliates are each individual members of a regional collective. They are not exchanging goods, services, employees, data, assets or liabilities. We have -- the Companies have had agreements numerous times with other parties to them and have filed them as affiliate agreements. I will note one. The process I would say for filing affiliate agreements under General Statute \$ 62-153 is long established. The Commission is very familiar with it.

I noted some affiliate agreements that the Companies have filed in the past two years under 62-153(a) that the Commission did not approve. That process goes all the way back a decade or so. And I will highlight an affiliate agreement that the Companies filed in 2009, it was a sales agreement by DEC. It was filing -- selling materials to its

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midwest affiliates, a number of them, to aid with
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    storm restoration. That was filed in Docket Number
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    E-7, Sub 913. Because the Agreement was not for the
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    provision of services, the Agreement was for the
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    exchange of assets, it was filed under 62-153(a) and
    the Commission was not required to take any action.
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    And we have also filed in the past two years -- one
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    moment, please. I apologize. I have the Agreements.
 9
    We have filed Dynamic Power Exchange Agreements that
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    had -- sorry. Right here. Sorry about that. We have
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    filed -- I'm sorry. We have filed Dynamic Power
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    Exchange Agreements where DEC, DEP and another party
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    were on it, but the other party was not an affiliate.
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    It was -- I believe it was a city. And I apologize, I
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    can get that site for you after the argument.
16
    just not where I thought it was going to be.
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    have done that. We have filed agreements that had
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    affiliates and other parties on it.
19
              COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND:
                                          Okay.
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              MS. FENTRESS: In 62-153 (a).
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              COMMISSIONER BROWN-BLAND: So I thank you
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    for that, because I wanted to be sure that I had your
23
    position correct. I appreciate that.
24
              No further questions.
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CHAIR MITCHELL: I'll give Commissioners one last opportunity and if I hear nothing then we have come to the conclusion of the proceeding. I appreciate everyone's time and preparation for today and responsiveness to the question posed in the Order. With that, we are adjourned. Let's go off the record, please. (The proceedings were adjourned)

CERTIFICATE I, KIM T. MITCHELL, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the Proceedings in the above-captioned matter were taken before me, that I did report in stenographic shorthand the Proceedings set forth herein, and the foregoing pages are a true and correct transcription to the best of my ability. Kim T. Mitchell Kim T. Mitchell Court Reporter